Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Rajendra Singh Sharma S/O Late Shri … vs Ganesh Kumar S/O Shri Baldev Singh B/C … on 16 January, 2025
Author: Anoop Kumar Dhand
Bench: Anoop Kumar Dhand
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 1623/2019
Rashmi Khandelwal W/o Shri Rajendra Singh Sharma, D/o Shri
Pramod Khandelwal, R/o Sahyog Nagar, Presently R/o C/o
Khandelwal Gheeya Mali Ki Haveli, Near Paththar Ki Tall, Anah
Gate, Bajariya, Police Station Atalbandh, District Bharatpur, Raj.
----Petitioner
Versus
Kanhiyalal S/o Shri Ramesh Chand, Aged About 38 Years, R/o
Kherapati Mohalla, Police Station Atalbandh, District Bharatpur,
Raj.
----Respondent
Connected With
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 1672/2019
Rajendra Singh Sharma S/o Late Shri Shobharam Sharma, R/o
Sahyog Nagar, Bharatpur, Police Station Mathura Gate,
Bharatpur, Raj.
—-Petitioner
Versus
Ganesh Kumar S/o Shri Baldev Singh, R/o Outside Surajpole
Gate, Bharatpur, Police Station Mathura Gate, Bharatpur, Raj.
—-Respondent
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 1674/2019
Rashmi Khandelwal D/o Shri Pramod Khandelwal, W/o Shri
Rajendra Singh Sharma, Aged About 38 Years, R/o Behind
Paththar Ki Tall, Gheeya Maliyon Ki Haveli, Police Station
Atalbandh, Bharatpur, Raj.
—-Petitioner
Versus
Ganesh Kumar S/o Shri Baldev Singh, Aged About 32 Years, R/o
Outside Surajpole Gate, Bharatpur, Police Station Mathura Gate,
Bharatpur, Raj.
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Yogesh Singhal
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Jitendra Singh
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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND
Order
Reserved on : 10/01/2025.
Pronounced on : 16/01/2025.
Reportable
1. The issue involved in this petition is “whether the amended
provision contained under Section 143A of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 would apply on the complaint filed prior to
enactment and enforcement of this provision?”
2. Since, common question of law and facts are involved in
these petitions. Hence, with the consent of the counsel for the
parties, all these matters have been taken for final disposal and
the same are decided by this common order.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
respondent-complainant (hereinafter referred to as the
complainant) has submitted three different complaints against the
accused-petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) for
the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of
1881’) on three different occasions i.e. on 28.08.2017,
01.04.2017 and 11.08.2017. Counsel submits that at the time of
filing of the complaints under Section 138, there was no provision
for the payment of interim compensation of 20% of the cheque
amount to the complainant under the Act of 1881.
4. Counsel further submits that the amended provision
contained under Section 143A came into force with effect from
01.09.2018, introducing a provision for issuing directions for the
payment of interim compensation to the complainant.
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5. Counsel submits that the amended provision contained under
Section 143A of the Act of 1881, cannot be applied with its
retrospective effects on the complaints filed before this
amendment. Counsel also submits that the amended provision
contained under Section 143A of the Act of 1881 would be
applicable upon those complaints filed on or after 01.09.2018.
6. Counsel submits that overlooking the material aspect in the
matter, the learned Court below has gravely erred in passing the
order impugned directing the petitioner to pay interim
compensation that is 20% of the cheque amount to the
complainant. Counsel submits that such direction cannot be issued
by the Trial Court. In support of his contentions, and he has placed
reliance upon the Judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in the case of Sidharth Jain Vs. Nidhi Financial
Services reported in 2023 (4) WLC 719 (Rajasthan). Counsel
submits that under these circumstances, the order impugned
passed by the Court below is not sustainable in the eyes of law
and is liable to be quashed and set aside.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for complainant opposed the
arguments raised by counsel for the petitioner and submitted that
in order to avoid the delay tactics adopted by the accused persons
in payment of the due amount to the aggrieved party, the
legislature has brought the said amendment. He submits that
Section 143A of the Act of 1881 was brought in picture for issuing
directions to the accused to pay interim compensation to the
complainant during pendency of the complaint. Counsel submits
that similarly, the same provision was kept under Section 148 of
the Act of 1881 at the stage of appeal, wherein the same direction
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of payment of 20% amount of arrears can be issued. Counsel
submits that giving interpretation to Section 148 of the Act of
1881, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Surinder Singh
Deswal & Ors. Vs. Virender Gandhi reported in 2019(8) Scale
445 has held that the amended provision of the Section 148 Act
of 1881 can be given retrospective effect even upon the
complaints filed prior to the amendment. Counsel submits in these
circumstances, the Trial Court has not committed an error in
passing the order impugned which warrants any interference of
this Court.
8. Heard. Considered the submissions made at Bar and perused
the material available on the record.
9. This fact is not in dispute that the complainant submitted
three different complaints under Section 138 of the Act of 1881
against the petitioner before the Trial Court on 28.08.2017,
01.04.2017 & 11.08.2017 respectively with the allegations that
the cheques issued by the petitioner were dishonoured. This fact is
also not in dispute that at the time of commission of the alleged
offence and filing of complaints, there was no provision of
payment of any interim compensation to the complainant under
the Act of 1881 by the accused during the pendency of trial.
10. The Legislature brought and introduced a new provision for
payment of interim compensation by the accused to the
complainant by incorporating a new provision in the form of
Section 143A of the Act of 1881 and the new amended provision
came into force with effect from 01.09.2018. The new Section
143A of the Act of 1881 reads as under:-
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“Section 143A: Power to direct interim compensation
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court trying an offence
under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque
to pay interim compensation to the complainant–
(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he
pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the
complaint; and
(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge.
(2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1)
shall not exceed twenty per cent. of the amount of the
cheque.
(3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty
days from the date of the order under sub-section (1),
or within such further period not exceeding thirty days
as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause
being shown by the drawer of the cheque.
(4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court
shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the
amount of interim compensation, with interest at the
bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India,
prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial
year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or
within such further period not exceeding thirty days as
may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being
shown by the complainant.
(5) The interim compensation payable under this
section may be recovered as if it were a fine under
section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2
of 1974).
(6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or
the amount of compensation awarded under section
357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974), shall be reduced by the amount paid or
recovered as interim compensation under this section.”
11. On the basis of, and with the strength of the new provision
under Section 143A of the Act of 1881, the Trial Court has directed
the petitioner to pay 20% of the cheque amount to the
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complainant, as interim compensation, by way of passing the
impugned orders.
12. Aggrieved by these impugned orders, the petitioners have
approached this Court by challenging the same.
13. Bare perusal of Section 143A of the Act of 1881 indicates
that the Court trying an offence under Section 138 of the Act of
1881, may direct the drawer of the cheque to pay interim
compensation to the complainant i.e. amount not exceeding 20%
of the cheque amount. The sub-section (4) of Section 143A of the
Act of 1881 provides that in case the drawer of the cheque is
acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay the
same amount to the drawer.
14. This fact is not in dispute that all the three complaints under
Section 138 of the Act of 1881 have been submitted by the
complainant against the petitioners in the year 2017 i.e. prior to
enactment, enforcement and insertion of the amended Section
143A of the Act of 1881. The new provision of payment of interim
compensation came into picture and saw the light of day on
01.09.2018. So now, the precise issue which is required to be
decided in these petitions, is that “whether this new provision can
be applied with it retrospective effect or prospective effect?”
15. While considering the general principles concerning the
‘retrospectivity of legislation’ in the context of Section 158-BE
inserted in the Income Tax Act, 1961, it was observed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax
(Central)-I, New Delhi vs. Vatika Township Private Limited
reported in 2015(1) SCC 1 as under:-
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“28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has
to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a
contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed
not to be intended to have a retrospective operation.
The idea behind the rule is that a current law should
govern current activities. Law passed today cannot
apply to the events of the past. If we do something
today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in
force and not tomorrow’s backward adjustment of it.
Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the
bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange
his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not
find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This
principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit:
law looks forward not backward. As was observed in
Phillips v. Eyre, a retrospective legislation is contrary to
the general principle that legislation by which the
conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced
for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to
change the character of past transactions carried on
upon the faith of the then existing law.”
16. Similarly, while considering the effect of the modified
application of the provisions of the Code, as a result of Section
20(4)(bb) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1987, whereunder the period for filing challan or charge-sheet
could get extended, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the
issue about the retrospective operation of the concerned
provisions in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others vs. State of
Maharashtra and others reported in 1994(4) SCC 602 as
under:-
“26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment
would operate retrospectively and would apply to the
pending cases in which investigation was not complete on
the date on which the Amendment Act came into force
and the challan had not till then been filed in the court.
From the law settled by this Court in various cases the
illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge
with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act
and its retrospective operation may be culled out as
follows:
(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed
to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective,(Downloaded on 16/01/2025 at 10:02:05 PM)
(8 of 16) [CRLMP-1623/2019]either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a
statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a
construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be
retrospective in its application, should not be given an
extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its
clearly defined limits.
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in
nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of
appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law
but no such right exists in procedural law.
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be
applied retrospectively where the result would be to
create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new
duties in respect of transactions already accomplished.
(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but
also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed
to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided,
either expressly or by necessary implication.”
17. The principle as culled out in points No. (iv) & (v) of the
above judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Hitendra
Vishnu Thakur (supra) are apposite to the present fact situation.
18. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that, prior to insertion
of the new provision, i.e., Section 143A in the Act of 1881, there
was no provision in the Act for issuing directions to the drawer of
cheque to pay interim compensation of 20% of the cheque
amount to the complainant prior to the commission of the offence
under Section 138 of the Act of 1881.
19. At the same time a new provision was inserted in the Act of
1881 with effect from 01.09.2018 in the form of Section 148
giving power to the Appellate Court to order payment during
pendency of an appeal against conviction. For ready reference
Section 148 of the Act of 1881 is reproduced as under:-
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“Section 148: Power of Appellate Court to order
payment pending appeal against conviction.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal by
the drawer against conviction under section 138, the
Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit
such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per
cent. of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial
Court:
Provided that the amount payable under this sub-
section shall be in addition to any interim
compensation paid by the appellant under section
143A.
(2) The amount referred to in sub-section (1) shall be
deposited within sixty days from the date of the order,
or within such further period not exceeding thirty days
as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause
being shown by the appellant.
(3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the
amount deposited by the appellant to the complainant
at any time during the pendency of the appeal:
Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the Court
shall direct the complainant to repay to the appellant
the amount so released, with interest at the bank rate
as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent
at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within
sixty days from the date of the order, or within such
further period not exceeding thirty days as may be
directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown
by the complainant.”
20. It is worthy to note here that both the new provisions i.e.
Section 143A and Section 148 were inserted in the Act of 1881
with effect from 01.09.2018.
21. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal
(supra) has held that the new provisions contained under Section
148 of the Act of 1881 as amended on 01.09.2018 shall be
applicable to the appeals against the order of conviction and
sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881,
even in the cases where the criminal complaints for the offence
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under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 were filed prior to the
amending Act No. 20/2018 i.e. prior to 01.09.2018 and it has
been held in Para 8, 8.1 & 9 as under:-
“8. It is the case on behalf of the appellants that as the
criminal complaints against the appellants under
Section 138 of the N.I. Act were lodged/filed before the
amendment Act No. 20/2018 by which Section 148 of
the N.I. Act came to be amended and therefore
amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act shall not be made
applicable. However, it is required to be noted that at
the time when the appeals against the conviction of the
appellants for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.
Act were preferred, Amendment Act No. 20/2018
amending Section 148 of the N.I. Act came into force
w.e.f. 1.9.2018. Even, at the time when the appellants
submitted application/s under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C.
to suspend the sentence pending appeals challenging
the conviction and sentence, amended Section 148 of
the N.I. Act came into force and was brought on statute
w.e.f. 1.9.2018. Therefore, considering the object and
purpose of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act
and while suspending the sentence in exercise of
powers under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C., when the first
appellate court directed the appellants to deposit 25%
of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed by the
learned trial Court, the same can be said to be
absolutely in consonance with the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I.
Act.
8.1 Having observed and found that because of the
delay tactics of unscrupulous drawers of dishonoured
cheques due to easy filing of appeals and obtaining
stay on proceedings, the object and purpose of the
enactment of Section 138 of the N.I. Act was being
frustrated, the Parliament has thought it fit to amend
Section 148 of the N.I. Act, by which the first appellate
Court, in an appeal challenging the order of conviction
under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, is conferred with the
power to direct the convicted accused – appellant to
deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of
the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court. By
the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act, it cannot
be said that any vested right of appeal of the accused –
appellant has been taken away and/or affected.
Therefore, submission on behalf of the appellants that
amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act shall not be
made applicable retrospectively and more particularly
with respect to cases/complaints filed prior to 1.9.2018(Downloaded on 16/01/2025 at 10:02:05 PM)
(11 of 16) [CRLMP-1623/2019]shall not be applicable has no substance and cannot be
accepted, as by amendment in Section 148 of the N.I.
Act, no substantive right of appeal has been taken
away and/or affected. Therefore the decisions of this
Court in the cases of Garikapatti Veeraya (supra) and
Videocon International Limited (supra), relied upon by
the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellants shall not be applicable to the facts of the
case on hand. Therefore, considering the Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the amendment in Section 148
of the N.I. Act stated hereinabove, on purposive
interpretation of Section 148 of the N.I. Act as
amended, we are of the opinion that Section 148 of the
N.I. Act as amended, shall be applicable in respect of
the appeals against the order of conviction and
sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.
Act, even in a case where the criminal complaints for
the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were filed
prior to amendment Act No. 20/2018 i.e., prior to
01.09.2018. If such a purposive interpretation is not
adopted, in that case, the object and purpose of
amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act would be
frustrated. Therefore, as such, no error has been
committed by the learned first appellate court directing
the appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of
fine/compensation as imposed by the learned trial
Court considering Section 148 of the N.I. Act, as
amended.
9. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the
appellants that even considering the language used in
Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended, the appellate
Court “may” order the appellant to deposit such sum
which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or
compensation awarded by the trial Court and the word
used is not “shall” and therefore the discretion is
vested with the first appellate court to direct the
appellant – accused to deposit such sum and the
appellate court has construed it as mandatory, which
according to the learned Senior Advocate for the
appellants would be contrary to the provisions of
Section 148 of the N.I. Act as amended is concerned,
considering the amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act as
a whole to be read with the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the amending Section 148 of the N.I. Act,
though it is true that in amended Section 148 of the
N.I. Act, the word used is “may”, it is generally to be
construed as a “rule” or “shall” and not to direct to
deposit by the appellate court is an exception for which
special reasons are to be assigned. Therefore amended
Section 148 of the N.I. Act confers power upon the
Appellate Court to pass an order pending appeal to
direct the Appellant-Accused to deposit the sum which(Downloaded on 16/01/2025 at 10:02:05 PM)
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either on an application filed by the original
complainant or even on the application filed by the
Appellant-Accused under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. to
suspend the sentence. The aforesaid is required to be
construed considering the fact that as per the amended
Section 148 of the N.I. Act, a minimum of 20% of the
fine or compensation awarded by the trial court is
directed to be deposited and that such amount is to be
deposited within a period of 60 days from the date of
the order, or within such further period not exceeding
30 days as may be directed by the appellate court for
sufficient cause shown by the appellant. Therefore, if
amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act is purposively
interpreted in such a manner it would serve the Objects
and Reasons of not only amendment in Section 148 of
the N.I. Act, but also Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
Negotiable Instruments Act has been amended from
time to time so as to provide, inter alia, speedy
disposal of cases relating to the offence of the
dishonoured of cheques. So as to see that due to delay
tactics by the unscrupulous drawers of the dishonoured
cheques due to easy filing of the appeals and obtaining
stay in the proceedings, an injustice was caused to the
payee of a dishonoured cheque who has to spend
considerable time and resources in the court
proceedings to realise the value of the cheque and
having observed that such delay has compromised the
sanctity of the cheque transactions, the Parliament has
thought it fit to amend Section 148 of the N.I. Act.
Therefore, such a purposive interpretation would be in
furtherance of the Objects and Reasons of the
amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and also Sec
138 of the N.I. Act.”
22. It is not worthy to mention here that the Hon’ble Apex Court
dealt with the applicability of Section 148 of the Act of 1881, even
on the complaints filed prior to 01.09.2018 but the issue of
applicability of Section 143A of the Act of 1881 was not under
challenge in the case of Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S. Deswal
(supra) before the Hon’ble Apex Court.
23. The issue of applicability of the new provision of Section
143A of the Act of 1881 on the complaints filed prior to
01.09.2018 came up before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
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G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana reported in AIR 2019 SC 3817 and
it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that prior to insertion of
Section 143A of the Act of 1881, there was no provision under the
Act of 1881 to direct the accused to pay interim compensation to
the complainant prior to his conviction for the offence under
Section 138 of the Act of 1881. It was held that provisions of
Section 143A of the Act of 1881 would apply with its prospective
effect and the provisions of Section 148 of the Act of 1881 would
not apply with its prospective effect after conviction of the accused
for the offence under Section 138 of the Act of 1881 and it was
held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 20 to 24 of the judgment
as follows:-
“20. It must be stated that prior to the insertion of
Section 143A in the Act there was no provision on the
statute book whereunder even before the 4 (1997) 7
SCC 131 Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019 @
SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019 G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
pronouncement of the guilt of an accused, or even
before his conviction for the offence in question, he
could be made to pay or deposit interim compensation.
The imposition and consequential recovery of fine or
compensation either through the modality of Section
421 of the Code or Section 357 of the code could also
arise only after the person was found guilty of an
offence. That was the status of law which was sought to
be changed by the introduction of Section 143A in the
Act. It now imposes a liability that even before the
pronouncement of his guilt or order of conviction, the
accused may, with the aid of State machinery for
recovery of the money as arrears of land revenue, be
forced to pay interim compensation. The person would,
therefore, be subjected to a new disability or
obligation. The situation is thus completely different
from the one which arose for consideration in
Employees’ State Insurance Corporation case.
21. Though arising in somewhat different context,
proviso to Section 142(b) which was inserted in the Act
by Amendment Act 55 of 2002, under which cognizance
could now be taken even in respect of a complaint filed(Downloaded on 16/01/2025 at 10:02:05 PM)
(14 of 16) [CRLMP-1623/2019]beyond the period prescribed under Section 142(b) of
the Act, was held to Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2019
@ SLP(Crl.)No.3342 of 2019 G.J. Raja vs. Tejraj Surana
be prospective by this Court in Anil Kumar Goel v.
Kishan Chand Kaura. It was observed:-
“10. There is nothing in the amendment made to
Section 142(b) by Act 55 of 2002 that the same
was intended to operate retrospectively. In fact
that was not even the stand of the respondent.
Obviously, when the complaint was filed on 28-
11- 1998, the respondent could not have foreseen
that in future any amendment providing for
extending the period of limitation on sufficient
cause being shown would be enacted.”
22. In our view, the applicability of Section 143A of the
Act must, therefore, be held to be prospective in nature
and confined to cases where offences were committed
after the introduction of Section 143A, in order to force
an accused to pay such interim compensation.
23. We must, however, advert to a decision of this
Court in Surinder Singh Deswal and Ors. vs. Virender
Gandhi where Section 148 of the Act which was also
introduced by the same Amendment Act 20 of 2018
from 01.09.2018 was held by this Court to be
retrospective in operation. As against Section 143A of
the Act which applies at the trial stage that is even
before the pronouncement of guilt or order of
conviction, Section 148 of the Act applies at the
appellate stage where the accused is already found
guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. It
may be stated that there is no provision in Section 148
of the Act which is similar to Sub-Section (5) of Section
143A of the Act. However, as a matter of fact, no such
provision akin to sub-section (5) of Section 143A was
required as Sections 421 and 357 of the Code, which
apply post-conviction, are adequate to take care of
such requirements. In that sense said Section 148
depends upon the existing machinery and principles
already in existence and does not create any fresh
disability of the nature similar to that created by
Section 143A of the Act. Therefore, the decision of this
Court in Surinder Singh Deswal stands on a different
footing.
24. In the ultimate analysis, we hold Section 143A to
be prospective in operation and that the provisions of
said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in
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cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act
was committed after the introduction of said Section
143A in the statute book. Consequently, the orders
passed by the Trial Court as well as the High Court are
required to be set aside. The money deposited by the
Appellant, pursuant to the interim direction passed by
this Court, shall be returned to the Appellant along with
interest accrued thereon within two weeks from the
date of this order.
24. Considering the aforementioned judgment passed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of G.J. Raja (supra) it has been
held by the Co-ordinate Benches of this Court in the case of Budh
Ram Regar Vs. Sanwar Mal Mochi reported in 2019 (3) RLW
2673 (Raj.) and Sidharth Jain Vs. Nidhi Financial Services
reported in 2023 (4) WLC 719 that the provision contained
under Section 143A of the Act of 1881 has no retrospective
application.
25. In the light of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of G.J. Raja (supra) it is clear that Section 143A
of the Act of 1881 has its prospective effect and the same is
applicable upon the complaints filed under Section 138 of the Act
of 1881 after introduction/insertion of Section 143A of the Act of
1881 i.e. after 01.09.2018. This provision cannot have its
retrospective effect upon the complaints filed prior to 01.09.2018.
26. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, these petitions
deserve to be and are hereby allowed. The impugned orders
passed by the Trial Court stands quashed and are hereby set
aside. The amount (if any) deposited by the petitioners, pursuant
to any order, shall be refunded to him/her (as the case may be)
with interest within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt
of this order.
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(16 of 16) [CRLMP-1623/2019]
27. Stay applications and all application(s) (pending if any) also
stand disposed of.
28. No order as to costs.
(ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J
NEERU /21-23
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