Jharkhand High Court
Rajesh Kumar vs The State Of Jharkhand on 21 August, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:24801-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No.3651 of 2025
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Rajesh Kumar, aged about 54 years, S/o Late Lakshmeshwar
Prasad Sinha, R/o-Village-Genrara, P.O.-Udiya Chirudih, P.S.-
Kamalpru (Patamda), District-East Singhbhum, Jharkhand
.... .... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through Secretary, Department of Mines
and Geology, Govt. of Jharkhand, Nepal House, P.O. & P.S.-
Doranda, Ranchi-834002
2. The Director of Mines and Geology, Government of Jharkhand,
Nepal House, P.O. & P.S.-Doranda, Ranchi-834002.
3. District Mining Officer, East Singhbhum District, Government of
Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S.-Sonari, District-East Singhbhum-831001
.... .... Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Sankalp Goswami, Advocate
Mr. Nitesh Bhandari, Advocate (through V.C.)
Mrs. Stuti Bisht, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Shray Mishra, AC to AG
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C.A.V. on 04.08.2025 Pronounced on 21/08/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
seeking for the following reliefs: –
(a) For issuance of appropriate writ(s)/ order(s)/,
direction(s) to quash and set aside order dated
12.06.2025, bearing No. 544 (Annexure-10)
issued by the District Mining Officer, East
Singhbhum, State of Jharkhand rejecting the
application for renewal of mining lease for stone
for a further period of 10 years in favour of the
Petitioner in respect of Plot No. 01 (Part), Khata
No. 480, over an area of 12.00 acres (4.85
hectares), situated at Village- Geruara, P.S.
Kamalpur (Patamda), District- East Singhbhum,1
2025:JHHC:24801-DBJharkhand;
b. For issuance of further appropriate writ(s)/
order(s)/, direction(s) to quash and set aside
order dated 30.08.2024 bearing No. 1647
(Annexure- 11) issued by the Directorate of Mines
& Geology, Govt., of Jharkhand to the extent it
seeks to declare that a mining lease for an area
exceeding 3 Hectares for all minor minerals
(except sand) can only be granted by way of
auction in terms of the amendment in Rule
9(1)(a) of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession Rules 2004 and therefore no renewal
can be granted to the existing mineral concession
holder;
c. For issuance of further appropriate writ(s)/
order(s)/, direction(s) directing the Respondents
to forthwith grant renewal of the mining lease for
stone for a further period of 10 years in favour of
the Petitioner in respect of Plot No. 01 (Part),
Khata No. 480, over an area of 12.00 acres (4.85
hectares), situated at Village -Geruara, P.S. –
Kamalpur (Patamda), District – East Singhbhum,
Jharkhand, in a time-bound period as may be
fixed by this Hon’ble Court;
(d) In the interim direct the Respondents to not to
create any third-party rights in the mining lease
area admeasuring 12.00 acres (4.85 hectares),
situated at Plot No. 01 (Part), Khata No. 480,
Village – Geruara, P.S. – Kamalpur (Patamda),
District – East Singhbhum, Jharkhand, of the
Petitioner, till the disposal of the present Writ
Petition.
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ
petition, requires to be enumerated, which read as under: –
(i) It is the case of the writ petitioner that in the year, 2015, the
petitioner has submitted an application for grant of mining
lease for stone over an area of 12.00 acres (4.85) in plot
no.01 (part), Khata No.480, Village-Geruara, P.S.-Kamalpur
(Patamda), District-East Singhbhum, Jharkhand. The said
application for mining lease was duly acknowledged and
2
2025:JHHC:24801-DBregistered by the District Mining Officer, East Singhbhum,
Jamshedpur.
(ii) On 13.02.2015, the Gram Sabha for Village Geruara,
District East Singhbhum, State of Jharkhand issued a no-
objection certificate in favour of the Petitioner for grant of
mining lease over the applied area.
(iii) On 11.03.2015, the Circle Officer, Patmada, Jharkhand
conducted site inspection and inter-alia submitted a report
indicating that the applied area is Anabad Government
land, no public place, hospital, river, educational institution,
human habitation, national monument, forest etc., in near
vicinity of the applied area. The circle officer found the area
suitable for grant of mining lease in favour of the Petitioner.
(iv) Vide letter dated 27.04.2015, the Department of Mines and
Geology, Jamshedpur, Jharkhand approved a mining plan
in favour of the petitioner for its mining lease over an area
of 12.00 Acres / 4.85 hects.
(v) On 07.08.2015, the State Level Environment Impact
Assessment Authority (SEIAA), Jharkhand, issued
Environmental Clearance in favour of the petitioner for its
mining lease over the above area.
(vi) The Mining Lease Deed was executed on 19.09.2015 in
favour of the petitioner for a period of 10 years, i.e., valid
up to 18.09.2025. The lease was duly registered and
entered into the official records of the Department of Mines
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& Geology, Government of Jharkhand.
(vii) In furtherance of the EC, the petitioner was also granted the
Consent to Establish (CTE) by the Jharkhand State
Pollution Control Board on 10.12.2015 under Section 25/26
of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974
and Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1981.
(viii) On 29.01.2016 the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board
granted Consent to Operate (CTO) under Section 25/26 of
the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and
Section 21 of the Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act,
1981 having validity upto 31.12.2016.
(ix) On 04.01.2017, the Consent to Operate was further
extended for a period till 31.12.2017 by the Jharkhand
State Pollution Control Board.
(x) Thereafter, on 19.01.2021, the Jharkhand State Pollution
Control Board extended the Consent to Operate for a
further period upto 18.09.2025 i.e., till expiry of the mining
lease.
(xi) The possession proceedings were duly recorded and
authenticated, enabling the Petitioner to lawfully
commence mining operations. The Petitioner, thereafter
commenced and continued with the mining operations with
all the necessary statutory clearances.
(xii) The petitioner has at all times complied with every statutory
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requirement, including but not limited to environmental
clearances, pollution control norms, annual reporting
obligations, and submission of returns under the mining
and environmental statutes.
(xiii) On 15.05.2025, the petitioner made an application for grant
of renewal of mining lease for a further period of 10 years
in terms of the provisions of Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession Rules 2004 and covenant of the lease deed,
particularly clause (3) of Part VIII of the Mining lease deed.
(xiv) The District Mining Officer, East Singhbhum, vide its Order
dated 12.06.2025, rejected the application of the Petitioner
by referring to the order dated 30.08.2024 issued by the
Directorate of Mines & Geology, Govt., of Jharkhand.
(xv) The said order is under challenge in this writ petition.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner
3. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that the
District Mining Officer, East Singhbhum, State of Jharkhand while
passing the impugned order dated 12.06.2025, bearing No. 544
(Annexure-10) has not appreciated the provision
amended/incorporated in the Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession Amendment Rules, 2017 and 2019 in right
prospective.
4. It has been contended that the Coordinate Bench of this Court
has considered the similar matter in the case of Gopal Kumar
and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors., vide order
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2025:JHHC:24801-DB
dated 06.02.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024.
5. The submission, therefore, has been made that the case of the
writ petitioner is squarely covered by the order passed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 06.02.2025 passed in
W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024, wherein, the issue of applicability of
Rule 9 has also been taken into consideration but applying the
implication of Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession Rules, 2017 and 2019, the said order has been
passed and as such, herein also, in view of the applicability of
Rule 23 of JMMC Rules, 2017 and 2019, the order passed by the
authority concern is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
6. It has further been contended that the authority concerned while
dismissing the renewal application of license vide order dated
12.06.2025 has not followed the principle of natural justice, as no
show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner and on the
aforesaid ground also, the order impugned is not sustainable in
the eye of law.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent-State
7. Per Contra, Mr. Shray Mishra, learned AC to AG appearing for the
respondent-State has submitted by taking aid of the provision of
Rule 9 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017
and 2019, wherein, it has been provided that on or after
31.03.2022, there cannot be renewal of licenses rather, the
licenses are to be granted only by virtue of auction.
8. It has been contended that the quasi-judicial authority, on
6
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consideration of legal implication of the aforesaid provision, since,
has passed an order, hence, the same does not require any
interference.
9. Learned State Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by
another Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 10.09.2024 passed
in the case of Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand
and Ors. [In W.P.(C) No.4950 of 2024].
10. Further, reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed by
this Court in the case of Ghosh Stone Works represented
through its Proprietor Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors.,
reported in (2023) SCC OnLine Jhar 3182.
11. Learned State Counsel has further submitted that the order, upon
which, reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner is not
applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
since, the said order has been passed without taking into
consideration the view already taken by the Co-ordinate Benches
in the aforesaid two cases.
12. It has further been contended that the order which has been
passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court dated 06.02.2025
in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024, wherein, the consideration has been
given with respect to the issue of Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules, but
if the provision of Rule 23 will be taken into consideration, the
same will only with respect to the process of making application
for the purpose of renewal, i.e., in an occasion where the
application is to be filed within the period of 180 days for the
7
2025:JHHC:24801-DB
purpose of renewal, earlier it was 31.03.2020 and subsequently,
31.03.2022.
13. The submission has also been made that the provision of Rule 23
of the JMMC Rules, is to be taken into consideration along with
the provision of Rule 9(च).
14. On the basis of the aforesaid grounds, the learned counsel for the
respondent-State has stated that since the authority concerned
has passed the order impugned as per the mandate of the
existing Rule 2004, as such, the same requires no interference.
15. So far as the non-issuance of show cause or non-adherence of
principle of natural justice is concerned, it is the settled position of
law that that the principle of natural justice is having no straight
jacket formula and there is no requirement to follow the principle
of natural justice when the fact is not in dispute, otherwise, it will
lead to futile exercise and empty formality and herein, since the
authority concerned has passed the order impugned dated
12.06.2025 as per the mandate of the existing Rule 2004, as
such, the plea of non-observance of principle of natural justice
has no leg to stand.
Analysis
16. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the
reasons assigned by the authority concerned negating the claim
of the writ petitioner.
17. The issue which requires consideration, i.e.,
8
2025:JHHC:24801-DB
(i) Whether the lease can be renewed after 31.03.2022
without auction.
(ii) Whether the application filed after the cut-off date,
i.e,. 31.03.2022 can be fit to be entertained by the
authority for the purpose of renewal of the lease.
(iii) Whether acceding to the prayer made on behalf of
the writ petitioner, will it not amount to violation of the
provision of Rule 9(च), wherein, the embargo has
been put under the statute for renewal of the lease
license on or after 31.03.2022.
(iv) Whether the order passed by the Coordinate Bench
of this Court dated 06.02.2025 in W.P.(C) No.6812 of
2024 in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The
State of Jharkhand and Ors., is to be considered on
the principle of judicial discipline if there is no
consideration of the earlier two judgments passed by
the Coordinate Benches of this Court in the aforesaid
case.
(v) Whether the order passed by the Coordinate Bench
in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State
of Jharkhand and Ors., is held to be per incuriam.
18. Issue no.(i) to (iii) are interlinked and as such, the same are to be
taken up together. However, issue no.(iv) and (v) are being dealt
with separately.
19. This Court, before dealing with the issue no.(i) to (iii), therefore, is
9
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thought it proper to deal with the issues, i.e., issue no.(iv) and (v),
since, the learned counsel for the petitioner has given much
emphasis upon the applicability of the order dated 06.02.2025
passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.6812
of 2024 (Gopal Kumar and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand
and Ors.).
20. This Court, in order to consider the applicability of the order dated
06.02.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.6812 of 2024, needs to refer
herein the order passed by the Coordinate Bench, which is being
referred hereinbelow: –
1. In this writ petition, petitioners assail order dated
29.11.2024 passed by the District Mining Officer,
Koderma refusing to grant renewal of the mining
lease granted to the petitioners from 11.02.2015
to 10.02.2025.
2. In the impugned order, it is mentioned that
because the land is Gair Majarua land and there
is no provision for grant of renewal of mining
lease for such a land, the application for renewal
of mining lease is being rejected.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed
before us Rule 23 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession Rules, 2004 which provides for
renewal of mining lease. The said rule nowhere
prohibits grant of renewal in respect of a mining
lease of Gair Majarua land. When there is no
such prohibition for renewal of a mining lease of
such a category of land, the respondents cannot
invent such a prohibition and seek to reject the
renewal application of the petitioners.
10
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4. Reliance by the respondents on the notification
issued on 22.02.2017 and 08.03.2019 amending
the Rule 9 of the above rules is of no avail, since
the said rule only provides for grant of mining
lease for the first time through a public auction,
and there has been no amendment to Rule 23
which deals with renewal of mining leases at all.
5. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. Order
dated 29.11.2024 passed by the District Mining
Officer, Koderma is set-aside and the
respondents are directed to renew the mining
lease granted to the petitioners forthwith subject
to the petitioners complying with all other
formalities.
21. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the Coordinate
Bench has considered the applicability of Rule 23 of the
Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004.
22. The reliance which has been placed on behalf of the respondent-
State about the applicability of Rule 9 of the above Rules has
been held to be not availed.
23. This Court, therefore, deems it fit and proper to refer the provision
of Rule 9(ङ), Rule 9(च), Rule 9(छ) and Rule 9(ज) of the JMMC
Rules for the purpose of consideration of lis.
“9(ङ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर
प्राप्त वैसे आवेदन पत्र धिसमें इस अधिसूचना धनर्गत होने की धतधि से
पूवग झारखण्ड लघु खधनि समनुदान धनयमावली, 2004 के धनयम 11
अंतर्गत Letter of Intent (आशय का पत्र) धनर्गत हो चुका है, उसे
इस अधिसूचना के धनर्गत होने की धतधि से 180 धदनों के अंदर11
2025:JHHC:24801-DBपयागवरण स्वीकृधत एवं खनन योिन अधनवायग रूप से समधपगत करना
होर्ा, अन्यिा उनका आवेदन स्वतः अस्वीकृत हो िाएर्ा।
9(च) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र परप्राप्त खनन पटे को िो करकामेव व एवं पयागवरणीय स्वीकृधत खनन
योिना प्राप्त नही राहत वैसे खर कालधतरोधहत हो र्ये हो, उनके पट्टे
की अवधि पट्टा स्वीकृधत/नवीनीकरण की धतधि से 31 माचग,
2022तक के धलए अवधि धवस्ताररत मानी िाएर्ी, बशते धकअधिसूचना की धतधि के पूवग खनन पट्टा की अस्वीकृधत/रद्द/व्ययर्त
होने का आदे श, नहीं पाररत धकया र्या है, परन्तु वैसे खानन पट्टे पर
कोई खनन तब तक नहीं धकया िा सकेर्ा, िब तक खनन हेतु
आवश्यक पयागवरणीय स्वीकृधत/वन एवं पयागवरण धवभार् की
स्वीकृधत/खनन योिना स्वीकृधत प्राप्त नहीं हो िाता है। आवेदक को
सभी वांधित अनापत्ती 180 धदनों के अंदर समधपगत कना होर्ा।
9(छ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे0 क्षेत्र से अधिक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर
स्वीकृत/नवीकृत खनन पट्टे की अवधि यधद उनकी स्वीकृधत/नवीकरण
की अवधि 3[31 माचग, 2022 के बाद की धतधि हो, तो उनकी अवधि
उनकी स्वीकृधत/नवीकरण की अवधि तक धवधिमान्य रहेर्ी।
9(ज)(12) धनयम-9 (1) (घ), 9(1)(ङ), 9(1)(च), 9 (1) (ि) तिा 9
(10) पूवग से स्वीकृत/आवधदत लघु खधनि के 5.00 हे क्टेयर क्षेत्र से कम
क्षेत्र पर भी लार्ू होंर्ें।”
24. It is evident from Rule 9 particularly Rule 9 (ङ) and (च), wherein,
the issue of renewal of lease/license has been dealt with initially
for the period of 90 days thereafter, it was extended upto the
period of 180 which is to be renewed on the basis of making
proper application by the applicant. The provision of Rule 9(च)
provides that in any case, ever after renewal of the lease, initially,
the same is not to be extended beyond the period of 31.03.2020
by virtue of amendment incorporated w.e.f. 2018, the period has
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been extended upto the period of 31.03.2022.
25. The specific stipulation has been made that even if the license
has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2020, the force of
the lease will be upto 31.03.2022.
26. It is evident from the provision as contained under Rule 9 (ि) as
referred above that the license if renewed or extended the validity
of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will
remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any
extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of
Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction.
27. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9 (ज)(12) as quoted
and referred hereinabove that the mandate of Rule 9(च) will be
applicable even if the area of land is less than 5 hectares.
28. The provision of Rule 23 speaks about the procedure for filing an
application for the purpose of renewal of lease. The occasion to
insert the provision as under Rule 23 is to comply with the
procedure by the applicant, which is required at the time of filing
an application for renewal of license, if any applicant is making an
application in view of the provision of Rule 9(ङ).
29. But the specific provision has been given under Rule 9 (च) putting
complete restriction of renewal on or after 31.03.2022, rather, the
allotment is to be made only through auction.
30. The aforesaid issue has been taken into consideration in the
judgment passed by the Coordinate Benches in two cases, i.e., in
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the cases of Ghosh Stone Works represented through its
Proprietor Vrs. State of Jharkhand and Ors. and Rang Nath
Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.
31. We have considered the said judgments and found therefrom that
the consideration has been given regarding Rule 9(च) in the
situation wherein the issue of renewal of license is to be granted
beyond the period of 31.03.2022 or not.
32. The Coordinate Benches have passed order by taking the
implication of Rule 9(ङ) and Rule 9(च), which is based upon the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Goa
Foundation Vrs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2014) 6
SCC 590, holding therein that there cannot be any extension
contrary to the statutory command.
33. The issue of applicability of the judgment passed by the
Coordinate Bench in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors., is
being considered by this Court.
34. This Court, on consideration of the judgment passed in the case
of Gopal Kumar and Ors., has found that the date of judgment is
dated 06.02.2025, while, the judgment passed by the Coordinate
Bench in the case of Ghosh Stone Works and Ors. is dated
29.11.2023 and in the case of Rang Nath Singh is dated
10.09.2024, respectively.
35. These two judgments are prior to the order dated 06.02.2025
passed in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors. But there is no
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consideration of the said judgments in the case of Gopal Kumar
and Ors. Vrs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. [W.P.(C) No.6812
of 2024].
36. We are conscious that if two conflicting views are there, then, the
matter is to be referred to the larger Bench on the principle of
judicial discipline.
37. We are further conscious that the judicial discipline warrants the
order passed by the Coordinate Benches are to be given adhered
to.
38. But, we are also conscious that if the judgment passed by the
Coordinate Bench without taking into consideration of the
judgment passed by the same Corum which is earlier to the
judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench, then, the principle of
judicial discipline is not to be made applicable.
39. The principle of per incuriam has been taken into consideration
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and
Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436, for
ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment
are being referred as under: –
“Per incuriam — Doctrine
64. “Incuria” literally means “carelessness”. In practice per
incuriam is taken to mean per ignoratium. The courts have
developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare
decisis. Thus the “quotable in law”, is avoided and ignored if
it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding
authority.
65. In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal [(1975) 2 SCC
232 :AIR 1975 SC 907] this Court held : (SCC p. 235, para15
2025:JHHC:24801-DB
7)
“7. … where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a
judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision
or obligatory authority running counter to the
reasoning and result reached, it may not have the
sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring
case, an obtrusive omission.”
40. Further, the concept of per incuriam was examined by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Hyder Consulting (UK)
Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2 SCC 189 where it was held
that decision can be said to be given per incuriam when the
court of record has acted in ignorance of any previous decision
of its own, or a subordinate court has acted in ignorance of a
decision of the court of record, for ready reference the relevant
paragraph is being quoted as under:
“46. Before I consider the correctness of the
aforementioned decisions, it would be necessary to
elaborate upon the concept of “per incuriam”. The Latin
expression “per incuriam” literally means “through
inadvertence”. A decision can be said to be given per
incuriam when the court of record has acted in ignorance
of any previous decision of its own, or a subordinate court
has acted in ignorance of a decision of the court of record.
As regards the judgments of this Court rendered per
incuriam, it cannot be said that this Court has “declared
the law” on a given subject-matter, if the relevant law was
not duly considered by this Court in its decision. In this
regard, I refer to State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals
Ltd. [(1991) 4 SCC 139] , wherein R.M. Sahai, J. in his
concurring opinion stated as follows : (SCC p. 162, para
40)
“40. ‘Incuria’ literally means ‘carelessness’. In
practice per incuriam appears to mean per
ignoratium. English courts have developed this16
2025:JHHC:24801-DBprinciple in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis.
The ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and ignored if it is
rendered, ‘in ignoratium of a statute or other
binding authority’.”
41. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition that the word “per
incuriam” has been interpreted if any order/judgment has been
passed by the Court in complete ignorance of the judgment
already passed on the same issue or ignorance of any statutory
provision, then, such judgment will come under the fold of
principle of per-incuriam, exactly same is the case herein, since,
in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors., even though, the views
have been taken by the Co-ordinate Benches in the cases of
Ghosh Stone Works represented through its Proprietor Vrs.
State of Jharkhand and Ors. [W.P.(C) No.1511 of 2018] and
Rang Nath Singh Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Ors.
[W.P.(C) No.4950 of 2024], since have not been produced, hence,
there is no consideration thereof.
42. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the judgment passed by
the Coordinate Bench in the case of Gopal Kumar and Ors., is
having no binding effect on the principle of judicial discipline.
43. Accordingly, issue no.(iv) and (v) are being answered.
44. So far as the issue nos.(i) to (iii) are concerned, the admitted
case of the writ petitioner is that during the subsistence period of
lease, the renewal application has been filed. The further
admitted fact is that the lease was to expire sometime in the year,
2025.
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2025:JHHC:24801-DB
45. The factual aspect therefore is not in dispute that the application
for renewal has been made on 15.05.2025, i.e., after 31.03.2022
and the concerned authority while taking into consideration the
mandate of aforesaid referred and discussed statutory restriction,
has rejected the application of the writ petitioner which has been
filed for grant of renewal of mining lease.
46. Further, argument has been advanced by the learned counsel for
the petitioner by taking aid of Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules but as
has been referred that the Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules lays down
the procedure for making application for the purpose of renewal
in a case where the application is to be filed under Rule 9(ङ) of
the JMMC Rules and once the application is being filed, then, the
lease is to be renewed either by way of renewal or extension but
in no case, it is beyond the period of 31.03.2022 in view of the
provision of Rule 9(च) .
47. The quasi-judicial authorities have taken into consideration the
aforesaid statutory restrictions and therefore rejected the claim of
the writ petitioner.
48. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued by putting
reliance upon Rule 23 of JMMC Rules, but the said submission is
also not acceptable due to the application of the principle of
harmonious construction of the statutory provision.
49. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anwar Hasan Khan vs.
Mohd. Shafi, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 540 has observed that
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2025:JHHC:24801-DB
the statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole
and one provision should be construed with reference to the other
provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought
to be achieved. It has further been observed that the well-known
principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given
to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the
provisions to a “dead letter” is not harmonious construction, for
ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid
Judgment is being quoted as under:
“8. It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an
Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and
phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text,
the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention
of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a
statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by
avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The
statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole
and one provision should be construed with reference to the
other provision to make the provision consistent with the object
sought to be achieved. The well-known principle of harmonious
construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions
and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “dead
letter” is not harmonious construction. With respect to law
relating to interpretation of statutes this Court in Union of
India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama [(1990)
1 SCC 277] held: (SCC p. 284, para 16)
“16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is
to discover what the legislature intended. This
intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of
enactment in question. That does not mean the text is
to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without
reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither
a literary text nor a divine revelation. ‘Words are
certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged’ as
Mr Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned.
(Towne v. Eisner [245 US 418, 425 (1918)] ) Learned19
2025:JHHC:24801-DBHand, J., was equally emphatic when he said:
‘Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of
Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes
which lie behind them.’ (Lenigh Valley Coal
Co. v. Yensavage [218 FR 547, 553] )”
50. Thus, it is settled position of law that the statute is to be taken
into consideration harmoniously and not on the basis of picking
one provision whose suits the litigant and leaving another
provision which is against the interest of the litigant concerned.
Otherwise, the same will be in defiance of the principle of
harmonious construction of the statutory provision and in that
view of the matter, the very object of the statutory command will
be frustrated, which has been mandated in the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Goa
Foundation (supra).
51. Further, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner has raised the
issue of non-adherence of principle of natural justice by the
authority concerned while rejecting the application for grant of
renewal of mining lease.
52. In the aforesaid context, it needs to refer herein the settled
position of law that show cause is not to be given merely for
formality, rather, opportunity of hearing is to be given if there is
chance of change in the final outcome after such decision being
taken. If there is no chance of change in the outcome, then
merely for the purpose of following the principle of natural justice,
the show cause is not required, reference in this regard be made
to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
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2025:JHHC:24801-DB
of Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commissioner, Kumaon Division,
Nainital, U.P. & Others [(2004) 4 SCC 281] wherein at
paragraph 64 it has been observed which is quoted hereunder:-
“64. … … Rules of natural justice are to be followed for
doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere
ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in
the decision of the case on merits. In view of the legal
position explained by us above, we, therefore, refrain
from remanding these cases in exercise of our
discretionary powers under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India.”
53. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v.
Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. [(2015)
8 SCC 519] has taken similar view at paragraph 45 which reads
as under: –
“45. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles in mind,
even when we find that there is an infraction of
principles of natural justice, we have to address a
further question as to whether any purpose would be
served in remitting the case to the authority to make
fresh demand of amount recoverable, only after issuing
notice to show cause to the appellant. In the facts of the
present case, we find that such an exercise would be
totally futile having regard to the law laid down by this
Court in R.C. Tobacco [(2005) 7 SCC 725].”
54. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law, it requires
to refer herein that in preceding paragraph, this Court has already
observed that order impugned has been passed by the authority
concerned as per the mandate of JMMC Rule 2004, particularly
section 9 of the rule 2004, therefore, even if show cause notice
would have been issued there was no chance of change in the
21
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outcome of the decision so taken by the respondent, as such,
merely because a show-cause notice has not been issued, the
decision taken by the authority cannot be said to suffer from an
error warranting interference.
55. It needs to refer herein that the writ petition has been filed for
issuance of Writ of Certiorari for interfering with the decision
taken by the District Mining Officer, as available in the order dated
12.06.2025, appended as Annexure-10 to the writ petition.
56. We are aware with the settled position of law of issuance of Writ
of Certiorari, which can only be issued if there is any error
apparent on record or there is gross miscarriage of justice,
reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs.
Radhakrishnan, reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477,
wherein, at paragraph-7 it has been held as under:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of
High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226
has been frequently considered by this Court and the
true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A
writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals:
these are cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of
it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ
can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction
conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or
improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without
giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by
the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with
the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice.
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There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue
a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the
Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate
Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of
fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of
the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or
questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is
apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a
writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may
appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is
shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had
erroneously refused to admit admissible and material
evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this
category of cases, however, we must always bear in
mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of
certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material
evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or
inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the
said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is
within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari
can be legitimately exercised.”
57. Similarly, in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad
Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph-21 as
hereunder: –
“21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ
23
2025:JHHC:24801-DBof certiorari and the conditions under which it can be
issued, the following propositions may be taken as
established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or
Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or
fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be
issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the
exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it
decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to
be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3)
The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of
a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One
consequence of this is that the Court will not review
findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal
even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a
Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has
jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when
the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of
appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its
purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear
the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings
in certiorari.”
58. In the case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and
Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868, their Lordships, while
discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold
at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder:
“12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will
be useful to notice the general principles indicating the
limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be
exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari
can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction.
The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 22624
2025:JHHC:24801-DBis not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed
out by this Court in Syed Yakoob‘s case (supra).
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior
tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in
recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on
evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to
admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not
supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases
the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction
extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a
result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them
or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their
jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.”
59. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court to issue Writ of Certiorari and basing upon the reason
assigned hereinabove, is of the view that the orders passed by
the authority concerned, cannot be said to suffer from an error,
hence, the same is not fit to be interfered with.
60. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed.
61. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Rohit/-A.F.R.
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