Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rajpal Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 16 April, 2025
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S. Kalgaonkar
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:10116
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S. KALGAONKAR
ON THE 16th OF APRIL, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 5685 of 2019
RAJPAL SINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri M.A. Bohra - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Vinod Thakur - Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State.
Shri Prateek Maheshwari - Advocate for the respondent [R-2].
ORDER
This petition u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C is filed for quashing of FIR
registered at Crime No. 422/2017 dated 08.08.2017 at P.S. Bhawarkuan,
Distt. Indore. It is further requested for quashing of order dated 12.12.2018
in RCT No. 215/2018 passed by the JMFC, Indore, whereby the charges
punishable u/S 420 and 406 of IPC are framed against the petitioner.
2. It is undisputed that the Petitioner Rajpal Singh executed an
agreement to sale in favour of respondent Gurpreet Saluja for sale of
immovable property i.e Plot No. 42/18 admeasuring 30×45=1350 sq.ft.
situated at Nanank Nagar, Pipaliyagaon, Indore for consideration of Rs.
Thirty three Lakhs to be paid in four months. Both the parties had given
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notice to each other after the dispute arose between them. The petitioner
filed a civil suit bearing Registration no. 42/2017 before Civil Judge Class
II, Indore on 10.01.2017 against respondent no.2 for declaration and
injunction to restrain respondent Gurpreet Saluja from interfering in his
peaceful possession on disputed property. Respondent Gurpreet Saluja also
filed Civil Suit bearing Registration No. 686/2019 on 21.07.2017 for
specific performance of the contract against the petitioner Rajpal.
3. The petition, in brief, states as under:
a. The Petitioner executed agreement to sale dated 22.07.2014 in
favor of respondent Gurpreet Saluja for sale of immovable property
for consideration of Rs. 33,00,000/-. The dispute arose when the
respondent Gurpreet Saluja did not pay the sale consideration in terms
of the agreement. Respondent Gurpreet, after expiry of the period for
performance of contract, sent a legal notice dated 16.11.2016 to the
petitioner demanding execution of sale deed in his favour. The
petitioner sent a reply dated 22.11.2016 denying all the allegations
contained in the notice.
b. Respondent Gurpeet Saluja never had arrangement of remaining
sale consideration. He never tendered the same to the petitioner.
Respondent Gurpreet Saluja attempted to pressurize the petitioner to
execute the sale deed without paying entire sale consideration.
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c. Respondent Gurpreet Saluja made all attempts to take illegal
possession of the property by intimidating and threatening the
petitioner.
d. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the conduct of respondent
Gurpreet Saluja, submitted written complaint to police authorities on
10.01.2017 and gave notice to respondent. Petitioner filed a civil suit
for declaration and injunction against respondent which was
registered as Civil Suit no. 42/2017.
e. Learned Civil Judge issued summons to the respondent on
21.01.2017. The respondent Gurpreet Saluja feeling aggrieved by
civil action of the petitioner submitted a complaint on the allegation
that petitioner has committed fraud with him and intimidated him.
The respondent no.1 on the basis of complaint of respondent no.2
maliciously registered FIR dated 04.02.2017 at Crime No. 422/2017
at P.S. Bhawarkua Indore.
f. The P.S. Bhawarkua, on completion of investigation submitted final
report on 30.12.2017. Learned JMFC, Indore framed charges against
the petitioner vide order dated 12.12.2018 without appreciating the
fact that no prima-face case was made out.
4. This petition is filed for quashing of impugned FIR and the order
framing the charges and subsequent proceedings on following grounds:
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(a) The action of respondent police authorities is unreasonable,
arbitrary and malicious.
(b) No prima-facie case for offence punishable u/S 406 and 420 of
IPC is made against the petitioner. The learned trial Court without
properly considering the material on record framed charges of offence
punishable u/Sec. 406 and 420 of IPC against the petitioner. The order
is without application of mind, illegal and arbitrary.
(c) The whole dispute alleged in the police complaint is purely
civil in nature, which has been given clock of criminal prosecution.
The dispute pertains to non-performance of the contract. The
petitioner and the respondent had filed civil suit regarding present
dispute.
(d) Respondent Gurpreet Saluja failed to pay the consideration
amount as per the agreement to sale, therefore, the petitioner refused
to execute the sale deed, until the entire consideration amount is paid.
Respondent Gurpreet Saluja under the garb of criminal case is
pressurizing the petitioner to execute sale deed in his favor.
On these grounds, it is prayed that the impugned FIR be quashed. The
order dated 12.12.2018 framing charges and the subsequent criminal
proceedings pending at RCT No 215/2018 be also quashed.
5. The respondent no.2 submitted written objection to the present
petition. The objection, briefly, states as under:
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(a) The petitioner, instead of filing a criminal revision u/S 397 r/w
401 of Cr.P.C., had filed present petition u/S 482 of the Cr.P.C. An
efficacious alternate remedy of criminal revision is available to the
petitioner, therefore, present petition u/S 482 of the Cr.P.C. is not
maintainable.
(b) The proceedings before the JMFC, Indore is at the stage of
evidence after framing of charges. Therefore, quashing of proceedings
at this stage will cause injustice to the complainant.
(c) The petitioner has executed the sale agreement with malafide
intention to extract money from the complainant and deceive the
complainant by refusing to transfer the property and refusing the
advance money.
(d) The petitioner has maliciously filed the civil suit to portray it to be
a civil dispute between the parties and to escape from criminal
proceedings lodged against him. The criminal complaint was filed
before the civil suit was initiated between the petitioner and the
respondent.
(e) The allegations made in FIR prima-facie show commission of
offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating. Mere pendency of
civil litigations between the parties does not bar the criminal
proceedings as the alleged act makes out offence against the
petitioner.
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On these grounds, it is requested that the petition be dismissed.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner referring to the agreement to sale
Annexure A-1 contended that the sale deed was to be executed after
payment of entire consideration amount of Rs. 33,00,000/- within the time
prescribed in the agreement to sale. The respondent/complainant gave legal
notice dated 16.11.2016 (Annexure A-2) to the petitioner/accused. In reply
to the notice (Annexure A-3), the petitioner requested for payment of entire
consideration amount. The respondent Gurpreet Saluja, instead of filing the
civil suit for specific performance of contract, submitted a written complaint
to the District Magistrate at Jan Sunwai on 18.12.2016. Learned counsel
referring to the civil suit (Annexure A-6) contended that the petitioner
approached civil Court for permanent injunction against forceful
dispossession by the respondent/complainant Gurpreet Saluja. The Civil
Court issued summons on 21.01.2017. Thereafter, the DIG, Indore directed
SHO, Bhanwarkuan to register FIR against the petitioner. Ultimately, the
respondent filed civil suit for specific performance of contract on
21.07.2017 which was registered as Civil Suit No. 686/2019. After
registration of the civil suit, P.S. Bhanwarkuan registered the impugned FIR
on 08.08.2017(Annexure A-8). The learned trial Court committed error in
framing charges for offence punishable u/S 406 and 420 of IPC against the
petitioner vide impugned order dated 12.12.2018(Annexure A-10). The
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dispute between the parties relates to specific performance of contract,
which is invariably of civil nature.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the
objector contended that the conduct of petitioner Rajpal Singh manifests his
intention to defraud from inception. The petitioner induced the respondent
to enter into agreement to sale and taken total amount of Rs. 12,52,853/- in
installments. As per the terms of agreement, petitioner was to perform the
proceedings with regard to lease of the land from the Indore Development
Authority, but the respondent paid the fees and executed entire proceeding
with regard to lease of land from the Indore Development Authority. The
petitioner attempted to delay the execution by making a publication with
regard to loss of documents. He pledged the property in year 2014 to secure
loan from Manpreet Singh. The petition is meritless and deserves to be
dismissed.
8. Heard both the parties, perused the record and the case diary.
9. It is trite law that mere availability of an alternate remedy of revision
u/Sec. 397 of the Cr.P.C. does not bar an application u/Sec. 482 of the
Cr.P.C. The inherent powers of the High Court are not conferred by the
statute but are merely saved thereunder. Therefore, the preliminary
objection about maintainability of present petition filed u/S 482 of the
Cr.P.C. is meritless. [Dhariwal Tobacco products Ltd. & Ors Vs. State of
Maharashtra & Another reported in (2009)2 SCC 370 & Prabhu Chawla
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Vs. State of Rajasthan & Another reported in 2016(16) SCC 30 relied
upon]
10. It is contended that the FIR lodged at the instance of DIG, Indore is
illegal. The record shows that the District Magistrate had forwarded the
complaint of Gurpreet received during Jan Sunwai for inquiry. It was duly
enquired by police authorities. The FIR was lodged on the basis of inquiry
report submitted by the CSP. It is not a case of registration of FIR merely on
the instruction of any authority.
11. The impugned FIR, in brief, reads as follows-
Rajpal Singh executed an agreement to sale in favour of Gurpreet
Saluja regarding Plot No. 42/2018 situated at Nanaknagar Pipliyagaon,
Indore for consideration of Rs. 33 Lakhs. Gurpreet Saluja paid Rs. 4 Lakhs
in cash and Rs. 50,000/- through cheque. Later, on 09.08.2014, Gurpreet
paid Rs. 2,50,000/- in cash and Rs. 2,00,000/- through cheque. Rajpal Singh
has not co-operated in execution of lease deed of the plot in favour of
complainant from IDA. Gurpreet had to pay Rs. 2,82,835/- for execution of
lease deed. Thus, he paid Rs. 12,52,835/- in furtherance of the agreement to
sale. Rajpal Singh has declined to execute registered sale deed. Although,
the original registry of the plot is with the complainant, Rajpal Singh has
mortgaged the channel Registry of plot with Manjeet Singh Bhatia and took
loan of Rs. 2,00,000/-. It appears that Rajpal Singh has changed his mind.
He has committed fraud and criminal breach of trust and misappropriated
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the amount of consideration towards sale of plot. On 17.12.2016, when the
complainant requested Rajpal Singh for execution of registered sale deed,
Arvind, associate of Rajpal Singh, abused him in filthy language and
threatened to kill him.
12. The material on record reveals that both the parties were at consensus
ad idem in executing the agreement to sale of disputed plot. Para 10 of the
agreement shows that parties were aware of the need of proceeding before
the IDA. A note on the back of agreement to sale also supports this status.
The parties, in furtherance of agreement to sale, paid and received part
consideration. Therefore, the intention to cheat cannot be inferred at the
inception i.e. when agreement to sale was executed between the parties.
Later, a dispute arose between the parties over the payment of fees to the
Indore Development Authority. Both the parties exchanged notices and
reported to concerned authorities. Ultimately, respondent/ complainant
Gurpreet Saluja had filed a civil suit for specific performance of contract.
13. The charges under Sections 406 and 420 of IPC stem from allegations
of criminal breach of trust and cheating, respectively. Section 406 IPC
addresses the dishonest misappropriation of property and entrusted to some
other person, while section 420 IPC deals with the cheating by dishonestly
inducing delivery of property. The two offenses are distinct and mutually
exclusive. They operate in entirely different spheres. The petitioner’s failure
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to execute the sale deed and to return the advanced money has led to these
charges. The reasons and responsibility for non-compliance with the terms
of contract will be evaluated on evidence at trial. The dispute appears to be
primarily civil in nature and lacks criminal intent. Mere non-performance of
the contract or inaction in complying with the terms of contract or cursory
denial of receipt of consideration amount in reply to legal notice may
provide cause of action for specific performance of the contract but
dishonest intention to cheat or fraudulent intention to misappropriate the
advance amount cannot be inferred from these actions.
14. In the case of International Advance Research Centre for P.M. &
N.M. Vs. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P)Ltd. & Anr. reported in (2016) 1
SCC 348 , the Supreme Court held as under:
15. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 IPC are : (i) cheating; (ii)
dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any
valuable security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being
converted into a valuable security; and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the
time of making the inducement. The making of a false representation is one of
the essential ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating under Section
420 IPC. In order to bring a case for the offence of cheating, it is not merely
sufficient to prove that a false representation had been made, but, it is further
necessary to prove that the representation was false to the knowledge of the
accused and was made in order to deceive the complainant.
16. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the cheating would
depend upon the intention of the accused at the time of alleged inducement. If
it is established that the intention of the accused was dishonest at the very
time when he made a promise and entered into a transaction with the
complainant to part with his property or money, then the liability is criminal
and the accused is guilty of the offence of cheating. On the other hand, if all
that is established is that a representation made by the accused has
subsequently not been kept, criminal liability cannot be foisted on the accused
and the only right which the complainant acquires is the remedy for breach of
contract in a civil court. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown at
the beginning of the transaction. In S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar [(2002) 1
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SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] , this Court held as under : (SCC p. 250, para
21)
“21. … In order to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive
should be in existence at the time when the inducement was made. It is
necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the
time of making the promise, to say that he committed an act of cheating. A
mere failure to keep up promise subsequently cannot be presumed as an act
leading to cheating.”
The above view in Palanitkar case [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129]
was referred to and followed in Rashmi Jain v. State of U.P. [(2014) 13 SCC
553 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 751]
15. In the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Vs. State of U.P. reported in
(2024) 10 SCC 690, the Supreme Court has held as under:
36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal
breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have
specific ingredients.
In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC): –
1) There must be entrustment with person for property or dominion over the
property, and
2) The person entrusted: –
a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted property to his own use, or
b) dishonestly used or disposed of the property or willfully suffers any
other person so to do in violation of:
i. any direction of law prescribing the method in which the trust is
discharged; or
ii. legal contract touching the discharge of trust (see: S.W.P.
Palanitkar (supra).
Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420 IPC, the essential
ingredients are: –
1) deception of any person, either by making a false or misleading
representation or by other action or by omission;
2) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property, or
3) the consent that any persons shall retain any property and finally
intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit (see: Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of
Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 712 : (2009) Cr.L.J. 3462 (SC))
37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea i.e. intention to defraud or
the dishonest intention must be present, and in the case of cheating it must be
there from the very beginning or inception.
38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to spell out any of the
aforesaid ingredients noted above. We may only say, with a view to clear a
serious misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as the courts
below, that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of criminal breach of
trust as defined under Section 405 of IPC, punishable under Section 406 of
IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said
that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined and
explained in Section 415 of the IPC, punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
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39. Every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal
breach of trust unless there is evidence of manipulating act of fraudulent
misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect
of which the person may seek his remedy for damages in civil courts but, any
breach of trust with a mens rea, gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well. It
has been held in Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha & Ors.,
reported in (1973) 2 SCC 823 as under:
“4. We have heard Mr. Maheshwari on behalf of the appellant and are of
the opinion that no case has been made out against the respondents
under Section 420 Penal Code, 1860. For the purpose of the present
appeal, we would assume that the various allegations of fact which have
been made in the complaint by the appellant are correct. Even after
making that allowance, we find that the complaint does not disclose the
commission of any offence on the part of the respondents under Section
420 Penal Code, 1860. There is nothing in the complaint to show that
the respondents had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the
appellant parted with Rs. 35.000/- There is also nothing to indicate that
the respondents induced the appellant to pay them Rs. 35,000/- by
deceiving him. It is further not the case of the appellant that a
representation was made, the respondents knew the same to be false.
The fact that the respondents subsequently did not abide by their
commitment that they would show the appellant to be the proprietor of
Drang Transport Corporation and would also render accounts to him in
the month of December might create civil liability on the respondents
for the offence of cheating.”
40. To put it in other words, the case of cheating and dishonest intention starts
with the very inception of the transaction. But in the case of criminal breach
of trust, a person who comes into possession of the movable property and
receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to his own use against
the terms of the contract, then the question is, in a case like this, whether the
retention is with dishonest intention or not, whether the retention involves
criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts
of each case.
41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of
criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating, the
intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into
which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent
conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a
criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is
shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the
offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is this intention, which
is the gist of the offence.
42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property must have been
entrusted to the accused or he must have dominion over it. The property in
respect of which the offence of breach of trust has been committed must be
either the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial
interest in or ownership’ of it must be of some other person. The accused
must hold that property on trust of such other person. Although the offence,
i.e. the offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest intention, yet
they are mutually exclusive and different in basic concept.
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43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For
cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false or
misleading representation i.e., since inception. In criminal breach of trust,
mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of
trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly
misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender
fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any
property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-exist
simultaneously.
46. It has been held in State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal reported in
(1968) 2 SCR 408, “The term “entrusted” found in Section 405 IPC governs
not only the words “with the property” immediately following it but also the
words “or with any dominion over the property” occurring thereafter–
see Velji Raghvaji Patel v. State of Maharashtra [(1965) 2 SCR 429]. Before
there can be any entrustment there must be a trust meaning thereby an
obligation annexed to the ownership of property and a confidence reposed in
and accepted by the owner or declared and accepted by him for the benefit of
another or of another and the owner. But that does not mean that such an
entrustment need conform to all the technicalities of the law of trust —
see Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [1956 SCR 483]. The
expression “entrustment” carries with it the implication that the person
handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to
another, continues to be its owner. Further the person handing over the
property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to
create a fiduciary relationship between them. A mere transaction of sale
cannot amount to an “entrustment””.
16. Recently, in the case of Radheyshyam & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan
& Anr. (Order dated 22.07.2024 passed in Cr.A. No. 3020 of 2024),
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2311 the Supreme Court has held as
under:
8. Thus, cheating forms an essential ingredient to constitute and offence under
Section 420, IPC. Further, to constitute cheating as defined under Section
415, IPC, it is necessary that a fraudulent or dishonest inducement is done and
the deceived person is made to deliver any property owing to the fraud.
Section 415, IPC, defines ‘cheating’, as:
“Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces
the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent
that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the
person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or
omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation
or property, is said to “cheat”.”
9. From the bare perusal of the FIR, it is evident that there was no act of
cheating, that is, the complainant was nowhere fraudulently induced or
dishonestly deceived by the appellants. A commercial transaction took place
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:10116
between the parties during which the parties consensually agreed for the sale
of the property of the appellants and respondent no. 2 paid the part
consideration. The default in payment of their loan dues on part of the
appellants is not reflective of their deceitful intention towards the
complainant. Mere non-registration of the sale or its refusal cannot amount to
cheating. The delivery of the advance payment towards consideration was
made in furtherance of an Agreement to Sale and it is not the case of the
respondent that he was in anyway deceived or duped to make such payments
to the appellants. It is a civil dispute and gives rise to the complainant’s right
to resort to the remedies provided under civil law by filing a suit for specific
performance.
10. Additionally, the appellants have also been accused of committing the
offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406, IPC. This offence is
defined under Section 405, IPC as follows:
“Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any
dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his
own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes off that property in
violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust
is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he
has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any
other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”.”
11. For an offence punishable under Section 406, IPC, the following
ingredients must exist:
i. The accused was entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion
over property;
ii. The accused had dishonestly misappropriated or converted to their own
use that property, or dishonestly used or disposed of that property or
wilfully suffer any other person to do so; and
iii. Such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in
violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust
is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made,
touching the discharge of such trust.
12. In the present case, the appellants were not entrusted with any property by
respondent no. 2 – complainant. The only delivery made was of part payment
towards an Agreement to Sale between the parties. The amount paid towards
consideration cannot be said to have been entrusted with the appellants by
respondent no. 2. Additionally, merely because the appellants are refusing to
register the sale, it does not amount to misappropriation of the advance
payment. Since there was no entrustment of property, the offence of
misappropriation of such property and thereby criminal breach of trust cannot
be said to be made out.
17. Therefore, in view of aforestated dictum of law laid down in the case
of International Advance Research Centre for P.M. & N.M., Delhi Race
Club and Radheyshyam (supra), the offence punishable u/S 420 and 406 of
IPC is prima-facie not made out against the petitioner from the contents of
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impugned FIR and the material on record. The impugned FIR based on
complaint of petitioner is an attempt to clock the civil dispute of specific
performance of contract with criminal prosecution for cheating and criminal
breach of trust. Hence, the exercise of inherent jurisdiction u/Sec. 482 of
Cr.P.C. is needed to prevent abuse of the process of Court.
18. Consequently, this petition u/S 482 of Cr.P.C. is allowed. The FIR
registered at Crime No. 422/2017 dated 08.08.2017 at P.S. Bhanwarkuan,
Distt. Indore as well as the order dated 12.12.2018 in RCT No. 215/2018
passed by the JMFC, Indore is quashed. The Petitioner stands discharged.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
sh/-
SEHAR
HASEEN
Digitally signed by SEHAR HASEEN
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH INDORE, ou=BENCH AT INDORE,
2.5.4.20=900ec6fc757798eaeb3df7a32860bd3298415
a4d1c2d91436213f2568c8f27da, postalCode=452001,
st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=E7DBBA955B262C04B8413251CE7FB6F
0B7DBA610C57F1559C08BF6C6F5DD40D4, cn=SEHAR
HASEEN
Date: 2025.04.17 18:59:20 +05’30’
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