Delhi District Court
Rakesh Press vs Duggals Print House And Anr on 16 July, 2025
IN THE COURT OF
Judicial Magistrate First Class (NI ACT) Digital Court-01,
Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi)
(Presided Over by Ms. Nishi Jindal, DJS)
(Earlier presided as Judicial Magistrate First Class (NI ACT) -05, RACC
At New Delhi, NEW DELHI)
C.C. No. 4157/2016
PS : Sansad Marg
CNR No.DLND020208392016
M/s Rakesh Press
A-22, Sector-68,
Noida- 201301
Uttar Pradesh
.........Complainant
Versus
1)M/s Duggals Print House,
A-68-69,
DSIDC Packaging Complex,
Kriti Nagar,
New Delhi
2)Mr. Siddharth Duggal
Proprietor,
S/o Late Sri Pradeep Duggal
F-254, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi ........Accused
C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 1/17
NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDAL
JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16
14:42:14 +0530
Date of Institution 20.10.2016
Offence complained of 138 NI Act
Date of decision 16.07.2025
Plea of guilt Not guilty
Decision Acquittal
JUDGMENT
Vide this judgment, this Court shall dispose of the present complaint case instituted
by the Complainant invoking the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881(as in after referred to as ‘NI Act‘).
2. The accused hereinabove mentioned has been summoned to face trial under
Section 138 NI Act on the complaint filed by M/s Rakesh Press (hereinafter referred
as ‘complainant’) against the accused M/s Duggals Print House through its
proprietor Siddharth Duggal (hereinafter referred as ‘accused’). It is alleged in the
complaint that the complainant had been printing materials for accused no. 1 sole
proprietorship concerned as per its requirement on consideration and as on July,
2014, there had been balance outstanding against the accused to the tune of Rs.
11,08,802/-. Thereafter, the sole proprietor Mr Siddharth Duggal being the
signatory of the cheque in question and sole proprietor acknowledged his liability
on 31st March 2016 for the same. A letter dated 2nd August, 2016 was sent to
accused by the complainant firm which was duly acknowledged by them by writing
the date 31st of March 2015. The same was objected to by the complainant wherein
it was stated that the date of 31st March 2015 was inadvertently put instead of the
date 2nd August 2016. Consequently, the accused handed over to the complainant
cheque bearing no. 166360 for Rs. 2,00,000/- drawn on Union Bank of India.
However, the same were dishonoured for the ground ‘Account Closed/ Transferred
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NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDAL
JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16
14:42:20 +0530
To’ vide dishonour memo dated 19.08.2016. That the complainant through its
counsel sent legal demand notice to the accused dt. 05.09.2016 through speed post.
That the accused neither made the said payment within the stipulated period of 15
days as contemplated under the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 from the receipt
of the legal demand notice and hence, the present complaint has been filed.
Pre Trial Procedure:-
3. The complainant tendered his evidence by way of affidavit which is Ex.
CW-1/A and relied upon following evidences: –
a) Letter of Authorization of AR is Ex. CW1/1,
b) Impugned Cheque is Ex. CW1/2,
c) Bank return memo dated 19.08.2016 is Ex. CW1/3,
d) Legal demand notice dated 05.09.2016 is Ex.CW1/4,
e) Speed Postal receipts are Ex. CW1/5,
f) Reply dt. 22.09.2016 to legal notice is Ex. CW1/6,
g) Letter dated 02.08.2016 is Mark A,
4. Upon appreciation of pre-summoning evidence, accused was summoned
for an offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act and notice under Section
251 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred as ‘Cr.P.C.’) was
served upon them on 06.03.2018 to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed
trial.
The accused took the defence that at the time of issuance of the
dishonoured cheque in question, Duggals Print House was a proprietorship
concern and late Mrs Madhu Duggal i.e. his mother was its sole proprietor. At
present, he has no knowledge about the status of Duggals Print House as on
September 2014, as there was a partition in his family and he was removed from
C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 3/17
Digitally signed
NISHI by NISHI
JINDAL
JINDAL Date:
2025.07.16
14:42:30 +0530
the working of the Duggals Print House. Prior to the Partition, he was the only
authorised representative/ attorney of Mrs. Madhu Duggal in Duggals Print
House. He admitted to have been in business transaction with the complainant
from the year 2016 to July 2014. His father was in business transaction with the
complainant since 1996. He admitted that Ex. CW1/2 is a leaf of a cheque book
issued to Duggals Print House. He admitted that the cheque bears his signatures
and the name of the payee as well as the amount in words and figures is filled in
his handwriting. However, the date was not in his handwriting. He admitted that
both the signatures on cheque were his. He signed it twice because there was some
issue with the signature in the bank. He stated that he gave specific instructions to
his bank that the cheque for Duggals Print House should be passed only after it is
signed by him and his mother Madhu Duggal together or when the cheque is
signed twice by him. Therefore, he had signed twice on the cheque so the cheque
could be passed. He signed the same in the capacity of authorised signatory and
became aware about its dishonour only after receiving the legal demand notice.
He admitted to have received the legal demand notice and even replied to the
same and admitted there was some liability towards the complainant to the tune of
approx. Rs. 4 Lacs. He further stated that he was never a proprietor of Duggals
Print House. His mother who expired on 01.05.2017 was its proprietor and he was
only the authorised representative and attorney acting on her behalf in Duggals
Print House. The cheque in question was issued as a security cheque to the
complainant in July, 2014 along with one more cheque bearing no. 166359 for Rs.
1.5 lakhs dated 10.07.2014 in order to discharge liability which was duly
encashed. In September, 2014, there was a partition in his family wherein he was
separated from the business of Duggals Print House and he was no more an
authorised representative, signatory or attorney for Duggals Print House. He had
no role to play with respect to business and working of Duggals Print House evenC.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 4/17
NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDALJINDAL Date: 2025.07.16
14:42:37 +0530
with respect to banking relations. He stated that it was in the knowledge of the
complainant and the proprietor of Duggals Print House is his late mother and not
him. There is no existing legally enforceable debt or any other liability on the date
of issuance of the dishonoured cheque and even as on date. A security cheque has
been misused by the complainant.
5. The AR of the complainant was examined as CW-1. In the post-summoning
evidence, the AR of the complainant (CW1) adopted his pre-summoning
evidence. The complainant was cross examined at length by the Ld. Counsel for
accused. Thereafter, the complainant evidence was closed by the AR of the
complainant on 02.07.2018.
Statement of accused :-
6. Accused was, thereafter, examined U/s 281 r/w Sec 313 Cr.P.C. on
05.07.2018, wherein entire incriminating evidence was put to him.
The accused took the defence that he had issued the cheque in question
as an AR of accused no. 1 company for security purpose. All the particulars on the
cheque except the date has been filled by him. One more cheque was issued
bearing no. 166359 to the complainant for Rs. 1,50,000/- which was cleared on
10th of July 2014 and upon clearance of this cheque, all liabilities of accused
stood cleared. He further stated that he was never the sole proprietor of accused
no. 1 company. The name of accused no. 1 is not Duggal Print House but it is
Duggal’s Print House. He personally has no liability and cannot say whether
accused no. 1 was having liability or not. He is not the proprietor of accused no. 1.
The cheque was not issued in discharge of liability but as a security cheque. He
admitted his signature on the cheque in question to be his. He admitted to have
signed the letter dated 02.08.2016 in the office of the complainant as they
informed him that they have to institute some case against Madhu Duggal,
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NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDAL
JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16
14:42:44 +0530
proprietor of accused no. 1 company. When the same was signed, he was neither
the AR of accused nor was holding any position. He admitted to have received the
legal demand notice and even replied to the same.
Defence Evidence:-
7. The accused chose to lead Defence Evidence and examined witness from
VAT department as DW-1 and Bank witness as DW-2. Accordingly, the same
was closed vide order dated 08.04.2025. The matter was, thereafter, fixed for final
arguments.
8. I have heard counsel for the parties and have ruminated over the case file
thoroughly.
9. The following points required determination in the present case.
(i) Whether the offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instrument Act is made out against the accused.
(ii) Whether the complainant proved the guilt of the accused
beyond shadow of reasonable doubt.
10. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the complainant is duty
bound to prove the following ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Aparna A.
Shah v M/s Sheth Developers P. Ltd &Anr. (2013)8 SCC 7.
“9. It is manifest that to constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Act,
the following ingredients are required to be fulfilled:
a) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a
bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of
that account;
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NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDAL
JINDAL 14:42:53 +0530
Date: 2025.07.16
b) the cheque should have been issued for the discharge, in whole or in part,
of any debt or other liability;
c) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months
from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity
whichever is earlier;
d) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the
cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by
an
agreement made with the bank;
e) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the
payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the
drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him
from the
bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
f) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of
money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days
of the receipt of the said notice”
11. The Act also raises certain presumptions i.e. one contained in Section 118
(a) of the Act and other in Section 139 thereof. Section 118 (a) raises presumption
as to Negotiable Instrument, until the contrary is proved the following
presumption shall be made: –
Section 118 of the N.I Act provides:
“Presumptions as to negotiable instruments: Until the contrary is proved, the
following presumptions shall be made:
of consideration – that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for
consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted,
indorsed, negotiated or transferred was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or
transferred for consideration;”
Section 139 of the N.I Act further provides as follows:
“Presumption in favour of holder – it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is
proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in
Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability”.
Section 146 of NI Act provides that:
“Bank’s slip prima facie evidence of certain facts. — The Court shall, in
respect of every proceeding under this Chapter, on production of bank’s slipC.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 7/17
Digitally signed
NISHI by NISHI
JINDAL
JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16
14:43:01 +0530
or memo having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque has been
dishonoured, presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque, unless and until
such fact is disproved.”
12. However, in N.S. Narayana Menon Vs. State of Kerala 2006 (6) SCC 39,
while dealing with the aspect of presumption in a case under Section 138 of the NI
Act, 1881, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the presumption under Section
118 (a) and 139 of the Act are rebuttable and the standard of proof required for
such rebuttal is preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It was further observed that in terms of Section 4 of the Indian Evidence
Act that, whenever it is provided by the Act that the court shall presume a fact, it
shall regard the said fact as proved unless and until it is disproved.
Applying the said definition of proved and disproved to the principle
behind Section 118(a) of the Act, the court shall presume a negotiable instrument
to be for consideration unless and until after considering the matter before it, it
either believes that the consideration does not exist or considers non-existence of
the consideration so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstance of
the particular case, to act upon supposition that the consideration does not exist.
For rebutting such presumption what is needed is to raise a probable defence.
The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probability. Inference
of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the material on
record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.
Therefore, rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such
evidence must be adduced before Court in support of defence, the court must
either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably
probable. The standard of reasonableness being that of the “Prudent Man”.
13. In this way from the combined reading of both these sections, two kinds of
presumptions are raised i.e. one regarding the fact that the cheque was drawn for
C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 8/17
NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDAL
JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16
14:43:09 +0530
some consideration and that the same was held by the holder in whole or in part of
any debt or any other liability. It is a mandatory presumption, though the accused
is entitled to rebut the said presumption.
14. During the course of final arguments, Ld. Counsel for complainant argued
that there exists a legally enforceable liability on behalf of the accused towards
the complainant. He further argued that the cheque in question Ex. CW1/2 was
issued to the complainant in discharge of the liability. He further argued that upon
presentation, the cheque was dishonoured and the same has been proved by the
cheque return memo Ex. CW1/3. Further, Ld. Counsel for complainant argued
that legal demand notice Ex. CW1/4 was sent to the accused and the same was
duly served upon the accused. Ld. Counsel for complainant submitted that all the
ingredients of Section 138 NI Act are fulfilled and accordingly, the accused
should be convicted.
15. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for accused argued that the accused was never a
proprietor of accused company and hence, was not liable for its dues. Moreover,
the cheque was issued as security which has been misused by the complainant.
Further, the requisite amount has already paid to the complainant by way of
cheque and hence, they have no legal liability towards the complainant. He
further argued that the essential ingredients of Section 138 NI Act have not been
satisfied in the present complaint in order to constitute a valid complaint. He
prayed that the accused be acquitted of the offence.
FINDINGS-
16. Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is an undisputed fact
that the cheque in question bears the signature of the accused and the same has
C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 9/17
Digitally signed
NISHI by NISHI
JINDAL
JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16
14:43:16 +0530
been drawn on an account maintained by him. Hence, a mandatory presumption is
raised against the accused in this case that the cheque in question was issued in
discharge of a legally recoverable debt and drawn for good consideration by
virtue of Section 118(a) r/w Section 139 of NI Act. The onus to rebut this
presumption lies upon the accused. The same has been held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case titled as Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513
that: –
“The accused under Section 138 NI Act has two options. He can either show
that the consideration and debt did not exit or that under the particular
circumstances of the case, the non-existence of consideration and debt is so
probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt
existed. To rebut the statutory presumption, an accused is not expected to
prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as it is expected of the
complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to
prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that
there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court
need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-
existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the
existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the
same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and
existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused.
Something which his probable has to be brought on record for getting the
burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the
accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon
consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and
debt did not exist or there non-existence was so probably that a prudent man
under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist.
Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question, was
not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability,
the accused may also rely upon the circumstantial evidence and if the
circumstances so relied upon are so compelling, the burden may likewise shift
again on the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of
fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut
the presumptions arises under Section 118 and 139 of NI Act”.
FIRST DEFENCE: – NO LEGALLY RECOVERABLE DEBT/ LIABILITY OF
THE ACCUSED TO PAY
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NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDAL
JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16
14:43:23 +0530
17. The accused has contended that he does not have any liability towards the
complainant as he is not the sole proprietor of accused no. 1 firm rather it was his
mother Mrs. Madhu Duggal who was the sole proprietor of accused no. 1 firm.
It is a settled position of law that a sole proprietorship firm is not covered within
the ambit of section 141 NI Act and vicarious liability cannot be fastened on any
other employee of the firm. Reliance in this regard is placed on case titled as M M
Lal vs State NCT Of Delhi & Anr., 2012 SCC OnLine Del 4851 wherein it was
held that-
“5. It is well settled that a sole proprietorship firm has no separate legal
identity and in fact is a business name of the sole proprietor. Thus any
reference to sole proprietorship firm means and includes sole proprietor
thereof and vice versa. Sole proprietorship firm would not fall within the
ambit and scope of Section 141 of the Act, which envisages that if the person
committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who,
at the time of offence was committed, was in-charge of, and was responsible
to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the
company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be
proceeded against and punished accordingly. Company includes a
partnership firm and any other association of individuals. The sole
proprietorship firm would not fall within the meaning of partnership firm or
association of individual. Vicarious liability cannot be fastened on the
employees of a sole partnership firm, by taking aid of Section 141 of the Act,
inasmuch as, no evidence has been led to show that the business was run by
the respondent no.2.”
The same has been held in the case titled as Raghu Lakshminarayanan vs. M/s.
Fine Tubes (2007) 5 SCC 103, wherein the Hon’ble The Supreme Court of India
has held that in case of proprietorship concern, it is only the proprietor who can be
held liable under Section 138 of NI Act, on account of the fact that proprietorship
concern has no separate legal identity. A sole proprietorship firm would therefore
not fall within the scope and ambit of Section 141 of NI Act. It was held that-
“It is settled position in law that the concept of vicarious liability introduced
in Negotiable Instruments Act is attracted only against the Directors,
partners or other persons in charge and control of the business of theC.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 11/17
Digitally signed
NISHI by NISHI
JINDAL
JINDAL 14:43:31
Date: 2025.07.16
+0530
company, or otherwise responsible for its affairs. Section 141 of NI Act not
covers within its ambit, the proprietary concern. The proprietary concern is
not a juristic person so as to attract the concept of vicarious liability. The
concept of vicarious liability is attracted only in the case of juristic person,
such as the company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act,
1956 or the partnership firm registered under the provisions of Partnership
Act, 1932 or association of persons which ordinarily would mean a body of
persons which is not incorporated under any statute. The proprietary concern
stands absolutely on different footing. A person may carry on a business in
the name of the business concern being proprietor of such proprietary
concern. In such case the proprietor of proprietary concern alone can be held
responsible for the conduct of business carried in the name of such
proprietary concern. Therefore, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act have no applicability in a case involving the offence committed by a
proprietary concern.”
18. To prove that accused no. 2 was not the sole proprietor of accused firm, he
has examined the concerned official from VAT department as DW-1 who has
placed on record the DVAT 11 Form as Ex. DW1/1 (Colly) as per which the sole
proprietor of accused firm is stated to be Mrs. Madhu Duggal and not Siddharth
Duggal. Further, concerned bank official was examined as DW-2 who brought the
account opening form of the account from which the cheque in question was
issued wherein the account holder is stated to be Mrs. Madhu Duggal and not
Siddharth Duggal.
19. Even the AR of the complainant was examined as CW-1 who deposed on
similar lines that he was not aware whether Siddharth Duggal was the sole
proprietor of accused no. 1 firm. The relevant portion of cross examination of AR
of the complainant/ CW-1 dated 02.07.2018 is reproduced as hereunder: –
“I had not seen any document which could suggest that Mr. Siddharth Duggal is
the sole proprietor of M/s Duggal’s Print House/ accused no. 1. I have no idea
that Mrs. Madhu Duggal has been shown and her name is registered as sole
proprietor of M/s Duggal’s Print House/ accused no. 1 in all public documents
after the death of Mr. Pradeep Duggal.”
C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 12/17
NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDAL
JINDAL 14:43:39 +0530
Date: 2025.07.16
Hence, it is manifest that only the sole proprietor can be held liable for the
transactions of the proprietorship concern and liability cannot be fastened on any
third person including the authorized signatory. The same being the case in the
present matter, Siddharth Duggal cannot be said to be acting on behalf of the
proprietorship firm and thus, cannot be held liable for the same.
20. Moreover, as far as the liability of accused firm is concerned, the accused has
contended that he had issued cheque bearing no. 166359 of Rs. 1,50,000/- in
discharge of his liability and therefore, no liability qua the amount mentioned in
the cheque in question can be fixed on him. Pertinently, the same has been
admitted by AR of the complainant in his cross examination. The relevant portion
of cross examination of AR of the complainant/ CW-1 dated 02.07.2018 is
reproduced as hereunder: –
“It is correct that a cheque bearing no. 166359 of Rs. 1,50,000/- was given to me
by the accused no. 1 and the same was duly encashed in my account.”
Furthermore, the complainant has not placed on record any ledger account or
bank statement by which the liability of the accused qua the amount mentioned in
the cheque in question could be determined. Mere placing on record the cheque in
question is not sufficient to compute the legal liability of the accused. This is
moreso, as the transaction in hand is of a business/ commercial in nature and not
personal. Not placing on record relevant documents to show the outstanding legal
liability of the accused creates an even further dent in the case of the complainant.
21. It is a settled law that to hold a conviction in cheque bounce case, there
must be legally enforceable debt or liability as on the date of
presentation/maturity of cheque or in other words, if there is no debt or liability to
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NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDAL
JINDAL 14:43:47 +0530
Date: 2025.07.16
the tune of cheque amount in question on date of presentation of cheque, Section
138 of NI Act is not made out.
22. The above discrepancies in the case of the complainant as projected in the
complaint and in deposition in the cross examination as noted above casted a
serious cloud on the entire case of the complainant against the accused. It is well
settled law that in a criminal case, prosecution has to stand upon its own legs and
it cannot take the advantage of the fact that accused has not led cogent defence
evidence or accused is having a weak defence. The suspicious circumstances
arising in the present case will certainly give advantage to the accused.
23. In Anss Rajashekar v. Augustus Jeba Ananth (2020) 15 SCC 348, a two
Judge Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court, reiterated the decision of the three-judge
bench of Apex Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, AIR 2010 SUPREME COURT
1898, on the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. The court held-
“12. Section 139 of the Act mandates that it shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received it, in discharge, in
whole or in part, of a debt, or liability. The expression “unless the contrary is
proved” indicates that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act is
rebuttable. Terming this as an example of a “reverse onus clause” the three-
Judge Bench of this Court in Rangappa held that in determining whether the
presumption has been rebutted, the test of proportionality must guide the
determination. The standard of proof for rebuttal of the presumption under
section 139 of the Act is guided by a preponderance of probabilities. This Court
held thus:
“28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually
impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in
view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption
under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of preponderance
of probabilities”. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence
which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can
rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a
defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to
adduce evidence of his/her own.”
C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 14/17
Digitally signed
NISHI by NISHI
JINDAL
JINDAL 14:43:53
Date: 2025.07.16
+0530
24. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the burden on the accused to prove
his defence is not very high. The defence needs to be proved by only a
preponderance of probability. This can be done either by proving his defence by
adducing cogent evidence or by destroying the case of the complainant by
pointing out loopholes in the complaint or by means of cross examination.
25. It is also pertinent to mention here that the accused has taken a consistent
stand and stood firm on his defence throughout the trial. Needless to state that the
case of the complainant has to stand on his own legs and not dependent upon the
lacunae or contradictions in the defence of the accused, once he has been able to
raise a probable defence.
26. Therefore, in present matter the accused has been able to raise a reasonable
probable defence by punching holes in the case of the complainant itself on the
basis of the materials already brought on record by way of cross examination of
the complainant, which has created doubt about the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability, and has been able to rebut the presumptions under
sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act and the reverse onus cast upon him has been
discharged.
27. Since the accused has rebutted the statutory presumptions, the onus again
shifts back upon the complainant. Now the presumptions under Sections 118 and
139 of the NI Act will not again come for the rescue of the complainant. In the
instant case, complainant has failed to establish his case beyond reasonable doubt
by proving all the ingredients under Section 138 NI Act.
C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 15/17
Digitally signed
NISHI by NISHI
JINDAL
JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16
14:44:00 +0530
28. Accordingly, accused namely Siddharth Duggal authorized signatory of
M/s Duggals Print House is acquitted of the offence under section 138 of the NI
Act. Bail bonds stand cancelled and surety, if any, stands discharged. File be
consigned to record room after due compliance.
Pronounced in Open Court. Digitally signed
NISHI by NISHI
JINDAL
Dated: 16.07.2025 JINDAL Date:
2025.07.16
14:44:06 +0530
(Nishi Jindal)
Judicial Magistrate First Class (NI ACT), Digital Court-01,
Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
Certified that this judgment contains 17 pages and each page bears my signature.
The undersigned had reserved the said judgment prior to her transfer vide
notification no. 16/DHC/Gaz-IIB/G-7/VI.E.2(a)/2025 dated 30.05.2025 of
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi and in compliance of the direction at footnote no.2
of the same, the judgment has been notified and is being pronounced.
NISHI Digitally signed
by NISHI JINDAL
Date: 2025.07.16
JINDAL 14:44:09 +0530
(Nishi Jindal)
Judicial Magistrate First Class (NI ACT) Digital Court-01,
Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 16/17
In compliance of practise direction no. 124/Rules/DHC dated 10.12.2024 of
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, the parties are hereby informed about the
availability of free legal aid facilities for pursuing higher remedies. The contact
address and phone number of DSLSA, PHC, NDD is provided here in below.
DSLSA, Patiala House Court, Tilak Marg, New Delhi-110001.
Phone number : 01123232273.
e-mail address : [email protected] Digitally signed by NISHI NISHI JINDAL JINDAL Date: 2025.07.16 14:44:16 +0530 C.C. No. 4157/2016 Rakesh Press V. Duggals Print House Page No. 17/17
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