Himachal Pradesh High Court
Raman Kapoor vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 29 July, 2025
( 2025:HHC:25004 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 81 of 2013
.
Reserved on : 11.07.2025
Date of Decision: 29.07.2025
Raman Kapoor .... Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
Coram
r to .... Respondent
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes
For the petitioner : Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri,
Advocate.
For the respondent : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present petition is directed against the
judgment dated 10.01.2013 passed by learned Sessions
Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan (learned appellate Court)
vide which the judgment of conviction dated 30.11.2010 and
order of sentence dated 03.12.2010 passed by learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan (learned trial Court)
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the
same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial
.
Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the
present petition are that the police presented a challan
before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 379 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC‘). It was asserted
that the informant Bhagat Ram Kataria (PW-4) is the
owner of the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-18-6400.
He had parked his car on Mall Road on 11.05.2009 at about
8:00 PM. When he was going on a morning walk on
12.05.2009 at about 7:00 am, he found that his car was
missing. He searched for the car in the whole town, but
could not find it. He reported the matter to the police, and
the police registered an FIR (Ext. PW8/A). HC Ranjeet Singh
(PW-7) conducted the investigation. He visited the spot
and prepared the site plan (Ext. PW7/A). The informant
produced the registration certificate and the key to the
vehicle. These were seized vide seizure memo (Ext. PW1/A).
Asif Rahman (PW-2) was running a shop of hair dresser at
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Saharanpur. Accused Javed and Raman Kapoor came to his
shop in a vehicle having a broken registration plate bearing
.
registration No. HP-18-6. They told Asif Rahman that the
vehicle had a defect, that they had parked the vehicle at
Gandhi Park and would take the vehicle after a few days.
However, they did not return for 3-4 days. Hence, Asif
Rahman called his brother-in-law, Firoz Khan (PW-5) and
told him about the visit of the accused and the parking of
the car. Firoz Khan informed Bhagat Ram (PW-4), and
Bhagat Ram told the police about this fact. HC Ranjeet
Singh (PW-7), ASI Subhash Chand, HHC Jagdish (PW-1)
went to Saharanpur with Firoz Khan. A Maruti Car bearing
Registration No. HR-18-6 was found parked at Gandhi
Park. The word ‘HP’ were changed to ‘HR’ with the help of
a black tape. The police checked the chassis number and
engine number of the car, and these matched the numbers
mentioned on the Registration Certificate. The police
checked the vehicle and found one purse having two
photographs of accused Raman Kapoor and one PAN Card
of Raman Kapoor’s father inside the car. These were put in
a parcel, and the parcel was sealed with the seal impression
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‘T’. Seal impression (Ext. PW7/B) was taken on a separate
piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Bhagat Ram
.
after the use. The parcel was seized vide seizure memo (Ext
PW4/A). The site plan (Ext. PW7/C) showing the place of
recovery was prepared. The accused Raman Kapoor and
Javed Ahmad were associated with the investigation.
Raman Kapoor produced a key to a motorcycle, which was
seized vide memo (Ext PW1/B). It was put in a cloth parcel,
and the parcel was sealed with seal impression ‘A’. Seal
impression (Ext. PW7/D) was taken on a separate piece of
cloth. The police arrested the accused Raman Kapoor.
Accused Raman Kapoor made a statement (Ext PW1/C) that
he had concealed a stepney of the vehicle in a jungle. The
accused led the police and the witnesses to this place from
where he got recovered a stepney. The police seized the
stepney vide seizure memo (Ext PW1/D). The site plan of
the place of recovery (Ext.PW7/E) was prepared. Accused
Raman Kapoor made a disclosure statement (Ext PW1/E)
that he could show the place from where the theft was
committed. The accused led the police to the place from
where the theft was committed. The accused also showed
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the place where the car was parked. A site plan (Ext. PW7/F)
was prepared. Statements of witnesses were recorded as
.
per their version, and after the completion of the
investigation, the challan was prepared and presented
before the Court.
3. The accused were charged with the commission
of an offence punishable under Section 379 read with
Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examines 8 witnesses to prove
its case. Jagdish Chand (PW-1) is the witness to the
recovery and the disclosure statement. Asif Rehman
(PW-2) saw the accused with the vehicle and informed his
brother-in-law about the same. HC Kawar Singh (PW-3)
was working as MHC with whom the case property was
deposited. Bhagat Ram (PW-4) is the informant. Firoj Khan
(PW-5) intimated about the parking of the car at
Saharanpur to the informant. Inspector Sant Singh (PW-6)
prepared the challan. HC Ranjeet Singh (PW-7) conducted
the investigation. HC Kunwar Singh (PW-8) signed the FIR.
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5. The accused, in their statements recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its
.
entirety. Accused Raman Kapoor stated that the witnesses,
Firoj Khan and Asif Rehman, made false statements against
him because of the dispute with Firoj Khan. Firoj Khan and
Asif Rehman are relatives of each other. He claimed that he
was innocent. He stated that he wanted to produce defence
evidence, but subsequently, no evidence was produced.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution
had succeeded in proving that the car was stolen from the
Mall Road and was found at Saharanpur. It was also proved
that photographs of the accused Raman Kapoor and a
photocopy of the PAN card of Raman Kapoor’s father were
found in the car. The accused, Raman Kapoor, failed to
provide any explanation for the recovery of these articles.
The stepney of the stolen car was recovered at the instance
of accused Raman Kapoor. He pointed out the places from
which the car was stolen and the place where the car was
parked. All these circumstances unerringly pointed towards
the guilt of the accused. The explanation provided by him
that a false case was made against him was not established
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on the balance of probability. However, the prosecution’s
case was not proved against the accused Javed Khan
.
because there was nothing to connect him to the
commission of crime except the fact that he was present in
the vehicle when it was brought to Gandhi Park. This was
not sufficient to convict him. Hence, the learned Trial Court
acquitted the accused, Javed Khan, but convicted the
accused, Raman Kapoor, for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 379 of IPC and sentenced him to
undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order
passed by learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal
which was decided by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur
District at Nahan (learned Appellate Court). Learned
Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by
learned Trial Court that the prosecution had proved that
the car was stolen from the Mall Road, Nahan and it was
recovered at Gandhi Park, Saharanpur. It was also proved
that the police found the photographs of accused Raman
Kapoor and a photocopy of the PAN Card of Raman
Kapoor’s father in the car. The stepney of the car was
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recovered at the instance of accused Raman Kapoor. He had
also identified the places from where the theft was
.
committed and where the car was parked. These
circumstances pointed to the guilt of the accused. Hence,
the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced
him. Consequently, the appeal filed by accused Raman
Kapoor was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order
passed by the learned Courts below, the accused filed the
present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below
erred in appreciating the material placed before them. It
was duly established on record that the accused was falsely
implicated and he had no concern with the theft of the car.
The prosecution relied upon the statements of interested
witnesses. They were inimical to the family of the accused.
No independent witness to the recovery was associated,
despite the opportunity and availability; therefore, it was
prayed that the present revision be allowed and the
judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set
aside.
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9. I have heard Mr. Sanjiv Kumar Suri, learned
counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Parshant Sen,
.
learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.
10. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts
below erred in appreciating the material on record. It was
duly proved on record that the accused Javed had enmity
with Asif Rehman (PW-2). Bhagat Ram (PW-4) is also
inimical to accused Raman Kapoor. The prosecution
witnesses admitted that the place of the incident is located
in a heavily populated area; however, no independent
witness was associated during the investigation. The
statements of the prosecution witnesses did not inspire
confidence, and learned Courts below erred in relying upon
these statements. Therefore, he prayed that the present
revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by
learned Courts below be set aside.
11. Mr. Parshant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate
General, for the State, submitted that the prosecution had
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and learned
Courts below had rightly appreciated the material placed on
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record. Mere enmity is not sufficient to discard the
testimony of the witness. The photographs of the accused
.
Raman Kapoor and the PAN Card of his father were found
in the car, for which no explanation was provided by him.
He had pointed out the place from where the stepney was
recovered. He was seen with the car by Asif Rehman
(PW-2), who had no enmity with accused Raman Kapoor.
This Court should not disturb the concurrent findings of
fact recorded by the learned Courts below. He prayed that
the present petition be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the
submission made at the bar and have gone through the
record carefully.
13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC
204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the
revisional Court is not an appellate Court and it can only
rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It
was observed at page 207: –
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the
contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that
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material and evidence brought on record. The High
Court in criminal revision against conviction is not
supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the
appellate court, and the scope of interference in.
revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the
Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC“) vests
jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court.
The object of the provision is to set right a patent
defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to
be a well-founded error which is to be determinedon the merits of individual cases. It is also well
settled that while considering the same, the
Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the
facts and evidence of the case to reverse thosefindings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court
under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with
the power to call for and examine records of aninferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself
as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding
or order made in a case. The object of this provisionis to set right a patent defect or an error of
jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept
in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of
this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012)
4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope
of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly
explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of
an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying
itself as to the legality and regularity of any
proceedings or order made in a case. The object::: Downloaded on – 30/07/2025 21:20:28 :::CIS
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of this provision is to set right a patent defect or
an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a
well-founded error, and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,.
which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful
consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments
of this Court, it emerges that the revisional
jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions
under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is
no compliance with the provisions of law, the
finding recorded is based on no evidence,
material evidence is ignored, or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely.
These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely
indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a
very limited one and cannot be exercised in a
routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is
that it should not be against an interim or
interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in
mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where
the Court is dealing with the question as to
whether the charge has been framed properly
and in accordance with law in a given case, it
may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories
aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-
advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”
16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit
Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012)
9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri)
986] has also laid down principles to be considered
for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397
particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of
charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for
as under : (Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh
Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27)
“27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction
under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and::: Downloaded on – 30/07/2025 21:20:28 :::CIS
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Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of
jurisdictional distinction, it will now be
appropriate for us to enlist the principles with
reference to which the courts should exercise.
such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult
but inherently impossible to state such principles
with precision. At best and upon objective
analysis of various judgments of this Court, we
are able to cull out some of the principles to be
considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction,
particularly, with regard to quashing of charge
either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section
397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the
case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the
more the power, the more due care and caution isto be exercised in invoking these powers. The
power of quashing criminal proceedings,
particularly, the charge framed in terms of
Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that too
in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as made
from the record of the case and the documentssubmitted therewith prima facie establish the
offence or not. If the allegations are so patentlyabsurd and inherently improbable that no
prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion,
and where the basic ingredients of a criminaloffence are not satisfied, then the Court may
interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere.
No meticulous examination of the evidence is
needed for considering whether the case would
end in conviction or not at the stage of framing
of charge or quashing of charge.
***
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine
the facts, evidence and materials on record to
determine whether there is sufficient material on
the basis of which the case would end in a
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conviction; the court is concerned primarily with
the allegations taken as a whole whether they
will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse
of the process of court leading to injustice.
.
***
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the
rule of continuous prosecution. Where the
offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court
should be more inclined to permit continuation
of prosecution rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not expected to
marshal the records with a view to decide
admissibility and reliability of the documents or
records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.”
17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate
court and start appreciating the evidence by finding
out inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses,
and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts
ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court
was dealing with an application for discharge.
15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court
under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with
the power to call for and examine records of aninferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself
as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding
or order made in a case. The object of this provision
is to set right a patent defect or an error of
jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept
in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of
this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit
Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012)
4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope
of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly
explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of::: Downloaded on – 30/07/2025 21:20:28 :::CIS
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an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying
itself as to the legality and regularity of any
proceedings or order made in a case. The object
of this provision is to set right a patent defect or.
an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a
well-founded error, and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,
which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful
consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments
of this Court, it emerges that the revisional
jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions
under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is
no compliance with the provisions of law, the
finding recorded is based on no evidence,
material evidence is ignored, or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely.
These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely
indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a
very limited one and cannot be exercised in a
routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is
that it should not be against an interim or
interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in
mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction
itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where
the Court is dealing with the question as to
whether the charge has been framed properly
and in accordance with law in a given case, it
may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories
aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-
advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”
16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit
Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012)
9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri)
986] has also laid down principles to be considered
for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397
particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of
charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for
as under : (Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh
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Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27)
“27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction
under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and.
Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of
jurisdictional distinction, it will now be
appropriate for us to enlist the principles with
reference to which the courts should exercise
such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult
but inherently impossible to state such principles
with precision. At best and upon objective
analysis of various judgments of this Court, we
are able to cull out some of the principles to be
considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction,
particularly, with regard to quashing of charge
either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section
397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the
case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the
more the power, the more due care and caution is
to be exercised in invoking these powers. Thepower of quashing criminal proceedings,
particularly, the charge framed in terms of
Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that tooin the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as made
from the record of the case and the documentssubmitted therewith prima facie establish the
offence or not. If the allegations are so patently
absurd and inherently improbable that no
prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion,
and where the basic ingredients of a criminal
offence are not satisfied, then the Court may
interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere.
No meticulous examination of the evidence is
needed for considering whether the case would
end in conviction or not at the stage of framing
of charge or quashing of charge.
***
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27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine
the facts, evidence and materials on record to
determine whether there is sufficient material on
.
the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily with
the allegations taken as a whole whether they
will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse
of the process of court leading to injustice.
***
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the
rule of continuous prosecution. Where the
offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court
should be more inclined to permit continuation
of prosecution rather than its quashing at that
initial stage. The Court is not expected to
rmarshal the records with a view to decide
admissibility and reliability of the documents or
records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.”
17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate
court and start appreciating the evidence by finding
out inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses,
and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts
ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court
was dealing with an application for discharge.
16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda,
(2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ)
37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the
High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its
conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was
observed at page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the
scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for
exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High
Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath
Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana
Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999::: Downloaded on – 30/07/2025 21:20:28 :::CIS
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SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court
has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para
5)
.
“5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court
can call for and examine the record of any
proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence ororder. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But
the said revisional power cannot be equated with
the power of an appellate court, nor can it betreated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate
for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence
and come to its conclusion on the same when theevidence has already been appreciated by the
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in
appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to
the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of
justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgmentof the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint,
we have no hesitation in concluding that the
High Court exceeded its jurisdiction ininterfering with the conviction of the respondent
by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred
to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of
this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray
Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao
Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC
123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the
High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction,
shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate
unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there
is non-consideration of any relevant material, the
order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that
another view is possible. The following has been laid
down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate
is perverse or the view taken by the court is
wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material or there is
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palpable misreading of records, the Revisional
Court is not justified in setting aside the order,
merely because another view is possible. The
Revisional Court is not meant to act as an
.
appellate court. The whole purpose of the
revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in
the court to do justice in accordance with the
principles of criminal jurisprudence. The
revisional power of the court under Sections 397
to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an
appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose
decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be
perverse or untenable in law or is grossly
erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where
the decision is based on no material or where the
material facts are wholly ignored or where the
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
rcapriciously, the courts may not interfere with
the decision in exercise of their revisional
jurisdiction.”
14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused
was recorded, and the High Court set aside
[Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao
Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of
conviction by substituting its view. This Court set
aside the High Court’s order holding that the High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its
views, and that too without any legal basis.
17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v.
Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40:
(2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was
observed at page 205:
“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not,
in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent
factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to
re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales &
Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels::: Downloaded on – 30/07/2025 21:20:28 :::CIS
20
( 2025:HHC:25004 )
GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design
and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-
established principle of law that the Revisional
Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is.
passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence
of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first
question is, therefore, in the negative.”
18. The present revision has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
19. Bhagat Ram (PW-4) stated that he had parked
his Maruti Car bearing Registration No.HP-18-6400 on the
Mall Road inside the parking line on 11.05.2009; however, it
was found missing on 12.05.2009. He reported the matter
to the police. Firoj Khan, his neighbour, was told by Asif
Rahman that the car was parked in Gandhi Park,
Saharanpur. Asif Rahman became suspicious because the
accused had parked the car and had not returned;
thereafter, the informant visited Saharanpur with the
police. The Maruti Car was found parked at Gandhi Park.
The front registration plate was broken. Registration No.
HR-18-6 could be read. The letter “P” was changed to “R”
with the help of black tape. The police checked the engine
and the chassis number of the vehicle. These tallied with
the stolen vehicle. The spare stepney was missing from the
vehicle. One purse having the photographs of accused
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21
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Raman Kapoor was recovered from the car. The police put
the photographs in the parcel and sealed the parcel. He
.
identified the purse, photographs and the identity card.
Accused Raman Kapoor produced a key which was seized by
the police. He stated in his cross-examination that his
house was located near Hathi ki Kabar, where the people
park their vehicles. He used to park his car inside the
parking lot of the Mall Road. He admitted that the police
post in Gunnu Ghat is located on Mall Road. He was not
aware that the people used to walk frequently on the Mall
Road till 1:00-1:30 AM. He admitted that people used to
walk during the summers, but volunteered to say that the
people do not walk at night. Seema was his tenant. He was
not aware that Mohit Maria used to visit her, and accused
Raman had quarrelled with him. He denied that he had
evicted Seema after the incident. He came to know about
the theft at about 7:00 AM. He went to the police post at
8:00 AM. The police prepared various documents at
different places. He denied that no recovery was effected in
his presence. He denied that the photographs and identity
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cards were provided by the police. He denied that he was
making a false statement.
.
20. There is nothing in his cross-examination to
show that he is making a false statement. It was suggested
to him that accused Raman quarrelled with Mohit.
However, he denied this fact. A denied suggestion does not
amount to any proof, and this suggestion is not sufficient
to discard his testimony.
21. His testimony is duly corroborated by HHC
Jagdish Chand (PW-1). He stated that accused Raman
Kapoor produced one key on 16.05.2009, which was seized
vide memo (Ex. PW1/B). It was put in a cloth parcel, and the
parcel was sealed with seal ‘A’. Accused Raman Kapoor
made a disclosure statement in his presence and in
presence of Chaman Lal that he had concealed the stepney
of the vehicle at Judda Ka Johar, which could be got
recovered by him. Statement (Ex.PW1/C) was reduced to
writing. The police party went to Judda Ka Johar, where one
stepney concealed in the bushes was got recovered. The
police seized the stepney vide memo (Ext. PW1/D). Accused
Raman Kapoor made a statement that he could show the
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23
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place from where the theft was committed and the place
where the vehicle was parked. The accused led the police to
.
Mall Road from where the theft was committed and to
Gandhi Park where the vehicle was parked. The memo
(Ex.PW1/A) was prepared at about 1:00-1:15 PM. There are
many shops and houses near the police post. Memo (Ex.
PW1/B) was prepared in the police station. He did not
remember whether any person was called while preparing
this memo. Memo (Ext.PW1/D) was prepared at Judda Ka
Johar. No independent witness was associated from the
Nahan. Many heavily populated mohallas fall on the way to
Judda Ka Johar. Many people have their houses around
Gandhi Park. He denied that the false case was made
against the accused.
22. The cross-examination of this witness was
directed towards establishing that the houses of many
people are located near the police post, the place of
incident, and the place of recovery, and no independent
witness was associated. This kind of cross-examination
will not help the accused. Learned Courts below had rightly
pointed out that the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted
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24
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because no independent witness was associated with the
disclosure statements and the consequent recoveries. In
.
State Versus Sunil 2001 (1) SCC 652, the recovery was
discarded by the High Court on the ground that no
independent witness had signed the memo, and it was
signed only by the highly interested person. It was held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there is no requirement
under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act or Section 161
of Cr.P.C. to obtain the signatures of independent
witnesses. The requirement of independent witnesses is
when the recovery is effected under Section 100(4) of the
Cr.PC and not when the recovery is effected pursuant to the
disclosure statement. It was further observed that
statements of police officials cannot be doubted because
they are official witnesses. It was observed: –
“17. Recovery of the nicker is evidenced by the
seizure memo, Ext. PW-10/G. It was signed by
PWlO-Sharda beside its author, PW17-
Investigating Officer. The Division Bench of the
High Court declined to place any weight on the
said circumstance purely on the ground that no
other independent witness had signed the memo,
but it was signed only by “highly interested
persons”. The observation of the Division Bench
in that regard is extracted below:
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“It need hardly be said that in order to lend
assurance that the investigation has been
proceeding in a fair and honest manner, it
would be necessary for the Investigating.
Officer to take independent witnesses to the
discovery under Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act; and without takingindependent witnesses and taking highly
interested persons and the police officers as
the witnesses to the discovery would render
the discovery, at least, not free from doubt.”
18. In this context, we may point out that there is
no requirement either under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act or under Section 161 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to obtain the signature of
independent witnesses on the record in which the
statement of an accused is written. The legal
obligation to call Independent and respectable
inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness
the exercise made by the police is cast on the
police officer when searches are made under
Chapter VII of the Code. Section 100(5) of the Code
requires that such a search shall be made in their
presence and a list of all things seized in the
course of such search and of the places in which
they are respectively found shall be prepared by
such officer or another person, and signed by
such witnesses. It must be remembered that a
search is made to find out a thing or document
which the searching officer has no prior idea
where the thing or document is kept. He prowls
for it either on reasonable suspicion or some
guesswork that it could possibly be ferreted out in
such prowling. It is a stark reality that during
searches, the team which conducts the search
would have to meddle with lots of other articles
and documents also, and in such a process, many
such articles or documents are likely to be
displaced or even strewn helter-skelter. The
legislative idea in insisting on such searches to be
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26
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made in the presence of two independent
inhabitants of the locality is to ensure the safety
of all such articles meddled with and to protect
the rights of the persons entitled thereto. But the
.
recovery of an object pursuant to the information
supplied by an accused in custody is different
from the searching endeavour envisaged in
Chapter VII of the Code. This Court has indicated
the difference between the two processes in the
Transport Commissioner, Andhra Pradesh,
Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali & Ors 1. Following
observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. can be used
to support the said legal proposition:
“Section 100 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
to which reference was made by the counsel,deals with searches and not seizures. In the
very nature of things, when the property is
seized and not recovered during a search, it is
not possible to comply with the provisions of
subsections (4) and (5) of Section 100 of theCriminal Procedure Code. In the case of a
seizure (under the Motor Vehicles Act), there
is no provision for preparing a list of thethings seized in the course of the seizure for
the obvious reason that all those things areseized not separately but as part of the
vehicle itself.”
19. Hence, it is a fallacious impression that when
recovery is effected pursuant to any statement
made by the accused, the document prepared by
the Investigating Officer contemporaneous with
such recovery must necessarily be attested by
independent witnesses. Of course, if any such
statement leads to the recovery of any article, it is
open to the Investigating Officer to take the
signature of any person present at that time on
the document prepared for such recovery. But if
no witness was present or if no person had agreed
to affix his signature on the document, it is
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difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law, that
the document so prepared by the police officer
must be treated as tainted and the recovery
evidence unreliable. The court has to consider the
.
evidence of the Investigating Officer who deposed
to the fact of recovery based on the statement
elicited from the accused on its own worth.
20. We feel that it is an archaic notion that the
actions of the police officer should be approached
with initial distrust. We are aware that such a
notion was lavishly entertained during the British
period, and policemen also knew about it. Its
hangover persisted during post-independent
years, but it is time now to start placing at least
initial trust in the actions and the documents
made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot
start with the presumption that the police records
are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the
presumption should be the other way around.
That official acts of the police have been regularly
performed is a wise principle of presumption and
recognised even by the legislature. Hence, when a
police officer gives evidence in court that a certain
article was recovered by him on the strength of
the statement made by the accused, it is open to
the court to believe the version to be correct if it is
not otherwise shown to be unreliable. It is for the
accused, through cross-examination of witnesses
or through any other materials, to show that the
evidence of the police officer is either unreliable
or at least unsafe to be acted upon in a particular
case. If the court has any good reason to suspect
the truthfulness of such records of the police, the
court could certainly take into account the fact
that no other independent person was present at
the time of recovery. But it is not a legally
approvable procedure to presume the police
action as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison
such action merely for the reason that police did
not collect signatures of independent persons in
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the documents made contemporaneous with such
actions.”
23. This question was also considered by the
.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Praveen Kumar Versus State of
Karnataka (2003) 12 SCC 199, in which a contention was
raised that the statement recorded by the police under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act was not witnessed by
any independent witness and the same should be rejected.
It was held that there is no requirement to associate
independent witnesses at the time of the disclosure
statement. It was observed: –
“20. The learned counsel for the appellant,
however, contended that the alleged statement,
Ext. P-35 was made to PW 33, not in the presenceof any independent witness; hence, the same
should be rejected. He also contended that thesaid statement was made on 2-3-1994, but the
recovery was made only on 3-3-1994; therefore,
the said recovery cannot be correlated to thestatement, if any, made by the accused on 2-3-
1994. He also challenged the fact of recovery,
stating that the panch witnesses to the said
recovery cannot be believed.
21. Section 27 does not lay down that the
statement made to a police officer should always
be in the presence of independent witnesses.
Normally, in cases where the evidence led by the
prosecution as to a fact depends solely on the
police witnesses, the courts seek corroboration as
a matter of caution and not as a matter of rule.
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the court seek corroboration from an independent
source, in such cases, while assessing the
evidence of the police. But in cases where the
court is satisfied that the evidence of the police.
can be independently relied upon, then in such
cases, there is no prohibition in law that the same
cannot be accepted without independentcorroboration. In the instant case, nothing is
brought on record to show why the evidence of
PW 33 10 should be disbelieved in regard to the
statement made by the accused as per Ext. P-35.
Therefore, the argument that the statement of the
appellant as per Ext. P-35 should be rejected
because the same is not made in the presence of
an independent witness has to be rejected.”
24. The Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has
also considered this question in State of Rajasthan vs.
Mangal Singh, AIR 2017 Raj. 68 and gave the following
reasons for not insisting upon the presence of independent
witnesses during the disclosure statements:
22. We are of the firm opinion that the insistence
to keep attesting witnesses present when the
Investigating Officer records the informationsupplied by the accused under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act is absolutely unwarranted and
rather amounts to a direct infringement of the
confidentiality of the investigation. There are
strong reasons behind this conclusion. We
summarise a few illustrations to fortify the same:
(a) Investigation commences the moment an
F.I.R. is registered for a cognizable offence. An
Investigating Officer, having custody of the
accused, cannot predict in advance the precise
moment when the accused would decide to
reveal the information, which could lead to::: Downloaded on – 30/07/2025 21:20:28 :::CIS
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the discovery of an incriminating fact. Thus, if
attestation of the information by an
independent witness is insisted upon, as a
direct corollary thereto, the Investigating.
Officer would be required to keep the
witnesses in attendance right from the
moment the accused is arrested till the
information is elicited. This would lead to an
absolutely absurd situation and is likely to
frustrate the investigation. The very sanctity
of investigation and the privilege available to
the Investigating Officer to keep the
investigation secluded from prying eyes would
be compromised.
(b) Another possible situation may be that the
accused might divulge the information under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act to the
Investigating Officer at a particular point in
time when independent witnesses are not
available. For adhering to the procedure of
seeking attestation by independent witnesses,
the Investigating Officer would then be
required to summon independent witnesses
and request the accused to repeat the
information in their presence. At this point in
time, the accused may either refuse to divulge
the information given earlier or may oblige
the Investigating Officer with the
information, which would then be taken down
in writing in the presence of the independent
attesting witnesses. However, there is a
fundamental glitch in adopting this
procedure, which would certainly make the
information, if any, received the second time
around in the presence of the witnesses,
inadmissible in evidence. Law is well settled
by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, including the judgment in the
case of Aher Raja Khima v. The State of
Saurashtra, reported in AIR 1956 SC 217, that
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information of a fact already known to the
Investigating Officer is inadmissible in
evidence. Thus, in case the Investigating
Officer, while making an investigation of the
.
accused in his custody, is provided
information under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act and soon thereafter, calls the Panchas and
records the same in their presence, then he
would be recording the memorandum of
information already known to him. Such
information would be inadmissible at the
outset, and thus, the entire endeavour would
become nothing short of an exercise in
futility.
(c) There is yet another risk involved, which
could severely prejudice the accused if the
information provided by the accused under
Section 27 is recorded in the presence of
independent witnesses. The information
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act often
comprises two parts: one being confessional,
which has to be excluded, and the other,
which leads to the discovery of an
incriminating fact and is admissible in
evidence to the extent of the discovery made
in pursuance thereof. In case independent
witnesses are kept present when the
information is given by the accused, the
prosecution may make an endeavour to prove
even the confessional part of the information
as being an extra-judicial confession made in
the presence of independent witnesses. There
may even arise a situation where the
independent witness present to attest to the
memorandum prepared under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act is a Magistrate. In such a
case, the confessional part of the information
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act would
almost assume the character of a confession
under Section 26 of the Evidence Act, thereby
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condemning the accused to face severe
consequences. There is a high probability of
this situation arising in cases involving the
recovery of narcotics where the Investigating
.
Officer gives an option to the accused that be
searched in the presence of a Magistrate or a
Gazetted Officer. Contemplating that option to
be searched in the presence of a Magistrate is
given, and a search of the accused is
conducted, and during the process, he is also
questioned in the presence of the Magistrate.
At this time, the accused may provide
information under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act to the Investigating Officer, which is
partly confessional in nature and is taken
r down in writing and witnessed by the
Magistrate by adhering to the requirement of
attestation. In such a situation, the accused
would be faced with severe consequences
because the prosecution would then, by lifting
the prohibition contained in Section 26 of the
Evidence Act, insist to prove the whole of the
information as amounting to a confession
made in the presence of a Magistrate. Thus,
the requirement seeking attestation of the
memorandum prepared under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act does not have any logic or
rationale behind it.”
25. Therefore, the disclosure statement cannot be
discarded on the ground that independent witnesses were
not associated.
26. Asif Rehman (PW-2) stated that accused Javed
and Raman Kapoor came to his shop during the summers of
2009 in a Maruti Car bearing Registration No. HP-18-6,
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which had a damaged registration plate. They told him
(Asif Rehman) that the vehicle was defective and they did
.
not have the money to repair it. They parked the vehicle at
Gandhi Park and assured to return the next day. However,
no one came for 3-4 days. He informed his brother-in-law,
who told him that the car of his neighbour Bhagat Ram was
stolen and the accused did not have any vehicle with them.
The police came with Bhagat Ram and Firoze Khan. The
police checked the vehicle and found a purse containing the
photographs. The police seized the vehicle and took it with
them. He stated in his cross-examination that people bring
the vehicle to Saharanpur for repairs. He admitted that the
defective vehicles are abandoned on the road. He denied
that he was making a false statement regarding the accused
Raman Kapoor driving the vehicle. He admitted the
litigation between him and the family of accused Javed
during the cross-examination by learned counsel for Javed.
27. It was submitted that he had enmity with the
family of Javed, and his testimony is not reliable. This
submission cannot be accepted. He had enmity with the
accused Javed but none with accused Raman Kapoor.
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Therefore, his testimony cannot be discarded because of
enmity with accused Javed Khan.
.
28. Firoze Khan (PW-5) stated that he received a
call from his brother-in-law, Asif Khan, on 15.05.2009,
informing him that a car registered at Nahan was
abandoned at Gandhi Park, Saharanpur. He also informed
that the front registration plate of the car was damaged. He
informed Bhagat Ram about this fact. He and Bhagat Ram
went to Saharanpur with the police, where the vehicle was
recovered at Gandhi Park. The police checked the engine
and chassis number of the vehicle with the registration
certificate and seized it vide memo (Ext PW4/A). He stated
in his cross-examination that he and accused Raman
Kapoor are residents of the same mohalla. He admitted that
the younger brother of accused Raman Kapoor used to park
his motorcycle in the house of accused Raman Kapoor. He
admitted that accused Raman Kapoor quarrelled with his
elder brother. He admitted that his sister-in-law was a
witness in that case. He voluntarily said that she had
sustained injury to her head. He admitted that Hathi Ki
Kabar is located near the house of Bhagat Ram, where
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35
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people park their vehicles. He admitted that the people
continue to move on Mall Road till 12:00-1:00 AM. He
.
admitted that the police carry out patrolling duty during
the night. He stated that the police had obtained his
signatures on two documents, one at Nahan and one at
Saharanpur. They returned to Nahan at 1:30-2:00 pm.
People were moving at Saharanpur when the vehicle was
seized. They went to the house of Asif, who led them to the
place of recovery. He was not literate and could not state
where the memo (Ext.PW4/A) was prepared. He denied that
he was making a false statement.
29. It was submitted that he had enmity with the
accused Raman Kapoor and had a reason to depose falsely
against him (the accused). The mere enmity will not result
in the rejection of his statement. The Court has to see his
testimony with utmost care and caution. Even if his
testimony is seen with due care and caution, there is
nothing to doubt his testimony. His testimony is duly
corroborated by the informant, his brother-in-law and
HHC Jagdish; therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly
relied upon the testimony of this witness.
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30. HC Ranjeet Singh (PW7) stated that he
accompanied the informant and Firoze Khan to
.
Saharanpur, where a Maruti car with a damaged front
registration plate was found parked at Gandhi Park.
Registration number HR-18-6 was readable. It was
identified by the informant. The police checked the chassis
number and engine number, and they matched with those
recorded in the registration certificate. One purse having
two photographs of accused Raman Kapoor and one
identity Card of Raman Kapoor’s father was found in the
car. These were put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was
sealed. Asif Rehman revealed that accused Raman Kapoor
and Javed Ahmad had visited his shop in a car, and the
police found accused Raman Kapoor and Javed Ahmad at
Nahan. Accused Raman produced a key which was used for
opening the car. He seized the key. Accused Raman Kapoor
made a disclosure statement that he had concealed a car
stepney in the jungle, which could be got recovered by him.
The accused led the police and the witnesses to the place
from where the stepney was recovered. Accused Raman
made a statement that he could show the place from where
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the theft was committed and the place where the vehicle
was parked. He led the police to Mall Road and Gandhi Park.
.
He prepared the memos of these places. He admitted in his
cross-examination that memos (Ext. PW1/C and Ext.
PW1/E) were prepared at the Police Station, Nahan. He did
not make any effort to call an independent witness. The
memo (Ext PW1/D) was prepared at Judda Ka Johar. No
witness was associated while going towards Judda ka Johar.
No witness was also associated at Saharanpur. He admitted
that the houses and shops are located on the Mall Road, and
many people move on the Mall Road. He denied that the car
had not been stolen and that the false case was made
against the accused.
31. This witness was also cross-examined
regarding the non-association of independent witnesses. It
has also been found that the prosecution’s case cannot be
doubted because of the non-association of independent
witnesses. The accused did not suggest anything in the
cross-examination that he had any motive to depose
against the accused, and his testimony cannot be doubted
simply because he is a police official.
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32. Thus, it was duly placed on record that the theft
of the informant’s car had taken place from the Mall Road,
.
Nahan. The accused Raman Kapoor was seen driving a car
by the witness Asif Khan (PW3) immediately after the theft.
The police recovered the car and found a purse containing
the photographs of the accused, Raman, and the identity
card of Raman’s father. Accused Raman Kapoor made a
disclosure statement, and the stepney of the car was
recovered. The accused failed to provide any explanation in
his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. or
during the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses
regarding these circumstances. He simply denied the
prosecution’s case and claimed false implication. Section
114 Illustrations (a) provides that a person found in
possession of the stolen goods soon after the theft is
presumed to be a thief or the receiver of the stolen
property. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dakkata Balaram Reddy v. State of A.P., (2023) 19 SCC 461:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 474 that where the accused was found
in possession of the stolen goods, a presumption would
arise under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act and the
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burden to rebut the presumption is upon the accused. Itwas observed at page 471:
.
“27. In this regard, it may also be noted that A-2
was found in possession of a bag carrying some of
the stolen ornaments and, therefore, suchpossession itself speaks against him, in terms of
Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act, 1872. Being a fact
especially within his knowledge, it was for A-2 to
explain as to how he came to be in possession ofthose stolen ornaments, under Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, 1872. However, no explanation was
offered by him. As regards A-1, it is the
prosecution’s case that he confessed to thecommission of the crime and upon being questioned
as to the stolen gold ornaments, he himself went
into the other room in his house and brought out a
bag containing the gold ornaments. This part of his
confession would, therefore, be admissible underSection 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, as it led to the
recovery of the stolen gold ornaments.”
33. Therefore, the learned Courts below were
justified in holding that the accused had committed the
theft of the car, and there is no infirmity in the judgments
and order passed by the learned Courts below.
34. Therefore, the judgments and order passed by
learned Courts below are sustainable, and no interference
is required with them.
35. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the
same is dismissed.
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40
( 2025:HHC:25004 )
36. Registry is directed to transmit the records of th
learned Courts below forthwith.
.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
29th July 2025
(Ritu)
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