Ramanbhai Ishwarbhai Patel vs Union Of India on 30 June, 2025

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Gujarat High Court

Ramanbhai Ishwarbhai Patel vs Union Of India on 30 June, 2025

Author: Sunita Agarwal

Bench: Sunita Agarwal

                                                                                                              NEUTRAL CITATION




                            C/SCA/2142/2014                                   ORDER DATED: 30/06/2025

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                                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                                    R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2142 of 2014
                                                        With
                                    R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8416 of 2016
                                                        With
                                    R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2281 of 2016
                                                        With
                                    R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8164 of 2014
                                                        With
                                    R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8403 of 2016
                                                        With
                                    R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13489 of 2016
                      ==========================================================
                                          RAMANBHAI ISHWARBHAI PATEL & ORS.
                                                        Versus
                                                UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                      ==========================================================
                      Appearance:
                      MR MP SHAH(2418) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,10,11,12,13,14,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
                      MS. KRUTI M SHAH(2428) for the Petitioner(s) No.
                      1,10,11,12,13,14,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
                      ADVOCATE NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1
                      MR SANJAY UDHAWANI, ASST.GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
                      Respondent(s) No. 2,3 (SCA No.2142,8164 of 2014, SCA No.8416, 2281 of
                      2016)
                      MS HETAL PATEL, ASST.GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
                      Respondent(s)2,3 (SCA No.8403,13489 of 2016)
                      MR MAULIK G NANAVATI with MS MANVI DAMLE (3318) for the
                      Respondent(s) No. 4
                      ==========================================================

                        CORAM:HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE
                              SUNITA AGARWAL
                              and
                              HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.N.RAY

                                            Date : 30/06/2025
                                              ORAL ORDER

(PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA
AGARWAL)

1. The above noted petitions pending before this Court

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prior to the decision of the Apex Court in Union of
India and another vs. Tarsem Singh and others
,
(2019) 9 SCC 304, are being decided together with the
consent of the learned counsels for the parties.

2. We may note, at the outset, that by means of the draft
amendment of 24.01.2024, filed without any affidavit, in
the above noted writ petitions, the petitioners are
seeking to challenge the legality, constitutionality and
validity of Section 3G(5) and (6) of the National
Highways Act, 1956
. We may further note that the draft
amendments narrate only to add the legal grounds
without any factual foundation therein. The draft
amendments being not in the form of proper applications
under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure
supported with any affidavit, we do not find any good
ground to grant prayer for amendment of the writ
petitions to challenge the validity of Section 3G(5), that
too at this stage after a period of 10 years of the filing of
the writ petitions. More so, the question as to the
constitutional validity of Section 3G(5) is engaging
attention of the Apex Court in Writ Petition (s) (Civil)
No(s).1364 of 2023 in the case of B.D.Vivek vs. Union
of India and others
, wherein notices have already been
issued on 12.12.2023. We, therefore, do not find any
reason to keep the writ petitions pending by allowing
draft amendments moved after 10 years.

3. Resultantly, the only dispute in the present set of writ

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petitions filed in the year 2014-15, and 2015-16 remains
is about the validity of Section 3J of the National
Highways Act, 1956 which has been held
unconstitutional by the Apex Court in the case of Union
of India vs. Tersem Singh (supra). The Apex Court
while holding Section 3J as ultra vires, made the
following observations:-

“11. Before embarking on a discussion as to the
constitutional validity of the Amendment Act, it is
important to first understand what is meant by the
expression “solatium”. In Sunder v. Union of India
[Sunder
v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211] , a
Bench of five Judges of this Court laid down the
nature of solatium as follows : (SCC p. 229, paras 21
and 22)
“21. It is apposite in this context to point out
that during the enquiry contemplated under
Section 11 of the Act the Collector has to
consider the objections which any person
interested has stated pursuant to the notice
given to him. It may be possible that a person so
interested would advance objections for
highlighting his disinclination to part with the
land acquired on account of a variety of grounds,
such as sentimental or religious or psychological
or traditional, etc. Section 24 emphasises that
no amount on account of any disinclination of
the person interested to part with the land shall
be granted as compensation. That aspect is
qualitatively different from the solatium which
the legislature wanted to provide ‘in
consideration of the compulsory nature of the
acquisition’.

22. Compulsory nature of acquisition is to be
distinguished from voluntary sale or transfer. In
the latter, the landowner has the widest
advantage in finding out a would-be buyer and in
negotiating with him regarding the sale price.
Even in such negotiations or haggling, normally

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no landowner would bargain for any amount in
consideration of his disinclination to part with
the land. The mere fact that he is negotiating for
sale of the land would show that he is willing to
part with the land. The owner is free to settle
terms of transfer and choose the buyer as also to
appoint the point of time when he would be
receiving consideration and parting with his title
and possession over the land. But in the
compulsory acquisition the landowner is
deprived of the right and opportunity to
negotiate and bargain for the sale price. It
depends on what the Collector or the court fixes
as per the provisions of the Act. The solatium
envisaged in sub-section (2) “in consideration of
the compulsory nature of the acquisition” is thus
not the same as damages on account of the
disinclination to part with the land
acquired.”(emphasis supplied)
Thus, the solatium that is paid to a landowner is
on account of the fact that a landowner, who
may not be willing to part with his land, has now
to do so, and that too at a value fixed
legislatively and not through negotiation, by
which, arguably, such landowner would get the
best price for the property to be sold. Once this
is understood in its correct perspective, it is
clear that “solatium” is part and parcel of
compensation that is payable for compulsory
acquisition of land.

12. As has been stated by us hereinabove, solatium
and interest were awarded to landowners for
compulsory acquisition of their lands for the purpose
of National Highways until the 1997 Amendment Act.
Interestingly, after the Land Acquisition Act has been
repealed and the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013
has come into force, Section
105 of the said Act provides as under:

“105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in
certain cases or to apply with certain

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modifications.–(1) Subject to sub-section (3),
the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the
enactments relating to land acquisition specified
in the Fourth Schedule.

(2) Subject to sub-section (2) of Section 106, the
Central Government may, by notification, omit or
add to any of the enactments specified in the
Fourth Schedule.

(3) The Central Government shall, by notification,
within one year from the date of commencement
of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of
this Act relating to the determination of
compensation in accordance with the First
Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement
specified in the Second and Third Schedules,
being beneficial to the affected families, shall
apply to the cases of land acquisition under the
enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or
shall apply with such exceptions or modifications
that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the
provisions of this Act relating to compensation or
rehabilitation and resettlement as may be
specified in the notification, as the case may be.
(4) A copy of every notification proposed to be
issued under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft
before each House of Parliament, while it is in
session, for a total period of thirty days which
may be comprised in one session or in two or
more successive sessions, and if, before the
expiry of the session immediately following the
session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both
Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the
notification or both Houses agree in making any
modification in the notification, the notification
shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall
be issued only in such modified form as may be
agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament.”

13. The First Schedule to the said Act provides that
solatium equivalent to 100% of the market value
multiplied by various factors, depending on whether the

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land is situated in a rural or urban area, constitutes
minimum compensation package to be given to those
whose land is acquired. The Fourth Schedule to this Act,
to be read along with Section 105, expressly includes
under Item 7, the National Highways Act, 1956. In Item
9, this Schedule also includes the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952
. By a
Notification dated 28-8-2015 issued under Section 105
read with Section 113 of the 2013 Act, it is provided
that the 2013 Act compensation provisions will apply to
acquisitions that take place under the National
Highways Act
. The result is that both before the 1997
Amendment Act and after the coming into force of the
2013 Act, solatium and interest is payable to
landowners whose property is compulsorily acquired for
purposes of National Highways. This is one other very
important circumstance to be borne in mind when
judging the constitutional validity of the 1997
Amendment Act for the interregnum period from 1997
to 2015.”

“19. It is well settled that in order that a law avail of the
protection of Article 31-C, it is not necessary that any
declaration be made in that behalf. (See State of
Maharashtra v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan [State of
Maharashtra
v. Basantibai Mohanlal Khetan, (1986) 2
SCC 516] SCC at p. 530.) It is also important to
remember that in order that a law be shielded by Article
31-C
, the said law must have a direct and rational nexus
with the principles contained in Article 39(b).
(See
Assam Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India [Assam
Sillimanite Ltd. v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC
692 : 1991 Supp (3) SCR 273] SCR at p. 290.)

20. An example of a law which claimed the benefit of
Article 31-C, but was denied such benefit is set out in
K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of T.N. [K.R. Lakshmanan v.
State of T.N., (1996) 2 SCC 226] as follows : (SCC pp.
254-55, para 44)
“44. The main object for which the Club was
established is to carry on the business of race club,

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in particular the running of horse races,
steeplechases or races of any other kind and for
any kind of athletic sports and for playing their
own games of cricket, bowls, golf, lawn tennis, polo
or any other kind of games or amusement,
recreation, sport or entertainment, etc. In the
earlier part of this judgment, we have noticed the
working of the Club which shows that apart from
5% commission from the totalizator and the
bookmakers no part of the betting-money comes to
the Club. The Club does not own or control any
material resources of the community which are to
be distributed in terms of Article 39(b) of the
Constitution of India. There are two aspects of the
functioning of the Club. One is the betting by the
punters at the totalizator and with the bookies. The
Club does not earn any income from the betting-
money except 5% commission. There is no question
whatsoever of the Club owning or controlling the
material resources of the community or in any
manner contributing towards the operation of the
economic system resulting in the concentration of
wealth and means of production to the common
detriment. The second aspect is the conduct of
horse races by the Club. Horse racing is a game of
skill, the horse which wins the race is given a prize
by the Club. It is a simple game of horse racing
where the winning horses are given prizes. Neither
the “material resources of the community” nor “to
subserve the common good” has any relevance to
the twin functioning of the Club. Similarly, the
operation of the Club has no relation or effect on
the “operation of the economic system”. There is
no question whatsoever of attracting the directive
principles contained in Articles 39(b) and (c) of the
Constitution. The declaration in Section 2 of the
Act and the recital containing aims and objectives
totally betray the scope and purpose of Articles
39(b)
and (c) of the Constitution. While Article
39(b)
refers to “material resources of the
community”, the aims and objects of the Act refer
to “the material resources of the Madras Race
Club”. It is difficult to understand what exactly are

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the material resources of the race club which are
sought to be distributed so as to subserve the
common good within the meaning of the directive
principles. Equally, the reference to Article 39(c) is
wholly misplaced. While Article 39(c) relates to
“the operation of the economic system … to the
common detriment”, the aims and objectives of the
Act refer to “the economic system of the Madras
Race Club”. What is meant by the economic system
of the Madras Race Club is not known. Even if it is
assumed that betting by the punters at the
totalizator and with the bookmakers is part of the
economic system of the Madras Race Club, it has
no relevance to the objectives specified in Articles
39(b)
and (c). We are, therefore, of the view that
reference to Articles 39(b) and (c) in the aims and
objects and in Section 2 of the Act is nothing but a
mechanical reproduction of constitutional
provisions in a totally inappropriate context. There
is no nexus so far as the provisions of the 1986 Act
are concerned with the objectives contained in
Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution. We,
therefore, hold that the protection under Article
31-C
of the Constitution cannot be extended to the
1986 Act.”

This is despite the fact that the impugned
enactment, namely, the Madras Race Club
(Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act,
1986 contained a declaration that it was enacted
to give effect to the policy of the State under
Articles 39(b) and (c).

21. When we examine the Objects and Reasons which
led to the 1997 Amendment of the National Highways
Act
, we do not find mentioned therein of any object
relating to distribution of the material resources of the
community. The object of the Amendment Act has no
relationship whatsoever to the directive principles
contained in Article 39(b), inasmuch as its limited object
is to expedite the process of land acquisition by avoiding
inordinate delays therein. The object of the Amendment
Act was not to acquire land for the purpose of National
Highways as, pre-amendment, the Land Acquisition Act

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provided for this. The object of the Amendment Act was
fulfilled by providing a scheme different from that
contained in the Land Acquisition Act, making it clear
that the stage of offer of an amount by way of
compensation is removed altogether; vesting takes place
as soon as the Section 3-D notification is issued; and
most importantly, the tardy court process is replaced by
arbitration. Obviously, these objects have no direct and
rational nexus with the directive principles contained in
Article 39(b). Article 31-C is, therefore, out of harm’s
way. Even otherwise, on the assumption that Article 31-
C
is attracted to the facts of this case, yet, as was held
by Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India
[Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 :

(1981) 1 SCR 206] : (SCC p. 716, para 114 : SCR pp.

338-39)
“114. … it is not every provision of a statute, which
has been enacted with the dominant object of
giving effect to a directive principles, that is
entitled to protection, but only those provisions of
the statute which are basically and essentially
necessary for giving effect to the directive
principles are protected under the amended Article
31-C.”

“24. Even if the 1997 Amendment Act be regarded as an
Act to carry out the purposes of Article 39(b), the object
of the Amendment Act is not served by removing
solatium and interest from compensation to be awarded.
It is obvious, therefore, that the grant of compensation
without solatium and interest is not basically and
essentially necessary to carry out the object of the 1997
Amendment Act, even if it is to be considered as an
acquisition Act pure and simple, for the object of the
said Amendment Act as we have seen is to obviate delays
in the acquisition process of acquiring land for National
Highways. On application of this test as well, it is clear
that the grant of compensation without solatium and
interest, not being basically and essentially necessary to
carry out the object of the Amendment Act, would not
receive the protective umbrella of Article 31-C and,
therefore, any infraction of Article 14 can be inquired
into by the Court.”

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4. The Apex Court while holding Section 3J as ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution of India, made the
following observations:-

“25. The sheet anchor of the case of the respondents is
the Constitution Bench judgment in P. Vajravelu
Mudaliar v. LAO [P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. LAO, (1965)
1 SCR 614 : AIR 1965 SC 1017] and Nagpur
Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao [Nagpur
Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500] .
It is, therefore, most important to advert to these two
decisions in some detail.”

“29. Both, P. Vajravelu Mudaliar [P. Vajravelu
Mudaliar v. LAO, (1965) 1 SCR 614 : AIR 1965 SC
1017] and Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur
Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao
, (1973) 1 SCC 500]
clinch the issue in favour of the respondents, as has
been correctly held by the Punjab and Haryana High
Court in Golden Iron and Steel Forging [Golden Iron
and Steel Forging v. Union of India
, 2008 SCC OnLine
P&H 498 : (2011) 4 RCR (Civil) 375] . First and
foremost, it is important to note that, as has been seen
hereinabove, the object of the 1997 Amendment was to
speed up the process of acquiring lands for National
Highways. This object has been achieved in the
manner set out hereinabove. It will be noticed that the
awarding of solatium and interest has nothing to do
with achieving this object, as it is nobody’s case that
land acquisition for the purpose of National Highways
slows down as a result of award of solatium and
interest. Thus, a classification made between different
sets of landowners whose lands happen to be acquired
for the purpose of National Highways and landowners
whose lands are acquired for other public purposes
has no rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the Amendment Act i.e. speedy acquisition
of lands for the purpose of National Highways. On this
ground alone, the Amendment Act falls foul of Article

14.”

“31.Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur Improvement

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Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500] has clearly held
that ordinarily a classification based on public purpose
is not permissible under Article 14 for the purpose of
determining compensation. Also, in para 30, the seven-
Judge Bench unequivocally states that it is immaterial
whether it is one Acquisition Act or another
Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired, as, if
the existence of these two Acts would enable the State
to give one owner different treatment from another
who is similarly situated, Article 14 would be
infracted. In the facts of these cases, it is clear that
from the point of view of the landowner it is
immaterial that his land is acquired under the National
Highways Act
and not the Land Acquisition Act, as
solatium cannot be denied on account of this fact
alone.”

“46. It is worthy of note that even in acquisitions that
take place under the National Highways Act and the
1952 Act, the notification of 2015 under the new
Acquisition Act of 2013 makes solatium and interest
payable in cases covered by both Acts. In fact, with
effect from 1-1-2015, Amendment Ordinance 9 of 2014
was promulgated amending the 2013 Act. Section 10
of the said Amendment Ordinance states as follows:

“10. In the principal Act, in Section 105–

(i) for sub-section (3), the following sub-section
shall be substituted, namely–

‘(3) The provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation in accordance with
the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement
in accordance with the Second Schedule and
infrastructure amenities in accordance with the
Third Schedule shall apply to the enactments
relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth
Schedule with effect from 1-1-2015;’

(ii) sub-section (4) shall be omitted.”

47. It is only when this Ordinance lapsed that the
Notification dated 28-8-2015 was then made under
Section 113 of the 2013 Act. This notification is
important and states as follows:

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“MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT
ORDER

New Delhi, 28-8-2015
S.O. 2368(E).–Whereas, the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of
2013) (hereinafter referred to as “the RFCTLARR Act“)
came into effect from 1-1-2014;

And whereas, sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the
RFCTLARR Act provided for issuing of notification to
make the provisions of the Act relating to the
determination of the compensation, rehabilitation and
resettlement applicable to cases of land acquisition
under the enactments specified in the Fourth
Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act
;

And whereas, the notification envisaged under sub-
section (3) of Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act was not
issued, and the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance,
2014 (9 of 2014) was promulgated on 31-12-2014,
thereby, inter alia, amending Section 105 of the
RFCTLARR Act to extend the provisions of the Act
relating to the determination of the compensation and
rehabilitation and resettlement to cases of land
acquisition under the enactments specified in the
Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act;

And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance,
2015 (4 of 2015) was promulgated on 3-4-2015 to give
continuity to the provisions of the RFCTLARR
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2014;

And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second
Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) was promulgated on 30-
5-2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the
RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015);
And whereas, the replacement Bill relating to the
RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015)
was referred to the Joint Committee of the Houses for
examination and report and the same is pending with
the Joint Committee;

And whereas, as per the provisions of Article 123 of
the Constitution, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second
Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) shall lapse on the 31st

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day of August, 2015 and thereby placing the
landowners at the disadvantageous position, resulting
in denial of benefits of enhanced compensation and
rehabilitation and resettlement to the cases of land
acquisition under the 13 Acts specified in the Fourth
Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act
as extended to the
landowners under the said Ordinance;
And whereas, the Central Government considers it
necessary to extend the benefits available to the
landowners under theRFCTLARRAct to similarly placed
landowners whose lands are acquired under the 13
enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule; and
accordingly the Central Government keeping in view
the aforesaid difficulties has decided to extend the
beneficial advantage to the landowners and uniformly
apply the beneficial provisions of the RFCTLARR Act,
relating to the determination of compensation and
rehabilitation and resettlement as were made
applicable to cases of land acquisition under the said
enactments in the interest of the landowners;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section (1) of Section 113 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of
2013), the Central Government hereby makes the
following Order to remove the aforesaid difficulties,
namely:

1. (1) This Order may be called the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Removal of
Difficulties) Order, 2015.

(2) It shall come into force with effect from the 1st
day of September, 2015.

2. The provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013
, relating to the
determination of compensation in accordance with the
First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in
accordance with the Second Schedule and
infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third
Schedule shall apply to all cases of land acquisition
under the enactments specified in the Fourth
Schedule to the said Act.

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[F. No. 13011/01/2014-LRD]
K.P. Krishnan, Addl. Secy.”

“48. It is thus clear that the Ordinance as well as the
notification have applied the principle contained in
Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur Improvement Trust
v. Vithal Rao
, (1973) 1 SCC 500] , as the Central
Government has considered it necessary to extend the
benefits available to landowners generally under the
2013 Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are
acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth
Schedule, the National Highways Act being one of the
aforesaid enactments.
This being the case, it is clear that
the Government has itself accepted that the principle of
Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur Improvement Trust
v. Vithal Rao
, (1973) 1 SCC 500] would apply to
acquisitions which take place under the National
Highways Act
, and that solatium and interest would be
payable under the 2013 Act to persons whose lands are
acquired for the purpose of National Highways as they
are similarly placed to those landowners whose lands
have been acquired for other public purposes under the
2013 Act. This being the case, it is clear that even the
Government is of the view that it is not possible to
discriminate between landowners covered by the 2013
Act and landowners covered by the National Highways
Act
, when it comes to compensation to be paid for lands
acquired under either of the enactments. The judgments
delivered under the 1952 Act as well as the Defence of
India Act, 1971
, may, therefore, require a re-look in the
light of this development. [ The Defence of India Act,
1971
, was a temporary statute which remained in force
only during the period of operation of a proclamation of
emergency and for a period of six months thereafter —
vide Section 1(3) of the Act. As this Act has since expired,
it is not included in the Fourth Schedule of the 2013 Act.]

In any case, as has been pointed out hereinabove, Chajju
Ram [Union of India v. Chajju Ram
, (2003) 5 SCC 568] ,
has been referred to a larger Bench.
In this view of the
matter, we are of the view that the view of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh,
2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6036] , [Jang Bahadur v. Union of
India, 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6034] , [Union of India v.

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NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/2142/2014 ORDER DATED: 30/06/2025

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Abhinav Cotspin Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 19319] is
correct, whereas the view of the Rajasthan High Court
[Banshilal Samariya v. Union of India, 2005 SCC OnLine
Raj 572 : 2005-06 Supp RLW 559] is not correct.”

4. The ultimate relief granted by the Apex Court is :-

“52. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor
General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the
issue raised in these cases. This assumes importance in
view of the plea of Shri Divan that the impugned
judgments should be set aside on the ground that when
the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or
interest, no Section 34 petition having been filed by the
landowners on this score, the Division Bench judgments
that are impugned before us ought not to have allowed
solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, we would have
acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the
Government itself is of the view that solatium and
interest should be granted even in cases that arise
between 1997 and 2015, in the interest of justice we
decline to interfere with such orders, given our
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India. We therefore declare that the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to
solatium and interest contained in Sections 23(1-A) and
(2) and interest payable in terms of Section 28 proviso
will apply to acquisitions made under the National
Highways Act
. Consequently, the provision of Section 3-

J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be
unconstitutional. Accordingly, appeal arising out of SLP
(C) No. 9599 of 2019 is dismissed.”

5. Following the same, we find it fit and proper to dispose
of the present petition in light of the decision of the
Apex Court with the observation that the benefits as
admissible to the land holders towards solatium and
interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 at the rate of 9% and 15%, shall be payable. It is
clarified that the interest amount of 9% and 15% shall

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NEUTRAL CITATION

C/SCA/2142/2014 ORDER DATED: 30/06/2025

undefined

be computed on the unpaid amount towards Solatium
which is to be computed by preparing an additional
award, from the date of taking possession of the land in
question till the date of deposit of the amount under
the award, before the competent authority. The
additional award shall include Solatium as well as
interest thereon and the computation shall be made
strictly in accordance with law. The disbursement of
the amount determined under the additional award
shall be made after due verification of the entitlement
of each land holder(s)/petitioners herein on production
of relevant documents pertaining to the same.

6. The entire exercise of computation by making of the
additional awards with respect to each of the land
holding shall be completed within the period of six
weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order
after providing due notice and opportunity to the
National Highways Authority of India and also the land
holders. The present set of petitions stand disposed of,
accordingly.

(SUNITA AGARWAL, CJ )

(D.N.RAY,J)
SUDHIR

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