Uttarakhand High Court
Ramesh Chandra vs State Of Uttaranchal on 2 April, 2025
Author: Pankaj Purohit
Bench: Pankaj Purohit
Judgment Reserved on:06.03.2025
Judgment Delivered on:02.04.2025
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Criminal Appeal No.101 of 2007
Ramesh Chandra .........Appellant
Vs.
State of Uttaranchal ........Respondent
Present:-
Mr. B.P.S. Mer, learned counsel for the appellant.
Mr. Vipul Painuly, learned Brief Holder for the State.
Hon'ble Pankaj Purohit, J. (Oral)
This appeal is preferred by the appellant under
Section 374 (2) Cr.P.C. and is directed against the judgment and
order dated 13.03.2007, passed by learned Sessions Judge,
Almora in Sessions Trial No.11 of 2004, State vs. Ramesh
Chandra & others, whereby the accused-appellant has been
convicted under Section 498A and 304B IPC and was sentenced
to undergo two years’ R.I. under Section 498A IPC with fine of
Rs.2,000/- with default stipulation of additional one month simple
imprisonment and was sentenced ten years’ R.I. under Section
304B IPC. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
2. In brief the prosecution case is that Smt. Munni who
was daughter of informant, namely, Jeva Nand was married to
Ramesh Chandra as per Hindu rites and rituals. On the fateful
night of 18.04.2001, she was found dead. The informant alleges
that she was killed as her paternal family was unable to fulfil
dowry demand of Rs.1.25 lakhs and four tolas of gold.
3. On the basis of aforesaid report, a charge-sheet was
filed by the investigating officer in the court of learned Judicial
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Magistrate, who in turn, committed the case to the Sessions Court,
Almora for trial.
4. Thereafter, on 13.08.2004, learned Sessions Judge,
Almora framed charges under Sections 498A and 304B IPC. The
charges were read over and explained to the accused, who pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
5. To prove its case, the prosecution has examined PW1
(Jiva Nand-informant), PW2 (Smt. Durga Devi-mother of
deceased), PW3 (Ramesh Chandra-brother of deceased), PW4
(Dr. K.S. Dhami-Medical Officer), PW 5 (Chandra Singh
Martoliya-Naib Tehsildar) and PW6 (Heera Singh Phartyal) to
substantiate and prove the charges against the appellant.
6. After prosecution evidence, the statement of appellant
was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which, he stated that
he was innocent and claimed to be tried.
7. During trial, PW1 reiterated the facts of the
prosecution story and supported it. He stated that the deceased
was his daughter and died within 14 months of the marriage. He
further deposed that whenever she used to visit her maternal
house, she used to inform that her in-laws are demanding Rs.1.25
lakhs and four tolas gold. He also deposed that when he visited
her matrimonial house for a function, his son-in-law demanded
Rs.1.25 lakhs for establishing an Atta-Chakki to which he replied
that he will not be able to arrange it due to lack of resources. He
also explained the cacuse of delay in lodging the FIR.
8. PW2 on oath deposed that she is the mother of
deceased. She stated that whenever the deceased used to visit her
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maternal house, she used to inform about the demand of Rs.1.25
lakhs and four tolas gold
9. PW3 in his examination-in-chief deposed that he is
the brother of deceased and got to know about her death when he
was in Madhya Pradesh after which he rushed to his home. On
reaching there his parents informed him that his sister’s in-laws
used to demand Rs.1.25 lakhs and four tolas of gold, non-
fulfilment of which ultimately resulted in her death. In cross-
examination, he told that when his sister informed him regarding
demand of dowry for the first time, he did not report about it to
the police authorities. He further admitted that during
investigation also he did not speak anything regarding demand of
dowry and is raising this fact for the first time in the Court.
10. PW4 who happens to be the Medial Officer admitted
that real cause of death could not be ascertained during post-
mortem and in cross-examination admitted that death could have
been caused due to epilepsy.
11. PW5 and PW6 were the Revenue Police authorities
who investigated the case and supported the prosecution story
during trial. They deposed regarding the veracity of charge-sheet,
site plan, FIR etc.
12. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the
appellant that there is a delay in lodging the FIR on behalf of
prosecution, which creates a serious doubt over their entire story.
He further submits that the FIR was lodged as a result of a tussel
regarding the custody of the minor child of the deceased.
13. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the
appellant that essential conditions of culpability under Section
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304B and 498A IPC were not established by the prosecution,
therefore, the learned trial court committed grave error in raising
the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.
14. Per contra, learned State Counsel supported the case
of prosecution.
15. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and
on perusal of the record and after going through the relevant
provisions under Sections 498A and 304B IPC and Section 113-B
of the Indian Evidence Act, this Court is of the opinion that there
is nothing on record to prove the guilt of the appellant to the hilt
and beyond all reasonable doubts.
16. Section 304B IPC for which the appellant was
convicted needs a look, before arriving at a conclusion. Section
304B IPC is quoted below:-
“304B. Dowry death.-(1) where the death of a woman is caused by
any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown
that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called
“dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
have caused her death.
Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry”
shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).”
17. From perusal of Section 304B IPC, it reflects that
following ingredients need to be proved to make out an offence
viz:-
(i) Unnatural death which may be suicidal/homicidal.
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(ii) Within seven years of marriage.
(iii) Soon before her death cruelty or harassment.
(iv) By the husband or his relative in connection with dowry.
18. Here in the case in hand, it is very clear from perusal
of the record that neither any prosecution witness alleges “cruelty
or harassment” meted out by the appellant “in connection to
dowry” nor the prosecution has proved the same. It is amply clear
that the statements given by PW1, PW2 & PW3 are bald
statements which do not indicate any form of cruelty meted out to
deceased by the appellant.
19. As held by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments
that presumption under Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act
would be attracted only when it is proved that soon before her
death the woman was subjected to cruelty that too in connection
with any demand of dowry. Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence
Act, which is quoted hereinbelow:-
“113B. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is
whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it
is shown that soon before her death such woman has been
subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume
that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, “dowry
death” shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
20. This Court is of the opinion that in the case in hand as
the appellant did not subject the deceased women to cruelty in
connection with the demand of dowry soon before her death, the
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learned trial court was wrong in raising a presumption under
Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act against the appellant.
My view is further substantiated by para 32 of the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Baijnath & others vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh; reported in (2017) 1 SCC 101. For the sake of
convenience, para 32 of Baijnath (Supra) is quoted below:-
“32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of
Section 304-B of the Code and Section 113-B of the Act have
propounded that the presumption is contingent on the fact that the
prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section
304-B as in Shindo v. State of Punjab [Shindo v. State of Punjab,
(2011) 11 SCC 517 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 394] and echoed
in Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rajeev Kumar v. State of
Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 640 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 346] . In the
latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the
essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304-B of the
Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty
in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and
that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the
accused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section
113-B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier decision
of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao [K. Prema
S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, (2003) 1 SCC 217 : 2003 SCC (Cri)
271] to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304-B of
the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is
required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was
subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection with the
demand for dowry”.”
21. In the absence of the essential, it cannot be safe to
convict the appellant under Section 304B IPC.
22. Further, the offence punishable under Section 498A
IPC in my opinion is also not made out against the appellant as
the prosecution has failed to prove any sort of cruelty by the
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appellant/husband towards to meet any unlawful demand as given
in Section 498A (b) IPC. Neither the evidence of prosecution
witnesses in the course of trial indicate any sort of cruelty as
defined under Section 498A IPC.
23. In this view of matter, it is safe to conclude that the
prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt
against the appellant.
24. The upshot of the aforesaid discussions is that the
appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, present appeal is
allowed and the impugned judgment and order dated 13.03.2007,
passed by learned Sessions Judge, Almora is hereby set-aside. The
appellant is on bail. He needs not to surrender. His sureties be
discharged forthwith.
25. Let the T.C.R. be immediately sent back to the trial
court for consignment.
(Pankaj Purohit, J.)
02.04.2025
AK
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