Chattisgarh High Court
Ramji @ Sonu Dadsena vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 5 February, 2025
Author: Sanjay K. Agrawal
Bench: Sanjay K. Agrawal
1
Digitally signed
by BHOLA
NATH KHATAI
Date:
2025.02.10
10:50:14 +0530
2025:CGHC:6496-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1405 of 2019
1 - Ramji @ Sonu Dadsena S/o Punit Dadsena Aged About 28
Years R/o Indira Awas Para, Lendhra, Thana- Baramkela,
District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Puneet Dadsena S/o Bheekharam Dadsena Aged About 56
Years R/o Indira Awas Para, Lendhra, Thana- Baramkela,
District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.
... Appellants
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Baramkela,
District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent
For Appellant : Smt. Indira Tripathi, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Shri Sharad Mishra, Panel Lawyer
Division Bench
Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and
Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal
Judgment on Board
(05.02.2025)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J
1. Appellant No.1 Ramji @ Sonu Dadsena and his father
2
appellant No.2 Puneet Dadsena have jointly preferred this
appeal under Section 374(2) of CrPC calling in question the
legality, validity and correctness of the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 23.08.2019, passed
in Special Criminal Case (Atrocity Act) No. 35/2018, by the
Special Judge [Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act], Raigarh, (CG), whereby the
appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:
Conviction Sentence U/s. 302/34 of IPC Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.3,000, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 2 years.
U/s. 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST R.I. for 10 years with fine of
(POA) Act Rs.2,000/-, in default of
payment of fine, additional R.I.
for 2 years.
U/s. 449 of IPC R.I. for 10 years with fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 2 years.
[All the sentences are directed to run concurrently]
2. During the pendency of this appeal, Appellant No.2 Puneet
Dadsena died, therefore, the appeal in respect of Appellant
No.2 Puneet Dadsena stands abated. Now, the appeal, in so
far as it relates to appellant No.1 Ramji @ Sonu Dadsena, is
being decided by this judgment.
3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 09.05.2018 at
about 10:00 pm, the appellants herein, knowing fully well
that deceased Ramcharan Bhoi belongs to Scheduled Tribe
community trespassed his house and in furtherance of their
common intention, assaulted him with stick & brick, due to
which Ramcharan Bhoi suffered grievous injuries and died.
When the wife and son of the deceased namely Tebha Bai
3
(PW-8) and Deepak Bhoi (PW-5) tried to intervene, the
appellants also caused injuries to them, thereby the offence
has been committed. The matter was reported to Police
Station Baramkela by Madan Binjhwar (PW-1), pursuant to
which Merg (Ex.P-4) was recorded and FIR (Ex. P-1) was
registered. Inquest was conducted vide Ex. P-3 and the dead
body of deceased Ramcharan Bhoi was subjected to
postmortem which was conducted jointly by Dr. Awadhesh
Panigrahi and Dr. Sanjay Patel. As per postmortem report
(Ex.P/13), cause of death was opined to be excessive
hemorrhage leading to hypovolemic shock which was caused
by polytrauma & multiple fractures on the body and death
was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum
statement of appellant No.2 (Ex.P-6), the weapon of offence
i.e. stick was seized vide Ex. P-8 but the same has not been
sent to FSL for chemical examination, for the reason best
known to the prosecution. The brick was seized from the
spot vide Ex.P-7 which was sent for chemical examination to
FSL along with other articles and as per the FSL report Ex.P-
28, human blood was found on the said brick and the T-
shirt of appellant No.1. After completion of investigation, the
appellants were charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence in
the competent criminal Court having jurisdiction, which was
thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing
and trial in accordance with law.
4. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many
as 14 witnesses and exhibited 33 documents, apart from
Article-A/1. Statements of the accused/appellants were
recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, in which they denied
the circumstances appearing against them in the evidence
brought on record by the prosecution, pleaded innocence
and false implication. The appellants in support of their
4
defence, though not examined any witness, but exhibited 02
documents.
5. Learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and
documentary evidence available on record, convicted and
sentenced the appellants as mentioned in the opening
paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has
been preferred by the appellants questioning the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence.
6. Smt. Indira Tripathi, learned counsel for the appellants
would submit that the prosecution has not been able to
bring home the offence under section 302/34 of IPC beyond
reasonable doubt. She submits that if the case of
prosecution is taken as it is, it would be a case, at the most,
of commission of offence under Section 304 Part-II of IPC as
the appellants had no intention to cause death of
Ramcharan Bhoi and on account of dispute regarding
boundary wall of courtyard, on the spur of moment and in a
heat of passion, the appellants caused the death of
Ramcharan Bhoi. As such, the conviction of appellant No.1
for offence under Section 302/34 of I.P.C. be converted to
Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C. and he be sentenced for the
period already undergone, as he is in jail since 11.05.2018
i.e. more than 6 ½ years. Learned counsel for appellants
submits that the appellants have not committed any offence
knowing fully well that the deceased belongs to Scheduled
Tribe community as the appellant and the deceased are
neighbours of each other, therefore the conviction under
Section 3 (2) (v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short “the Act
of 1989”) is liable to be set aside. Hence, the present appeal
deserves to be allowed.
5
7. Per-contra, Shri Sharad Mishra, learned State counsel would
submit that prosecution has been able to prove the offence
beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching
nature. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent-
State that in view of statements of the wife and son of the
deceased namely Smt. Tebha Bai (PW-8) and Deepak Bhoy
(PW-5), coupled with other evidence available on record, the
trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants for the
offence mentioned hereinabove and it is not a case where
sentence of appellant No.1 can be converted or reduced to
any extent. Thus, the present appeal is liable to be
dismissed.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered
their rival submissions made herein-above and went through
the records with utmost circumspection.
9. We will consider the argument of learned counsel for the
appellant with regard to offence under Section 302/34 of IPC
first and thereafter, the offences under Section 449 of IPC
and 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989.
10. The conviction of appellants for offence under Section
302/34 of IPC is based on the testimony of two injured
witnesses Tebha Bai (PW-8) and Deepak Bhoi (PW-5) who
are the wife and son of the deceased. There is no dispute
that the appellants and the deceased were neighbours and
there was a dispute regarding the boundary of their
courtyards which were also connected. On the date of
incident, both the parties were disputing over the boundary
of their courtyards and the appellants entered the house of
deceased Ramcharan Bhoi and assaulted him with stick and
brick, due to which, he suffered grievous injuries and died.
Considering the testimony of two injured witness Tebha Bai
6
(PW-8) and Deepak Bhoi (PW-5) who are the wife and son of
the deceased and further considering that as per the FSL
report Ex.P-28, human blood was found on the T-shirt of
appellant No.1, we are of the considered opinion that the
finding recorded by the trial Court for convicting appellant
No.1 for offence under Section 302/34 of IPC is based on the
evidence available on record and we do not find any illegality
or perversity in the same. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the
said finding.
11. Now, the question would be whether the case of appellant
No.1 would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 of I.P.C.
and, as such, his conviction under Section 302/34 of I.P.C.
can be altered to Section 304 Part-II of I.P.C., as contended
by learned counsel for the appellant ?
12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of
Chhattisgarh1 has elaborately dealt with the issue and
observed in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-
“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements
that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this
Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh
[(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has
been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7)
“7. To invoke this exception four requirements
must be satisfied, namely, (i) it was a sudden
fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act
was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the
assailant had not taken any undue advantage or
acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel
is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the
provocation or started the assault. The number of
wounds caused during the occurrence is not a
decisive factor but what is important is that the
occurrence must have been sudden and
unpremeditated and the offender must have acted
1. (2017) 3 SCC 247
7in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not
have taken any undue advantage or acted in a
cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a
person in the heat of the moment picks up a
weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one
of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the
benefit of this exception provided he has not acted
cruelly.”
21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC
590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the
proposition of law that under what circumstances
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if
death is caused, it has been explained as under :
(SCC p. 596, para 9)
“9. …. ’18. The help of exception 4 can be
invoked if death is caused (a) without
premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c)
without the offender’s having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner; and (d) the fight must have been
with the person killed. To bring a case within
Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in
it must be found. It is to be noted that the
“fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section
300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code,
1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of
passion requires that there must be no time
for the passions to cool down and in this
case, the parties had worked themselves into
a fury on account of the verbal altercation in
the beginning. A fight is a combat between
two or more persons whether with or without
weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any
general rule as to what shall be deemed to
be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact
and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must
necessarily depend upon the proved facts of
each case. For the application of Exception
4, it is not sufficient to show that there was
a sudden quarrel and there was no
premeditation. It must further be shown that
8the offender has not taken undue advantage
or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The
expression “undue advantage” as used in the
provisions means “unfair advantage”.
13. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held
that when and if there is intent and knowledge, the same
would be case of Section 304 Part-I IPC and if it is only a
case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder
and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304
Part-II IPC.
14. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light of the
aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of
the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that there was no
premeditation on the part of the appellants to cause death. It
is also vivid from the statements of Tebha Bai (PW-8) and
Deepak Bhoi (PW-5) that there was a dispute regarding the
boundary of their courtyard. On the date of incident also,
there was a hot talk on the said issue between appellants
and the deceased party and on the spur of moment and in a
heat of passion, the appellants assaulted deceased
Ramcharan Bhoi with stick and brick which resulted in his
death. Though there was no premeditation and intention on
the part of appellant to cause death, but the appellant must
have had knowledge that the injury caused by them is likely
to cause death and, as such, the case of appellant No.1
would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 of I.P.C.
15. In that view of the matter, the conviction of appellant No.1
Ramji @ Sonju Dadsena for offence punishable under
Section 302/34 of I.P.C. is converted/altered to Section 304
Part-II/34 of I.P.C. and he is sentenced to 10 years rigorous
imprisonment. However, the fine amount and its default
9stipulation imposed by learned trial Court shall remain
intact. Further, considering the entire facts and
circumstances of the case, the nature of injury and the
statements of the injured witnesses Tebha Bai (PW-8) and
Deepak Bhoi (PW-5), the conviction of appellant No.1 for
offence under Section 449 of IPC is hereby maintained,
however, the sentence of R.I. for 10 years as imposed upon
him by the trial Court under Section 449 of IPC is reduced to
R.I. for 5 years. However, the fine amount and its default
stipulation shall remain intact.
16. Now, the question would be whether learned trial Court is
justified in convicting Appellant No.1 for offence under
Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989, for which, he has been
sentenced for rigorous imprisonment for 10 years, as
contended by learned counsel for the appellant ?
17. In order to answer this plea, it would be relevant to take note
of the fact that the date of incident in the instant case is
09.05.2018, whereas Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 was
amendment w.e.f. 26.01.2016 by Act 1 of 2016. Prior to its
amendment w.e.f. 26.01.2016, Section 3(2)(v) stood as
under:
“3. Punishment for offences of atrocities –
(1) xxx xxx
(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe –
(i) to (iv) xxx xxx
(v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal
Code punishable with imprisonment for a term of
ten years or more against a person or property on
the ground that such person is a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such
10property belongs to such member, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for life and with
fine;”
Prior to its amendment w.e.f. 26.01.2016, the unamended
portion of Section 3(2)(v) was:
“on the ground that such person is a member of
a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such
property belongs to such member”
After the amendment, the substituted portion of Section
3(2)(v) is:
“knowing that such person is a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such
property belongs to such member.”
18. The unamended provision of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of
1989 came to be considered before the Supreme Court in the
matter of Patan Jaman Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh2
wherein their Lordships have held that it has to be
established by the prosecution on the basis of evidence
adduced that the accused has committed sexual
intercourse/crime on the ground that such person is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe
community and held as under:-
“58. ….We agree with the Sessions Judge that
the prosecution’s case would not fail merely
because PW1 did not mention in her statement
to the police that the offence was committed
against her daughter because she was a
Scheduled Caste woman. However, there is no
separate evidence led by the prosecution to
show that the accused committed the offence on
the basis of the caste identity of PW2. While it
2 R 2021 SC 2190
11would be reasonable to presume that the
accused knew the caste of PW2 since village
communities are tightly knit and the accused
was also an acquaintance of PW2’s family, the
knowledge by itself cannot be said to be the
basis of the commission of offence, having
regard to the language of Section 3(2)(v) as it
stood at the time when the offence in the
present case was committed. As we have
discussed above, due to the inter-sectional
nature of oppression PW2 faces, it becomes
difficult to establish what led to the commission
of the offence – whether it was her caste, gender
or disability. This highlights the limitation of a
provision where causation of a wrongful act
arises from a single ground or what we refer to
as the single axis model.
59. It is pertinent to mention that Section 3(2)
(v) was amended by the Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Amendment Act, 2015, which came into effect
on 26 January 2016. The words “on the ground
of” under Section 3(2)(v) have been substituted
with “knowing that such person is a member of
a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe”. This
has decreased the threshold of proving that a
crime was committed on the basis of the caste
identity to a threshold where mere knowledge is
sufficient to sustain a conviction…
60. xxx xxx xxx
61. However, since Section 3(2)(v) was amended
and Clause (c) of Section 8 was inserted by Act
1 of 2016 with effect from 26 January 2016
these amendments would not be applicable to
the case at hand. The offence in the present
case has taken place before the amendment, on
31 March 2011. Therefore, we hold that the
evidence in the present case does not establish
that the offence in the present case was
committed on the ground that such person is a
member of a SC or ST. The conviction under
12Section 3(2)(v) would consequently have to be
set aside.”
19. After the amendment to the provision of Section 3(2)(v) of the
Act of 1989, the wording of the substituted portion is
“knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such
member”. The word “knowing” has been defined in the
Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, Page 888, — “1.
Having or showing awareness or understanding; well-
informed. 2. Deliberate; conscious”.
20. In the matter of Shashikant Sharma & Ors. v. State of
Uttar Pradesh & Anr.3, Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989
came to be considered before their Lordships of the Supreme
Court, wherein it has been held that in order to commit
offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989
(as amended), there must be allegation that the accused not
being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe
committed an offence under the provision of IPC punishable
with imprisonment for 10 years or more on a member of
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe knowing that such
person belongs to the said community.
21. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle of law laid down by
their Lordships of the Supreme Court qua Section 3(2)(v) (as
amended w.e.f. 26.01.2016), it is quite vivid that from the
entire material available on record, it is evident that no
legally admissible evidence has been led to prove that
appellants have caused the death of Ramcharan Bhoi
knowing fully well that he belongs to Scheduled
Caste/Scheduled Tribe community. Section 3(2)(v) of the Act
of 1989 (as amended) can be pressed into service only if it is
3 23 SCC Online SC 1599 I
13
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offence has been
committed on a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe community knowing that such person belongs to the
said community. Therefore, having regard to the language of
Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 as it stood after its
amended w.e.f. 26.01.2016 and further the prosecution
must have led separate evidence to demonstrate that
appellants have committed the offence in question knowing
fully well the caste identity of the deceased, in light of the
decision of Shashikant Sharma (supra), the conviction of
Appellant No.1 for offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v)
of the Act of 1989 and the sentence of rigorous
imprisonment for 10 years, as awarded by the trial Court, is
liable to be set aside.
22. Concludingly, the conviction and sentence of Appellant No.1
for offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of
1989, as imposed upon him by the learned trial Court, is
hereby set aside. The conviction of appellant No.1 for offence
under section 449 of IPC is affirmed/upheld, however, the
sentence of R.I. for 10 years under Section 449 of IPC is
reduced to R.I. for 5 years. Further, the conviction of
appellant No.1 for offence under Section 302/34 of I.P.C. is
converted/altered to Section 304 Part-II/34 of I.P.C. and he
is sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment. However,
the fine amount and its default stipulation shall remain
intact.
23. Consequently, this criminal appeal is partly allowed to the
extent indicated herein-above.
24. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original
record be transmitted forthwith to the concerned trial Court
14
for necessary information & action, if any. A copy of the
judgment may also be sent to the concerned Jail
Superintendent wherein No.1 is suffering the jail sentence.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal)
Judge Judge
Khatai
