Ramlal Sahu vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 6 March, 2025

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Chattisgarh High Court

Ramlal Sahu vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 6 March, 2025

Author: Sanjay K. Agrawal

Bench: Sanjay K. Agrawal

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                             Digitally signed
                             by BHOLA
                             NATH KHATAI
                             Date:
                             2025.03.12
                             10:41:45 +0530




                                                           2025:CGHC:11102-DB


                                                                    NAFR

          HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                     CRA No. 1873 of 2019

Ramlal Sahu S/o Jhadiram Sahu, Aged About 36 Years R/o
Village Chhirpani, Police Station Kukdur, District Kabirdham
Chhattisgarh.
                                                             ... Appellant
                                   versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police
Station    Kukdur,   Civil    And            Revenue   District   Kabirdham
Chhattisgarh.
                                                           ... Respondent

For Appellant    : Mr. Vivek Kumar Agrawal, Advocate
For Respondent : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Addl. Advocate General
                 & Mr. Amit Buxy, Panel Lawyer


                         (Division Bench)


             Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
           Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal


                      Judgment On Board
                             (06.03.2025)

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

1. This criminal appeal has been preferred under Section 374(2)
of Cr.P.C. calling in question the legality, validity and
2

correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 04.11.2019, passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Kabirdham (C.G.) in Sessions Trial
No.12/2019, whereby the appellant herein has been
convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo Life
Imprisonment with fine of ₹5,000/- and in default of
payment of fine, to suffer 6 months additional rigorous
imprisonment.

2. The case of prosecution, in brief, is that on 19.01.2019 at
about 08:00 p.m., at village Chhirpani, Police Station
Kukdur, District Kabirdham, the appellant herein, assaulted
his wife Gouribai Sahu (now deceased) by axe, by which she
suffered grievous injuries and died; thereby committed the
offence. The matter was reported to the Police by the son of
Kotwar Rohit Kumar Sakat (PW-5), pursuant to which,
Dehati Merg Intimation was recorded vide Ex. P-8 and FIR
was registered vide Ex. P-16. Spot map was prepared vide
Ex. P-9. Inquest was conducted vide Ex. P-2 and dead body
of deceased Gouribai was subjected to post-mortem, which
was conducted by Dr. Prasangina Sadhu (PW-8), who proved
the post-mortem report Ex. P-11, according to which, cause
of death was due to incised wound with comminuted
fracture of cervical vertebrae (C1, C2, C3) with rupture of
internal jugular vein and deep groove in bone and death was
homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of
appellant (Ex.P-3), the weapon of offence i.e. axe was seized
vide Ex. P-7, which was sent for chemical examination to
FSL along-with other seized articles and as per FSL report
Ex.P-20, human blood of ‘B’ Group was found on the said
axe. After completion of investigation, appellant was charge-
sheeted for the aforesaid offence before the jurisdictional
3

criminal court, which was ultimately committed to the Court
of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law.

3. During the course of trial, in order to bring home the offence,
prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses and
exhibited 20 documents and the appellant-accused in
support of his defence has neither examined any witness nor
exhibited any document. The statement of appellant /
accused was recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC in
which he denied the circumstances appearing against him in
the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, pleaded
innocence and false implication.

4. Learned trial Court, after appreciation of oral and
documentary evidence on record, convicted and sentenced
the appellant herein as mentioned in the opening paragraph
of this judgment, against which the present appeal has been
preferred by the appellant questioning the legality, validity
and correctness of the impugned judgment.

5. Mr. Vivek Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for appellant
would submit that the trial Court is absolutely unjustified
in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of
IPC by invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act as there is
no evidence that the appellant was in the house along with
the deceased on the date and time of offence. He would
further submit that as per FSL report (Ex P-20), though
human blood was found on the axe but it has not been
proved that the said axe was used in commission of the
offence. As such, the prosecution has failed to establish the
case beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant is entitled
for acquittal on the basis of principles of benefit of doubt.

4

6. Mr. Ashish Shukla & Mr. Amit Buxy, learned State counsel,
would support the impugned judgment and submit that the
prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond
reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted
the appellant for offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. As
such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered
their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through
the records with utmost circumspection.

8. The case of prosecution is not based on direct evidence. It is
based on circumstantial evidence. The five golden principles
which constitute the Panchsheel of the proof of a case based
on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by their
Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra1
which must
be fulfilled for convicting an accused on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. The relevant paragraph 153 of the
said judgment
reads as under: –

“153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled
before a case against an accused can be said to be
fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be
fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that
the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and
not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may
be proved’ and “must be or should be proved” as
was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao

1 (1984) 4 SCC 116
5

Bobade v. State of Maharashtra2 where the
following observations were made:

Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
accused must be and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the mental
distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is
long and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.

(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that
in all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.”

9. The trial Court, in para-35 of its judgment, has found the
following incriminating circumstances to be proved for
convicting the appellant under Section 302 of IPC:

i) The death of deceased Gouribai was homicidal in
nature.

ii) The appellant has failed to establish that on the date
and time of offence, he was not in the house with his
wife (deceased) but was somewhere else and he could
not explain as to how and in what circumstances his

2 (1973) 2 SCC 793
6

wife died, therefore, the provisions of section 106 of the
Evidence Act would be applicable.

iii) The motive of offence is established from the statements
of witnesses Ganesh (PW-2) and Kejuram (PW-10) who
are the sons of appellant and deceased.

iv) As per FSL report Ex.P-20, human blood of ‘B’ Group
was found on the weapon of offence i.e. axe seized from
the appellant pursuant to his memorandum statement
Ex. P-3.

10. Now, we will consider the circumstances recorded by the trial
Court in the light of the principles of law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda
(supra).

11. The first and foremost circumstance for consideration is as
to whether the death of deceased Gouribai was homicidal in
nature?

12. Learned trial Court has recorded an affirmative finding in
this regard relying upon the postmortem report Ex. P-11
proved by Dr. Prasangina Sadhu (PW-08), according to
which, cause of death was incised wound with comminuted
fracture of cervical vertebrae (C1, C2, C3) with rupture of
internal jugular vein and deep groove in bone and death was
homicidal in nature, which is a finding of fact based on
evidence available on record, it is neither perverse nor
contrary to the record and we hereby affirm the said finding.

Second Circumstance

13. The trial Court has invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act
holding that on the date and time of offence, the appellant
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was present in the house along with his wife (deceased) and
he could not explain as to how and in what circumstances,
his wife died. But, it is well settled that the initial burden is
upon the prosecution to first prima facie establish the guilt
of the accused and then only the burden shifts upon the
accused to explain the circumstances as contemplated by
Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

14. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of
Anees v. The State Govt. of NCT3, has elaborately
considered the principles of law governing the applicability of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act and has held in paragraphs
47 to 55 as under:-

“47. But Section 106 of the Evidence Act has no
application to cases where the fact in question,
having regard to its nature, is such as to be capable
of being known not only to the accused but also to
others, if they happened to be present when it took
place. The intention underlying the act or conduct
of any individual is seldom a matter which can be
conclusively established; it is indeed only known to
the person in whose mind the intention is
conceived. Therefore, if the prosecution has
established that the character and circumstance of
an act suggest that it was done with a particular
intention, then under illustration (a) to this section,
it may be assumed that he had that intention,
unless he proves the contrary.

48. A manifest distinction exists between the
burden of proof and the burden of going forward
with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof
upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be
established as the foundation of an issue does not
shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of
explanation may shift from one side to the other
according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution

3 . 2024 INSC 368 [Criminal Appeal No.437 of 2015, decided on 30.05.2024]CC
8

has offered evidence, which if believed by the court,
would convince them of the accused’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, the accused, if in a position,
should go forward with counter-vailing evidence, if
he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is
on him to present evidence of such facts, whether
the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He
is not required to do so even though a prima facie
case has been established, for the court must still
find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
before it can convict. However, the accused’s failure
to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded
by the court as confirming the conclusion indicated
by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as
confirming presumptions which might arise
therefrom. Although not legally required to produce
evidence on his own behalf, the accused may,
therefore, as a practical matter find it essential to
go forward with proof. This does not alter the
burden of proof resting upon the prosecution [See:
Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 SCC
OnLine 1261]

49. The Latin expression prima facie means “at first
sight”, “at first view”, or “based on first impression”.

According to Webster’s Third International
Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a
case established by “prima facie evidence” which in
turn means “evidence sufficient in law to raise a
presumption of fact or establish the fact in question
unless rebutted”. In both civil and criminal law, the
term is used to denote that, upon initial
examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence
to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal
proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the
prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires
them to present prima facie evidence for each
element of the case or charges against the
defendant. If they cannot present prima facie
evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed
without any need for a response by other parties.

9

50. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to
cases where the prosecution could be said to have
succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable
inference can be drawn regarding guilt of the
accused.

51. The presumption of fact is an inference as to
the existence of one fact from the existence of some
other facts, unless the truth of such inference is
disproved.

52. To explain what constitutes a prima facie case
to make Section 106 of the Evidence Act applicable,
we should refer to the decision of this Court in
State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad and ors. (2000)
8 SCC 382, wherein this Court has observed in
paras 36 and 37 respectively as under:

“36. In this context we may profitably utilize the
legal principle embodied in Section 106 of the
Evidence Act which reads as follows: “When
any fact is especially within the knowledge of
any person, the burden of proving that fact is
upon him.”

37. The section is not intended to relieve the
prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the
section would apply to cases where the
prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from
which a reasonable inference can be drawn
regarding the existence of certain other facts,
unless the accused by virtue of his special
knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer
any explanation which might drive the court to
draw a different inference.”

(Emphasis supplied)

53. We should also look into the decision of this
Court in the case of Ram Gulam Chaudhary &
Ors. v. State of Bihar
, (2001) 8 SCC 311, wherein
this Court made the following observations in
paragraph 24 as under:

“24. Even otherwise, in our view, this is a case
10

where Section 106 of the Evidence Act would
apply. Krishnanand Chaudhary was brutally
assaulted and then a chhura-blow was given on
the chest. Thus chhura-blow was given after
Bijoy Chaudhary had said “he is still alive and
should be killed”. The appellants then carried
away the body. What happened thereafter to
Krishnanand Chaudhary is especially within
the knowledge of the appellants. The appellants
have given no explanation as to what they did
after they took away the body. Krishnanand
Chaudhary has not been since seen alive. In the
absence of an explanation, and considering the
fact that the appellants were suspecting the boy
to have kidnapped and killed the child of the
family of the appellants, it was for the
appellants to have explained what they did with
him after they took him away. When the
abductors withheld that information from the
court, there is every justification for drawing the
inference that they had murdered the boy. Even
though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not
be intended to relieve the prosecution of its
burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, but the section would apply
to cases like the present, where the prosecution
has succeeded in proving facts from which a
reasonable inference can be drawn regarding
death. The appellants by virtue of their special
knowledge must offer an explanation which
might lead the Court to draw a different
inference. We, therefore, see no substance in
this submission of Mr. Mishra.”

(Emphasis supplied)

54. Cases are frequently coming before the courts
where the husband, due to strained marital
relations and doubt as regards the character, has
gone to the extent of killing his wife. These crimes
are generally committed in complete secrecy inside
the house and it becomes very difficult for the
prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the
11

family, like in the case at hand, even if he is a
witness of the crime, would come forward to depose
against another family member.

55. If an offence takes place inside the four walls of
a house and in such circumstances where the
accused has all the opportunity to plan and
commit the offence at a time and in the
circumstances of his choice, it will be extremely
difficult for the prosecution to lead direct evidence
to establish the guilt of the accused. It is to resolve
such a situation that Section 106 of the Evidence
Act exists in the statute book. In the case of
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra), this Court
observed that a Judge does not preside over a
criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is
punished. The Court proceeded to observe that a
Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does
not escape. Both are public duties. The law does
not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead
evidence of such character, which is almost
impossible to be led, or at any rate, extremely
difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to
lead such evidence, which it is capable of leading,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case.”

15. The principle of law laid down in the case of Anees (supra)
has been followed very recently by the Supreme Court in the
case of Ravi v. State of Punjab4.

16. In light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships
of the Supreme Court in the above judgments, it is quite
vivid that Section 106 of the Evidence Act would be invoked
only where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts
from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding
the guilt of the accused and not otherwise.

4 2025 SCC OnLine SC 279
12

17. In this case, though the prosecution has been able to prove
that the death was homicidal in nature, but there is no
evidence on record that on the date and time of offence the
appellant was present in the house along with the deceased
or they were last seen together, in order to invoke section
106
of the Evidence Act. Ballaram Barwe (PW-1) is the
neighbour of the appellant and is also the witness to inquest
Ex. P-2. Ballaram Barwe (PW-1) in his 161 CrPC statement
has only stated that on 20.01.2019 he was informed by
Rohit Kumar Sakat (PW-5) that the appellant had
assassinated his wife. When he went to the house of
appellant along with the villagers, he saw the deceased lying
dead on the bed inside the house. However, on being
declared hostile, leading questions were put to this witness,
in which in para-2, he has stated that he was not informed
by Rohit Kumar Sakat (PW-5) that the appellant had
assassinated his wife. In para-5 he has stated that on the
date of offence, the sons of the deceased, Ganesh (PW-2) &
Kejuram Sahu (PW-10) were not in the house and only her
husband i.e. the appellant was present. However, such fact
is not available in his 161 CrPC statement though he was
present in the inquest proceeding (Ex.P-2). It is not the case
of the prosecution that Ballaram Barwe (PW-1) had lastly
seen the appellant and the deceased together in the house
on the date of offence. Even that statement was made on
leading question being asked after the appellant was
declared hostile. Hence, this part of evidence of Ballaram
Barwe (PW-1) would not be admissible. Moreover, brother of
the deceased Ramkhilawan (PW-4) has only stated that after
attending Dashagatra ceremony of his father at Hardibandh,
his sister (deceased) and the appellant went back to their
village Chhirpani. As such, from the evidence available on
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record, the presence of the appellant and the deceased
together in the house on the date and time of offence is not
established beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the trial
Court is absolutely unjustified in invoking Section 106 of
Evidence Act for convicting the appellant under Section 302
of IPC.

Third Circumstance

18. The third circumstance that has been found established by
the Trial Court is Motive. In this regard, the trial Court has
relied upon the statements of Ganesh (PW-2) & Kejuram
Sahu (PW-10) who are the sons of appellant and deceased.
Both the witnesses, in their court statements, have clearly
stated that the appellant used to assault and torture their
mother (deceased) doubting her character. As such, the trial
Court has rightly held that the motive of offence has been
established.

Fourth Circumstance

19. The fourth circumstance which has been found to be proved
by the trial Court is that pursuant to the memorandum
statement of the appellant, the weapon of offence i.e. axe
was seized vide Ex. P-7, on which, as per FSL report Ex. P-
20, human blood of ‘B’ Group was found. Though, on the
weapon of offence human blood was found but it could not
be established that the same weapon of offence was used by
the appellant in commission of the offence. Even otherwise,
as per the principle of law laid down in the case of
Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan 5, which
has been followed in the matter Raja Naykar v. State of

5 (2011) 11 SCC 724
14

Chhattisgarh6, the finding of human blood stain on the
seized article is one of the circumstances, on the basis of
which, the accused cannot be convicted for offence under
Section 302 of IPC. Thus, merely on the basis of motive of
the offence, the appellant cannot be convicted for the said
offence.

20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that as per the
principle of ‘Panchsheellaid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sharad Birhichand Sarda (Supra), the
chain of circumstances is not so complete in which the
appellant can be held guilty for the offence. The prosecution
has failed to produce evidence to prove the guilt of the
appellant beyond the shadow of doubt on the basis of the
circumstantial evidence. Consequently, we are unable to
uphold the conviction of the appellant for the aforesaid
offence and he is entitled for acquittal on the basis of the
principle of benefit of doubt.

21. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 04.11.2019
passed by the Trial Court convicting and sentencing the
appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC is hereby set
aside/quashed on the basis of benefit of doubt and the
appellant is acquitted of the said charge. The appellant is
reported to be in jail. He be released from jail forthwith, if his
detention is not required in connection with any other
offence.

22. This criminal appeal, accordingly, stands allowed.

23. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original
record be transmitted forthwith to the concerned trial Court
for necessary information & action, if any. A copy of the

6 (2024) SCC Online SC 67
15

judgment may also be sent to the concerned Jail
Superintendent wherein the appellant is suffering the jail
sentence. Sd/- Sd/-

                      Sd/-                             Sd/-

               (Sanjay K. Agrawal)            (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal)
Khatai               Judge                             Judge
 



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