Uttarakhand High Court
Rampal Singh vs State Of Uttarakhand And Another on 28 February, 2025
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Criminal Revision No. 40 of 2025
28 February, 2025
Rampal Singh -Revisionist
Versus
State of Uttarakhand and Another -Respondents
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Presence:-
Mr. Navneet Kaushik, Advocate for the Applicant.
Mr. Akshay Latwal, Brief Holder for the State.
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Hon'ble Alok Mahra, J.
The criminal revision is preferred against the
impugned order dated 09.01.2025 passed by learned
Special Judge, Anti-Corruption/IV Additional Sessions
Judge, Dehradun in Misc. Case No. 17 of 2025 (SST No.
27 of 2024), State Vs. Rampal in Case Crime No. 06 of
2020, under Section 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “P.C. Act“) and Section
13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, Police Station Vigilance Sector Dehradun, District
Dehradun, by which, the learned Court has refused to
release the applicant on an application moved by him.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record.
2
3. Learned counsel for the revisionist would
submit that the arrest and further remand of the
revisionist is bad in the eyes of law because the grounds
of arrest have never been communicated to them in
writing, as mandated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
the case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and others,
(2024) 7 SCC, 576, Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 and Vihaan Kumar Vs. State of
Haryana and Another, (2025) SCC Online SC 269.
Therefore, it is argued that the remand order may be set
aside and revisionist may be released forthwith.
4. Learned State counsel would submit that
the principle of law that has been laid down in the case
of Pankaj Bansal (supra) was pertaining to the provisions
of The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (“the
PMLA Act“) and in the case of Prabir Purkayastha
(supra), the principles are laid down under the
provisions of The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 (“the UAPA Act“). It is argued that those principles
cannot be made applicable to the offences under P.C.
Act. He would submit that Section 47 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“the BNSS, 2023”) is a
provision that will be applicable in the instant case.
3
5. In the instant case, the revisionist was
arrested and produced before the Magistrate on
27.09.2024. At the time of remand, an argument was
raised on behalf of the revisionist that since he was not
communicated the grounds of his arrest in writing, the
remand should be refused. The Investigating Officer
admitted that the reasons of arrest were not
communicated to the revisionist in writing instead it was
orally informed to him. After hearing the parties, the
Magistrate proceeded to remand the revisionist in
judicial custody. Bail application was moved which was
rejected and after investigation in the matter, charge-
sheet has been filed.
6. It is true that in the case of Pankaj Bansal
(supra), the offence was punishable under the provisions
of the PMLA Act and it is also true that in the case of
Prabir Purkayastha (supra) the provisions of the UAPA
Act were interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
7. It may be made clear that reasons of arrest
and grounds of arrest are two different contexts. In the
case of Prabir Purkayastha (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has elaborated on that aspect in para 48 as
follows:-
4
“48. It may be reiterated at the cost of
repetition that there is a significant difference in
the phrase “reasons for arrest” and “grounds of
arrest”. The “reasons for arrest” as indicated in the
arrest memo are purely formal parameters viz. to
prevent the accused person from committing any
further offence; for proper investigation of the
offence; to prevent the accused person from
causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or
tampering with such evidence in any manner; to
prevent the arrested person for making
inducement, threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case so as to
dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the
court or to the investigating officer. These reasons
would commonly apply to any person arrested on
charge of a crime whereas the “grounds of arrest”
would be required to contain all such details in
hand of the investigating officer which
necessitated the arrest of the accused.
Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in
writing must convey to the arrested accused all
basic facts on which he was being arrested so as
to provide him an opportunity of defending himself
against custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus,
the “grounds of arrest” would invariably be
personal to the accused and cannot be equated
with the “reasons of arrest” which are general in
nature.”
8. Generally, there are many safeguards to
protect personal liberty of an individual prior to arrest,
at the time of arrest or after arrest. One of such
safeguards is that the grounds of arrest should be
communicated to an arrestee soon after his arrest.
Section 47 of the BNSS, 2023 reads as follows:-
5
“47. Person arrested to be informed of grounds of
arrest and of right to bail.–(1) Every police officer or
other person arresting any person without warrant
shall forthwith communicate to him full
particulars of the offence for which he is arrested
or other grounds for such arrest.
(2) Where a police officer arrests without warrant any
person other than a person accused of a non-bailable
offence, he shall inform the person arrested that he is
entitled to be released on bail and that he may
arrange for sureties on his behalf.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. It would be appropriate to make reference
to the provisions of the PMLA Act and the UAPA Act on
this aspect. Section 19(1) of the PMLA Act makes
provision with regard to communication of the grounds
of arrest. It reads as follows:-
“19. Power to arrest.–(1) If the Director, Deputy
Director, Assistant Director or any other officer
authorised in this behalf by the Central
Government by general or special order, has on
the basis of material in his possession, reason to
believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in
writing) that any person has been guilty of an
offence punishable under this Act, he may arrest
such person and shall, as soon as may be,
inform him of the grounds for such arrest.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. Similarly, Section 43-B of the UAPA Act
also makes provision in that regard. It reads as under:-
“43-B. Procedure of arrest, seizure, etc.–(1) Any
officer arresting a person under Section 43-A
6shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the
grounds for such arrest.
(2) Every person arrested and article seized under
Section 43-A shall be forwarded without
unnecessary delay to the officer-in-charge of the
nearest police station.
(3) The authority or officer to whom any person or
article is forwarded under sub-section (2) shall,
with all convenient dispatch, take such measures
as may be necessary in accordance with the
provisions of the Code.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. A bare perusal of Section 43 of the BNSS,
2023, Section 19(1) of the PMLA Act and Section 43-B of
the UAPA Act make it abundantly clear that these
provisions speak of communication of grounds of such
arrest. These provisions do not mandate that these
grounds should be communicated in writing.
12. There is another Constitutional provision
which is applicable in such matters. Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India makes a safeguard in this respect,
which reads as follows:-
“22. Protection against arrest and detention in
certain cases.–(1) No person who is arrested shall
be detained in custody without being informed, as
soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest
nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to
be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.”
(emphasis supplied)
7
13. The provisions of Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India has been interpreted, in the case of
Pankaj Bansal (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed as follows:-
“38. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1)
of the Constitution provides, inter alia, that no
person who is arrested shall be detained in
custody without being informed, as soon as may
be, of the grounds for such arrest. This being the
fundamental right guaranteed to the arrested
person, the mode of conveying information of the
grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful
so as to serve the intended purpose. It may be
noted that Section 45 PMLA enables the person
arrested under Section 19 thereof to seek release
on bail but it postulates that unless the twin
conditions prescribed thereunder are satisfied,
such a person would not be entitled to grant of
bail. The twin conditions set out in the provision
are that, firstly, the court must be satisfied, after
giving an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to
oppose the application for release, that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested
person is not guilty of the offence and, secondly,
that he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail. To meet this requirement, it would be
essential for the arrested person to be aware of the
grounds on which the authorised officer arrested
him/her under Section 19 and the basis for the
officer’s “reason to believe” that he/she is guilty of
an offence punishable under the 2002 Act. It is
only if the arrested person has knowledge of these
facts that he/she would be in a position to plead
and prove before the Special Court that there are
grounds to believe that he/she is not guilty of
such offence, so as to avail the relief of bail.
8
Therefore, communication of the grounds of
arrest, as mandated by Article 22(1) of the
Constitution and Section 19 PMLA, is meant to
serve this higher purpose and must be given due
importance.
43. The second reason as to why this would be the
proper course to adopt is the constitutional
objective underlying such information being given
to the arrested person. Conveyance of this
information is not only to apprise the arrested
person of why he/she is being arrested but also to
enable such person to seek legal counsel and,
thereafter, present a case before the court under
Section 45 to seek release on bail, if he/she so
chooses. In this regard, the grounds of arrest in V.
Senthil Balaji [V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3
SCC 51 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] are placed on
record and we find that the same run into as
many as six pages. The grounds of arrest recorded
in the case on hand in relation to Pankaj Bansal
and Basant Bansal have not been produced before
this Court, but it was contended that they were
produced at the time of remand. However, as
already noted earlier, this did not serve the
intended purpose. Further, in the event their
grounds of arrest were equally voluminous, it
would be well-nigh impossible for either Pankaj
Bansal or Basant Bansal to record and remember
all that they had read or heard being read out for
future recall so as to avail legal remedies. More so,
as a person who has just been arrested would not
be in a calm and collected frame of mind and may
be utterly incapable of remembering the contents
of the grounds of arrest read by or read out to
him/her. The very purpose of this constitutional
and statutory protection would be rendered
nugatory by permitting the authorities concerned
to merely read out or permit reading of the
9grounds of arrest, irrespective of their length and
detail, and claim due compliance with the
constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) and
the statutory mandate under Section 19(1) PMLA.
45. On the above analysis, to give true meaning
and purpose to the constitutional and the
statutory mandate of Section 19(1) PMLA of
informing the arrested person of the grounds of
arrest, we hold that it would be necessary,
henceforth, that a copy of such written
grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested
person as a matter of course and without
exception…………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………….”
(emphasis supplied)
14. In the case of Prabir Purkayastha (supra),
the principles of law, as laid down in the case of Pankaj
Bansal has been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
and in para 19 the Hon’ble Court observed as follows:-
“19. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind of
the court that any person arrested for allegation of
commission of offences under the provisions of
UAPA or for that matter any other offence(s)
has a fundamental and a statutory right to be
informed about the grounds of arrest in writing
and a copy of such written grounds of arrest have
to be furnished to the arrested person as a matter
of course and without exception at the earliest.
The purpose of informing to the arrested person
the grounds of arrest is salutary and sacrosanct
inasmuch as this information would be the only
effective means for the arrested person to consult
his advocate; oppose the police custody remand
and to seek bail. Any other interpretation would
10tantamount to diluting the sanctity of the
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(1)
of the Constitution of India.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. The first sentence of para 19 has been read
over and interpreted by the learned State counsel to
argue that the principle of law, as laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabir
Purkayastha (supra) relates to the offences under the
UAPA Act and the PMLA Act only.
16. This interpretation as given by the learned
State counsel is not in consonance with what is held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabir
Purkayastha (supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in that
case has interpreted the concept of right to life and
liberty and in para 20, 21 and 26 observed as follows:-
“20. The right to life and personal liberty is the
most sacrosanct fundamental right guaranteed
under Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of
India. Any attempt to encroach upon this
fundamental right has been frowned upon by this
Court in a catena of decisions. In this regard, we
may refer to the following observations made by
this Court in Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala [Roy
V.D. v. State of Kerala, (2000) 8 SCC 590 : 2001
SCC (Cri) 42] : (SCC p. 593, para 7)
“7. The life and liberty of an individual is so
sacrosanct that it cannot be allowed to be
interfered with except under the authority of law.
11
It is a principle which has been recognised and
applied in all civilised countries. In our
Constitution Article 21 guarantees protection of
life and personal liberty not only to citizens of
India but also to aliens.”
Thus, any attempt to violate such fundamental
right, guaranteed by Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the
Constitution of India, would have to be dealt with
strictly.
21. The right to be informed about the grounds of
arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India and any infringement of this fundamental
right would vitiate the process of arrest and
remand. Mere fact that a charge-sheet has been
filed in the matter, would not validate the illegality
and the unconstitutionality committed at the time
of arresting the accused and the grant of initial
police custody remand to the accused.
26. From a holistic reading of various judgments
pertaining to the law of preventive detention
including the Constitution Bench decision of this
Court in Harikisan [Harikisan v. State of
Maharashtra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117] , wherein,
the provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of
India have been interpreted, we find that it has
been the consistent view of this Court that the
grounds on which the liberty of a citizen is
curtailed, must be communicated in writing so as
to enable him to seek remedial measures against
the deprivation of liberty.”
17. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court read
the provisions of Article 22(1) and 22(5) of the
Constitution of India regarding the communication of
grounds of arrest and held that these grounds are
12
identical. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further
observed as follows:-
“28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article
22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the
communication of the grounds is exactly the
identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions
require that the “grounds” of “arrest” or
“detention”, as the case may be, must be
communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to
this important facet of the fundamental right as
made by the Constitution Bench while examining
the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of
India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India insofar as the requirement to
communicate the grounds of arrest is concerned.
45. We are of the firm opinion that once this Court
has interpreted the provisions of the statute in
context to the constitutional scheme and has laid
down that the grounds of arrest have to be
conveyed to the accused in writing expeditiously,
the said ratio becomes the law of the land binding
on all the courts in the country by virtue of Article
141 of the Constitution of India.”
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vihaan Kumar
Vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2025) SCC Online SC
269, have reiterated the decision passed in the case of
Pankaj Bansal (supra). Paragraph Nos. 14, 15 and 16 of
the said judgment are extracted hereinunder:-
“14. Thus, the requirement of informing the person arrested of
the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory
constitutional requirement. Article 22 is included in Part III of
13the Constitution under the heading of Fundamental Rights.
Thus, it is the fundamental right of every person arrested and
detained in custody to be informed of the grounds of arrest as
soon as possible. If the grounds of arrest are not informed as
soon as may be after the arrest, it would amount to a violation
of the fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed under
Article 22(1). It will also amount to depriving the arrestee of
his liberty. The reason is that, as provided in Article 21, no
person can be deprived of his liberty except in accordance
with the procedure established by law. The procedure
established by law also includes what is provided in Article
22(1). Therefore, when a person is arrested without a
warrant, and the grounds of arrest are not informed to him, as
soon as may be, after the arrest, it will amount to a violation
of his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 as well.
In a given case, if the mandate of Article 22 is not followed
while arresting a person or after arresting a person, it will
also violate fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under
Article 21, and the arrest will be rendered illegal. On the
failure to comply with the requirement of informing grounds of
arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest is
vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person
arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.
15. We have already referred to what is held in paragraphs
42 and 43 of the decision in the case of Pankaj Bansal1. This
Court has suggested that the proper and ideal course of
communicating the grounds of arrest is to provide grounds of
arrest in writing. Obviously, before a police officer
communicates the grounds of arrest, the grounds of arrest
have to be formulated. Therefore, there is no harm if the
grounds of arrest are communicated in writing. Although there
is no requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest in
writing, what is stated in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the
decision in the case of Pankaj Bansal1 are suggestions that
merit consideration. We are aware that in every case, it may
14not be practicable to implement what is suggested. If the
course, as suggested, is followed, the controversy about the
non-compliance will not arise at all. The police have to balance
the rights of a person arrested with the interests of the
society. Therefore, the police should always scrupulously
comply with the requirements of Article 22.
16. An attempt was made by learned senior counsel
appearing for 1st respondent to argue that after his arrest, the
appellant was repeatedly remanded to custody, and now a
chargesheet has been filed. His submission is that now, the
custody of the appellant is pursuant to the order taking
cognizance passed on the charge sheet. Accepting such
arguments, with great respect to the learned senior counsel,
will amount to completely nullifying Articles 21 and 22(1) of
the Constitution. Once it is held that arrest is unconstitutional
due to violation of Article 22(1), the arrest itself is vitiated.
Therefore, continued custody of such a person based on
orders of remand is also vitiated. Filing a charge sheet and
order of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is per
se unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 21 and 22(1) of
the Constitution of India. We cannot tinker with the most
important safeguards provided under Article 22.”
19. What is observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in para 45 in the case of Prabir Purkayastha (supra) is
the law of land. Reading the statutory provisions in
context of the Constitutional Scheme as envisaged under
the Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India makes it
abundantly clear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
laid down the law that the grounds of arrest have to be
conveyed to the accused in writing. It cannot be said
15
that this law, as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court is applicable only to the cases pertaining to the
UAPA Act and the PMLA Act. As stated, it is applicable to
every offence in view of the Constitutional Scheme. In
the instant case, admittedly, the grounds of arrests have
not been communicated to the revisionist in writing.
Learned State Counsel further argued that the custody
of the appellant is pursuant to the order taking
cognizance passed on the charge-sheet.
20. Accepting such arguments, with great respect to
the learned State Counsel, will amount to completely
nullifying Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Once
it is held that arrest is unconstitutional due to violation
of Article 22(1), the arrest itself is vitiated. Therefore,
continued custody of such a person based on orders of
remand is also vitiated. Filing a charge sheet and order
of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is per
se unconstitutional, being violative of
Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. We
cannot tinker with the most important safeguards
provided under Article 22.”
21. Therefore, the arrests and subsequent remands
are not in accordance with law. The impugned remand
16
orders are, therefore, deserve to be set aside.
Accordingly, the criminal revision deserves to be allowed.
22. Accordingly, the criminal revision is
allowed.
23. The arrest and remand of the revisionist
are invalid. As a consequence, the order dated
09.01.2025 passed by learned Special Judge, Anti-
Corruption/IV Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun in
Misc. Case No. 17 of 2025 (SST No. 27 of 2024), State
Vs. Rampal in Case Crime No. 06 of 2020 is set-aside
and the revisionist be released on bail.
24. Accordingly, without expressing any
opinion on the merit of the case, the revisionist be
released on bail, on furnishing his personal bond and
two reliable sureties each of the like amount to the
satisfaction of the court concerned.
(Alok Mahra, J.)
28.02.2025
Ujjwal
