Ranjan Rattan Vadhera vs State & Ors on 22 August, 2025

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Delhi High Court

Ranjan Rattan Vadhera vs State & Ors on 22 August, 2025

                          *        IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                          %                                 Judgment delivered on: 22.08.2025

                          +        FAO 203/2008

                                   RANJAN RATTAN VADHERA                             .....Appellant

                                                              Versus
                                   STATE & ORS.                                       .....Respondents

                                   Advocates who appeared in this case

                                   For the Appellant    :   Mr. Jai Sahai Endlaw, Mr. Saran Suri,
                                                            Ms. Ruchi Jain, Mr. Sahil Goyal & Mr.
                                                            Zubin John, Advocates.

                                   For the Respondents :    Mr. Naresh Kumar Bhalla, Advocate for
                                                            R-2&3.
                                   CORAM:
                                   HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA

                                                            JUDGMENT

TEJAS KARIA, J
CM APPL. 44515/2025

1. The Appellant / Applicant has filed the present Review Application
(“Application”) praying for review of the Judgment dated 25.06.2025
(“Judgment”) passed by this Court in FAO No.203/2008.

2. The Appellant / Applicant has filed the present Application on the
ground that certain issues and pertinent questions of law have either been
inadvertently overlooked or not taken note of while passing the Judgment.

3. The Appellant / Applicant has submitted that the Judgment is required

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to be reviewed as:

i. There was no objection from any Respondents with respect to
the execution of the Will. As the factum of attestation of the Will has
been proved, the probate ought to have been granted in favour of the
Petitioner / Applicant. Respondent No.2 had submitted written
objections and Respondent No. 3 did not object to grant of probate in
favour of the Petitioner / Applicant.

ii. There is a presumption in law in favour of the Appellant /
Applicant regarding the genuineness attached to the signatures of the
Testatrix as the signature of one of the attesting witnesses was duly
proved. Unless the signature of Testatrix is rebutted by any cogent
evidence, the Court ought to have accepted her signature on the Will.

iii. The circumstantial evidence, which was the best possible
evidence that was available and in the absence of any cogent evidence
being produced by the other legal heirs to object, there was a
presumption under law regarding the genuineness and authenticity of
the Will and the signatures thereon.

iv. The Will dated 20.09.1972 being a more than thirty-year old
document, as per Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(“Act”), the same is presumed to be authentic, genuine and duly
executed by the Testatrix as well as the attesting witnesses in absence
of any cogent evidence in support of the objection for grant of the
probate.

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SHARMA
Signing Date:22.08.2025
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT / APPLICANT:

4. The learned counsel for the Appellant / Applicant submitted that the
evidence produced before the learned Trial Court established the complete
chain in respect of a reasonable conclusion in favour of validity and
execution of the Will by the Testatrix supported by corroborating evidence,
which remained uncontroverted. As there was no cross-examination either
in respect of the execution of the Will, there exists a strong presumption in
law in favour of the Appellant / Applicant regarding the signature of the
Testatrix and the execution and attestation of the Will.

5. It was submitted that originally, Respondent No.2, i.e., the husband of
Testatrix and father of the Appellant / Applicant, had filed objection
opposing the grant of probate, however, Respondent No.2 died on
06.01.2009. Respondent No. 3, i.e., sister of the Appellant / Applicant and
daughter of the Testatrix did not originally file any objections for grant of
probate before the learned Trial Court and in the present Appeal. The
Judgment inadvertently does not observe that Respondent No. 3, having not
objected, had lost all her rights to object to grant of probate.

6. In the absence of any objections and in view of the testimony of the
Appellant / Applicant before the learned Trial Court, wherein it was stated
that the Will was, in fact, executed by the Testatrix and as there was no
cross-examination of the Appellant / Applicant on this aspect, the execution
of the Will was proved by the Appellant / Applicant.

7. The learned Counsel for the Appellant / Applicant relied upon the
decision of this Court in Chanchal Dhingra v. Raj Gopal Mehra 2013 SCC
OnLine Del 3753 and State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (Dead) and Others
(1998) 3 SCC 561.

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8. In Chanchal Dhingra (supra), it is observed that:

“29. In my opinion, no argument can be made by the
respondent/plaintiff, of the suspicious circumstances argued above
relating to the documents, without confronting the
appellant/defendant therewith in cross-examination and which has
not been done in the present case. Though the senior counsel for the
respondent/plaintiff attempted to contend that there was no need for
the respondent/plaintiff to cross-examine the appellant/defendant
with respect to the suspicious circumstances apparent on record and
to the naked eye, but I am unable to agree. All the suspicious
circumstances argued are such which are explainable or which can
well be mistakes/errors during preparation and execution of
documents. Such mistakes/errors generally happen when a
transaction is happening in an atmosphere of cordiality, without the
contracting parties suspecting each other. The possibility of such
mistakes is remote when documents are forged and fabricated to
serve a purpose and with knowledge that the same will be subject to
scrutiny in law and usually when it is doubly verified that there is no
mistake therein. It cannot be lost sight of that the evidence of the
respondent/plaintiff is not, of the signatures on the documents being
his and matter thereon being typed subsequently (which was the plea
taken in the plaint) but of denial of signatures on the documents. The
respondent/plaintiff in the cross-examination also deposed that he
had not put his signatures on the General Power of Attorney,
Agreement to Sell, Affidavit, Will and the Receipt and his signatures
had been forged by Sh. Madan Lal Dhingra. Once that was the
evidence, the argument of the appellant/defendant/her husband
having squeezed the contents on three sheets of paper signed by the
respondent/plaintiff in blank disappears; if the appellant/
defendant/her husband were forging the signatures of the
respondent/plaintiff on three sheets of paper on which the Agreement
to Sell is typed, they could very well have forged the same on four or
five sheets of paper and there was no need for them to use different
font or different spacing on different pages. Judicial notice can be
taken of the manner in which such documents are usually prepared.
Unfortunately, documents relating to transfer of valuable properties
are not always drafted by Advocates in the peace of their office but
are mostly got prepared from Deed Writers or pool of typists sitting
in the Court compound or in the office of the Sub-Registrars and for

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the sake of saving on time, the work of typing is often distributed
amongst several typist available and which can result in different
pages of the same document being in different fact and having
different spacing.

30. Similarly, the putting of point ‘A’ during the testimony of Sh.
Madan Lal Gulati, witness to the Agreement to Sell, against the
signatures of Sh. Madan Lal Dhingra and not against the signatures
of Sh. Madan Lal Gulati is clearly a case of mistake/error, perhaps
due to the same first and middle name of the two. The
respondent/plaintiff ought to have in the cross-examination of the
said witness quizzed him in this respect and without doing so, cannot
take any advantage thereof. The Supreme Court in Rajinder
Pershad v. Darshana Devi
(2001) 7 SCC 69 has held that there is an
age old rule that if you dispute the correctness of the statement of a
witness you must give him an opportunity to explain his statement by
drawing his attention to that part of it which is objected to as untrue,
otherwise you cannot impeach his credit.
The following observation
of Lord Herschell, L.C. in Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL) was
cited with approval:

“I cannot help saying, that it seems to me to be absolutely essential
to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that
a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his
attention to the fact by some questions put in cross examination
showing that that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take
his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and
then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might
have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the
circumstances which, it is suggested, indicate that the story he tells
ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of
credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to
impeach a witness, you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give an
opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as
it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the
conduct of a case, but it is essential to fair play and fair dealing with
witnesses.”

The same principles were recently reiterated
in Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva (2013) 4 SCC 97 and it was further

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held that they are essential to ensure fair play and fairness in
dealing with the witness.

*** *** ***

32. Yet similarly, there is no cross-examination on the difference in
dates which the General Power of Attorney bears and the date of
notarization thereof or the difference in the date of the Agreement to
Sell mentioned in the Affidavit and the date which the Agreement to
Sell bears. The same is the position with respect to the signatures of
the “first party” and the “second party” on the Agreement to Sell.
The basis of all the said arguments of suspicion, is the legal acumen
of the counsel for the respondent/plaintiff and not the foundation
laid therefor in evidence and in cross examination. The
appellant/defendant cannot be condemned on such
discrepancies/suspicions without having an opportunity to explain
the same. The Supreme Court, though in the context of a Will, in
Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage (2002) 2 SCC 85 has
held that the law of evidence does not permit conjecture or suspicion
having the place of legal proof nor permit conjectures or suspicion
to demolish a fact otherwise proved by legal and convincing
evidence. It was further held that suspicion alone cannot form the
foundation of a judicial verdict – positive or negative. All the
documents viz. Agreement to Sell, General Power of Attorney, Will,
Receipt and Affidavit have been proved in accordance with law and
the signatures thereon also now have been conclusively proved to be
of the respondent/plaintiff and cannot be discarded on the basis of
suspicious circumstances argued and of which no opportunity was
given to the appellant/defendant and her witnesses to explain.”

9. In Nahar Singh (Dead) and Others (supra), it is held that:

“13. It may be noted here that that part of the statement of
PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the absence of
cross-examination on the explanation of delay, the evidence of
PW 1 remained unchallenged and ought to have been believed by
the High Court. Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a
valuable right of cross-examining the witness tendered in
evidence by the opposite party. The scope of that provision is
enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by allowing a
witness to be questioned:

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(1) to test his veracity,
(2) to discover who he is and what is his position in life,
or
(3) to shake his credit by injuring his character, although
the answer to such questions might tend directly or
indirectly to incriminate him or might expose or tend
directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or
forfeiture.

14. The oft-quoted observation of Lord Herschell, L.C. in Browne
v. Dunn [(1893) 6 R 67] clearly elucidates the principle
underlying those provisions. It reads thus:

“I cannot help saying, that it seems to me to be
absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a
cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness
is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to
direct his attention to the fact by some questions
put in cross-examination showing that that
imputation is intended to be made, and not to take
his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether
unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for
him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able
to do if such questions had been put to him, the
circumstances which, it is suggested, indicate that
the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue
that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I
have always understood that if you intend to
impeach a witness, you are bound, whilst he is in
the box, to give an opportunity of making any
explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems
to me, that is not only a rule of professional
practice in the conduct of a case, but it is essential
to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses.”

This aspect was unfortunately missed by the High Court when it
came to the conclusion that explanation for the delay is not at all
convincing. This reason is, therefore, far from convincing.

10. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the Appellant / Applicant
that the Appellant being the son of Testatrix was competent to recognize her

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signature and was not required to be physically present at the time of the
execution of the Will, in order to identify her signature. The judgment relies
on the fact that Appellant / Applicant was not present at the time of
execution of the Will, however, no weightage can be given to such a fact as
this case is covered under Section 69 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as the
Appellant / Applicant has led secondary evidence and does not require the
execution of the Will to be proved by the person who witnessed the said
execution.

11. It was further submitted that even assuming that Respondent No. 3
was entitled to object, it was the case of Respondent No.3 that the Testatrix
performed the marriage of Respondent No.3 on 16.09.1972, i.e., four days
prior to the execution of the Will dated 20.09.1972. The fact that
Respondent No.3 admits that the Testatrix was competent to perform the
marriage of her own daughter, shows the absence of any suspicious
circumstances or inability of the Testatrix to execute the Will.

12. It was further submitted that as per Section 90 of the Act, there is a
presumption in favour of the valid execution of the Will as the same was
executed more than thirty years ago. The learned Counsel for the Appellant /
Applicant relied upon the decision of this Court in Subhash Nayyar & Ors.
v. Registrar, University of Delhi & Ors.
2013 (134) DRJ 457, wherein the
Division Bench of this Court had held that once it stands established that the
document in question was thirty years old and produced on proper custody,
the presumption would be attracted in order to support the fact that the
document was in the handwriting of the person concerned and had been so
executed and attested. As the custody of the document had not been

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questioned in the present case and as the Will is thirty years old, the
signature of the Testatrix stands proved in terms of Section 90 of the Act.

13. The learned Counsel for the Appellant / Applicant submitted that as
per the settled legal position with respect to the twin requirement under
Section 69 of the Act, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in
Punnuswami Goundan & Anr. v. Kalyanasundara Ayyar & Ors. 1934 SCC
OnLine Mad 16 has held that the signature of the attesting witness having
been proved, it would be presumed that the witness would not have
subscribed his name in attestation of that which did not take place.
This
view of the Madras High Court has been endorsed subsequently in another
judgment of the Madras High Court in Jayalakshmi Ammal v. K. Lakhsmi
Iyengar
rep. by power Agent M. Jayaramiyer 1992 SCC OnLine Mad 94,
wherein after considering the views taken by various High Courts, it has
been held that for the purpose of Section 69 of the Act, it is not necessary for
the same witness to prove the signature of the attesting witness and that of
the executant, and that the said requirements could be satisfied by two
different witnesses.

14. It was submitted that even though Section 69 of the Act requires
fulfillment of two conditions, emphasis has been laid on the first condition
about proving the attestation of at least one of the attesting witnesses.

15. The learned Counsel for the Appellant / Applicant also relied upon the
Decision of this Court in Surender Rode v. Madan Mohan Rode & Ors.
2013 (139) DRJ 98, wherein it has been held that there is no bar to the
signature of executant of a Will being proved by the propounder of the Will.

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16. In view of the above settled legal position, the Judgment observing
that both conditions under Section 69 of the Act are required to be fulfilled,
is required to be reviewed.

17. Accordingly, the learned Counsel for the Appellant / Applicant
submitted that the present Application be allowed and consequently the
Appeal also be allowed by granting the probate in favour of the Appellant /
Applicant.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.3:

18. The learned counsel for Respondent No.3 submitted that this
Application is not maintainable as there is no error apparent on the face of
the Judgment. There is no misinterpretation of law or any failure to consider
any issue raised before this Court in the Judgment.

19. It was also submitted that the present Application has been filed to
extend the period of limitation so as to challenge the Judgment as the
Appellant / Applicant has not challenged the Judgment in accordance with
law. There is no legal question pending to be answered in the Judgment and
there is no mistake or misinterpretation of law in the Judgment. Hence, the
present Application deserves to be dismissed.

20. It was submitted that the review is not a second appeal and the scope
of review is very limited as it does not give an opportunity to reargue the
case. As the Appellant / Applicant has failed to discharge the burden of
proving the valid execution of the Will, the Judgment has rightly dismissed
the Appeal.

21. As regards the argument of the Will being a thirty-year old document,
the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 3 submitted that the probate case

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was filed in the year 2000 and, therefore, the Will was not a thirty-year old
document at the time of filing of the probate case. The pendency of the
probate case before the learned Trial Court and the Appeal before this Court
cannot enure to the benefit of the Appellant / Applicant as the relevant date
for considering whether the document is a thirty-year old document is on the
date of filing of the probate case. Hence, the submission about the Will
being a thirty-year old document is an afterthought and cannot be taken up
for the first time in the Application.

22. It was further submitted that no ground for review of the Judgment
has been made out by the Appellant / Applicant and the Application deserves
to the dismissed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:

23. This Court has vide judgment dated 25.06.2025 dismissed the Appeal
of the Appellant / Applicant while observing that:

“25. However, whether the signature of the Testatrix on the Will
document was made in her handwriting or not is required to be
proved. It is the Appellant’s case that – firstly, the Succession
Certificate was granted by the learned Sub-Judge after examining
the attesting witnesses of the Will; and secondly, the learned Sub-
Judge had endorsed the Will document as original.

26. The following factors are relevant to evaluate whether
signature of the Testatrix on the Will document was made in her
handwriting:

a) The Testatrix executed the said Will on 20.09.1972. She
passed away a month later on 20.10.1972 and it is
undisputed that she was suffering from some health
conditions before her demise.

b) The Appellant admitted in his cross-examination that he
was not present during the execution of the said Will by
the Testatrix.

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c) The Appellant has failed to draw a co-relation between
the grant of Succession Certificate and the valid execution
of the Will.

d) The Appellant submitted that the attesting witnesses were
examined in the proceedings before the learned Sub-Judge
in the proceedings for grant of succession certificate.

However, the same remains uncorroborated because the
record of the said proceedings could not be produced as
they were burnt due to fire in Tis Hazari Court as per the
Appellant’s version.

e) The Appellant submitted that the learned Sub-Judge in the
proceedings for grant of Succession Certificate had
endorsed the Will in question as original. After perusing
the said document, the Appellant’s contention remains
unsubstantiated as firstly, the Appellant has failed to
establish any between the alleged endorsement on the said
document and the grant of Succession Certificate; and
secondly, the veracity of the said document still remains
under question as it does not have any seal or stamp of the
Court of Sub-Judge concerned.

27. In view of the above facts and circumstances, the second
precondition under Section 69 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is
not satisfied in the present case as it cannot be established that the
signature on the said Will document is that of the Testatrix herself.

28. As the Appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proving
the valid execution of the Will in question, there is no infirmity
with the Impugned Order. Accordingly, the present Appeal is
hereby dismissed. Pending Application(s), if any, also stand
disposed of.”

24. The Appellant / Applicant has sought to reargue the Appeal by raising
substantial arguments in guise of reviewing the Judgment. At the time of
hearing of the Appeal, all arguments made by the Appellant / Applicant were
considered while passing the Judgment.

25. It is a settled position that the scope and ambit of the Court’s power
under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (“CPC“) is very limited and the review application is maintainable
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only if there is a discovery of new and important matters or evidence, which
after the exercise of the due diligence was not within the knowledge of the
applicant or there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record. It is also settled law that an error apparent on the face of the record
must be such an error which may strike one on a mere looking at the record
and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning. Where an
alleged error is far from self-evident and has to be detected by a process of
reasoning after lengthy and complicated arguments, it can hardly be said to
be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise
its power of review.

26. It is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and
corrected’. A review application has a limited purpose and cannot be
allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’. It is well established that the power of
review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a
view. The ground of ‘any other sufficient reason’ provided in Order XLVII
Rule 1 of the CPC
has to be a reason sufficient on the grounds that are at
least analogous to those specified in the said Rule. There is no doubt that
the Court while exercising the power of review does not sit in appeal over its
own order as rehearing of the matter is impermissible in law. Once a
judgment is signed and pronounced, it should not be altered and the exercise
of inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked for reviewing any order beyond
the limited scope and ambit prescribed under law for review.

27. In view of the above, the Application filed by the Appellant /
Applicant does not make out any grounds that are within the limited scope
available for review of the Judgment. All the grounds mentioned in the
Application are beyond the permissible scope for reviewing the Judgment.

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28. As regards the ground of non-objection by Respondent No.3, the same
is not relevant. In any event, the Judgment has considered the same in
paragraph 12 of the Judgment. Hence, the Appellant / Applicant is not
permitted to raise the same argument which has already been considered by
this Court while passing the Judgment by way of this Application. As per the
settled law as discussed above, this Application cannot be used for rearguing
the Appeal de novo.

29. The contention of the Appellant / Applicant that failure to cross-
examine the Appellant / Applicant about his statement in his affidavit of
evidence that the Will was executed by the Testatrix, amounts to proving the
execution of the Will, cannot be accepted. The Judgment has analyzed the
law with respect to the proof and execution of the document required by law
to be attested and proving the same where no attesting witness is found as
provided under Sections 68 and 69 of the Act. Accordingly, it is required that
both the pre-conditions as prescribed under Section 69 have to be fulfilled.
The argument of the Appellant / Applicant that merely stating that the Will
was executed by the Testatrix and there being no cross-examination on that
aspect, amounts to proving of the signature of the Testatrix is untenable.

30. As per Section 69 of the Act, it must be proved that the signature of
the person executing the document is in the handwriting of that person. The
testimony of the Appellant / Applicant before the learned Trial Court does
not specifically state that the signature on the Will is in the handwriting of
the Testatrix. The Appellant / Applicant has admitted during his cross-
examination that he was not personally present at the time of execution of
the Will. In the absence of any proof that the signature on the Will was of the

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Testatrix, the mandatory requirement of Section 69 of the Act has not been
fulfilled as already held in the Judgment.

31. There is no cavil that under Section 69 of the Act, it is not necessary
for the same witness to prove the signature of the attesting witness and that
of the executant, and the said requirement can be satisfied by two different
witnesses. Hence, Jayalakshmi Ammal (supra) is not applicable in the
present case as it holds that the second condition of proving the signature of
the executant can be proved by a different witness than the one who proved
the signature of the attesting witness, however, the said decision does not
hold that the second requirement under Section 69 of the Act is not required
to be fulfilled.

32. The decision of Punnuswami Goundan (supra) was in the context of
Section 67 of the Act, which requires proof of signature and handwriting of
the person alleged to have signed or written the document. The said decision
held that Section 67 of the Act does not specify the limit and the kind of
evidence required so long as the proof of signature or handwriting is by way
of admissible evidence. The observation in the said decision that “The
signature of the attesting witness, when proved, is evidence of everything
upon the face of the instrument, since it is to be presumed that the witness
would not have subscribed his name in attestation of that which did not take
place” is in the context of manner of proving the signature or handwriting on
an instrument. However, this decision does not deal with the requirement of
proving the signature under Section 69 of the Act. There cannot be any
presumption with regard to the requirement of proving that the signature on
the Will is in the handwriting of the Testatrix by proving the signature of the
attesting witness of the Will. Section 69 of the Act provides for both the

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requirements to be fulfilled as it clearly mentions ‘and’ for both the
conditions. Hence, fulfillment of the first condition cannot be presumed to
be fulfilling the second condition.

33. It is open for the propounder of the Will to prove the signature of the
executant of the Will as rightly held by this Court in the case of Surender
Rode
(supra). However, in this case, the Appellant has failed to prove that
the signature on the Will is in the handwriting of the Testatrix. There is no
such statement in the affidavit of evidence of the Appellant / Applicant
before the learned Trial Court. As the Appellant / Applicant has failed to
prove that the signature on the Will is in the handwriting of the Testatrix, the
second condition as per Section 69 of the Act has not been fulfilled as
rightly observed in the Judgment.

34. Section 90 of the Act is not applicable as on the date of filing of the
probate case in the year 2000, the Will was not a thirty-year old document.
Therefore, this argument being taken up for the first time in this Review
Application, which was not even pleaded in the Appeal, is clearly an
afterthought and cannot be considered.

35. In view of the above, no ground has been made out for reviewing the
Judgment. Accordingly, this Review Application is dismissed.

TEJAS KARIA, J

AUGUST 22, 2025
‘gsr’

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