Jharkhand High Court
Rebeka Murmu vs Suruj Kisku on 11 July, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:19208-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No.93 of 2025
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Rebeka Murmu , aged about 74 years, wife of late Jems
Tudu, resident of village Baliyhandagal, P.O. Baliadangal,
P.S. Maheshpur, District-Pakur, Jharkhand.
... ... Appellant
Versus
Suruj Kisku, wife of late Lakhiram Marandi, aged about 70
years, resident of village Lalchua, P.O. Devinagar, P.S.
Maheshpur, District-Pakur, Jharkhand.
... ... Respondent
1. Alimus Tudu, S/o late Jems Tudu, aged about 53 yrs.
2. Piysh Tudu, S/o late Jems Tudu, aged about 50 yrs.
Both R/o Vill. Baliyandagal, P.O. Baliadangal, P.S.
Maheshpur, Distt. -Pakur (Jharkhand).
... ... Performa Respondents
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
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For the Appellant : Mr. Suraj Singh, Advocate
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Order No.03/Dated 11 July, 2025
th
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:
1. The instant first appeal, under Section 19(1) of Family
Courts Act, 1984, is directed against the order/judgment
dated 27.02.2023 and decree dated 13.03.2023 passed by
learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Pakur in Original Suit
No.110 of 2020 whereby and whereunder the suit filed by the
appellant under Section 25 of Guardians and Wards Act,
1890 has been dismissed.
I.A. No. 4515 of 2025
2. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation
since there is delay of 477 days in preferring the appeal,
therefore, an application being I.A. No. 4515 of 2025 has been
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filed for condoning such delay.
3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that
the instant appeal has been filed after inordinate delay of 477
days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay
condonation application before going into the legality and
propriety of the impugned order on merit.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has
submitted that delay in preferring the appeal may be
condoned by allowing the Interlocutory Application on the
basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be
sufficient.
5. The ground for condoning the delay in preferring the
appeal, as has been mentioned at paragraph 4 of the
interlocutory application is that passing of the
order/judgment dated 27.02.2023 and decree dated
13.03.2023 by learned family court was not within the
knowledge of the applicant/appellant and as soon as the
applicant came to know about the judgment in the month of
June 2024, she contacted her advocate and after getting
opinion from her advocate the applicant/appellant filed first
appeal before this Court on 19.07.2024 without any delay, for
ready reference, paragraph 4 of the instant interlocutory
application is being quoted hereunder as :-
“4. That the appellant states that after passing of the
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2025:JHHC:19208-DBorder dated judgment dated 27.02.2023 and decree
dated 13.03.2023 by learned family court appellant
was not aware of the judgment, the applicant came to
know about the judgment in the month of June 2024
after knowing the same petitioner contacted his
advocate and after getting opinion from his advocate
the applicant filed first appeal before this Hon’be court
on 19.07.2024 then the appellant came to know about
the order and asked for opinion.”
6. Further, at paragraph – 5 of the interlocutory application
it has been mentioned that after taking opinion on
17.06.2024 the appellant arranged the professional fee and
got the first appeal drafted on 17.07.2024 and thereafter on
19.07.2024 the first appeal was filed before this Hon’ble Court
without any further delay.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on
delay condonation application and before considering the
same, this Court, deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal
proposition as has been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex
Court with respect to the approach of the Court in condoning
the inordinate delay.
8. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is
not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but
certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay,
then the duty of the Court is to consider the application to
condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.
9. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is
enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis
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litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy
must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as
has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana &
Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
10. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim,
(1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in
Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:
“A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to
operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case,
but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be
enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular
party as the Judge cannot, on equitable grounds,
enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its
operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by
law.”
11. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7
SCC 556, the Apex Court while considering a case of
condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation
much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for
condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as
under:
“6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular
party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes and the courts have no
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable4
2025:JHHC:19208-DBgrounds.”
12. While considering the similar issue, this Court in Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013)
12 SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as under:
“21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is
so as the fundamental principle is that the courts
are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice
in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal
approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay
as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner
requires to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters.”
13. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not
act with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to
inaction and laches on its part, the period of limitation for
filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide and gross
inaction and negligence are the vital factors which should be
taken into consideration while considering the question of
condonation of delay.
14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762,
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has held that merely because sufficient cause has been made
out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to the
appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:-
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even
after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not
entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a
matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
condition precedent for the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by
Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing
further has to be done; the application for condoning
delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If
sufficient cause is shown then the court has to
enquire whether in its discretion it should condone
the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally
introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and
it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its
bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope
of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary
power after sufficient cause is shown would
naturally be limited only to such facts as the court
may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry
as to why the party was sitting idle during all the
time available to it. In this connection we may point
out that considerations of bona fides or due
diligence are always material and relevant when the
court is dealing with applications made under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with
such applications the court is called upon to
consider the effect of the combined provisions of
Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion,
considerations which have been expressly made
material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14
cannot to the same extent and in the same manner
be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to6
2025:JHHC:19208-DBbe decided only under Section 5 without reference to
Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty
in holding that the discretion should be exercised in
favour of the appellant because apart from the
general criticism made against the appellant’s lack
of diligence during the period of limitation no other
fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have
already pointed out, the learned Judicial
Commissioner rejected the appellant’s application
for condonation of delay only on the ground that it
was appellant’s duty to file the appeal as soon as
possible within the period prescribed, and that, in
our opinion, is not a valid ground.”
15. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay
condonation application, the Court of Law is required to
consider the sufficient cause for condonation of delay as also
the approach of the litigant as to whether it is bona fide or not
as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is
accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is
necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and
at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
16. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning
of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of
‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs.
Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein,
it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to
15 hereunder:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The
meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or
“enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer7
2025:JHHC:19208-DBthe purpose intended. Therefore, the word
“sufficient” embraces no more than that which
provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the
facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly
examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
“sufficient cause” means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that
the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained
inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the
court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason
that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has
to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the court that he was prevented by any
“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and
unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the
court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine
whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra
Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee
[AIR 1964 SC 1336], Mata Din v. A. Narayanan
[(1969) 2 SCC 770], Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC
545] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn.
of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157].)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC
993] this Court explained the difference between a
“good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed
that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice
versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be
that the requirement of good cause is complied with
on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient
cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given
a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial
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justice is done, but only so long as negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to
the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause
has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535]
and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC
195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation.” The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed
lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”,
stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a
decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a
statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks
to bury all acts of the past which have not been
agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of
England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of limitations
namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant9
2025:JHHC:19208-DBmight have lost the evidence to disprove a stale
claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of
actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long
enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s
own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and
Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC
510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC
705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that
judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts
to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid
down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the
court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain
the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which
means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within
limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or
for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could
be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by
imposing any condition whatsoever. The application
is to be decided only within the parameters laid down
by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay.
In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation
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of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
17. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or
there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the
party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by
any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not
allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has
to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in
Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.
Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala
Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal
Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben
Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
18. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that
the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
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only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath
Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao &
Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:-
“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression
“sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of
the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other
similar provision should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides
is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether
explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient
cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each
case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for
accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the
delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear
that the courts should not proceed with the
tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and
reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-
jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of
explanation furnished should be the rule and
refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or
inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the
defaulting party. On the other hand, while
considering the matter the courts should not lose
sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the
time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the
other party which should not be lightly defeated by
condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However,12
2025:JHHC:19208-DBby taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the
matter the explanation furnished should not be
rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable
points of facts and law are involved in the case,
causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the
party against whom the lis terminates, either by
default or inaction and defeating valuable right of
such a party to have the decision on merit. While
considering the matter, courts have to strike a
balance between resultant effect of the order it is
going to pass upon the parties either way.”
19. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition
and the explanation furnished in the delay condonation
application to condone the inordinate delay of 477 days, is
proceeding to examine as to whether the explanation
furnished can be said to be sufficient explanation for
condoning the delay.
20. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove,
wherein, expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with
which means that the party should not have acted in a
negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part
in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or
“remained inactive”.
21. This Court, in order to assess as to whether the ground
as has been referred in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the instant
interlocutory application can be considered to be sufficient
cause for condoning the delay of 477 days in filing the appeal,
has scrutinized the record and found therefrom that the order
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was passed on 27.02.2023 in presence of the learned counsel
for the appellant.
22. The reason has been shown that the appellant has no
knowledge about the order/judgment passed by the learned
Family Judge and when it came to her knowledge, she
contacted her advocate and, as such, delay of about 477 days
occurred in filing the instant appeal.
23. The ground which has been taken in the interlocutory
application to the effect that the appellant had no knowledge
about the judgment passed by the learned Family Judge and,
therefore, could not file the appeal in time does not seem to be
a cogent explanation.
24. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the explanation
which has been furnished by the appellant in the delay
condonation application, cannot be said to be a sufficient
cause to condone the inordinate delay.
25. This Court, after taking into consideration the ratio laid
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments referred
hereinabove as also the explanation furnished in the delay
condonation application, is of the view that no sufficient
cause has been shown to condone inordinate delay of 477
days in filing the appeal.
26. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court has also dismissed
S.L.P.(C) Diary No.(S) No.3188 of 2024 on 02.02.2024 filed by
the State of Jharkhand against the order dated 14.08.2023
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passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.401 of 2022, wherein, the
delay of 259 days was not condoned.
27. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court as also considering the fact that the delay
of 477 days has not sufficiently been explained and as such,
the instant interlocutory application deserves to be dismissed.
28. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being
I.A. No. 4515 of 2025 is hereby dismissed.
29. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal also stands
dismissed.
30. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand
dismissed.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Birendra/A.F.R.
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