Delhi District Court
Rohan Singh vs State on 3 January, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-017955-2024
Criminal Revision No.: 512/2024
ROHAN SINGH,
S/o. Lt. Sh. Narender Singh,
R/o. H. No. A-257, Ground Floor,
Gali No. 5, Tomar Colony,
Burari, New Delhi. ... REVISIONIST/
PETITIONER
VERSUS
STATE (NCT OF DELHI),
Through Addl. Public Prosecutor,
Department of Prosecution,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. ... RESPONDENT
Date of Institution : 16.11.2024
Date when judgment was reserved : 21.12.2024
Date when judgment is pronounced : 03.01.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present revision petition has been filed under
Sections 397of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter, referred to as ‘Cr.P.C./Code’)/Section 438 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred
to as ‘BNSS’), seeking setting aside of the order dated
28.10.2024 (hereinafter referred to as ‘impugned order’), passed
by Ld. ACJM-01, Central Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Ld. Trial Court/Ld. ACJM’) in case bearing, ‘State
v. Rohan Singh‘, arising out of FIR No. 572/2023, PS. EOW,
under Sections 420/467/471/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC‘). Pertinently, by virtue of the
impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court dismissed the application of
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ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.03
16:02:51 +0530
the revisionist under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C./Section 480(6)
BNSS. Consequently, it is prayed that the revisionist be admitted
to bail on such terms and conditions, which this Court may deem
fit and proper, in the interest of justice.
2.1. Succinctly, the facts leading to the filing of the
present petition are that on 20.04.2023, an information vide DD
No. 59, was received at the concerned police station from the
complainant, namely, Sukhbir Singh S/o. Dharam Singh. As per
the complainant, upon his retirement from the post of Sub-
Inspector from Delhi Police, he/the complainant explored a
residential premise in Burari, Delhi in October 2021. At that
point in time, the complainant is asserted to have come in contact
with the revisionist, who operated his business in the name and
style of Shri. Ram Property Dealer at Burari, Delhi. Further, as
per the complainant, on 19.10.2021, the revisionist showed the
complainant, a ‘two rooms’ flat at the first floor of house no.
783/2, Lal Dora Extension, Burari Delhi, wherein the number of
the said house/flat was specified as 793/1 in its electricity bill.
Subsequently, as per the complainant, on 20.10.2021, the
revisionist reached at Rohini Court with the keys of the flat as
well as got executed, Lease Security Agreement dated
20.10.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Security Agreement’),
mentioning the flat number as First Floor, Front side Khasra No.
783/2, Extended Lal Dora Village, Burari, Delhi-110084 ( अत:
दिनांक 20/10/2021 को रोहन सिंह फ्लै ट की चाबी लेकर रोहिनी कोर्ट पहुँच गया जहाँ पर
उसने हमारा उपरोक्त फ्लै ट का सिक्यूरिटी एग्रीमेंट लिखवा दिया). The complainant
is further avowed to have made payment of the security amount
of Rs. 4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) to the revisionist,
whilst, receiving the keys of the said flat from the revisionist.
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Thereupon, the complainant declared that he started residing in
the said flat (जिसमें सभी नियम व शर्ते अंकित है और चार लाख रूपये लेकर उपरोक्त
फ्लै ट की चाबी हमें सुर्पद कर दी और प्रार्थी ने मय परिवार के फ्लै ट में रहना शुरू कर दिया).
Suddenly, as per the complainant, on 07/08.04.2023, one person
in the name of Sh. Sundeshwar Kumar Suman, reached at
his/complainant’s flat and demanded the rent of the said
premise/flat from the complainant (दिनांक 07-08/04/2023 को अचानक
एक व्यक्ति जिसका नाम सुन्देश्वर कु मार सुमन है, प्रार्थी के फ्लै ट पर आया जिसने आते प्रार्थीसे फ्लै ट के किराये की मांग की). Upon being enquired, Sh. Sundeshwar
Kumar Suman, informed the complainant that he was the owner
of the flat in question and that he had not leased out the same to
anyone on security (तब उस व्यक्ति सुन्देश्वर कु मार सुमन ने बताया कि मैं इस
मकान का असली मालिक हूँ और मैंने यह मकान किसी को सिक्यूरिटी पर नहीं दिया है).
Correspondingly, despite being shown the Security Agreement,
Sh. Suman denied being related to the revisionist, rather,
proclaimed that the flat was leased to revisionist by him/Sh.
Suman (उपरोक्त सुन्देश्वर कु मार सुमन से पूछा कि क्या तुम उपरोक्त रोहन सिंह के भाई
हो तो सुन्देश्वर कु मार सुमन ने कहा कि मैं उसका कोई भाई-वाई नही हूँ उसने तो यह मकान
मुझसे किराये पर लिया है और हर महीने की दस तारीख पर आकर वह उसका किराया मुझेमेरे घर पर दे जाता है). Subsequently, when the complainant confronted
the revisionist regarding the incident and asked him to return the
security amount, the revisionist is asserted to have got angry as
well as threatened the complainant of dire consequences ( रोहन सिंह
ने गुस्से में आकर प्रार्थी से कहा कि अगर तुम्हे अपने पैसे वापस लेने है तो मुझे कु छ समय
दो वरना अगर तुम मुझसे अभी पैसे मांगोगे तो ना तो मैं तुम्हे पैसे वापस दूंगा और तुम्हे वतुम्हारे परिवार को जान से मार दूंगा). Corresponingly, as per the
complainant, the revisionist persevered with his illegal acts,
threatening the complainant of serious repercussions in case he
did not deter demanding his money. Markedly, under said facts
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ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.03
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and circumstances as well as on the basis of the complainant’s
complaint, the instant FIR came to be registered, and
investigation ensued. Notably, during the course of investigation,
the investigating officer is declared to have discovered several
other victims, who were duped by the revisionist following
similar modus operandi. Pertinent to further observe, upon filing
of chargesheet before the Ld. Trial Court, it was brought to the
attention of the Ld. MM on 03.01.2024 by the IO/SI Deepak that
since many more victims have filed their respective complaints in
the police station qua the revisionist alleging the act of cheating
committed by the revisionist while deploying same modus
operandi, process had been initiated in terms of the standing
order no. 173/2021 for transfer of the matter from PS Burari to
the Economic Offences Wing/EOW, in terms of the guidelines
specified under Part III, para 14 of the said standing order.
Subsequently, on 12.04.2024, report was filed by the concerned
SHO, PS Burari before the Ld. MM, inter alia specifying that the
approval of concerned authories for getting the matter transferred
to EOW was received and that the matter(s) was(were) in the
process of being transferred to the concerned EOW.
Consequently, the Ld. MM vide order of the said date i.e. on
12.04.2024, directed the matter to be put up before Ld. CMM,
Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi for the reason of lack of
jurisdiction with the Ld. MM. Subsequently, the Ld. CMM,
Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi vide order dated 22.04.2024,
directed the matter to be listed before Ld. ACMM/Ld. Trial
Court.
2.2. Appositely, it is specified under the instant
petition/revision petition that during the interregnum proceedings
before the Ld. Trial Court, the revisionist preferred an application
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by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.01.03
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in terms of the proceedings under Section 439 Cr.P.C. before the
Ld. Sessions Judge. However, the same was withdrawn on
08.04.2024 by the revisionist as the revisionist desired to move
an appropriate application before the Ld. Trial Court, on merits.
Subsequently, the revisionist moved an application under Section
437 Cr.P.C., seeking bail, which was dismissed by the Ld. Trial
Court vide order dated 04.07.2024. Markedly, charges against the
revisionist were framed under Sections 420/506 IPC by the Ld.
Trial Court vide order dated 19.07.2024 and the matter was fixed
for prosecution evidence on 21.08.2024. The revisionist further
proclaimed that when the matter was listed before the Ld. Trial
Court on 21.08.2024, i.e., the first date for prosecution evidence,
Ld. Counsel for the revisionist had appeared as well as, was
willing to cross examine the said witness. However, the
revisionist avowed that due to absence of the complainant,
evidence could not be recorded on the said date. Subsequently, it
was only on 09.10.2024, the evidence of the complainant could
be recorded. However, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist asserted
that on 20.10.2024, more than 60 (sixty) days since the first date
fixed for prosecution evidence had lapsed, leading to the
revisionist moving an application under Section 437(6)
Cr.P.C./Section 480(6) BNSS, before the Ld. Trial Court.
Nonetheless, as per the Ld. Counsel, the instant application was
dismissed by the Ld. Trial Court vide its order dated 28.10.2024,
i.e., the order impugned herein.
3.1. Learned Counsel for the revisionist outrightly
contended that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial
Court without properly appreciating the facts of the present case
as well as wrongly applying the law. Further, as per the Ld.
Counsel, the impugned order is wrong and contrary to settled law
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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and has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court, mechanically,
without due application of mind to the factual and legal position.
As per the Ld. Counsel, the reasons to be given in writing, while
dismissing the bail application could have been limited to the
extent whether the delay in trial has been caused by the
applicant/accused and not to the general reasons under Section
437 Cr.P.C. In this regard, it was further submitted that from a
plain reading of the provisions under Section 437(6)
Cr.P.C./Section 480(6) BNSS, it would be quite manifest that the
provision is not only obligatory, rather, little room/leverage is left
with the magistrate to refuse the bail, subject to recording his
statement for doing so. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the
revisionist has been in judicial custody for the whole/entire
interregnum period, without any delay being attributable to
him/the revisionist. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial
Court did not consider that powers under Section 437(6)
Cr.P.C./Section 480(6) BNSS should have been exercised as the
revisionist has been in judicial custody since 21.08.2024 and that
it has been more than sixty days from the date, first fixed for
prosecution evidence, with the trial not having been concluded in
the meanwhile and the Ld. Trial Court has been able to examine
only one witness, entitling the revisionist to the benefit under
Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. It was further vehemently contended by
the Ld. Counsel that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the
Hon’ble High Court of Uttarakhand in Mohd. Inam v. State of
Uttarakhand & Ors., C482 Application No. 2502 of 2023, dated
24.05.2024, held that the provisions under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C.
are mandatory in nature and that in case, trial is not concluded
within the period as specified under the said provision, accused is
entitled to bail. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial
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GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.03
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Court did not properly appreciate the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Chandraswami & Ors. v. CBI, (1996) 6 SCC
751, wherein the Hon’ble Court in unambiguous terms held that
the paramount consideration, while determining an entreaty of
bail should be that release of such person would not jeopardize
prosecution case. However, in the instant case, as per the Ld.
Counsel, despite such any apprehension forthcoming on record,
the Ld. Trial Court wrongly denied the revisionist’s prayer for
bail, unmindful of the statutory provisions and the mandatory
nature thereof. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the
impugned judgment was passed by the Ld. Trial Court, oblivious
to the dictate in RE: Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, WP(C)
No. 406/2013, dated 06.05.2016, wherein, as per the Ld.
Counsel, Under Trial Review Committee/UTRC was directed to
examine the case of under trial prisoners eligible for release
under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C., wherein in a case triable by a
magistrate, the trial of such a person has not been concluded
within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking
evidence in the case.
3.2. Learned Counsel for the revisionist further
strenuously reiterated that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider
that the provisions under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C./Section 480(6)
BNSS, entitles an accused to be released on bail in case the trial
is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date,
fixed for taking evidence in the case and that there is no special
reason on the basis of which, the revisionist’s prayer in the
instant case, ought to have been refused. As per the Ld. Counsel,
the Ld. Trial Court further failed to consider that the legislative
intent behind the introduction of the said provision is to provide
expeditious disposal of a case and that the said provision is in
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.03
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consonance with the principles of equity, justice, and good
conscience. As per the Ld. Counsel, it is unambiguous that in
case of non-bailable offence in case the trial is not concluded
within a period of sixty days from the date first fixed for
evidence, such person gets an unassailable right to be released on
bail, which has been erroneously rejected by the Ld. Trial Court
under the impugned order. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel the Ld.
Trial Court also did not consider that it has been persistently
ruled by superior courts that while the trial is still pending and
there is prolonged delay in conclusion thereof, reasons for delay
being not attributable to an accused, accused is entitled to bail. It
was further submitted that in the instant case, there is, even
otherwise, no reasonable apprehension that the revisionist would
flee from justice and that solely for the reason that an offence,
prima facie appears to be made out against the revisionist, cannot
be a ground to withhold/deny bail to the revisionist, despite there
are no allegations that the revisionist endeavored to tamper with
the evidence/prosecution evidence/witnesses in the instant case.
Even otherwise, it was submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the Ld.
Trial Court did not even consider that no notice was issued by the
IO to the revisionist to join the investigation, in blatant disregard
to the dictate of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar v.
State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273. Further, as per the Ld.
Counsel, the general principles governing the grant/dismissal of
bail have not been considered by the Ld. Trial Court, while
adjudication on the revisionist’s application under Section 437(6)
Cr.P.C. In so far as the maintainability of the present petition is
concerned, Ld. Counsel submitted that the impugned order,
grossly affects the rights of the petitioner and is amenable to the
revisional jurisdiction of this Court. As per the Ld. Counsel, the
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impugned order determines a valuable right of the petitioner to
be released on bail in case the trail is not concluded within a
period of sixty days, as specified under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C.,
making the same amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this
Court. In support of the said contentions, reliance was further
placed on the decisions in; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central
Bureau of Investigation & Ors., (2022) 10 SCC 51; Ram Kumar
@ Raj Kumar Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2000 Cri.LJ
2644; Riza Abdul Razak Zunzunia v. State of Gujarat, 2009
Cri.LJ 4766; Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 2009 Cri.LJ
2941; Haricharan Ramteke v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2002 (1)
MPJR 16; Rajendra S/o. Rajaram Pal v. State of M.P., Misc. Crl.
Case No. 2605/2002, dated 26.07.2002 (MP High Court);
Saritadevi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2000 (2) Crimes 543;
Mohd. Abdul v. State of West Bengal, 1991 Crimes (II) 741;
Suresh Verma v. State of U.P. & Anr., Application u/S. 482
Cr.P.C. No. 5136/2013, dated 12.03.2013; In Re: 122 Prisoners,
Crl. MC No. 3179/1998, dated 10.10.2006; Vikas Kumar v. State
of Rajasthan, SB Crl. Misc. III Bail Appln. No. 12925/2023,
dated 29.11.2023 (HC of Rajasthan); Bhikaji Chaturji Thakore v.
State of Gujarat, 2007 (2) GLH 580; Anil Mahajan v.
Commissioner of Customs, 2000 (2) JCC Delhi 302; Court on its
Own Motion v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2004 (1) JCC 308 (Delhi);
and Rajesh Sarathe v. State of Madhya Pradesh, MCRC No.
22736/2019, dated 01.08.2019 (MP High Court).
4. Per contra Ld. Addl. PP for the State outrightly
submitted that there is no irregularity in the impugned order,
which has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court after duly
appreciating the facts of the present case and the judicial
precedents. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further submitted that Ld.
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Date:
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Trial Court, while passing the impugned order duly appreciated
that considering the nature of allegations involved against the
revisionist as well as the number of victims involved, the
revisionist was not entitled to the beneficial provisions under
Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. Ld. Addl. PP for the State, even otherwise,
strenuously argued that the provisions under Section 437(6)
Cr.P.C. are not mandatory in nature and that the Ld. Trial Court is
vested with enough discretion for the reasons to be recorded in
writing, for denying the benefit of the said provision, if the facts
and circumstances of the case so demand. Ld. Addl. PP for the
State further contended that even presuming that the provisions
under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. are mandatory in nature, however,
the same are not absolute as the provisions of Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C. and that the right of an accused to be released on bail
under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C., is in the nature of a statutory
protection granted under the Code, which has to be cautiously
exercised. In this regard, it was further submitted that the offence
involved in the instant case is quite grievous with larger
ramification against the society, multiple victims, emerging on
regular basis. Further, as per Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the
revisionist by deploying similar modus operandi, conned several
innocent victims and that the amount involved in the instant case
extends to several crores. It was further vehemently asserted that
superior courts have persistently avowed that economic offences
are grave and pose a serious threat to the economic health of the
country. Accordingly, as per Ld. Addl. PP for the State, the view
adopted by the Ld. Trial Court under the impugned order is in
consonance with as well as passed being wary of the seriousness
of allegations involved in the instant case. Accordingly, Ld. Addl.
PP for the State firmly affirmed that the present revision
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GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.01.03
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petition/revision is grossly misconceived and has been filed by
the revisionist only to delay the proceedings before the Ld. Trial
Court, making the same liable to be rejected at the outset. In
support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the
decisions in; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of
Investigation & Ors., (Supra.); Latabai v. State of Maharashtra,
2024 SCC OnLine Bom. 3110; Karan Pal Singh Advocate v.
Union of India & Anr., WP(Crl.) 545/2015, dated 06.03.2017
(DHC); and Karam Allahi v. State of UP & Anr., Application
under Section 482 No. 30784/2023, dated 12.10.2023: Neutral
Citation: 2023:AHC:197166.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and
that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State have been heard as well as the
record(s), including the Trial Court record(s) as well as the
judgments relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and
Ld. Addl. PP for the State have been thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding further with the determination of
the rival contentions of parties, i.e., Ld. Counsel for the
revisionist and Ld. Addl. PP for the State, this deems it apposite
to outrightly refer and reproduce the provisions under Section
397 Cr.P.C.1, as under;
“397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of
revision – (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate
within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of1
Pari materia to Section 438 BNSS, which provides; “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of
revision-(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying
itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or
passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such
record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement
that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation–All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate
jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of
Section 439.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding….”
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or
order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may,
when calling for such record, direct that the
execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and
if the accused is in confinement, that he be released
on bail or on his own bond pending the examination
of the record.
Explanation – All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior
to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-
section and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding…”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Appositely, from a perusal of the aforesaid
provision, it is quite manifest that the revisional jurisdiction of
this Court can be agitated either suo motu or an application of the
parties only in the instances where there is a palpable error, non-
compliance of the provision of law, decision of Trial Court being
completely erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised
arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander,
(2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein the Hon’ble Court, while explicating
the various contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C.
(pari materia to Section 438 BNSS) observed as under;
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as
to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or
order made in a case. The object of this provision is
to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it
may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the
orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of
careful consideration and appear to be in accordance
with law. If one looks into the various judgments of
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this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction
can be invoked where the decisions under challenge
are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with
the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based
on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are
merely indicative. Each case would have to be
determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise
of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with
the question as to whether the charge has been
framed properly and in accordance with law in a
given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case
substantially falls within the categories aforestated.
Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in
the proceedings under the CrPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Manifestly, it may be noted from above that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. Further, as aforenoted,
the object of the provisions under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. Needless to
further iterate that law is settled 2 that there has to be, “well-
founded error which is to be determined on the merits of
individual case. It is also well settled that while considering the
same, the revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts
and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.” Quite
evidently, the revisional jurisdiction of court(s) is confined only
to the extent of correcting the errors in the exercise of jurisdiction
or if the finding of the trial court is manifestly contrary to
2
Malkeet Singh Gill v. The State of Chhattisgarh, MANU/SC/0814/2022.
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evidence on record or so palpably wrong that if allowed to stand,
the same would result in grave injustice to a party. In distinction,
appellate jurisdiction permits a court to re-examine, reevaluate
and re-appreciate the material placed on record. Needless to
mention, the main distinction between appellate and revisional
jurisdiction is that exercise of revisional jurisdiction is confined
only to the questions of jurisdiction, whilst, in first appeal, court
is free to decide all questions of law as well as fact, which may
arise in a case. Reference in this regard is made to the decision in
State of Kerala v. Putthumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, AIR
1999 SC 981: MANU/SC/0100/1999, wherein the Apex Court in
unambiguous terms noted as under;
“5. Having examined the impugned Judgment of
the High Court and bearing in mind the contentions
raised by the learned Counsel for the parties, we have
no hesitation to come to the conclusion that in the
case in hand, the High Court has exceeded its
revisional jurisdiction. In Its revisional jurisdiction,
the High Court can call for and examine the record of
any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as
to the correctness, legality or propriety of any
finding, sentence or order. In other words, the
jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court for correcting
miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power
cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate
Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate
Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be
appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the
evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same
when the evidence has already been appreciated by
the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in
appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the
notice of the High Court which would otherwise
tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On
scrutinizing the impugned Judgment of the High
Court from the aforesaid stand point, we have no
hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the
conviction of the respondent by re-appreciating the
oral evidence. The High Court also committed
further error in not examining several items ofC.R No. 512/2024 Rohan Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 14 of 25
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
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evidence relied upon by the Additional Sessions
Judge, while confirming the conviction of the
respondent. In this view of the matter the impugned
Judgment of the High Court is wholly unsustainable
in law and we, accordingly, set aside the same. The
conviction and sentence of the respondent as passed
by the Magistrate and affirmed by the Additional
Sessions Judge in appeal is confirmed. This appeal is
allowed. Bail bonds furnished stand cancelled. The
respondent must surrender to serve the sentence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Significantly, at this stage, this Court deems it
pertinent to reproduce the relevant provisions under law, for the
purpose of present adjudication on merits, as under;
“437. When bail may be taken in case of non-
bailable offence-(1) When any person accused of, or
suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable
offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an
officer in charge of a police station or appears or is
brought before a Court other than the High Court or
Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but-
(i) such person shall not be so released if there
appear reasonable grounds for believing that he
has been guilty of an offence punishable with
death or imprisonment for life;
(ii) such person shall not be so released if such
offence is a cognizable offence and he had been
previously convicted of an offence punishable
with death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had
been previously convicted on two or more
occasions of a cognizable offence punishable
with imprisonment for three years or more but not
less than seven years:
Provided that the Court may direct that a person
referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be released
on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen
years or is a woman or is sick or infirm:
Provided further that the Court may also direct
“that a person referred to in clause (ii) be released
on bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so
to do for any other special reason:
Provided also that the mere fact that an accused
person may be required for being identified by
witnesses during investigation shall not be
sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is
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otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives
an undertaking that the shall comply with such
directions as may be given by the Court.
Provided also that no person shall, if the offence
alleged to have been committed by him is
punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment for seven years or more be released
on bail by the Court under this sub-section
without giving an opportunity of hearing to the
Public Prosecutor.
*** *** ***
(6) If, in any case triable by a Magistrate, the
3trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence
is not concluded within a period of sixty days from
the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case,
such person shall, if he is in custody during the
whole of the said period, be released on bail to the
satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to
be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise
directs…”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Noticeably, from a perusal of the above provision, in
particular, from a conscientious appreciation of provisions under
Section 437(6) Cr.P.C./Section 480(6) BNSS, it is observed that
the same provides that where the trial of any person, accused of
any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty
days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case,
then, such person, “shall, if he is in custody during the whole of
the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the
Magistrate…”. However, the provision itself envisages that even
under such circumstances, a Magistrate is competent and well
within his right to deny such benefit to an accused for the reasons
to be recorded in writing. Appositely, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Gurcharan Singh & Ors. v. State, Delhi Administration,
MANU/SC/0420/1978, while inter alia scrutinizing the
3
Pari materia provision under Section 480(6) BNSS provides, “(6) If, in any case triable by a Magistrate,
the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from
the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of
the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in
writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.”
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provisions under Section 437(6) as well as the objective of
introduction thereof under the statute books, remarked as under;
“20. Under the first proviso to Section 167(2) no
Magistrate shall authorise the detention of an accused
in custody under that section for a total period
exceeding 60 days on the expiry of which the
accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared to
furnish the same. This type of release under the
proviso shall be deemed to be a release under the
provisions ‘of Chapter XXXIII relating to bail. This
proviso is an innovation in the new Code and is
intended to speed up investigation by the police so
that a ‘person does not have to languish unnecessarily
in prison facing a trial. There is a similar provision
under Sub-section (6) of Section 437, Cr. P.C. which
corresponds to Section 497(3A) of the old Code. This
provision is again intended to speed up trial without
unnecessarily detaining a person as an under-trial
prisoner, unless for reasons to ‘be recorded in writing,
the Magistrate otherwise directs. We may also notice
in this connection Sub-section (7) of Section 437
which provides that if at any time after the
conclusion of a trial of any person accused of non-
bailable offence and before the judgment is delivered
the court is of opinion that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused to art guilty of
such an offence, it shall release the accused, if he is
in custody, on the execution of him of a bond without
sureties for his appearance to hear the judgment. The
principle underlying Section 437 is, therefore,
towards granting of ‘bail except in cases where there
appear to be reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused has been guilty of an offence punishable
with death or imprisonment for life and also when
there are other valid reason to justify the refusal of
bail…”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Undoubtedly, the provision under Section 437(6)
Cr.P.C. aims to provide a respite to an accused by ensuring
expeditious adjudication by speeding up trial, without
unnecessarily detaining such an accused as an under-trial
prisoner. However, Magistrate, in his wisdom may direct for
continued incarceration even beyond the period specified under
the said provision by means of a written order, as aforenoted.
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Markedly, in the instant case it has been vehemently contended
by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that the provisions under
Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. are mandatory in nature and that no
detention of an accused is permissible beyond the statutory
prescribed period, as specified therein. However, when the
provisions of Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. are scrupulously analyzed in
light of the contentions raised before this Court and the judicial
dictates relied upon by/on behalf of the revisionist as well as Ld.
Addl. PP for the State, this Court unambiguously reaches a
conclusion that even presuming the wordings of Section 437(6)
Cr.P.C. to be mandatory, same cannot, in the considered opinion
of this Court, be deemed to be absolute in nature. The reason for
the same is quite explicit with the use of words, “unless for
reasons to be recorded in writing”, as specified under Section
437(6) Cr.P.C., which confer enough leverage on the Magistrate
to permit continued detention of an accused, even beyond the
statutory prescribed period. Needless to mention that the period
of sixty days, as prescribed under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. does not
give an absolute right to an accused for bail in default, in the
same manner, as provided under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.
Reference in this regard is made to the decision in Raju v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, MANU/MP/1597/2023, wherein the
Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, while carrying out a
thorough evaluation of the legal provisions under the
Code/Cr.P.C., remarked as under;
“13. Undoubtedly, under Section 437(6) of
Cr.P.C. the accused does not get absolute right to
seek bail. Hence, the provisions does not confer any
indefeasible right as is provided under Section 167(2)
of Cr.P.C. While deciding the application under
Section 437(6) of Cr.P.C., the Court has to keep in
mind that the object behind such a provision is to
speed up the trial particularly when the accused is in
C.R No. 512/2024 Rohan Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 18 of 25Digitally signed
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detention. However, the Magistrate is expected to
keep in mind the gravity of the offence, quantum of
punishment, the manner in which the accused is
involved in the offence, whether the default is
attributable to the accused in prison, likelihood of his
jumping bail or any other special circumstances due
to which the Magistrate considers it expedient not to
exercise discretionary powers under Section 437(6)
of Cr.P.C. Thus, in the end, it can be concluded that
the right conferred under Section 437(6) of Cr.P.C. is
not absolute, however, nonetheless, it is a right which
cannot be defeated easily and both the courts below
have not committed any grave error in rejecting the
application filed by the petitioner in this regard.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Connectedly, quite recently, the Hon’ble High Court
of Bombay in Latabai v. State of Maharashtra (Supra.) , in the
similar context, observed as under;
“7. The Bombay High Court has interpreted the
said Section and recorded the findings that the power
to grant bail under various Sub-sections of Section
437 is discretionary and has to be exercised on sound
judicial principles. The same principle will apply to
bail under Section 437(6) of the Cr.P.C. It cannot,
therefore, be said that bail must be granted to the
accused if the trial is not concluded within 60 days
from first date fixed for evidence. Merely because
the word shall is used in section does not mean that it
is a mandate to do so. The word “unless” …..
otherwise in Sub-Section cannot be ignored. Even if
the period of 60 days is so over, the Court has
discretion to refuse the bail under Section 437(6) but,
reasons for that have to be recorded. Provision is not
like that under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. If discretion
is wrongly exercised, a remedy of appeal can be
availed. Power to cancel bail can therefore, be
exercised if the order for grant of bail is palpably
illegal, perverse and vitiated by total non-application
of mind. Similar was the view reiterated in the case
of Snehdip (supra).
*** *** ***
13. Where the trial is not concluded within 60
days as prescribed under Section 437(6) of Cr.P.C.
that does not give a right to bail for default. The term
“shall” in the said section is discretionary. The Court
should exercise such powers judiciously and consider
other circumstances as provided under Section 437 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.”
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(Emphasis supplied)
13. Correspondingly, as aforenoted, Ld. Counsel for the
revisionist has contended that the reasons for rejection of
application under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C. have to be different and
little bit more serious than the reasons that may be relevant for
rejection for bail under the initial stage is concerned. However,
the said contention too does not find favour with this Court in
view of the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in
Robert Lendi v. The Collector of Customs and Ors.,
MANU/DE/0050/1986, wherein the Hon’ble Court, while
dispelling/rejecting the contention to similar effect, noted as
under;
“21. The next question that arises for
consideration is whether while refusing bail under
sub-section (6) of S. 437 of the Code the Magistrate
can only refuse bail on the limited reasoning germane
to the cause of delay and whether the bail can be
refused on the general grounds recognised as good
for refusal to grant bail. Undoubtedly, the object of
sub-section (6) of S. 437 of the Code is to eradicate
delay in trial. To us, it appears that it is equally
important that the ends of justice do not suffer. The
procedural laws are essentially meant to safeguard
the interest of justice. The twin objects namely to
eradicate the delay in trial and to achieve and ends of
justice are necessarily to be harmonized. It is in that
the context one has to find out whether the discretion
exercised by the Magistrate in withholding bail after
sixty days, has been properly and judicially
exercised. We find nothing in the provision to
support the assertion of Mr. Mehta that the reasons
for the declining the bail under this provision should
be only those which are germane to the cause of
delay. There is no reason to give such a restricted
meaning to the provision. The expression used in the
provision is “unless for the reasons to be recorded in
writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs”. A plain
reading of the expression shows that the Legislature
has put no fetters on the powers of the Magistrate
that under this provision bail can only be refused for
reasons germane to the cause of delay. If that were
so, the Legislature would have certainly made it
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
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clear. To us it appears that the considerations for
refusing bail under this provision can be the reasons
which are generally invoked and understood in law
as the grounds for refusing bail. All that is required
of the Magistrate is that should he decide to decline
to grant bail, he must record his reasons in writing.
There are no fetters placed on the exercise of this
discretion.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Quite evidently, it is observed from a careful perusal
of the aforesaid dictate that as per the Hon’ble High Court,
legislature has provided no fetters on the power of Magistrate to
confine the reasons for rejection of application under Section
437(6) Cr.P.C. only germane to the cause of delay. On the
contrary, the Hon’ble Court in unambiguous terms remarked that
the considerations for refusing bail under the said provision, “can
be the reasons which are generally invoked and understood in
law as the grounds for refusing bail…” Pertinently, the said
decision was again referred by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi
in Karan Pal Singh Advocate v. Union of India & Anr., (Supra.).
Ergo, being mindful of the aforenoted principles, this Court
would proceed with the evaluation of the impugned order/order
dated 28.10.2024 of the Ld. Trial Court. However, in order to do
so, this Court deems it apposite at this stage to reproduce the
relevant extracts from the said order/impugned order, as under;
“In my considered opinion, it is not the fit case
where the accused should be released under the
provisions of 480(6) BNSS. Although prima facie
reading of the provisio shows that it is mandatory to
release the accused on bail if the trial is not
completed for the period of 60 days from the date
first fixed for the evidence of the prosecution.
However, it is provided in the provision itself that if
reason to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate may
direct otherwise. What immediately clear from the
above that the discretion lies with the court that it can
refuse the bail even if the evidence is not concluded
within the period of 60 days from the date first fixedC.R No. 512/2024 Rohan Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 21 of 25
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ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
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for taking the evidence in the case. Judgments filed
by Ld. Counsel for the accused cannot be relied upon
de-hors the fact of the present case. However, the
discretion should be judicial one. Reference can be
made to the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi in the matter “Karan Pal Singh Vs. UOI dated
06.03.2017″.
In this matter, the evidence was started on
21.08.2024 and the one witness has already been
examined. Considering the nature of the case and
number of victims involves, I am not of the view that
the discretion in this case should be exercised in
favour of the accused. The victims involved in this
case are poor people therefore, there is a possibility
to influence the witnesses by the accused and
considering the nature of the case and role of the
accused, there are chances that the accused may flee
away from the justice. Further, the investigation in
this matter is still going on as more and more victims
are coming forward with their complaints.
Allegations against the accused are of cheating
against the multiple victims which is a very serious
in nature therefore, for the above reasons, the
application for bail u/s 480(6) BNSS stands
dismissed…”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Markedly, from a meticulous inspection of the
impugned order, it is observed that the Ld. Trial Court, while
passing the said order duly considered all the relevant facts and
circumstances, besides passed a reasoned and speaking decision.
In particular, it is observed that under the impugned order, the
Ld. Trial Court also considered gravity of the offence as well as
multiplicity of victims involved in the present case, belonging to
poor strata of the society, not ruling out a possibility of
revisionist’s influencing the said victims. Correspondingly, the
Ld. Trial Court further noted that investigation in the instant case
is still ongoing, and more and more victims are coming forward
with their complaints against the revisionist, while rejecting the
revisionist’s application under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C./Section
480(6) BNSS. However, despite the same, Ld. Counsel for the
C.R No. 512/2024 Rohan Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 22 of 25
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revisionist/revisionist has not been able to show any irregularity,
palpable error, arbitrariness and/or any reasonable ground for
interfering with the impugned order, except contending that the
provisions of Section 437(6) Cr.P.C./Section 480(6) BNSS are
mandatory in nature. However, as aforenoted, this Court has
observed that the provisions of Section 437(6) Cr.P.C./Section
480(6) BNSS, presuming to be mandatory are not absolute in
nature. Further, in light of the aforesaid observations/judicial
dictates, this court unerringly reaches a conclusions that reason
for entreaty for bail are not restricted the cause of delay, the only
restriction being that the Magistrate has to pass a reasoned order.
Needless to reiterate, revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only
when there is glaring defect in procedure or there is manifest
error of law and consequently there has been a flagrant
miscarriage of justice. However, when the impugned order is
scrupulously perused, in light of the scope of the provisions
under Section 397 Cr.P.C./Section 438 BNSS, no illegality,
impropriety and/or irregularity is forthcoming/demonstrable by
the revisionist therein. Needless to further mention that though
this Court holds highest regard for the decisions relied upon by
Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, however, the same would not, in
the considered opinion of this Court come to the aid/rescue of the
revisionist in the manner as prayed for the facts and
circumstances of the said cases/dictates are clearly,
distinguishable.
16. Apposite to further note that even on a general
principle of law, it is trite4 that determination of bail entails the
establishment of an equilibrium between the personal liberty of
4
Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694
C.R No. 512/2024 Rohan Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 23 of 25
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.01.03
16:04:59
+0530
an individual, on one hand, and securing fair trial as well as
ensuring the presence of accused during the trial, on the other.
Undoubtedly, liberty of an individual is valuable right, however,
it is trite law5 that such a protection cannot be absolute and there
may be instances where the collective interest of the community
may predominate the right6 of personal liberty of an individual.
Ergo, when the personal interests of individuals are pitted against
the greater societal interests, it is quite understandable that
several factors are required to be considered while granting or
refusing bail7. Concomitantly, though, there is no prescribed strait
jacket formula regarding such relevant factors, however, it is a
settled law8 that where there are sufficient reasons to have
reasonable apprehension that the accused would flee from justice
or tamper with prosecution evidence, such an accused can be
refused bail. Even otherwise, the superior courts 9 have also
repeatedly declared that economic offences constitute a class
apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the
matter of bail and further, “economic offences having deep-
rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need
to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting
the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing
serious threat to the financial health of the country.”
17. Consequently, in conspectus of above and keeping in
view the aforenoted judicial precedents, law as well as the
submissions addressed before this Court, it is reiterated that no
illegality, impropriety and/or irregularity is demonstrable by the
5
Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286
6
Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, (1987) 2 SCC 684
7
Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118.
8
Anil Mahajan v. Commissioner of Customs, 84 (2000) DLT 854.
9
Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439.
C.R No. 512/2024 Rohan Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 24 of 25 Digitally signed by ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL Date: GOYAL 2025.01.03 16:05:04 +0530
revisionist in the order dated 28.10.2024/impugned order, passed
by Ld. ACJM-01, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in case
bearing, ‘State v. Rohan Singh‘, arising out of FIR No. 572/2023,
PS. EOW, under Sections 420/467/471/506 IPC, dismissing the
revisionist’s application under Section 437(6) Cr.P.C./Section
480(6) BNSS. Conclusively, in light of the above, this Court
unambiguously observes that present revision petition deserves to
be dismissed as devoid of merits and is hereby, accordingly,
dismissed.
18. Trial Court Record be sent back along with a copy of
this order.
19. Revision file be consigned to record room after due
compliance. Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.01.03
16:05:10
+0530Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
On 03.01.2025. ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, DelhiC.R No. 512/2024 Rohan Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Page 25 of 25
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