Madhya Pradesh High Court
Roop Singh Alawa vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 May, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT,
CHIEF JUSTICE
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
WRIT PETITION NO. 18931 OF 2017..
ROOP SINGH ALAWA
VS.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANOTHER.
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Appearance:
Shri Prahlad Choudhary- Senior Advocate with Shri Aditya Narayan Sharma-
Advocate for the petitioner.
Dr. S.S. Chouhan- Government Advocate for the respondents-State.
Shri Anoop Nair- Senior Advocate with Shri Mihir Linawat- Advocate for
respondent No. 2.
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ORDER
(Reserved on : 23/04/2025)
(Pronounced on : 01/05/2025)
Per: Hon'ble Shri Justice Vivek Jain.
The present petition has been filed challenging the order
Annexure P/7 dated 19.10.2015 whereby the petitioner who was
working as Additional District and Sessions Judge being member of
the M.P. Higher Judicial Services, has been dismissed from service by
the Government of M.P. by its Department of Law and Legislative
Affairs, based upon the recommendation made by the Full Court of the
High Court which in turn endorsed the decision taken by the concerned
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Administrative Committee of the High Court. Consequent to order
Annexure P/7 the petitioner had preferred an appeal and the said
appeal has also been rejected by order dated 02.03.2017 and
communicated vide letter dated 17.07.2017.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed as Civil
Judge Class-II in the year 1987 and upon satisfactory discharge of his
duty, was promoted to the post Additional District and Sessions Judge
on 12.04.2004. It is further the case of the petitioner that his career was
unblemished from initial date of appointment i.e. 1987 till the present
matter arose which lead to his ultimate dismissal from service.
3. It has been categorically stated by the petitioner that apart from
the present allegation against him leading to his dismissal from service
by order Annexure P/7 dated 19.10.2015, there is nothing on record
against the petitioner in his entire service career.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner while projecting the case of
the petitioner submits that the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner
vide Annexure P/2 dated 13.03.2014 levelling the charge that on
09.11.2012 in pending Sessions Trial No. 248/2010 (State of M.P. Vs.
Hakim and others) with corrupt or oblique motive or for some
extraneous consideration the petitioner allowed the bail application of
the accused Hakim facing accusation under Sections 302, 120-B and
147 of IPC which was after rejection of his four successive bail
applications by the High Court on 09.03.2011, 09.12.2011, 17.02.2012
and 17.09.2012. However, despite the High Court having repeatedly
dismissed the bail applications of the same accused, the grant of bail
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by the petitioner to said accused person was alleged to be against
judicial discipline and propriety and therefore, he was alleged to have
failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty expected of a
judicial officer. Therefore, on such allegations, he was visited with the
charge sheet.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before this
Court that the accused Hakim whose bail application has been allowed
by the petitioner had earlier filed first bail application before this Court
which was dismissed as not pressed on 09.03.2011. However, when
second bail application registered as M.Cr.C. No. 7617/2011 was filed,
the same was decided by the High Court on 09.12.2011 and in the said
order the High Court held that the trial court shall decide the trial
within a period of four months and if the trial is not concluded within
the said period then the accused would be at liberty to move fresh
application before the trial court which shall be considered by the trial
court in view of the material available before the trial court. It is
argued that indeed subsequent bail applications were also considered
by the High Court i.e. third bail application on 17.02.2012 and fourth
bail application on 17.09.2012 and bail was not granted by the High
Court and further time was given to conclude the trial and lastly vide
order dated 17.09.2012 the High Court had granted six months time to
conclude the trial. The allegation against the petitioner is that though
the High Court has granted six months time to conclude the trial on
17.09.2012 but the petitioner had granted bail to the accused person on
09.11.2012 which amounts to judicial impropriety in as much as once
the High Court had rejected the bail applications of the same accused
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person or had allowed withdrawal of the bail application of the same
accused person as the High Court was not inclined to grant bail to that
person, the Sessions Judge ought not to have granted bail to the
accused person.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Inquiry
Officer in his enquiry report has not found that there has been any
corruption or extraneous consideration on the part of the petitioner in
allowing the bail application. Rather the Inquiry Officer in the enquiry
report Annexure P/4 dated 17.07.2014 has categorically held that no
corrupt conduct nor any extraneous consideration or mal-intention has
been proved in the Departmental Enquiry in the matter of grant of bail
to the accused person but the act of the petitioner amounts to judicial
indiscipline because he has failed to maintain Judicial discipline by
granting bail to a accused person whose bail applications have been
rejected by the high court. Learned counsel for the petitioner
vehemently argued that once the high court had itself granted four
months time to conclude the trial court vide order dated 09.12.2011
passed in M.Cr.C. No. 7617/2011, and set the trial Court at liberty to
consider the bail application if trial is not completed within four
months, then the petitioner could have considered the repeat bail
application of the same accused person. So far as the subsequent
rejection/ withdrawals of the bail application of the same accused
person from the High Court is concerned, it was contended by learned
counsel for the petitioner that same is not on account of willful act on
the part of the petitioner but on account of inadvertence in as much as
the effect of subsequent orders of rejection and withdrawal of the bail
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applications of the same accused person by the High Court on
17.02.2012 and 17.09.2012 were misconstrued at the time of
consideration of bail application by the petitioner on 09.12.2012 and
neither the prosecution nor the complainant had pointed out the true
effect of the said order to the petitioner. It was a case of oversight and
inadvertence in as much as the petitioner did not take into account the
true effect of subsequent orders of the High Court while allowing the
bail application of the accused person-Hakim. It was further argued
that there is nothing on record to indicate that the subsequent to orders
dated 17.02.2012 and 17.09.2012 passed by the High Court in
subsequent bail applications were indeed sent by the High Court to the
file of the Sessions Judge so that the petitioner can be said to have
failed to adhere to judicial discipline by granting bail to the accused
person. On these grounds it is prayed that the charges against the
petitioner are not made out and further that even if the charges are
made out then the punishment meted out to the petitioner amounts to
shockingly disproportionate punishment in as much as the petitioner
was set to superannuate on attaining the age of superannuation in the
year 2018 while the impugned dismissal order has been passed in the
year 2015 when the petitioner had hardly less than 3 years left for his
superannuation and the said dismissal order in the evening of
otherwise unblemished career deserves to be set-aside, on merits and
in the alternative, on the question of quantum being shockingly
disproportionate punishment.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently
supported the dismissal of the petitioner from judicial service and it is
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vehemently argued that the petitioner had failed to maintain Judicial
discipline by allowing bail application of accused Hakim in sessions
trial though the high Court had been repeatedly rejecting or allowing
withdrawal of the bail application of the same accused person despite
which the Sessions Judge jumped in between and allowed the bail
application which is a blatant act of judicial indiscipline and judicial
impropriety which is not expected of a senior judicial officer who is
nearing retirement and is holding the post of a senior Additional
District and Sessions Judge in Higher Judicial Service. It is further
argued that it is duly brought on record in the enquiry report that the
subsequent bail rejection orders and bail withdrawal orders of the High
Court were placed before the file of Sessions Court by the complainant
and the Inquiry Officer has duly recorded the said fact in the enquiry
report. Learned counsel for respondents have also referred to the order
passed by the High Court in M.Cr.C. No. 1866/2013 whereby the High
Court has cancelled the bail granted to accused Hakim by noting that
the grant of bail by sub-ordinate court after rejection by the High Court
amounts to misuse of power and also noted the judicial indiscipline of
the petitioner and had directed copy of the bail cancellation order be
sent to District and Sessions Judge of the district concerned for
assessing the working of the concerned judge and also to bring the
entire matter to the notice of the Portfolio Judge of the District.
Therefore, it is argued that the penalty of dismissal given to the
petitioner is fully justified because the misconduct of the petitioner is
made out and also that the punishment given to the petitioner is not
shockingly disproportionate to his misconduct.
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8. Heard.
9. In the present case the allegation against the petitioner in the
charge sheet was allowing the bail application of accused Hakim with
corrupt/ oblige motive or extraneous consideration and further failure
to maintain judicial discipline and propriety. So far as the allegation of
the petitioner acting with corrupt or oblique motive or for some
extraneous consideration is concerned, the said allegations were not
sustained in the enquiry itself and Enquiry Officer has categorically
held the no corrupt/ oblique motive or extraneous consideration could
be established during the course of the enquiry. Therefore, the only
issues that remain for consideration is whether the petitioner has failed
to maintain judicial discipline and propriety and to what extent and
whether it is to such an extent which would warrant dismissal and
whether the punishment of dismissal given to the petitioner is
shockingly disproportionate, or not.
10. The basic facts of the case are not in dispute. It is duly
established from record that the accused Hakim was arrested on
13.04.2010 and his first bail application was dismissed as not pressed
on 09.03.2011 in M.Cr.C. No. 8197/2010 by the High Court.
11. The second bail application of the same accused person
registered as M.Cr.C. No. 7617/2011 was decided on 09.12.2011
whereby the High Court directed the trial court to decide the trial
expeditiously preferably within four months and in the event of non
conclusion of trial within four months, set the Sessions Judge at liberty
to consider the bail application of the accused on merits. The operative
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part of this order dated 09.12.2011 which is the very origin of the
entire matter, was as under :-
After taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances of the case, petition filed by the
petitioner is disposed of with a direction that the
learned trial Court shall proceed with the case and
shall conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible
preferably within a period of 4 months. If the trial is
not concluded within a stipulated period then the
petitioner shall be at liberty to move fresh application
before the Court below which shall be taken into
consideration by the Court below keeping in view the
evidence which has already been recorded by the Court
below.
12. The third bail application of the same accused person registered
as M.Cr.C. No. 774/2012 was decided on 17.02.2012 by the High
Court and by the said order the High Court directed the Trial Judge to
decide the trial within four months and disposed of the bail application
without granting bail.
13. Thereafter, another i.e. fourth bail application was filed by the
same accused person registered as M.Cr.C. No. 5650/2012 whereby
the High Court directed the Trial court /Sessions court to expedite the
trial and conclude it expeditiously preferably within a period of six
months.
14. In between an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. was filed
by the complainant party and the applicant therein was wife of the
deceased and prayer was made for modification of the directions given
in M.Cr.C. No. 7617/2011 on the ground that conclusion of trial within
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four months is not possible. The High Court vide order dated
07.06.2012 disposed of the petition filed by the complainant under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. with a direction that the trial court shall proceed
with the case and decide the same as early as possible.
15. From the aforesaid gamut of events happening in successive bail
applications/application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the high
Court, it is evident that the High Court in M.Cr.C. No. 7617/2011 gave
liberty to the Trial judge to consider fresh bail application of the
accused if the trial is not concluded within four months. This outer
limit of four months stood relaxed in M.Cr.C. No. 4472/2012 which
was filed by the complainant of the case but the liberty granted to the
trial judge was not withdrawn in specific words.
16. It is also true that subsequently in third and fourth application
filed by the same accused person i.e. M.Cr.C. No. 774/2012 decided on
17.02.2012 and M.Cr.C. No. 5650/2012 decided on 17.09.2012, these
applications were rejected/ withdrawn before the High Court.It is also
not in dispute that the Inquiry Officer has recorded in para 2(i) of
enquiry report Annexure P/4 that on 20.07.2012 the orders passed in
M.Cr.C. 4472/2012 (petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. filed by the
complainant) and M.Cr.C. No. 7617/2011 (order in second bail
application) are received by the trial court and the said fact is recorded
in the order sheet written by the trial court on 20.07.2012. However, as
noted by us above, in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by
the complainant though the outer time limit had been relaxed by the
High Court but the liberty granted to the trial judge to consider the
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fresh bail application was not withdrawn in specific terms. Though the
subsequent third and fourth bail applications i.e. M.Cr.C. No. 774/2012
and M.Cr.C. No. 5650/2012 were rejected/ withdrawn before the High
Court but in the enquiry report there is no clear finding that the said
orders were placed in the file of the trial court when the repeat bail
application of accused Hakim was decided by the petitioner. The
Inquiry Officer has held that in para 2(i) of the enquiry report that the
order passed in second bail application granting liberty to the trial
judge was placed before the trial court and the order passed in petition
under Section 482 filed by the complainant was also placed before the
Trial Court. However, the fact remains that the order passed in fourth
bail application i.e. M.Cr.C. No. 5650/2012 was duly brought to notice
of the Trial Judge while granting bail to the accused person on
09.11.2012.The bail order passed by the petitioner on 09.11.2012 duly
mentions that the order passed in M.Cr.C. 5650/2011 dated 17.09.2012
has been placed before the Court. The number was wrongly mentioned
as M.Cr.C. 5650/2011 in place of M.Cr.C. No. 5650/2012 but the date
and facts are of order passed in M.Cr.C. No. 5650/2012 which relates
to the present matter. Therefore, the order passed by the High Court in
fourth bail application seems to be duly intimated to the TrialJudge i.e.
the petitioner while allowing the bail application of the accused
Hakim. In view of the fact recorded in the order dated 09.11.2012
allowing the bail application that on 17.09.2012 the bail application of
the same accused person has been dismissed as not pressed before the
High Court it cannot be said that the petitioner was not having
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knowledge of the subsequent rejection/ withdrawal of the bail
application of the same accused person.
17. In the present case though it is apparent from the record that the
petitioner had knowledge of subsequent withdrawal/ dismissal of
repeat bail application of the accused person from the High Court but
the fact remains that the High Court at one point of time while dealing
with second bail application had granted liberty to the trial court to
decide the bail application of the accused person on merits if trial is
not concluded within four months vide order dated 09.12.2011. Infact,
the petitioner had allowed the repeat bail application on 09.11.2012 by
exercising the said liberty, and mentioned so in the bail order. The
repeat bail applications before the High Court had been though
dismissed or withdrawn but once a liberty was given over to the Trial
Judge at some point of time, then the act of the petitioner in allowing
the subsequent bail application of the accused person by exercising the
liberty granted by the High Court on 09.12.2011 can only be said to be
an error of judgment by the Trial Judge. More so when the Inquiry
Officer himself has noted that no ingredients of any corrupt practice or
extraneous consideration have been found proved in the enquiry.
18. In Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2019) 10 SCC 640,
the Supreme Court has held that high Court has role as guardian and
protector of the district judiciary and misconduct is different from
erroneous order. Erroneous order will be part of the service record of
the judicial officer but cannot perse be deemed as misconduct unless
they are passed for erroneous reasons or illegal gratification etc. In the
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said case decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the judicial officer
had granted bail despite rejection of the bail application by the High
Court and the order being available in his file, but skipped his
attention, but had promptly cancelled the bail once the order of the
High Court was brought to his notice. The only difference between the
said case and the present one before us is that in this case the Trial
Judge rejected the application for cancellation for bail too.However, in
the present case, the application for cancellation of bail was
subsequently rejected by the petitioner. Therefore, this case is a case of
error of judgement, and very thinly crossing the line of not maintaining
judicial discipline, though the same seems to be under a mistaken
belief that the petitioner was still having liberty to consider the repeat
bail application in terms of liberty granted while deciding the second
bail application by the High Court, which was never expressly
withdrawn, but was impliedly withdrawn, by allowing subsequent bail
applications filed before it to be rejected/withdrawn as not pressed.
19. In the case ofAbhay Jain v. High Court of Rajasthan, (2022) 13
SCC 1,the Supreme Court was considering the case of a probationer
Judicial Officer who had granted bail to an accused despite rejection
by the High Court and the prosecution had failed to bring the fact to
notice of the judicial officer concerned. It was held that it may be a
case of negligence, but not misconduct, moreso when the bail order
was not challenged by the prosecution or any other party. The penalty
of discharge was set aside with 50% backwages.
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20. In K.C. Rajwani v. State of M.P., 2022 SCC OnLine MP 1550
this court dealt with the case of judicial officer wherein the allegation
against the judicial officer were passing erroneous orders who
otherwise had a unblemished career and there were no complaints as
regard his integrity in performance of duties and he enjoyed very good
reputation. There was no doubt in the integrity of the said judicial
officer. On these grounds the major penalty granted to the judicial
officer concerned was set-aside.
21. In the present case though it is a case of error of judgment and
erroneous order passed by the trial judge, but it is also a case very
thinly crossing the line of judicial indiscipline which appears to be
under a mistaken belief/impression, as noted by us above. Even no
extraneous or ulterior motive was proved in the enquiry.
22. In our view though it is a case of granting bail by the Trial Judge
despite accused withdrawing his subsequent bail application from the
High Court, but it cannot be lost sight by this Court that the High
Court itself had been passing contradictory orders because at one point
of time liberty was granted to the Trial Judge to consider the bail
application of the accused if trial is not concluded in four months and
in the same breath subsequent bail application was dismissed/
withdrawn as not pressed by the High Court. It cannot be disputed that
the Trial judge should have been careful enough in respecting the order
of the High Court and ought not to have granted the bail to the accused
person once the subsequent bail applications i.e. third and fourth repeat
bail applications were rejected by the High Court and liberty has been
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granted in the second bail application by the High Court but once at
some point of time there was a liberty granted by the High Court to the
Trial Judge then the Trial Judge exercising liberty cannot be said to
have conducted a grave misconduct in allowing the bail application of
the accused since the trial was being delayed and there is nothing on
record to indicate that the petitioner being the Trial Judge had been
deliberately delaying the Trial, only to allow the benefit of bail to the
accused.
23. It is certainly not a case of any major misconduct and not a
case of wilful behavior by the Trial Judge passing orders stubbornly
disregarding the order of the High Court. Though the order was
erroneous but here was a case where confusions were being created by
contradictory orders passed by the High Court in subsequent bail
applications. Therefore in our opinion it is a case of erroneous order
and only because the petitioner subsequently did not cancel the bail, it
cannot be said that the petitioner committed any major misconduct.
The only difference between this case and the case of Krishna Prasad
Verma (supra) is that in the present case, the petitioner rejected bail
cancellation application also. However, it is not such case which
warrants dismissal of the judicial officer from service that too when
judicial officer had put in 28 years of service and was due to retire
within next two to three years or so, and had an otherwise unblemished
career. He had been promoted along with his batch mates and no doubt
on his integrity and honesty were cast at any point of time ever and
even in the enquiry report of the present case no such doubts have been
cast and on the contrary it has been held that no ingredients of
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extraneous consideration or of any corrupt practice could be
established during the course of enquiry against the petitioner.
Therefore, the punishment of dismissal in the present case shocks the
conscience of this court because the punishment is shockingly
disproportionate.
24. The Supreme Court in the matter of punishment being
shockingly disproportionate has considered the scope of jurisdiction in
judicial review in the case of Delhi Police Through Commissioner of
Police and others Vs. Sat Narayan Kaushik (2016) 6 SCC 303 and
Union of India and others Vs. Ex. Constable Ram Karan (2022) 1
SCC 373. In the case of Sat Narayan Kaushik (supra), it has been
held that the High Court can interfere with the quantum of punishment
in an appropriate case after considering the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the case such as nature of charges levelled against the
employee, its gravity, seriousness, whether proved and, if so, to what
extent, entire service record, work done in the past, remaining tenure
of the delinquent left, etc. In other words, it is necessary for the High
Court to take these factors into consideration before interfering in the
quantum of the punishment. In the case of Ex Constable Ram Karan
(supra), after considering paragraph-18 of the three-judge Bench
judgement in case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6
SCC 749, it has been held if the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience
of the High Court, it would appropriately mould the relief and to
shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases,
impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.
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25. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is now more than 65 years
of age and would have superannuated from service in the year 2018,
therefore, it is a fit case to interfere in the quantum of punishment by
the Court itself. As the petitioner has already passed the age of
superannuation, in our opinion it would not be proper to remand the
matter to the Full Court or to the Administrative Committee for
reconsideration on the quantum of punishment. In our considered
opinion, the interest of justice would be met if the punishment of
dismissal is replaced with punishment of withholding two increments
without cumulative effect.
26. The petitioner would be entitled to 50% of backwages from the
date of termination till the date of superannuation and thereafter shall
be entitled to full pensionary benefits as permissible under the law.
27. Let necessary calculation be carried out and payment be released to
the petitioner within a period of two months from the date of
production of certified copy of this order.
28. Accordingly, petition stands allowed in the above terms.
(SURESH KUMAR KAIT) (VIVEK JAIN)
CHIF JUSTICE JUDGE
MISHRA
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