Himachal Pradesh High Court
Roshan Kumar Jha vs State Of H.P on 5 May, 2025
Author: Virender Singh
Bench: Virender Singh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT
SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 772 of 2025
Reserved on : 2.5.2025
Decided on : 5.5.2025
Roshan Kumar Jha
…Applicant
Versus
State of H.P.
…Respondent
_______________________________________________________
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge
Whether approved for reporting?
________________________________________________
For the Applicant : Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Bhairav
Gupta, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Ms. Ranjna Patial, Dy. A.G.,
assisted by ASI Jagdish
Singh, Police Station, West
Shimla.
Virender Singh, Judge
The applicant has filed the present application,
under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the B.N.S.S.’) in
case FIR No. 257 of 2022, dated 16.10.2022, under
Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic
2
Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the NDPS”)
registered with Police Station, Boileauganj, Shimla, H.P.
2. According to the applicant, he has been falsely
implicated in the present case, as he is an innocent
person and has nothing to do with the case.
3. Applicant has further pleaded that investigation,
in the present case, is complete and Police has filed the
charge sheet. All these facts have been pleaded to show
that custodial interrogation of the applicant is no longer
required by the Police.
4. The bail has also been sought on the ground that
there is no legal evidence against the applicant and he
has falsely been implicated in this case by distorting the
facts.
5. In addition to this, the plea of inordinate delay in
trial has been put forward in this case, to get the relief.
According to the applicant, he has been arrested on
16.10.2022 and there are 30 witnesses in this case, out
of which, till date, only eight witnesses are stated to have
been examined.
3
6. The applicant has also relied upon the decisions
of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal
(Crl.) No. 6690/2022, titled as, ‘Dheeraj Kumar Shukla
versus State of Uttar Pradesh’ and Cr. Appeal No. 2787 of
2024, titled as, ‘Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh versus State of
Maharashtra & anr. and the decisions of this Court in
Cr.M.P. (M) No. 892 of 2024, titled as, ‘Aakash versus
State of Himachal Pradesh, Cr.M.P. (M) No. 909 of 2024,
titled as, ‘Aakash versus State of Himachal Pradesh’ and
Cr.M.P. (M) No. 2822 of 2022, titled as, ‘Deep Raj @ Neetu
versus State of Himachal Pradesh‘.
7. The applicant has also put forward his young age
and future prospects, as grounds to seek relief of bail.
8. Thereafter, the applicant has again tried his luck
by moving similar bail applications, bearing Cr.M.P. (M)
No.1761 of 2023, Cr.M.P. (M) No. 3198 of 2023, Cr.M.P.
(M) No. 1281 of 2024 and Cr.M.P. (M) No. 26 of 2025,
which were dismissed as withdrawn.
9. The applicant had earlier tried his luck, by
moving bail application No. 134-S/22 of 2022, before
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the learned Special Judge-I, Shimla, District Shimla,
H.P., which was dismissed on 23.1.2023.
10. The applicant, through his counsel, has
undertaken to abide by the terms and conditions, to
be imposed by this court, in case, he is ordered to be
released on bail.
11. On these submissions, a prayer has been
made to allow the bail application.
12. When, put to notice, Police has filed status
report, disclosing therein, that on 16.10.2022, HC Lalit
alongwith HHC Sunil Kumar, HC Amit, Const.
Bhuvnesh Kumar and Const. Rahul, under the
leadership of ASI Ambi Lal was on patrolling duty and
duty to check the traffic violation and to prevent the
crime, in the private vehicle No.HP 52C-0426. They had
proceeded towards Sankat Mochan-Tara Devi-Shoghi
side. At about 11:40 a.m., when HC Lalit alongwith other
police officials was present at Police barrier,Shoghi for
checking, then, from Solan side, Haryana Roadways bus,
being driven by its driver, came there. HC Lalit signaled
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to stop the vehicle. The registration of the bus was found
to be HR58B-2566, enroute from Yamunanagar to
Shimla. HC Lalit and HC Bhuvnesh Kumar entered the
bus for checking, from front door. There were about 35-
36 passengers in the bus. HC Lalit had started checking
the belongings of the passengers from the front portion of
the vehicle, and when, he reached at seat Nos. 9,10, then
he noticed that on seat No. 9 (window), one young man
was sitting and seat No. 10 was found vacant.
12.1 The person sitting on seat No. 9 was having a
rucksack in his lap. When, the reason for travelling was
inquired, then, he could not give satisfactory answer and
also shown his reluctance to get the rucksack checked.
As such, I.O. developed suspicion that some
objectionable item could be there. As such, he has
requested other passengers sitting in the bus to be the
witnesses, but all of them had shown their inability to be
the witnesses. Thereafter, the bus driver Mahinder Singh
and Conductor Shamsher Singh were associated as
independent witnesses. In the presence of aforesaid
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persons, name and address of the person, sitting on seat
No. 9 were inquired. On inquiry, he disclosed his name
as Roshan Kumar Jha S/o Naveen Jha (applicant).
12.2 Thereafter, his rucksack was checked. From the
outer packet of rucksack, question papers of UPSC and
BPSC, one mobile charger, one E-Admit card, issued in
the name of applicant and from the inner pocket of
rucksack, two books pertaining to UPSC examinations,
one lower, one micron packet (white coloured),
containing wearing apparels, alongwith one plastic
envelope and two pouches, wrapped with brown tape,
were found. On opening the pouches, granule shaped
white coloured substance was found. Total 15 pouches
were found. Apart from this, a green coloured bottle
containing 4-4 white coloured granules were found. The
yellow substance was found to be heroin/chitta,
whereas, 12 granules were found to be MDMA.
12.3 On weighment, chitta was found to be 324 grams
and MDMA was found to be 3.58 grams. Other codal
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formalities were completed and after registration of the
FIR, accused was arrested.
12.4 During investigation, involvement of one Sahib
Singh was also found. After receiving positive report from
the SFSL, Junga, charge sheet has been filed.
12.5 On the basis of above facts, it has been
apprehended that in case, the applicant is released on
bail, he may not be available for trial and may again
indulge in the same activities. As such, a prayer has
been made to dismiss the application.
13. The contraband, allegedly recovered in the
present case, admittedly, falls within the ‘commercial
quantity’. When, the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS are
applicable, in that eventuality, before releasing the
accused (applicant) on bail, this Court has to satisfy the
twin conditions as per Section 37(b) of the NDPS Act by
holding that the accused (applicant) has not committed
the offence and in case, he is ordered to be released on
bail, he will not commit any offence.
8
14. The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
have been discussed and explained by a three-Judge
Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, way back in the
year 2004, in cases, titled as Collector of Customs, New
Delhi versus Ahmadalieva Nodira, reported in (2004)
3 Supreme Court Cases 549, and Narcotics Control
Bureau versus Dilip Pralhad Namade, reported in
(2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases 619. The relevant paras
9 to 11 of the judgment in Dilip Pralhad Namade’s
case (supra), are reproduced, as under:
“9. As observed by this Court in Union of India v.
Thamisharasi & Ors. (JT 1995(4) SC 253) clause (b)
of sub-section (1) of Section 37 imposes limitations on
granting of bail in addition to those provided under
the Code. The two limitations are (1) an opportunity
to the public prosecutor to oppose the bail application
and (2) satisfaction of the Court that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is
not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.
10. The limitations on granting of bail come in only
when the question of granting bail arises on merits.
Apart from the grant of opportunity to the public
prosecutor, the other twin conditions which really
have relevance so far the present accused
respondent is concerned, are (1) the satisfaction of
the Court that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative
and not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated
9regarding the accused being not guilty has to be
based for reasonable grounds. The expression
“reasonable grounds” means something more than
prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief
contemplated in the provision requires existence of
such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in
themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is
not guilty of the alleged offence and he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail. This nature of
embargo seems to have been envisaged keeping in
view the deleterious nature of the offence,
necessitates of public interest and the normal
tendencies of the persons involved in such network to
pursue their activities with greater vigour and make
hay when, at large. In the case at hand the High
Court seems to have completely overlooked the
underlying object of Section 37 and transgressed the
limitations statutorily imposed in allowing bail. It did
not take note of the confessional statement recorded
under Section 67 of the Act.
11. A bare reading of the impugned judgment shows
that the scope and ambit of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act was not kept in view by the High Court. Mere
non-compliance of the order passed for supply of
copies, if any, cannot as in the instant case entitle an
accused to get bail notwithstanding prohibitions
contained in Section 37.”
15. The term ‘reasonable’ has elaborately been
discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled
as Union of India versus Shiv Shanker Kesari,
reported in (2007) 7 Supreme Court Cases 798. The
relevant paras 8 to 11 of the judgment are reproduced, as
under:
10
“8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie
meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to
give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
“7. … In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Fourth
Edition, page 2258 states that it would be
unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the
word ‘reasonable’. Reason varies in its conclusions
according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and
the times and circumstances in which he thinks.
The reasoning which built up the old scholastic
logic sounds now like the jingling of a child’s toy.
(See: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Jagan
Nath Ashok Kumar and another (1987) 4 SCC 497.
and Gujarat Water Supplies and Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. and another [(1989)
1 SCC 532].
9. “9. …It is often said that “an attempt to give a
specific meaning to the word “reasonable” is trying to
count what is not number and measure what is not
space”. The author of Words and Phrases (Permanent
Edition) has quoted from Nice & Schreiber 123 F. 987,
988 to give a plausible meaning for the said word. He
says,‘the expression “reasonable” is a relative term, and the
facts of the particular controversy must be considered
before the question as to what constitutes reasonable
can be determined’.
It is not meant to be expedient or convenient but
certainly something more than that.”
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance
with reason”. In the ultimate analysis it is a question
of fact, whether a particular act is reasonable or not
depends on the circumstances in a given situation.
(See: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and
another v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315).
11
11. The Court while considering the application for bail
with reference to Section 37 of the Act is not called
upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the
limited purpose essentially confined to the question of
releasing the accused on bail that the Court is called
upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty and records its
satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But
the Court has not to consider the matter as if it is
pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a
finding of not guilty.”
16. This view has again been reiterated by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a latest decision, in case,
titled as State of Kerala and others versus Rajesh
and others, reported in (2020) 12 Supreme Court
Cases 122. The relevant paras 18 to 21 of the judgment
are reproduced, as under:
“18. This Court has laid down broad parameters to
be followed while considering the application for bail
moved by the accused involved in offences under
NDPS Act. In Union of India Vs. Ram Samujh and
Ors. 1999(9) SCC 429, it has been elaborated as
under:
“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to
and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a
murder case, the accused commits murder of one
or two persons, while those persons who are
dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in
causing death or in inflicting deathblow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are
vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a
deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to
the society; even if they are released temporarily,
12in all probability, they would continue their
nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in
intoxicants clandestinely. Reason may be large
stake and illegal profit involved. This Court,
dealing with the contention with regard to
punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly
observed about the adverse effect of such
activities in Durand Didier v. Chief Secy., Union
Territory of Goa [(1990) 1 SCC 95)] as under:
’24. With deep concern, we may point out that the
organised activities of the underworld and the
clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances into this country and
illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances
have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section
of the public, particularly the adolescents and
students of both sexes and the menace has
assumed serious and alarming proportions in the
recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively
control and eradicate this proliferating and booming
devastating menace, causing deleterious effects
and deadly impact on the society as a whole,
Parliament in its wisdom, has made effective
provisions by introducing this Act 81 of 1985
specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and
fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
the market, Parliament has provided that the
person accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trial unless
the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37,
namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accused is not guilty of such offence; and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while
on bail are satisfied. The High Court has not given
any justifiable reason for not abiding by the
aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the
respondent-accused on bail. Instead of attempting
to take a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic
13consequences and health hazards which would
accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs,
the court should implement the law in the spirit
with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has
amended.”
19. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the
exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to
the limitations contained under Section 439 of the
CrPC, but is also subject to the limitation placed by
Section 37 which commences with non-obstante
clause. The operative part of the said section is in
the negative form prescribing the enlargement of
bail to any person accused of commission of an
offence under the Act, unless twin conditions are
satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution
must be given an opportunity to oppose the
application; and the second, is that the Court must
be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that he is not guilty of such offence. If
either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the
ban for granting bail operates.
20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the
alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated
in the provision requires existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of
the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High
Court seems to have completely overlooked the
underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to
the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any
other law for the time being in force, regulating the
grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of
bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.
21. We may further like to observe that the learned
Single Judge has failed to record a finding
mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act which
14
is a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused
under the NDPS Act.”
17. In a recent decision, in case, titled as Narcotics
Control Bureau versus Mohit Aggarwal, reported in
AIR 2022 SC 3444, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
reiterated the earlier view regarding compliance of the
conditions, as enumerated in Section 37 of the NDPS
Act. The relevant paras 10 to 15 of the judgment are
reproduced, as under:
“10. The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
read as follows:
“[37. Offences to be cognizable and non-
bailable.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)-
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall
be cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
[offences under section 19 or section 24 or section
27A and also for offences involving commercial
quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own
bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.
15
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
clause (b) of sub section (1) are in addition to the
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being
in force, on granting of bail.
11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non-
obstante clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the
conditions imposed in subsection (2) of Section 37
that there are certain restrictions placed on the
power of the Court when granting bail to a person
accused of having committed an offence under the
NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations imposed
under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 to be kept in mind, the restrictions
placed under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section
37 are also to be factored in. The conditions
imposed in sub-section (1) of Section 37 is that (i)
the Public Prosecutor ought to be given an
opportunity to oppose the application moved by an
accused person for release and (ii) if such an
application is opposed, then the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the person accused is not guilty of
such an offence. Additionally, the Court must be
satisfied that the accused person is unlikely to
commit any offence while on bail.
12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come
up for discussion in several rulings of this Court. In
“Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva
Nodira“, (2004) 3 SCC 549, a decision rendered by
a Three Judges Bench of this Court, it has been
held thus:
“7. The limitations on granting of bail come in
only when the question of granting bail arises on
merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity to the
Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions
which really have relevance so far as the present
accused respondent is concerned, are: the
satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable
16grounds for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence and that he is not
likely to commit any offence while on bail. The
conditions are cumulative and not alternative.
The satisfaction contemplated regarding the
accused being not guilty has to be based on
reasonable grounds. The expression
“reasonable grounds” means something
more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes
for believing that the accused is not guilty
of the alleged offence. The reasonable
belief contemplated in the provision
requires existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in
themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence.”
[emphasis added]
13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up
for discussion in “State of Kerala and others Vs.
Rajesh and others” (2020) 12 SCC 122 and this
Court has observed as below:
“20. The expression “reasonable grounds”
means something more than prima facie
grounds. It contemplates substantial probable
causes for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable
belief contemplated in the provision
requires existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in
themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence.
In the case on hand, the High Court seems to
have completely overlooked the underlying
object of Section 37 that in addition to the
limitations provided under the CrPC, or any
other law for the time being in force, regulating
the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the
matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed
uncalled for.”
[emphasis added]
17
14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable
grounds” used in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of
Section 37 would mean credible, plausible and
grounds for the Court to believe that the accused
person is not guilty of the alleged offence. For
arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and
circumstances must exist in a case that can
persuade the Court to believe that the accused
person would not have committed such an
offence. Dove-tailed with the aforesaid
satisfaction is an additional consideration that
the accused person is unlikely to commit any
offence while on bail.
15. We may clarify that at the stage of
examining an application for bail in the context
of the Section 37 of the Act, the Court is not
required to record a finding that the accused
person is not guilty. The Court is also not
expected to weigh the evidence for arriving at a
finding as to whether the accused has
committed an offence under the NDPS Act or not.
The entire exercise that the Court is expected to
undertake at this stage is for the limited purpose
of releasing him on bail. Thus, the focus is on
the availability of reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the
offences that he has been charged with and he
is unlikely to commit an offence under the Act
while on bail.”
18. Moreover, the view of this Court is also being
guided by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Criminal Appeal No.5544 of 2024, titled as ‘Narcotics
Control Bureau versus Kashif’, Citation No.2024
INSC 1045, wherein, it has been held that in case of
18
commercial quantity of the contraband, the accused
shall generally be not released on bail, until or unless,
the conditions, as per Section 37 of the NDPS Act, are
held to be existed in favour of the applicant. Relevant
paragraphs 8 and 39 of the said judgment are
reproduced, as under:-
“8. There has been consistent and persistent view
of this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the
offence is punishable with minimum sentence of
ten years, the accused shall generally be not
released on bail. Negation of bail is the rule and
its grant is an exception. While considering the
application for bail, the court has to bear in mind
the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
which are mandatory in nature. The recording of
finding as mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua
non for granting bail to the accused involved in the
offences under the said Act. Apart from the
granting opportunity of hearing to the Public
Prosecutor, the other two conditions i.e., (i) the
satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
of the alleged offence and that (ii) he is not likely
to commit any offence while on bail, are the
cumulative and not alternative conditions.
Xxx xxx xxx xxx
39. The upshot of the above discussion may be
summarized as under:
(i) The provisions of NDPS Act are required to be
interpreted keeping in mind the scheme, object
and purpose of the Act; as also the impact on the
19society as a whole. It has to be interpreted literally
and not liberally, which may ultimately frustrate
the object, purpose and Preamble of the Act.
(ii) While considering the application for bail, the
Court must bear in mind the provisions of Section
37 of the NDPS Act which are mandatory in
nature. Recording of findings as mandated in
Section 37 is sine qua non is known for granting
bail to the accused involved in the offences under
the NDPS Act.
(iv) Sub-section (2) of Section 52A lays down the
procedure as contemplated in sub-section (1)
thereof, and any lapse or delayed compliance
thereof would be merely a procedural irregularity
which would neither entitle the accused to be
released on bail nor would vitiate the trial on that
ground alone.
(v) Any procedural irregularity or illegality found to
have been committed in conducting the search and
seizure during the course of investigation or
thereafter, would by itself not make the entire
evidence collected during the course of
investigation, inadmissible. The Court would have
to consider all the circumstances and find out
whether any serious prejudice has been caused to
the accused.”
(self-emphasis supplied)
19. So far as the case law, relied upon by the learned
counsel for the applicant in Dheeraj Kumar Shukla
versus the State of Uttar Pradesh, Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl.) No. 6690 of 2022, is concerned, with due
20
respect to the law laid down, the same in no way, helps
the case of the applicant, as facts of the case before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court were totally different from the
case at hand, as co-accused of the applicant were
already released on bail.
20. So far as the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Cr. Appeal No. 2787 of 2024, titled as Javed Gulam
Nabi Shaikh versus State of Maharashtra & Anr. is
concerned, no benefit can be derived by the applicant
from the same, as in the case before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, the accused was in custody for four
years and charges were not framed, whereas, in this
case, not only charges have been framed, but eight
witnesses, as per the stand taken by the applicant, have
also been examined.
21. So far as the decisions of Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in Cr.M.P. (M) No. 892 of 2024, titled as,
‘Aakash versus State of Himachal Pradesh’ and Cr. M.P.
(M) No. 909 of 2024, titled as, ‘Aakash versus State of
Himachal Pradesh‘, are concerned, the contraband
21
recovered in those cases, was of intermediate quantity.
As such, no benefit can be derived from the same, by the
applicant, in this case.
22. So far as the decision of this Court in Cr.M.P.(M)
No. 2822 of 2022, titled as, ‘Deep Raj @ Neetu versus
State of Himachal Pradesh‘, is concerned, the same is not
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present
case, as commercial quantity of heroin is stated to be
recovered from the possession of the accused.
23. In view of the above discussion, at this stage, it
cannot be said that the applicant has not committed the
offence, nor it can be said that in case, he is ordered to
be released on bail, he will not commit any offence.
24. In the absence of the twin conditions, as
enumerated, under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act,
this Court cannot accept the arguments of learned
counsel, appearing for the applicant, who has sought the
release of the applicant, on bail, during the pendency of
the trial.
22
25. In view of the discussions, made hereinabove,
this Court is of the view that the applicant is not able to
make out a case for his release on bail.
26. Considering all these facts, the present bail
application is dismissed.
27. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall
not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the merits of
the case, as these observations, are confined, only, to the
disposal of the present bail application.
(Virender Singh)
Judge
May 5, 2025
Kalpana
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