Delhi High Court
Rspl Health Pvt. Ltd vs Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited & Anr on 12 June, 2025
Author: Navin Chawla
Bench: Navin Chawla
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 03.03.2025
Pronounced on: 12.06.2025
+ FAO (COMM) 65/2025 & CM APPL. 12743/2025
RSPL HEALTH PVT. LTD. .....Appellant
Through: Mr.Raj Shekhar Rao, Sr. Adv.
& Ms.Swathi Sukumar, Sr.
Adv. with Mr.S.K. Bansal,
Mr.Rishi Bansal, Mr.Rishabh
Gupta & Ms.Ayushi Arora,
Advs.
versus
SUN PHARMA LABORATORIES LIMITED & ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr.Amit Sibal, Sr. Adv. with
Mr.Sachin Gupta, Mr.Rohit
Pradhan, Mr.Tanmay Sharma,
Ms.Prashansa Singh,
Mr.Saksham Dhingra,
Mr.Ankur Vyas & Mr.Ankit,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHALINDER KAUR
JUDGMENT
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
1. This appeal has been filed under Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 (in short, „CC Act‟) challenging the Order dated
15.02.2025, passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial Court-
02), New Delhi District, Patiala House Court, in CS (COMM) No.
Signature Not Verified
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By:RENUKA NEGI
Signing Date:12.06.2025
13:39:52
914/2024, titled RSPL Health Pvt. Ltd. v. Sun Pharma Laboratories
Ltd. and Anr. (hereinafter referred to as the „Impugned Order‟),
dismissing the application filed by the appellant herein under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short,
„CPC‟).
Brief Background
2. As the facts and pleadings giving rise to the present appeal have
been stated in detail in the Impugned Order itself, we would only give
a brief background of these facts necessary for the adjudication of the
grounds urged by the parties, in support and against the present
appeal.
3. The above suit has been filed by the appellant praying for inter
alia a decree of permanent injunction restraining the respondents from
dealing in or using the trademark/label „PRUEASE‟
(hereinafter referred to as the „Impugned Mark‟) on the ground that it
is deceptively similar to appellant‟s trademark/label „PRO-EASE‟
(hereinafter referred to as the „Subject Mark‟).
4. In the plaint, the appellant asserts that it had conceived and
adopted the Subject Trademark in the year 2012, in relation to
Sanitary napkins, sanitary towels, sanitary pads, menstruation pads,
menstruation briefs, sanitary panties, panty liners for hygienic or
menstrual purposes, deodorizing agent and refreshener, panty shields
for hygienic or menstrual purposes, menstruation tampons, sanitary
wipes, paper wipes impregnated with sanitizers, paper wipes
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impregnated with disinfectants, and allied and other cognate goods
(hereinafter referred to as the „said goods‟).
5. The appellant asserts that it also intends to extend and expand
its activities under the subject trademark.
6. The appellant states that to protect its rights under the said
trademark, it has obtained the following registrations of the Subject
Mark under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (in short,
„TM Act‟) for various goods and services:-
S. Trade Mark Application Date of Class Status User
No. No. Filing Details
1. PROEASE 2450092 27/12/2012 5 Registered Proposed to
No disclaimer Renewed upto be used
27/12/2032
2. PROEASE 2830004 20/10/2014 5 Registered & Proposed to
GO-LONG No Renewed upto be used
disclaimer 20/10/2024
3. Pro-Ease 3160408 14/01/2016 35 Registered & 27-12-2012
No Renewed upto
disclaimer 14/01/2026
4. Pro-Ease 3160409 No 14/01/2016 39 Registered & 27-12-2012
disclaimer Renewed upto
14/01/2026
5. PRO-EASE 3366792 19/09/2016 5 Registered & Proposed to
READY No Renewed upto be used
disclaimer 19/09/2026
6. PRO EASE 3157037 01-12-2016 35 Registered & 27-12-2012
LABEL No Renewed upto
disclaimer 01-12-2026
7. The appellant has also applied for seeking registration of its
trademarks in other forms, details of which the appellant gives as
under:-
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By:RENUKA NEGI
Signing Date:12.06.2025
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S.No. Trade Mark Application Date of Filing Class Status
No.
1. PROEASE 2662319 20-01-2014 5 Pending
2. Pro-ease “Clean” 3311628 16-07-2016 5 Registered
3. Pro-ease “Swachh” 3311629 16/07/2016 5 Registered
4. Pro-ease “Swachh” 3311630 16/07/2016 5 Registered
5. PRO-EASE 3444646 28/12/2016 5 Pending
SWACHH
LABEL
6. Pro-ease DAY & 3607337 05/08/2017 5 Registered
NIGHT
7. Pro-ease DAY & 3721671 08/01/2018 5 Registered
NIGHT COMBO
8. PROEASE BEST 3984024 26/10/2018 5 Registered
XL
9. PROEASE GO XL 3984023 26/10/2018 5 Registered
10. Pro-ease Go XL 4483389 30/03/2020 5 Registered
11. PROEASE Dry & 4491568 25/04/2020 5 Pending
Comfortable
12. PROEASE 4491546 25/04/2020 5 Registered
DOUBLE DRY
TOP SHEET
13. PROEASE 3X 4491545 25/04/2020 5 Registered
ABSORBENCY
AND TENTION
14. PRO-EASE GO 4677415 28/09/2020 5 Registered
ULTRA XL+
8. The appellant further asserts that it has built up an immense
reputation in the Subject Mark and discloses the following sales
figures and advertisement expenses:-
Sales Figures
YEAR SALE AMOUNT (IN lakhs)
2014-15 112.01
2015-16 2,141.24
2016-17 7,150.23
2017-18 9,743.23Signature Not Verified
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By:RENUKA NEGI
Signing Date:12.06.2025
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2018-19 13,159
2019-20 15,237
2020-21 25,404
2021-22 32,202Advertisement Expenditure
YEAR ADVERTISEMENT EXPENDITURE
(IN lakhs)
2014-15 77.20
2015-16 1,661.86
2016-17 1,440.82
2017-18 1,854.73
2018-19 1,449.31
2019-20 1,873.32
2020-21 1,680
2021-22 1,124
9. The appellant asserts that the respondents have dishonestly
adopted the Impugned Trademark, which is identical/deceptively
similar to the Subject Trademark, and is bound to cause confusion and
deception in the normal course of business activities, thereby not only
infringing the registered trademark of the appellant, but also passing
off of the same.
10. The appellant filed the above suit claiming therein that it first
came to know of the adoption of the Impugned Mark by the
respondents in December 2020, when it received a notice of
opposition No. 1070676 dated 05.11.2020, against its trademark
application No. 4491568 in Class 5 for registration of the said
trademark. The appellant asserted that the respondents thereafter have
not filed evidence under Rule 45 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 (in
short, „TM Rules‟) till the filing of the suit. The appellant asserted thatSignature Not Verified
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it again received notices of opposition Nos. 1191872 and 1191873
dated 18.10.2020 against the appellant‟s trademark applications Nos.
5426855 in Class 5 and 5426854 in Class 3. The respondents,
however, again had not filed affidavit of evidence under Rule 45 of
the TM Rules till the filing of the suit. The appellant stated that its
trademark application No. 5426855 in Class-5 has been erroneously
abandoned, and the appellant has filed for a review thereagainst.
11. The appellant further stated that in January 2024, it came across
publication in the trademark journal of an application filed by the
respondent for registration of the Impugned Trademark bearing
No.5353750 in Class 5 dated 03.03.2022, falsely claiming user since
2017, for a wide range of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations
products, including hygienic and sanitary preparations for medical
purposes. The appellant has filed opposition to the same.
12. The appellant asserted that on further search it found that the
respondents had previously also filed an application No. 3562708 in
Class 5 in the year 2017 for the registration of the Impugned
Trademark, on a „proposed to be used‟ basis, but the same was not
prosecuted and was deemed as abandoned by the trademark registry.
13. The appellant asserted that it is only in the first week of
November 2024, that it came across advertisements on the interactive
online markets for the sale of the medicine under the Impugned
Trademark. Further inquiry revealed that the respondents have
recently started using, selling, soliciting, and networking for the goods
under the Impugned Trademark in the markets at Delhi.
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By:RENUKA NEGI
Signing Date:12.06.2025
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14. On the other hand, the respondents filed its written statement
contending therein that the respondent no.1 is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited (hereinafter
referred to as „SPIL‟). SPIL started business of marketing pharma
products in the year 1978 and manufactures, deals in, and trades into
pharmaceutical goods, preparation and allied goods and services.
15. It is the case of the respondents that on or about the year 2017,
the respondents independently coined and adopted the Impugned
Mark in relation to medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations and has
been continuously using the same since then without any
interruptions. It applied for the registration of the same vide
application no. 3562708 dated 02.06.2017 in Class 5, which was
abandoned for non-prosecution. Thereafter, the respondents filed
another application for the said trade mark vide application no.
5353750 dated 03.03.2022 with a prior user claim from 2017 in Class
5 and the said application is still pending before the learned Registrar
of Trade Marks.
16. It further contended that the term „PRU‟ in the respondents‟
mark is derived from the active pharmaceutical ingredient
Prucalopride, while „Ease‟ is a term indicating easy relief from
constipation.
17. The respondents further assert that it has built up an immense
reputation in the Impugned Mark and disclose the following sales:-
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Signing Date:12.06.2025
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Sales Figure
18. The respondents contended that for infringement to arise,
confusion among the public must be probable or inevitable, and in the
present case, no reasonable consumer is likely to confuse a sanitary
pad with a medicine designed for constipation relief.
19. The respondents also contended that the appellant has actively
concealed in the plaint the Trade Mark Application, which clearly
included documents showcasing respondents‟ use of the Impugned
Mark since 2017.
Previous Proceedings
20. Before we proceed further, it is also necessary to point out that
the learned District Judge, by an ad interim ex parte Order dated
03.12.2024, had granted ad-interim injunction in favour of the
appellant. The same was challenged by the respondents by way of an
appeal, being FAO (COMM) 241/2024. The said appeal was disposed
of by an Order dated 18.12.2024 of this Court, with the consent of the
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parties setting aside the ad interim ex parte order of injunction and
remitting back the application to the learned District Judge to decide
the claim of the appellant for an interim injunction afresh. The
Impugned Order has been passed by the learned District Judge on
such remand.
Impugned Order:
21. The learned District Judge in the Impugned Order, while
rejecting the application of the appellant, has inter alia observed as
under:-
a) The appellant has even prima facie failed to show that
any reasonable consumer or unwary purchaser is likely to
get confused between a sanitary pad (product of the
appellant), and a medicine designed for constipation
relief (product of the respondent);
b) The trade channels and routes in respect of hygiene
products like sanitary pads and napkins are quite different
from that of medicinal and pharmaceutical goods,
therefore, the appellant has failed to show that there is
any likelihood of confusion or deception within the
meaning of Section 2(h) read with Section 29(2) of the
Trade Marks Act;
c) Products of the appellant and the respondents have
starkly different packaging and design, which would
distinguish their goods;
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d) The respondents have claimed to be the prior user of the
Impugned Mark, with the earliest use claimed to be of the
year 2017, whereas the appellant has never used its marks
for pharmaceuticals;
e) The respondents have stated that it does not intend to
enter into the field of manufacturing or selling sanitary
napkins/pads;
f) The appellant is also not entitled to the discretionary
relief of injunction as it withheld the user affidavit filed
by the respondents in the trademark application(s) to
show use of its marks since 2017; and,
g) The respondents have bona fide adopted the Impugned
Mark, deriving the first three alphabets of its name from
the chemical used in the product, that is, prucalopride,
and the word „Ease‟ indicating easy relief from
constipation. It has also used a tagline for promoting its
products accordingly.
Submissions of the learned senior counsel for the appellant
22. Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao, the learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant submits that the learned District Judge has failed to
appreciate that the appellant has a right to expand use of the Subject
Trade Mark to allied and cognate goods, such as pharmaceuticals for
treatment of ailments like menstrual cramps and other related use. The
respondents, therefore, cannot be allowed to adopt a deceptively
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similar mark only on the ground that presently, the appellant is not
using its trade mark for such goods.
23. He further submits that the claim of the use of the mark by the
respondents since 2017, is also not supported by any documents. In
the journal „Drug Today‟, issue of July 2017, the advertisement of the
respondents stated that the drug under the Impugned Mark was to be
launched soon. The invoices that have been placed on record are
indicating sale of the respondents products to their own entity, namely
Aditya Medisales Limited and, therefore, do not inspire any
confidence. He submits that, therefore, the learned District Judge has
erred in accepting the claim of the respondent qua the adoption and
use of its mark since the year 2017.
24. He further submits that the respondents are using its mark not
only for the medicine for giving relief to constipation, but also for
allied and cognate goods. Therefore, the learned District Judge should
at least have granted an injunction in favour of the appellant
restraining the respondents from using the Impugned Mark for the
goods of the appellant, that is, sanitary napkins/pads etc.
25. He further submits that admittedly the goods of the parties fall
in Class 5 of the Trademark Classification, for which the appellant is a
registered proprietor since 27.12.2012. On the other hand, the
respondents do not have any trade mark registration for its Impugned
Mark, and has in fact let the earlier application to be treated as
abandoned. It is only by a subsequent application filed on 03.03.2022,
that the respondents again sought statutory protection of their mark by
claiming its registration. He submits that being a registered proprietor
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of the Subject Mark, the appellant was entitled to claim protection of
its mark against the unauthorized use by the respondents, who cannot
be claimed to be the proprietor of its mark.
26. The learned senior counsel for the appellant further submits that
the respondents were also estopped from claiming that the trade
channel of the goods of the appellant and the respondents are
different. In its opposition to appellant‟s registration application, the
respondents had claimed that the goods are allied and the use of the
marks is bound to cause confusion and deception. It is only later that
the respondents allowed its opposition to be abandoned.
27. He submits that the learned District Judge erred in placing
reliance on the reputation of the mark „Sun Pharma‟ of the
respondents when that was not even in issue. It was the subsidiary
mark „Pru-ease‟, which was in issue before the learned District Judge.
He submits that as far as this subsidiary mark is concerned, against the
sales revenue of Rs. 300 crores of the appellant, the respondents, even
as per their claim, have revenue of only Rs. 18 crores, therefore, have
no reputation to protect in the mark.
28. He submits that the learned District Judge also erred in its
finding that the appellant had concealed material facts in the suit. He
submits that the appellant was not in possession of the alleged proof of
user of the Impugned Mark filed by the respondents, as the
respondents had failed to place these documents on record as part of
the evidence under Rule 45(2) of the TM Rules in support of their
opposition to the appellant‟s trade mark.
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29. He submits that the learned District Judge has further erred in
invoking the principle of estoppel against the appellant based on its
submissions before the learned Registrar of Trade Marks for its
registration of the mark. He submits that these statements were made
with respect to third parties, and not the respondents and, therefore,
were not relevant for the adjudication of the interim application filed
by the appellant.
Submissions of the learned senior counsel for the respondents
30. On the other hand, Mr. Amit Sibal, the learned senior counsel
for the respondents, submits that not only did the appellant not press
its claim under Section 29(4) of the TM Act before the learned District
Judge, but even otherwise, the same was not made out, as the two
marks are not deceptively similar to each other, are being used for
distinct products, and the Impugned Mark has been adopted by the
respondents bona fide.
31. He further submits that the appellant was also not entitled to the
discretionary relief on account of concealment of the user affidavit
filed by the respondents, which showed that the respondents had been
using the mark since the year 2017. The appellant also concealed its
own stand in reply to the Examination Report and the counter-
statement, where it had taken the stand that the sanitary napkin,
pharmaceutical goods, and ayurvedic medicines are distinct and the
use of the marks will not cause any confusion. He submits that the
appellant is estopped from approbating and reprobating from the stand
taken by the appellant before the Trade Mark Registry. In support of
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his submissions, he places reliance on K. Jayaram & Ors. v. BDA &
Ors., (2022) 12 SCC 815, Oswal Fats & Oils Ltd. v. Commr. (Admn.)
& Ors., (2010) 4 SCC 728, SK Sachdeva & Anr. v. Shri Educare
Limited & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 473, ICOMM Tele Ltd. v.
BSNL & Anr., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8667; and Preetendra Singh
Aulakh v. Green Light Foods (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2492.
32. He submits that though the goods may fall under Class 5, they
are completely distinct and cannot be termed as allied or cognate.
They are sold through different trade channels and there is absolutely
no likelihood of confusion being caused by the use of the marks. In
support, he places reliance on United Brothers v. United Traders,
1982 SCC OnLine Del 20.
33. He submits that there can also be no initial interest confusion
because of the distinct nature of the goods. He submits that the
respondents had no intent of using the Impugned Mark for sanitary
pads/napkins or other like goods, and it is for this reason that it
withdrew its opposition to the appellant‟s application seeking
registration of its marks for those goods. He submits that the
respondents have, in fact, shown its bona fide by withdrawing these
oppositions. He submits that the respondents have also sought deletion
of „hygiene and sanitary preparation etc.‟ from its goods classification
for its own application seeking registration of the Impugned Mark.
34. He submits that the respondents being the prior user of the
Impugned Mark for the pharmaceutical goods, the appellant cannot be
allowed to use the same for such goods.
Signature Not Verified
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By:RENUKA NEGI
Signing Date:12.06.2025
13:39:52
Analysis and findings
35. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties.
36. At the outset, we would note that the present appeal challenges
the Impugned Order which is passed in exercise of the discretionary
jurisdiction vested in the learned District Judge by way of Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. The Courts have time and again
cautioned that in appeals challenging the orders passed by the learned
Trial Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction, the appellate
court will not interfere with, except where the discretion has been
shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely
or where the court has ignored the settled principles of law regulating
grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The appellate court will
not re-assess the material and seek to reach a conclusion if it would
have exercised its discretion differently, but will only interfere if the
discretion has been exercised in a perverse manner by the Trial Court.
Recently, this principle has been reiterated and explained by the
Supreme Court in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal
Choksi & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3538, by holding as under:-
“20. Order 43 of the CPC specifies the orders
against which an appeal lies. Sub-Rule (r) of
Rule 1 of the said order provides that an
appeal would lie against an order made under
Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4 and 10 of Order 39 of
the CPC respectively.
21. The law in relation to the scope of an
appeal against grant or non-grant of interim
injunction was laid down by this Court
in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990
Supp SCC 727. Antox brought an action ofSignature Not Verified
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passing off against Wander with respect to the
mark Cal-De-Ce. The trial court declined
Antox’s plea for an interim injunction,
however, on appeal the High Court reversed
the findings of the trial judge. This Court,
upon due consideration of the matter, took
notice of two egregious errors said to have
been committed by the High Court:
a. First, as regards the scope and nature of
the appeals before it and the limitations
on the powers of the appellate court to
substitute its own discretion in an
appeal preferred against a
discretionary order; and
b. Secondly, the weakness in ratiocination
as to the quality of Antox’s alleged user
of the trademark on which the passing
off action is founded.
22. With regards to (a), this Court held thus:
“In such appeals, the appellate court will
not interfere with the exercise of discretion
of the court of the first instance and
substitute its own discretion, except where
the discretion has been shown to have been
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or
perversely, or where the court had ignored
the settled principles of law regulating
grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions
… the appellate court will not reassess the
material and seek to reach a conclusion
different from the one reached by the court
below … If the discretion has been
exercised by the trial court reasonably and
in a judicial manner the fact that the
appellate court would have taken a different
view may not justify interference with the
trial court’s exercise of discretion.”
23. This Court, while arriving at the above
findings, relied on its earlier judgment
in Printers (Mysore) v. Pothan Joseph, 1960
SCC OnLine SC 62 where it was held thus:
“[…] as has been observed by Viscount
Simon LC in Charles Osenton &
Co v. Johnston – the law as to reversal by a
court of appeal of an order made by a judgeSignature Not Verified
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below in the exercise of his/her discretion is
well established, and any difficulty that
arises is due only to the application of well-
settled principles in an individual case.”
24. It is pertinent to note that
in Printers (supra) this Court had held that
ignoring relevant facts is also a ground for
interfering with the discretion exercised by the
trial court. Furthermore, Viscount Simon LC
in Charles Osenton & Co v. Johnston, [1942]
A.C. 130, after stating the above, went on to
quote Lord Wright’s decision
in Evans v. Bartlam, [1937] A.C. 473:
“It is clear that the court of appeal should
not interfere with the discretion of a judge
acting within his jurisdiction unless the
court is clearly satisfied that he was wrong.
But the court is not entitled simply to say
that if the judge had jurisdiction and had all
the facts before him, the court of appeal
cannot review his order unless he is shown
to have applied a wrong principle. The
court must, if necessary, examine anew the
relevant facts and circumstances in order to
exercise a discretion by way of review
which may reverse or vary the order.”
25. In Evans (supra) case, Lord Wright made
it clear that while adjudicating upon the
discretion exercised by the trial court, the
appellate court is obliged to consider the case
put forward by the appellant in favour of its
argument that the trial court exercised its
discretion arbitrarily or incorrectly in the
circumstances.
26. What flows from a plain reading of the
decisions in Evans (supra) and Charles
Osenton (supra) is that an appellate court,
even while deciding an appeal against a
discretionary order granting an interim
injunction, has to:
a. Examine whether the discretion has been
properly exercised, i.e. examine whether the
discretion exercised is not arbitrary,
capricious or contrary to the principles of law;
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b. In addition to the above, an appellate court
may in a given case have to adjudicate on
facts even in such discretionary orders.
27. The principles of law explained by this
Court in Wander‘s (supra) have been
reiterated in a number of subsequent decisions
of this Court. However, over a period of time
the test laid down by this Court as regards the
scope of interference has been made more
stringent. The emphasis is now more on
perversity rather than a mere error of fact or
law in the order granting injunction pending
the final adjudication of the suit.
28. In Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical
Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672 this
Court held that the Appellate Court should not
flimsily, whimsically or lightly interfere in the
exercise of discretion by a subordinate court
unless such exercise is palpably perverse.
Perversity can pertain to the understanding of
law or the appreciation of pleadings or
evidence. In other words, the Court took the
view that to interfere against an order
granting or declining to grant a temporary
injunction, perversity has to be demonstrated
in the finding of the trial court.
29. In Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma
Ibrahim Khan, (2013) 9 SCC 221 this Court
emphasised on the principles laid down
in Wander (supra) and observed that while the
view taken by the appellate court may be an
equally possible view, the mere possibility of
taking such a view must not form the basis for
setting aside the decision arrived at by the
trial court in exercise of its discretion under
Order 39 of the CPC. The basis for
substituting the view of the trial court should
be malafides, capriciousness, arbitrariness or
perversity in the order of the trial court. The
relevant observations are extracted below:
“20. In a situation where the learned trial
court on a consideration of the respective
cases of the parties and the documents laid
before it was of the view that the entitlement
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mandatory injunction was in serious doubt,
the Appellate Court could not have
interfered with the exercise of discretion by
the learned Trial Judge unless such
exercise was found to be palpably incorrect
or untenable. The reasons that weighed
with the learned Trial Judge, as already
noticed, according to us, do not indicate
that the view taken is not a possible view.
The Appellate Court, therefore, should not
have substituted its views in the matter
merely on the ground that in its opinion the
facts of the case call for a different
conclusion. Such an exercise is not the
correct parameter for exercise of
jurisdiction while hearing an appeal
against a discretionary order. While we
must not be understood to have said that the
Appellate Court was wrong in its
conclusions what is sought to be
emphasized is that as long as the view of
the trial court was a possible view the
Appellate Court should not have interfered
with the same following the virtually settled
principles of law in this regard as laid
down by this Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox
India (P) Ltd.”
(Emphasis supplied)
30. This Court in Shyam Sel & Power
Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., (2023) 1
SCC 634 observed that the hierarchy of the
trial court and the appellate court exists so
that the trial court exercises its discretion
upon the settled principles of law. An appellate
court, after the findings of the trial court are
recorded, has an advantage of appreciating
the view taken by the trial judge and
examining the correctness or otherwise thereof
within the limited area available. It further
observed that if the appellate court itself
decides the matters required to be decided by
the trial court, there would be no necessity to
have the hierarchy of courts.
31. This Court in Monsanto Technology
LLC v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd., (2019) 3 SCC
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381, observed that the appellate court should
not usurp the jurisdiction of the Single Judge
to decide as to whether the tests of prima facie
case, balance of convenience and irreparable
injury are made out in the case or not.
32. The appellate court in an appeal from an
interlocutory order granting or declining to
grant interim injunction is only required to
adjudicate the validity of such order applying
the well settled principles governing the scope
of jurisdiction of appellate court under Order
43 of the CPC which have been reiterated in
various other decisions of this Court. The
appellate court should not assume unlimited
jurisdiction and should guide its powers within
the contours laid down in the Wander (supra)
case.
37. The Supreme Court in Ramakant (supra), also explained the
meaning of the term „perverse‟, as under:
“35. Any order made in conscious violation of
pleading and law is a perverse order. In
Moffett v. Gough, (1878) 1 LR 1r 331, the
Court observed that a perverse verdict may
probably be defined as one that is not only
against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v.
Godfrey, 106 NW 814, the Court defined
“perverse” as “turned the wrong way”; not
right; distorted from the right; turned away or
deviating from what is right, proper, correct,
etc.
36. The expression “perverse” has been
defined by various dictionaries in the
following manner:
a. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of
Current English, 6th Ed.
Perverse – Showing deliberate
determination to behave in a way that most
people think is wrong, unacceptable or
unreasonable.
b. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary
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English – International Edition
Perverse – Deliberately departing from
what is normal and reasonable.
c. The New Oxford Dictionary of English –
1998 Edition
Perverse – Law (of a verdict) against the
weight of evidence or the direction of the
judge on a point of law.
d. New Webster’s Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition)
Perverse – Purposely deviating from
accepted or expected behavior or opinion;
wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or
petulant.
e. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words &
Phrases, 4th Ed.
Perverse – A perverse verdict may probably
be defined as one that is not only against
the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence.
37. The wrong finding should stem out on a
complete misreading of evidence or it should
be based only on conjectures and surmises.
Safest approach on perversity is the classic
approach on the reasonable man’s inference
on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the
facts in evidence made by the court below is
possible, there is no perversity. If not, the
finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence
or a different reading of evidence is not
perversity. (See : Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi,
(2016) 3 SCC 78)”
(Emphasis Supplied)
38. In Ramakant (supra), the Supreme Court also reiterated the
guiding principles governing the grant of temporary injunction, as
under:
“33. In the case of Anand Prasad Agarwal v.
Tarkeshwar Prasad, (2001) 5 SCC 568, it was
held by this Court that it would not be
appropriate for any court to hold a mini-trial
at the stage of grant of temporary injunction.
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34. The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence
aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that
there is “a prima facie case” in his favour
which needs adjudication at the trial. The
existence of the prima facie right and
infraction of the enjoyment of his property or
the right is a condition precedent for the
grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie
case is not to be confused with prima facie
title which has to be established on evidence
at the trial. Only prima facie case is a
substantial question raised, bona fide, which
needs investigation and a decision on merits.
Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case
by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction.
The Court further has to satisfy that
noninterference by the court would result in
“irreparable injury” to the party seeking
relief and that there is no other remedy
available to the party except one to grant
injunction and he needs protection from the
consequences of apprehended injury or
dispossession. Irreparable injury, however,
does not mean that there must be no physical
possibility of repairing the injury, but means
only that the injury must be a material one,
namely one that cannot be adequately
compensated by way of damages. The third
condition also is that “the balance of
convenience” must be in favour of granting
injunction. The Court while granting or
refusing to grant injunction should exercise
sound judicial discretion to find the amount
of substantial mischief or injury which is
likely to be caused to the parties, if the
injunction is refused and compare it with that
which is likely to be caused to the other side if
the injunction is granted. If on weighing
competing possibilities or probabilities of
likelihood of injury and if the Court
considers that pending the suit, the subject
matter should be maintained in status quo, an
injunction would be issued. Thus, the Court
has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in
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injunction pending the suit. (See : Dalpat
Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719.)”
(Emphasis Supplied)
39. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case,
there is no dispute that the appellant is using its Subject Mark for
goods like sanitary napkins, sanitary towels, pads etc., while the
respondents are using their Impugned Mark for medicine claimed to
be giving relief against constipation. The two goods are neither allied
nor cognate. The learned District Judge, in our opinion, has rightly
held that the nature of goods, their trade channel, their purpose, and
the intended consumers are distinct, and there is no likelihood of
confusion being caused by the use of the marks for such goods.
40. Section 29 of the TM Act, reads as under:-
“Section 29. Infringement of registered trade
marks.
(1) A registered trade mark is infringed by a
person who, not being a registered proprietor
or a person using by way of permitted use,
uses in the course of trade, a mark which is
identical with, or deceptively similar to, the
trade mark in relation to goods or services in
respect of which the trade mark is registered
and in such manner as to render the use of the
mark likely to be taken as being used as a
trade mark.
(2) A registered trade mark is infringed by a
person who, not being a registered proprietor
or a person using by way of permitted use,
uses in the course of trade, a mark which
because of–
(a) its identity with the registered trade
mark and the similarity of the goods or
services covered by such registered trade
mark; or
(b) its similarity to the registered trade
mark and the identity or similarity of theSignature Not Verified
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goods or services covered by such
registered trade mark; or
(c) its identity with the registered trade
mark and the identity of the goods or
services covered by such registered trade
mark, is likely to cause confusion on the
part of the public, or which is likely to have
an association with the registered trade
mark.
(3) In any case falling under clause (c) of sub-
section (2), the court shall presume that it is
likely to cause confusion on the part of the
public.
(4) A registered trade mark is infringed by a
person who, not being a registered proprietor
or a person using by way of permitted use,
uses in the course of trade, a mark which–
(a) is identical with or similar to the
registered trade mark; and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services
which are not similar to those for which the
trade mark is registered; and
(c) the registered trade mark has a
reputation in India and the use of the mark
without due cause takes unfair advantage of
or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or repute of the registered trade
mark.
(5) A registered trade mark is infringed by a
person if he uses such registered trade mark,
as his trade name or part of his trade name, or
name of his business concern or part of the
name, of his business concern dealing in goods
or services in respect of which the trade mark
is registered.
(6) For the purposes of this section, a person
uses a registered mark, if, in particular, he–
(a) affixes it to goods or the packaging
thereof;
(b) offers or exposes goods for sale, puts
them on the market, or stocks them for
those purposes under the registered trade
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mark, or offers or supplies services under
the registered trade mark;
(c) imports or exports goods under the
mark; or
(d) uses the registered trade mark on
business papers or in advertising.
(7) A registered trade mark is infringed by a
person who applies such registered trade mark
to a material intended to be used for labeling
or packaging goods, as a business paper, or
for advertising goods or services, provided
such person, when he applied the mark, knew
or had reason to believe that the application of
the mark was not duly authorised by the
proprietor or a licensee.
(8) A registered trade mark is infringed by any
advertising of that trade mark if such
advertising–
(a) takes unfair advantage of and is
contrary to honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters; or
(b) is detrimental to its distinctive
character; or
(c) is against the reputation of the trade
mark.
(9) Where the distinctive elements of a
registered trade mark consist of or include
words, the trade mark may be infringed by the
spoken use of those words as well as by their
visual representation and reference in this
section to the use of a mark shall be construed
accordingly.
41. In Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai & Ors.,
(2022) 5 SCC 1, the Supreme Court explained the various facets of
Section 29 of the TM Act as under:-
“34. Sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the said
Act provides that a registered trade mark is
infringed by a person who, not being a
registered proprietor or a person using by way
of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a
mark which is identical with, or deceptivelySignature Not Verified
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similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods
or services in respect of which the trade mark
is registered and in such manner as to render
the use of the mark likely to be taken as being
used as a trade mark.
35. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the said
Act provides that a registered trade mark is
infringed by a person who, not being a
registered proprietor or a person using by way
of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a
mark which because of its identity with the
registered trade mark and the similarity of the
goods or services covered by such registered
trade mark; or its similarity to the registered
trade mark and the identity or similarity of the
goods or services covered by such registered
trade mark; or its identity with the registered
trade mark and the identity of the goods or
services covered by such registered trade
mark, is likely to cause confusion on the part
of the public, or which is likely to have an
association with the registered trade mark.
36. Sub-section (3) of Section 29 of the said
Act is of vital importance. It provides that in
any case falling under clause (c) of sub-
section (2) of Section 29 of the said Act, the
court shall presume that it is likely to cause
confusion on the part of the public.
37. A perusal of sub-section (2) of Section 29
of the said Act would reveal that a registered
trade mark would be infringed by a person,
who not being a registered proprietor or a
person using by way of permitted use, uses in
the course of trade, a mark which because of
the three eventualities mentioned in clauses
(a), (b) and (c), is likely to cause confusion on
the part of the public, or which is likely to
have an association with the registered trade
mark. The first eventuality covered by clause
(a) being its identity with the registered trade
mark and the similarity of the goods or
services covered by such registered trade
mark. The second one covered by clause (b)
being its similarity to the registered trade
mark and the identity or similarity of the goodsSignature Not Verified
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or services covered by such registered trade
mark. The third eventuality stipulated in
clause (c) would be its identity with the
registered trade mark and the identity of the
goods or services covered by such registered
trade mark.
38. It is, however, pertinent to note that by
virtue of sub-section (3) of Section 29 of the
said Act, the legislative intent insofar as the
eventuality contained in clause (c) is
concerned, is clear. Sub-section (3) of Section
29 of the said Act provides that in any case
falling under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of
Section 29 of the said Act, the Court shall
presume that it is likely to cause confusion on
the part of the public.
39. Sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the said
Act provides that a registered trade mark is
infringed by a person who, not being a
registered proprietor or a person using by way
of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a
mark which is identical with or similar to the
registered trade mark; and is used in relation
to goods or services which are not similar to
those for which the trade mark is registered;
and the registered trade mark has a reputation
in India and the use of the mark without due
cause takes unfair advantage of or is
detrimental to, the distinctive character or
repute of the registered trade mark.
40. Sub-section (5) of Section 29 of the said
Act provides that a registered trade mark is
infringed by a person if he uses such
registered trade mark, as his trade name or
part of his trade name, or name of his business
concern or part of the name, of his business
concern dealing in goods or services in
respect of which the trade mark is registered.
41. Sub-section (6) of Section 29 of the said
Act provides that for the purposes of this
section, a person uses a registered mark, if, in
particular, he affixes it to goods or the
packaging thereof; offers or exposes goods for
sale, puts them on the market, or stocks them
for those purposes under the registered trade
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mark, or offers or supplies services under the
registered trade mark; imports or exports
goods under the mark; or uses the registered
trade mark on business papers or in
advertising.
42. Sub-section (7) of Section 29 of the said
Act provides that a registered trade mark is
infringed by a person who applies such
registered trade mark to a material intended to
be used for labelling or packaging goods, as a
business paper, or for advertising goods or
services, provided such person, when he
applied the mark, knew or had reason to
believe that the application of the mark was
not duly authorised by the proprietor or a
licensee.
43. Sub-section (8) of Section 29 of the said
Act provides that a registered trade mark is
infringed by any advertising of that trade mark
if such advertising takes unfair advantage of
and is contrary to honest practices in
industrial or commercial matters; or is
detrimental to its distinctive character; or is
against the reputation of the trade mark.
44. Sub-section (9) of Section 29 of the said
Act provides that where the distinctive
elements of a registered trade mark consist of
or include words, the trade mark may be
infringed by the spoken use of those words as
well as by their visual representation and
reference in this section to the use of a mark
shall be construed accordingly.
*****
52. It could thus be seen that this Court again
reiterated that the question to be asked in an
infringement action is as to whether the
defendant is using a mark which is same as, or
which is a colourable imitation of the
plaintiff’s registered trade mark. It has further
been held that though the get-up of the
defendant’s goods may be so different from the
plaintiff’s goods and the prices may also be so
different that there would be no probability of
deception of the public, nevertheless even in
such cases i.e. in an infringement action, an
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injunction would be issued as soon as it is
proved that the defendant is improperly using
the plaintiff’s mark. It has been reiterated that
no case of actual deception nor any actual
damage needs to be proved in such cases. This
Court has further held that though two actions
are closely similar in some respects, in an
action for infringement, where the defendant’s
trade mark is identical with the plaintiff’s
trade mark, the Court will not enquire whether
the infringement is such as is likely to deceive
or cause confusion.
*****
56. It is further clear that in case of an
eventuality covered under clause (c) of sub-
section (2) of Section 29 in view of the
provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 29 of
the said Act, the Court shall presume that it is
likely to cause confusion on the part of the
public.
57. The perusal of sub-section (4) of Section
29 of the said Act would reveal that the same
deals with an eventuality when the impugned
trade mark is identical with or similar to the
registered trade mark and is used in relation
to goods or services which are not similar to
those for which the trade mark is registered.
Only in such an eventuality, it will be
necessary to establish that the registered trade
mark has a reputation in India and the use of
the mark without due cause takes unfair
advantage of or is detrimental to, the
distinctive character or repute of the
registered trade mark. The legislative intent is
clear by employing the word “and” after
clauses (a) and (b) in sub-section (4) of
Section 29 of the said Act. Unless all the three
conditions are satisfied, it will not be open to
the proprietor of the registered trade mark to
sue for infringement when though the
impugned trade mark is identical with the
registered trade mark, but is used in relation
to goods or services which are not similar to
those for which the trade mark is registered.
To sum up, while sub-section (2) of Section 29
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of the said Act deals with those situations
where the trade mark is identical or similar
and the goods covered by such a trade mark
are identical or similar, sub-section (4) of
Section 29 of the said Act deals with situations
where though the trade mark is identical, but
the goods or services are not similar to those
for which the trade mark is registered.”
42. In Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Coop. Milk Producers
Federation Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 183, the Supreme Court held that if a
trader or manufacturer actually trades in or manufactures only one or
some of the articles coming under a broad classification and such
trader or manufacturer has no bona fide intention to trade in or
manufacture other goods or articles which also fall under the said
broad classification, such trader or manufacturer should not be
permitted to enjoy monopoly in respect of all the articles which may
come under such broad classification and by that process preclude the
other traders or manufacturers from getting registration of separate
and distinct goods which may also be grouped under the broad
classification. We quote from the judgment, as under:-
“32. Having arrived at the aforesaid
conclusion, the reasoning of the High Court
that the goods belonging to the appellant and
the respondent (though the nature of goods is
different) belong to the same class and,
therefore, it would be impermissible for the
appellant to have the registration of the trade
mark concerned in its favour, would be
meaningless. That apart, there is no such
principle of law. On the contrary, this Court in
Vishnudas Trading [Vishnudas Trading v.
Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd., (1997) 4 SCC
201] has decided otherwise as can be seen
from the reading of paras 47 and 48 of the
said judgment: (SCC pp. 223-25)Signature Not Verified
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“47. The respondent Company got
registration of its brand name
“Charminar” under the broad
classification “manufactured tobacco”. So
long such registration remains operative,
the respondent Company is entitled to claim
exclusive use of the said brand name in
respect of articles made of tobacco coming
under the said broad classification
“manufactured tobacco”. Precisely for the
said reason, when the appellant made
application for registration of quiwam and
zarda under the same brand name
“Charminar”, such prayer for registration
was not allowed. The appellant, therefore,
made application for rectification of the
registration made in favour of the
respondent Company so that the said
registration is limited only in respect of the
articles being manufactured and marketed
by the respondent Company, namely,
cigarettes. In our view, if a trader or
manufacturer actually trades in or
manufactures only one or some of the
articles coming under a broad
classification and such trader or
manufacturer has no bona fide intention to
trade in or manufacture other goods or
articles which also fall under the said
broad classification, such trader or
manufacturer should not be permitted to
enjoy monopoly in respect of all the articles
which may come under such broad
classification and by that process preclude
the other traders or manufacturers from
getting registration of separate and distinct
goods which may also be grouped under the
broad classification. If registration has
been given generally in respect of all the
articles coming under the broad
classification and if it is established that the
trader or manufacturer who got such
registration had not intended to use any
other article except the articles being used
by such trader or manufacturer, theSignature Not Verified
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registration of such trader is liable to be
rectified by limiting the ambit of
registration and confining such registration
to the specific article or articles which
really concern the trader or manufacturer
enjoying the registration made in his
favour. In our view, if rectification in such
circumstances is not allowed, the trader or
manufacturer by virtue of earlier
registration will be permitted to enjoy the
mischief of trafficking in trade mark.
Looking to the scheme of the registration of
trade mark as envisaged in the Trade
Marks Act and the Rules framed
thereunder, it appears to us that
registration of a trade mark cannot be held
to be absolute, perpetual and invariable
under all circumstances. Section 12 of the
Trade Marks Act prohibits registration of
identical or deceptively similar trade marks
in respect of goods and description of
goods which is identical or deceptively
similar to the trade mark already
registered. For prohibiting registration
under Section 12(1), goods in respect of
which subsequent registration is sought for,
must be (i) in respect of goods or
description of goods being same or similar
and covered by earlier registration, and (ii)
trade mark claimed for such goods must be
same or deceptively similar to the trade
mark already registered. It may be noted
here that under sub-section (3) of Section
12 of the Trade Marks Act, in an
appropriate case of honest concurrent use
and/or of other special circumstances, same
and deceptively similar trade marks may be
permitted to another by the Registrar,
subject to such conditions as may deem just
and proper to the Registrar. It is also to be
noted that the expressions “goods” and
“description of goods” appearing in
Section 12(1) of the Trade Marks Act
indicate that registration may be made in
respect of one or more goods or of allSignature Not Verified
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goods conforming a general description.
The Trade Marks Act has noted distinction
between description of goods forming a
genus and separate and distinctly
identifiable goods under the genus in
various other sections e.g. goods of same
description in Section 46, Sections 12 and
34 and class of goods in Section 18, Rules
12 and 26 read with Fourth Schedule to the
Rules framed under the Act.
48. The “class” mentioned in the Fourth
Schedule may subsume or comprise a
number of goods or articles which are
separately identifiable and vendible and
which are not goods of the same description
as commonly understood in trade or in
common parlance. Manufactured tobacco is
a class mentioned in Class 34 of Fourth
Schedule of the Rules but within the said
class, there are a number of distinctly
identifiable goods which are marketed
separately and also used differently. In our
view, it is not only permissible but it will be
only just and proper to register one or more
articles under a class or genus if in reality
registration only in respect of such articles
is intended, by specifically mentioning the
names of such articles and by indicating the
class under which such article or articles
are to be comprised. It is, therefore,
permissible to register only cigarette or
some other specific products made of
“manufactured tobacco” as mentioned in
Class 34 of Fourth Schedule of the Rules. In
our view, the contention of Mr
Vaidyanathan that in view of change in the
language of Section 8 of the Trade Marks
Act as compared to Section 5 of the Trade
Marks Act, 1940, registration of trade mark
is to be made only in respect of class or
genus and not in respect of articles of
different species under the genus is based
on incorrect appreciation of Section 8 of
the Trade Marks Act and Fourth Schedule
of the Rules.”
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(emphasis supplied)
33. We may mention that the aforesaid
principle of law while interpreting the
provisions of the Trade and Merchandise
Marks Act, 1958 is equally applicable as it is
unaffected by the Trade Marks Act, 1999
inasmuch as the main object underlying the
said principle is that the proprietor of a trade
mark cannot enjoy monopoly over the entire
class of goods and, particularly, when he is
not using the said trade mark in respect of
certain goods falling under the same class. In
this behalf, we may usefully refer to Section 11
of the Act which prohibits the registration of
the mark in respect of the similar goods or
different goods but the provisions of this
section do not cover the same class of goods.
(Emphasis Supplied)
43. In the present case as well, the goods are distinct, having
distinct and separate trade channels, and there is no likelihood of
confusion being caused to the public by the use of the marks. There is
also no case of passing off made out by the appellant as the packaging
of the products and the manner of the depiction of the mark along with
other additional ingredients of the label do not indicate any likelihood
of confusion resulting in the use of the same.
44. As far as the plea of the appellant that non-grant of injunction
may prevent the appellant from expanding its business to
pharmaceuticals, apart from being based on mere conjectures, even
otherwise, cannot be accepted. It is common practice that for distinct
goods the manufacturers use distinct trademarks. In fact, it is own case
of the appellant that it has other trademarks like GHARI/GHADI
Label, VENUS, REDCHIEF, NAMASTE INDIA etc.. The above
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By:RENUKA NEGI
Signing Date:12.06.2025
13:39:52
plea, therefore, appears to be a red herring, rather than any genuine
concern.
45. Equally, the plea of the appellant that the respondents may
venture out to the products like sanitary napkins, etc., has been
answered by the respondents by stating that they do not intend to use
their marks for these goods. This intent has also been evidenced by the
respondents withdrawing their oppositions to the applications of the
appellant seeking registration of its mark.
46. Though much was also stated on the evidence of user of the
mark by the respondents, in our view, at this stage, given the evidence
placed on record by the respondents, it cannot be said that their claim
of user of their mark since 2017 can be disbelieved. Moreover, selling
its products through one selling partner cannot lead to an inference
that the invoices are not genuine. These are, in any case, matters of
evidence and trial.
47. As far as the plea of the appellant that it cannot be held guilty of
concealment, in our opinion, the same has lost significance once on
merit we find that the appellant, even otherwise, was not entitled to
grant of an interim injunction. However, we must state that the
conduct of the appellant is not completely bona fide and transparent.
Once it has been disclosed that the appellant was aware of the
application filed by the respondents seeking registration of its mark,
and it was aware of the user affidavit filed along with it, the appellant
should have placed the same before the learned District Judge along
with the suit itself. It appears to have intentionally withheld this
document as it wanted to claim that the respondents came into market
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By:RENUKA NEGI
Signing Date:12.06.2025
13:39:52
only in November 2024, that is, just before the filing of the suit, so
that it can make out a case for grant of ex parte interim relief.
48. For grant of an interim injunction, the appellant has to meet the
trinity test that is, of showing a good prima facie case, balance of
convenience in its favour, and that irreparable harm shall be caused to
it in case such interim order is not granted. The appellant has failed to
make a prima facie case in its favour. The balance of convenience is
also in favour of the respondents and against the appellant inasmuch
as the respondents have, at least prima facie, been able to show the
user of their mark since 2017, that is, for a period of almost seven
years prior to the filing of the suit. The adoption of the Impugned
Mark by the respondents has also been explained by it, and the same
appears to be bona fide and in accordance with industry practice,
wherein alphabets are taken from the chemical compound the product
is made of, and additions are made to it to make it a coined mark. In
the present case, as noted hereinabove, the respondents have taken the
first three alphabets from the chemical compound prucalopride, and
have added the word „Ease‟ to the same, for reflecting the ultimate use
of the medicine, that is, giving relief to constipation. As far as
irreparable harm and injury is concerned, the appellant can always be
compensated in terms of the damages, in case, it is later found to have
made out a case for the same.
49. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we find no merit in the
present appeal. The same is dismissed. The pending application also
stands dismissed.
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By:RENUKA NEGI
Signing Date:12.06.2025
13:39:52
50. We, however, make it clear that the observations made
hereinabove shall in no manner influence the trial as they are only
prima facie in nature.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
SHALINDER KAUR, J
JUNE 12, 2025/rv/VS
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Digitally Signed FAO (COMM) 65/2025 Page 37 of 37
By:RENUKA NEGI
Signing Date:12.06.2025
13:39:52