Telangana High Court
Rupineni Venkata Krishna Rao vs State Of Telangana on 17 March, 2025
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.5018, 5731 and 8309 of 2024 COMMON ORDER:
Since the issue involved in all these criminal petitions is
one and the same, they are being heard together and are being
decided by way of this common order.
2. Criminal Petition Nos.5018, 5731 and 8309 of 2024
were filed by accused Nos.3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, respectively, under
Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
‘Cr.P.C.’) to quash the proceedings against them in Crime
No.305 of 2024 of Jubliee Hills Police Station, Hyderabad,
registered for the offences punishable under Sections 386,
365, 341 and 120(b) read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short ‘IPC‘).
3. The brief facts of the cases are that respondent No.2 in
all the cases is one and the same. He lodged a complaint
before the Police against the petitioners and other accused
stating that in the year 2011, respondent No.2 founded
M/s. Kria Healthcare Services, providing affordable healthcare
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solutions in Andhra Pradesh. By the year 2016, the said
Company had grown significantly, operating 165 urban health
centers, telemedicine facilities, and emergency vehicles. These
projects were established before the four part time Directors
namely Gopal, Raj, Naveen and Ravi. Initially, respondent
No.2 hired Mr. Balaji Utla as CEO and later few investors
joined the company. By the end of financial year 2016-17, the
said company had four shareholders, respondent No.2-Venu
with 60%, Balaji with 20%, Gopal with 10% and Raj with 10%.
The company has total six Directors, including two Full Time
Directors, Venu and Balaji, and four part-time directors,
Gopal, Raj, Naveen and Ravi. However, things took a dark
turn in the year 2018. Four Part-Time Directors pressurized
respondent No.2 to sell his 60% shares at a low value. One
Chandrasekhar Vege is the Managing Director and CEO of
Goldfish Abode Private Limited, is the neighbor of respondent
No.2 and engaged in construction business, approached him
in the month of March, 2018 for an investment in his Goldfish
Company. Four Part Time Directors teamed up with the said
Chandrasekhar Vege, who pretended to help respondent No.2
but secretly worked with the said Directors.
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4. It is further stated that on November 22, 2018,
respondent No.2 was kidnapped by DCP Radha Kishan and
his team, allegedly on the orders of influential individuals.
The kidnappers forced respondent No.2 to sign away his
shares without compensation by showing guns and sticks.
The said Chandrasekhar Vege and the said four Part Time
Directors of Kria Healthcare threatened him, citing
connections with powerful people. They demanded silence,
warning of dire consequences if he sought legal action or
media attention. They entered into an agreement and taken
shares in their favour and released respondent No.2.
Thereafter, when respondent No.2 has seen the arrest of DCP-
Radha Kishan on television; he felt safe enough to report the
incident to the Police and accordingly, he urged the
Hyderabad City Police to investigate into the kidnapping,
threats, and fraudulent activities perpetrated by the said
Chandrasekhar Vege, the four part-time directors, and the
officials, who involved and that he sought protection for
himself and his family members. Basing on the said
complaint, the Police registered a case in Crime No.305 of
2024 of Jubliee Hills Police Station, Hyderabad, for the
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offences punishable under Sections 386, 365, 341 and 120(b)
read with 34 of IPC.
5. Heard Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned Senior Counsel,
representing Pillix Law Firm, appearing on behalf of the
petitioners in Crl.P.No.5018 of 2024, Sri Ravi Kiran Rao,
learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Aruva Raghuram
Mahadev, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner in Crl.P.No.5731 of 2024, Sri Ch. Venkat Raman,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in
Crl.P.No.8309 of 2024 as well as Sri Rudresh Deshpande,
learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of
respondent-State in Crl.P.Nos.5018 and 5731 of 2024, Sri
Palle Nageshwar Rao, learned Public Prosecutor appearing on
behalf of the respondent-State in Cr.P.No.8309 of 2024 and
Sri Gandham Durga Bose, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent No.2.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
petitioners are law-abiding citizens; they did not commit any
offence as alleged in the complaint and that there is an
unreasonable delay in filing the complaint i.e., six years after
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the alleged incident and the same lacks satisfactory
explanation. He further submitted that the complaint was
filed after the arrest of accused No.1-DCP Radha Kishan,
which is unclear and unsatisfactory and that initially
complaint against accused No.2-Chandrashekar Vege was
lodged by respondent No.2 and the same was registered as
Crime No.1055 of 2023, which contains the same allegations
as alleged in the present complaint, however, by alleging the
offences of kidnapping and extortion, and by including the
petitioners. Therefore, registering second FIR with the same
facts violates Sections 154 and 156 of Cr.P.C, which is
nothing but abuse of process of law.
6.1. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted
that the present complaint is an afterthought, contradicting
the initial complaint i.e., FIR No.1055 of 2023, lodged by
respondent No. 2. Primarily, respondent No.2 himself has
transferred 2 lakh shares voluntary, but now alleges extortion,
kidnapping, and wrongful restraint. He further submitted
that this inconsistency suggests that the present complaint is
fabricated only to harass the petitioners. Learned counsel for
the petitioners contended that the allegations in the complaint
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are absurd and inherently improbable. He specifically
contended that respondent No.2 initially stated that the
petitioners voluntarily sold their remaining shares for
Rs.1,70,00,000/-, but now claims that he was kidnapped and
coerced into signing off those shares, which is contradictory to
the complaint.
6.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the allegations
in the complaint are false and even if they are considered to be
true, they do not constitute an offence under Sections 365
and 341 of the IPC. Respondent No.2 allegedly deceived and
misappropriated an amount of Rs.14 crores from accused
Nos.6, 7, and 8, leading to a criminal breach of trust, as such,
the said accused lodged a complaint against respondent No.2
and the same was registered as Crime No.644 of 2018 for the
offences punishable under Sections 420 and 506 of IPC.
6.3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that
Section 386 of IPC which relates to extortion does not apply
here. To constitute an offence of extortion, there must be an
element of inducing fear to obtain property, valuable security,
or something signed/sealed that could become a valuable
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security. In the present case, even if the allegations are
considered to be true, there is no evidence of inducing fear to
obtain property or valuable security. Respondent No.2 claims
that the petitioners were coerced into signing a settlement
agreement, but they did not explain the contents of the
agreement or how it is being utilized by the accused. Notably,
the alleged settlement deed, which was supposedly signed on
November 2, 2018, in the office of accused No.1, was never
utilized, and no settlement deed was filed with the Registrar of
Companies.
6.4. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted
that to attract the charge under Section 120B of IPC, there
must be an agreement between at least two people to commit
an unlawful act or to carry out a lawful act through illegal
means. Essentially, a “meeting of minds” is necessary to prove
conspiracy. In the present case, the complaint mentions that
CI Gattu and Krishna were instructed to draft a settlement
agreement in the office of DCP.
6.5. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended
that the allegations of kidnapping and coercion to sign away
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shares seem to be unfounded and contradictory to the
established procedures for share transfer under the
Companies Act, 2013. To transfer shares, a proper transfer
deed in Form SH.4, duly stamped and executed by both the
transferor and transferee, must be delivered to the Company
within 60 days from the date of execution. This form requires
the details such as the name, address, and occupation of the
transferee. Additionally, stamp duty must be paid, and two
witnesses must attest the transfer deed. Even that
respondent No.2 did not claim to have signed Form SH.4 or
receive consideration for their shares, the allegations of
kidnapping and threats to sign away shares appear to be false
and improbable.
6.6. Learned counsel for the petitioners incessantly
contended that the petitioners were not involved in the
transactions between respondent No.2 and accused No.2, as
they have already filed cases against each other. The only
accusation against the petitioners is that they pressurized
respondent No.2 to resign from the company i.e., M/s. Kria
Healthcare Private Limited, which led to a settlement deed
being forcibly executed on November 2, 2018, allegedly with
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the use of guns. However, respondent No. 2 has not explained
the contents of this settlement deed or how it is being utilized
by the accused.
6.7. Learned counsel submitted that Kria Healthcare Private
Limited was originally founded as Vasanthi HR Consultancy
Services Private Limited on October 1, 2009, by Kiran Babu
Chundru and Phani Raja Kumari Meka. The company
underwent name change, becoming Uber Gang Marketing
Consultants Private Limited on July 16, 2011, and finally,
Kria Healthcare Private Limited on February 6, 2016. This
means respondent No.2 cannot be the founder Director of Kria
Healthcare, contrary to their claims. Additionally, the alleged
allotment of 165 primary health care centers to Kria in 2014
by the Government of Andhra Pradesh is also false, as Kria
Healthcare does not exist until 2016.
6.8. The credibility of Respondent No. 2 is questionable due
to suppressed information about FIR No.644 of 2018 and
receipt of payment upon leaving Kria Company. This raises
concern as respondent No. 2 has a history of filing and being
involved in multiple cases, including counter cases with
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accused No.2. The fact that respondent No.2 typically files
complaints promptly when grievances arise contradicts their
current reasoning for delaying the complaint until the arrest
of accused No.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the
complaint of respondent No.2 is malicious and driven by an
ulterior motive to usurp the shares of the company. Further,
respondent No.2 filed the present complaint aiming to coerce
the Directors into a settlement and, transferring shares at a
lower price. Therefore, the allegations leveled against the
petitioners are vague and baseless and they do not constitute
any offence as alleged by respondent No.2 and prayed the
Court to quash the proceedings.
7. In support of the submissions of the petitioners, they
relied upon the Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are
as follows:
7.1 In Thulia Kali v. R.M.D.The State of Tamilnadu 1 ,
wherein in paragraph No.12, it is held as follows:
“12. It is in the evidence of Valanjiaraju that
the house of Muthuswami is at a distance of three1
1972 (3) SCC 393
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Crl.P.No.5018 of 2024 and batchfurlongs from the village of Valanjiaraju. Police
Station Valavanthi is also at a distance of three
furlongs from the house of Muthuswami. Assuming
that Muthuswami PW was not found at his house
till 10.30 p.m. on March 12, 1970, by Valanjiaraju,
it is not clear as to why no report was lodged by
Valanjiaraju at the police station. It is, in our
opinion, most difficult to believe that even though
the accused had been seen at 2 p.m. committing the
murder of Madhandi deceased and a large number
of villagers had been told about it soon thereafter,
no report about the occurrence could be lodged till
the following day. The police station was less than
two miles from the village of Valanjiaraju and Kopia
and their failure to make a report to the police till
the following day would tend to show that none of
them had witnessed the occurrence. It seems likely,
as has been stated on behalf of the accused, that
the villagers came to know of the death of Madhandi
deceased on the evening of March 12, 1970. They
did not then know about the actual assailant of the
deceased, and on the following day, their suspicion
fell on the accused and accordingly they involved
him in this case. First information report in a
criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable
piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating
the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The
importance of the above report can hardly be
overestimated from the standpoint of the accused.
The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the
report to the police in respect of commission of an
offence is to obtain early information regarding the
circumstances in which the crime was committed,
the names of the actual culprits and the part played
by them as well as the names of eyewitnesses
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the first information report quite often results in
embellishment which is a creature of afterthought.
On account of delay, the report not only gets bereft
of the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of
the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated
account or concocted story as a result of
deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore,
essential that the delay in the lodging of the first
information report should be satisfactorily
explained. In the present case, Kopia, daughter-in-
law of Madhandi deceased, according to the
prosecution case, was present when the accused
made murderous assault on the deceased.
Valanjiaraju, step-son of the deceased, is also
alleged to have arrived near the scene of occurrence
on being told by Kopia. Neither of them, nor any
other villager, who is stated to have been told about
the occurrence by Valanjiaraju and Kopia, made
any report at the police station for more than 20
hours after the occurrence, even though the police
station is only two miles from the place of
occurrence. The said circumstance, in our opinion,
would raise considerable doubt regarding the
veracity of the evidence of those two witnesses and
point to an infirmity in that evidence as would
render it unsafe to base the conviction of the
accused-appellant upon it.”
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7.2 In Hasmukhlal D. Vora & Ors v. State of Tamilnadu 2,
wherein in paragraph No.24, it is held as follows:
“24. While inordinate delay in itself may not
be ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, in
such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of such
length must be taken into consideration as a very
crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal
complaint.”
7.3 In Mohmood Ali & Ors v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors 3, wherein in paragraph No.13 it is held as follows:
“13. At this stage, we would like to observe
something important. Whenever an accused comes
before the Court invoking either the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR
or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on
the ground that such proceedings are manifestly
frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such
circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into
the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say
so because once the complainant decides to proceed
against the accused with an ulterior motive for
wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would
ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted2
2022 (15) SCC 164
3
2023 SCC OnLine SC 950
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Crl.P.No.5018 of 2024 and batchwith all the necessary pleadings. The complainant
would ensure that the averments made in the
FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged
offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the
Court to look into the averments made in the
FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the
alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or
vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to
look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above
the averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the lines. The
Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution
need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but
is empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration
of the case as well as the materials collected in the
course of investigation. Take for instance the case
on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a
period of time. It is in the background of such
circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs
assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or personal
grudge as alleged.”
7.4 In T. T. Antony v. State of Kerala & Ors 4, wherein in
paragraph Nos.19, 20,22 and 27, it is held as under:
4
2001 (6) SCC 181
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Crl.P.No.5018 of 2024 and batch“19. The scheme of CrPC is that an officer in
charge of a police station has to commence
investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157
CrPC on the basis of entry of the first information
report, on coming to know of the commission of a
cognizable offence. On completion of investigation
and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to
form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as
the case may be, and forward his report to the
Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) CrPC.
However, even after filing such a report, if he comes
into possession of further information or material,
he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to
make further investigation, normally with the leave
of the court, and where during further investigation
he collects further evidence, oral or documentary,
he is obliged to forward the same with one or more
further reports; this is the import of sub-section (8)
of Section 173 CrPC.
20. From the above discussion it follows that
under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154,
155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 CrPC only
the earliest or the first information in regard to the
commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the
requirements of Section 154 CrPC. Thus there can
be no second FIR and consequently there can be no
fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent
information in respect of the same cognizable
offence or the same occurrence or incident giving
rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt
of information about a cognizable offence or an
incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or
offences and on entering the FIR in the station
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house diary, the officer in charge of a police station
has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence
reported in the FIR but also other connected
offences found to have been committed in the
course of the same transaction or the same
occurrence and file one or more reports as provided
in Section 173 CrPC.
22. On a perusal of the judgment of this Court in
M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka [(1999) 3 SCC 247
: 1999 SCC (Cri) 397] we do not find anything
contra to what is stated above. The case is
distinguishable on facts of that case. In the case on
hand the second FIR is filed in respect of the same
incident and on the same facts after about three
years.
27. A just balance between the fundamental
rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Constitution and the expansive power of the police
to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck
by the court. There cannot be any controversy that
sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the
police to make further investigation, obtain further
evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a
further report or reports to the Magistrate. In
Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri)
479] it was, however, observed that it would be
appropriate to conduct further investigation with
the permission of the court. However, the sweeping
power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a
citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police
in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or
more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of
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successive FIRs whether before or after filing the
final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would
clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and
156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory
power of investigation in a given case. In our view a
case of fresh investigation based on the second or
successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in
connection with the same or connected cognizable
offence alleged to have been committed in the
course of the same transaction and in respect of
which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation
is under way or final report under Section 173(2)
has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit
case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC
or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.”
7.5 In Amitabhai Anil Chandra Shah v. Central Bureau of
Investigation, and Ors 5, wherein in paragraph Nos.36 to 38,
it is held as follows:
36. Now, let us consider the legal aspects raised
by the petitioner Amit Shah as well as CBI. The
factual details which we have discussed in the
earlier paragraphs show that right from the
inception of entrustment of investigation to CBI by
order dated 12-1-2010 [(2010) 2 SCC 200 : (2010) 2
SCC (Cri) 1006] till filing of the charge-sheet dated
4-9-2012, this Court has also treated the alleged
fake encounter of Tulsiram Prajapati to be an
outcome of one single conspiracy alleged to have
been hatched in November 2005 which ultimately5
2013 (6) SCC 348
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Crl.P.No.5018 of 2024 and batchculminated in 2006. In such circumstances, the
filing of the second FIR and a fresh charge-sheet for
the same is contrary to the provisions of the Code
suggesting that the petitioner was not being
investigated, prosecuted and tried “in accordance
with law”.
37. This Court has consistently laid down the
law on the issue interpreting the Code, that a
second FIR in respect of an offence or different
offences committed in the course of the same
transaction is not only impermissible but it violates
Article 21 of the Constitution. In T.T. Antony [(2001)
6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] , this Court has
categorically held that registration of second FIR
(which is not a cross-case) is violative of Article 21
of the Constitution. The following conclusion in
paras 19, 20 and 27 of that judgment are relevant
which read as under : (SCC pp. 196-97 & 200)“19. The scheme of CrPC is that an officer in
charge of a police station has to commence
investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157
CrPC on the basis of entry of the first information
report, on coming to know of the commission of a
cognizable offence. On completion of investigation
and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to
form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as
the case may be, and forward his report to the
Magistrate concerned under Section 173(2) CrPC.
However, even after filing such a report, if he comes
into possession of further information or material,
he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to
make further investigation, normally with the leave
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of the court, and where during further investigation
he collects further evidence, oral or documentary,
he is obliged to forward the same with one or more
further reports; this is the import of sub-section (8)
of Section 173 CrPC.
20. From the above discussion it follows that
under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154,
155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 CrPC only
the earliest or the first information in regard to the
commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the
requirements of Section 154 CrPC. Thus there can
be no second FIR and consequently there can be no
fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent
information in respect of the same cognizable
offence or the same occurrence or incident giving
rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt
of information about a cognizable offence or an
incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or
offences and on entering the FIR in the station
house diary, the officer in charge of a police station
has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence
reported in the FIR but also other connected
offences found to have been committed in the
course of the same transaction or the same
occurrence and file one or more reports as provided
in Section 173 CrPC.
27. A just balance between the fundamental
rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Constitution and the expansive power of the police
to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck
by the court. There cannot be any controversy that
sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the
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police to make further investigation, obtain further
evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a
further report or reports to the Magistrate. In
Narang case [Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi
Admn.), (1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it
was, however, observed that it would be appropriate
to conduct further investigation with the permission
of the court. However, the sweeping power of
investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen
each time to fresh investigation by the police in
respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or
more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of
successive FIRs whether before or after filing the
final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would
clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and
156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory
power of investigation in a given case. In our view a
case of fresh investigation based on the second or
successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in
connection with the same or connected cognizable
offence alleged to have been committed in the
course of the same transaction and in respect of
which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation
is under way or final report under Section 173(2)
has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit
case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC
or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.”
The above referred declaration of law by this
Court has never been diluted in any subsequent
judicial pronouncements even while carving out
exceptions.
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38. Mr Raval, learned ASG, by referring T.T.
Antony [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048]
submitted that the said principles are not applicable
and relevant to the facts and circumstances of this
case as the said judgment laid down the ratio that
there cannot be two FIRs relating to the same
offence or occurrence. The learned ASG further
pointed out that in the present case, there are two
distinct incidents/occurrences, inasmuch as one
being the conspiracy relating to the murder of
Sohrabuddin with the help of Tulsiram Prajapati
and the other being the conspiracy to murder
Tulsiram Prajapati — a potential witness to the
earlier conspiracy to murder Sohrabuddin. We are
unable to accept the claim of the learned ASG. As a
matter of fact, the aforesaid proposition of law
making registration of fresh FIR impermissible and
violative of Article 21 of the Constitution is
reiterated and reaffirmed in the following
subsequent decisions of this Court : (1) Upkar Singh
v. Ved Prakash [(2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri)
211] , (2) Babubhai v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 12
SCC 254 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 336] , (3) Chirra
Shivraj v. State of A.P. [(2010) 14 SCC 444 : (2011)
3 SCC (Cri) 757 : AIR 2011 SC 604] , and (4) C.
Muniappan v. State of T.N. [(2010) 9 SCC 567 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1402] In C. Muniappan [(2010) 9
SCC 567 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1402] this Court
explained the “consequence test” i.e. if an offence
forming part of the second FIR arises as a
consequence of the offence alleged in the first FIR
then offences covered by both the FIRs are the same
and, accordingly, the second FIR will be
impermissible in law. In other words, the offences
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Crl.P.No.5018 of 2024 and batchcovered in both the FIRs shall have to be treated as
a part of the first FIR.”
7.6 In Surender Kaushik & Ors v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Ors 6, wherein in paragraph No.24, it is held as follows:
“24. From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite
luminous that the lodgment of two FIRs is not
permissible in respect of one and the same incident.
The concept of sameness has been given a restricted
meaning. It does not encompass filing of a counter-
FIR relating to the same or connected cognizable
offence. What is prohibited is any further complaint
by the same complainant and others against the
same accused subsequent to the registration of the
case under the Code, for an investigation in that
regard would have already commenced and allowing
registration of further complaint would amount to
an improvement of the facts mentioned in the
original complaint. As is further made clear by the
three-Judge Bench in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v.
Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri)
211] , the prohibition does not cover the allegations
made by the accused in the first FIR alleging a
different version of the same incident. Thus, rival
versions in respect of the same incident do take
different shapes and in that event, lodgment of two
FIRs is permissible.”
6
2013 (5) SCC 148
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7.7 In Rajiv Thappar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor 7 ,
wherein in paragraph No.29, it is held as under:
“29. The issue being examined in the instant
case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the
initiation of the prosecution against an accused at
the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of
committal, or even at the stage of framing of
charges. These are all stages before the
commencement of the actual trial. The same
parameters would naturally be available for later
stages as well. The power vested in the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to
hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences
inasmuch as it would negate the
prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing
the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such
a determination must always be rendered with
caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the
High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material
produced by the accused is such that would lead to
the conclusion that his/their defence is based on
sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the
material produced is such as would rule out and
displace the assertions contained in the charges
levelled against the accused; and the material
produced is such as would clearly reject and
overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in
the accusations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to7
2013 (3) SCC 330
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Crl.P.No.5018 of 2024 and batchrule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled
by the prosecution/complainant, without the
necessity of recording any evidence. For this the
material relied upon by the defence should not have
been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably
refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable
quality. The material relied upon by the accused
should be such as would persuade a reasonable
person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of
the accusations as false. In such a situation, the
judicial conscience of the High Court would
persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482
CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that
would prevent abuse of process of the court, and
secure the ends of justice.”
8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent No.2, filed counter affidavit denying the averments
made in the criminal petitions stating that on 22.11.2018,
respondent No.2 was kidnapped and coerced transferring of
shares of KRIA (a company valued at Rs.100 crores) to four
part-time directors (Accused Nos.6, 7, 8 and 10). He further
submitted that the kidnapping was orchestrated by accused
Nos.1, 2, and the four part-time directors, with the help of
accused Nos.3 and 4-Police officials. He further submitted
that respondent No.2 lodged the present complaint after the
arrest of accused No.1, seeking investigation into the
kidnapping, coercion, and financial losses. Therefore, learned
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Crl.P.No.5018 of 2024 and batch
counsel for respondent No.2 prayed the court to conduct a
rigorous, unbiased review of the orchestrated efforts made by
all accused to undermine financial stability and violation of
legal rights through threats, coercion, and fraudulent
activities.
8.1. Learned Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public
Prosecutor filed counter affidavit stating that in December
2018, accused No.2 owed 4 lakh KRIA shares of respondent
No.2 valued at Rs.40 crores but delayed payment. Accused
No.2 offered respondent No.2 a position at Goldfish with past
dues in March 2019. During the tenure of respondent No.2 in
Kria Company, four Part Time Directors uncovered legal
issues and staff misconduct, prompting their departure.
Thereafter, accused No.2 admitted his involvement in
kidnapping respondent No.2 with accused No.1-DCP Radha
Kishan and four part-time directors and that accused No.2
received an extra 10 crores for double-dealing. Accused No.2
threatened respondent No.2 and their family, citing potential
retaliation from DCP Radha Kishan.
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8.2. Learned Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public
Prosecutor further submitted that accused No. 5, managed
transactions of accused No.1 and participated in coercive
meetings, supported intimidation efforts of accused No.1,
enforced illegal demands, and made threatening calls to
respondent No.2, accused No.6 is a master litigator with
influence, approved the kidnapping and accused No.8 is the
partner of Naveen Yerneni, was part of the kidnapping plan.
Therefore, Section 386 IPC applies to all the accused due to
kidnapping and transferred shares forcibly. He further
submitted that the case is under investigation to determine
the applicability of Section 386 of IPC. Respondent No.2
delayed in lodging the complaint due to fear of accused No.1,
but gained confidence after learning of his arrest. Therefore,
the allegations against the petitioner are serious in nature,
quashing of proceedings against the petitioner, at this stage,
does not arise. Hence, he prayed the Court to dismiss the
criminal petitions.
9. In the light of the submissions made by the parties and
a perusal of the material available on record, it appears that
the there is a delay of five years in lodging the FIR for the
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Crl.P.No.5018 of 2024 and batch
alleged illegal acts. It is specifically contended by the learned
counsel for the petitioners that there was a five-year delay in
lodging the complaint due to life threats to respondent No. 2
and his family from accused No. 1 and that the settlement
deed was obtained under threat, but its clarity and
authenticity are disputed. On going through the said
contentions, the version of respondent No.2 is that there is a
life threat to respondent No.2 from accused No.1, as such,
after the arrest of accused No.1 in other case, respondent No.2
lodged the present complaint, and therefore, there is a delay
in lodging the complaint. In addition to that the shares were
sold forcibly to the petitioners at a lower value. Admittedly,
respondent No.2 received Rs.1,70,00,000/- for two lakh
shares (face value Rs.10 each, but sold at Rs.85 per share).
10. Upon a meticulous examination of the record and
submissions made by both parties, one of the contention of
the petitioner is that the offence under Section 386 of IPC
(Extortion) is not applicable to the accused. For an offence
under Section 386 to be established, there must be intentional
inducement of fear of death or grievous hurt to compel the
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Crl.P.No.5018 of 2024 and batch
victim to deliver property or valuable security. At this stage, it
is pertinent to note Section 386 of IPC, which reads as under:
“386. Extortion by putting a person in fear of death
or grievous hurt.– Whoever commits extortion by
putting any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt
to that person or to any other, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine.”
11. However, there is no credible evidence indicating that
the petitioners induced such fear to unlawfully obtain the
shares of Respondent No.2. On the contrary, the records
clearly demonstrate that Respondent No.2 voluntarily
transferred 2 lakh shares for a substantial consideration of
Rs.1.7 crores, which translates to Rs. 85 per share (calculated
by dividing the total consideration of Rs.1,70,00,000 by the
total shares transferred, i.e., 2,00,000 shares). This payment
was made as part of a mutually agreed transaction, indicating
a legitimate share transfer process rather than one made
under coercion or extortion.
12. Furthermore, the alleged settlement agreement, which is
claimed to have been signed under coercion, was neither
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utilized nor registered with the Registrar of Companies,
indicating that the accused did not attempt to exploit the
document for any unlawful gain. The complainant’s claim that
the settlement agreement was signed under threat is
unsubstantiated, particularly when the alleged agreement was
never enforced or used to gain an unfair advantage. The
complainant’s inconsistent statements, where he initially
claimed a voluntary share transfer and later alleged coercion,
further weaken the reliability of his accusations. The absence
of any evidence demonstrating inducement of fear of death or
grievous hurt to obtain property or valuable security makes it
clear that the essential ingredients required to attract Section
386 IPC are completely absent. Therefore, the charges under
this provision are liable to be quashed.
13. However, the allegations concerning the other offences
punishable under Sections 365, 341, and 120B of IPC require
thorough examination during a full-fledged investigation. At
this stage, it is pertinent to note that while exercising its
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court must
recognize its limitations and refrain from acting as an
appellate or revisional court. The Court should employ its
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inherent jurisdiction judiciously, cautiously, and sparingly,
avoiding premature decisions in cases where the facts are
incomplete or unclear, the evidence is insufficient, or the
issues are complex and require comprehensive scrutiny. Since
there are allegations against the petitioners involving the
kidnapping of Respondent No.2 and taking him to the office of
accused No.1, which is purportedly supported by CCTV
footage and WhatsApp messages (though CCTV footage not
filed before this Court), the allegations cannot be dismissed as
vague or baseless. Therefore, the charges under Sections 365,
341, and 120B of IPC require a full-fledged investigation to
determine their validity and merit.
14. In view thereof, these Criminal Petitions are allowed in
part quashing of the proceedings against the petitioners for the
offence punishable under Section 386 of IPC in Crime No.305
of 2024 of Jubliee Hills Police Station, Hyderabad. However,
the Police are directed to conclude the investigation for the
offences punishable under sections 365, 341, and 120B of IPC.
Further, since the punishment prescribed for the remaining
offences alleged against the petitioners is less than seven (07)
years, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the petitioners
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to appear before the Investigating Officer and in turn the
Investigating Officer is directed to follow the procedure laid
down under Section 35 (3) of BNSS (previously section 41-A of
Cr.P.C.) and also the guidelines formulated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar 8
scrupulously. However, the petitioners shall co-operate with
the Investigating Officer as and when required by furnishing
information and documents as sought by him in concluding
the investigation. The petitioners shall file all the documents
which he ought to file to prove that it do not come under the
criminal offences and the Investigating Officer shall consider
the same before filing appropriate report before the Magistrate.
Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand
closed.
_______________
K. SUJANA, J
Date: 17.03.2025
SAI
8
(2014) 8 SCC 273