Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
S. Jyothi, vs S. Sathish Chakravarthi 2 Others, on 17 February, 2025
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.589 OF 2010
Between:-
S.JYOTHI, W/O SATHISH CHAKRAVARTHI, R/O NEAR
VEERABHADRASWAMY TEMPLE, SRIKALAHASTI VILLAGE &
MANDAL, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
Versus
1. S SATHISH CHAKRAVARTHI 2 OTHERS, S/O DAMODARAM, R/O
RAJU NILAYAM, SRIRAM NAGAR COLONY, SRIKALAHASTHI,
2. S MANGA RAJAMMA, W/O DAMODARAM, R/O RAJU NILAYAM,
SRIRAM NAGAR COLONY, SRIKALAHASTHI,
3. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., AT HYDERABAD.
...RESPONDENT
****
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 17.02.2025
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Dr.YLR,J
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
3
Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010
Dr.YLR,J
* THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
+ CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.589 OF 2010
% 17.02.2025
# Between:
S.JYOTHI, W/O SATHISH CHAKRAVARTHI, R/O NEAR
VEERABHADRASWAMY TEMPLE, SRIKALAHASTI VILLAGE &
MANDAL, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
Versus
1. S SATHISH CHAKRAVARTHI 2 OTHERS, S/O DAMODARAM,
R/O RAJU NILAYAM, SRIRAM NAGAR COLONY, SRIKALAHASTHI,
2. S MANGA RAJAMMA, W/O DAMODARAM, R/O RAJU NILAYAM,
SRIRAM NAGAR COLONY, SRIKALAHASTHI,
3. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., AT HYDERABAD.
...RESPONDENT
! Counsel for the Petitioners : Sri Challa Srinivasa Reddy
^ Counsel for the Respondent : Sri K.Sandeep, Assistant Public Prosecutor
< Gist:
> Head Note:
4
Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010
Dr.YLR,J
? Cases referred:
1) (2002) 6 SCC 650
2) AIR 1951 SC 196
3) AIR 1962 SC 1788
4) AIR 1968 SC 707
5) AIR 1972 SC 468
6) AIR 1973 SC 1274
7) AIR 1973 SC 2145
8) AIR 1973 SC 84
9) AIR 1973 SC 799
10) AIR 1975 SC 580
11) AIR 1986 SC 1436
12) AIR 1993 SC 1126
13) AIR 2002 SC 2229
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Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010
Dr.YLR,J
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 589 of 2010
ORDER:
The Revision was filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) for acquitting the
Revisionist for the alleged offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 342 read with
34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C.,’) by the learned
Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Srikalahasti in C.C.No.94 of 2005
vide judgment dated 08.12.2009.
2. Sri Challa Srinivasa Reddy, the learned Counsel for the Revisionist
while reiterating the grounds of the Revision, argued that even though the
prosecution could prove the guilt of the Respondent Nos.1 & 2, being A1 and
A2, before the learned Magistrate, beyond all reasonable doubt, the learned
Magistrate did not believe the version of the prosecution and acquit them.
3. The learned Counsel for the Revisionist further argued that P.Ws.1 & 2
had supported the case of the prosecution. P.W.1 was harassed by
Respondent No.1 by maintaining illegal intimacy with one woman, who was
working in his office and he got illegal contact with some other woman;
Respondent No.1 indiscriminately had beat on P.W.1 and locked the door
from outside by keeping P.W.1 inside; Respondent Nos.1 & 2 demanded for
additional dowry from the parents of P.W.1.
6
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Dr.YLR,J
4. Mr.K.Sandeep, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would argue that
the learned Magistrate had rightly appreciated the evidence of all prosecution
witnesses and acquitted the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 as the guilt was not
proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
5. Now the point for consideration is:
“Whether the judgment in C.C..No.94 of 2005 dated 08.12.2009,
passed by the learned Additional Judicial I Class Magistrate,
Srikalahasti, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its
finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material
irregularities? And to what relief?”
6. It is apposite to refer the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad
Singh v State of Bihar1 wherein at Paragraph Nos.12 & 13 it is held as
under:
“12. … We have carefully considered the material on record
and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-
appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different
conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section
401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section
401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed
to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one
of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation
on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a
finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the
nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not
convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it
could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is
well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High
Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of
acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public
justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest
illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High
Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal
merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law
or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor
advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which1
(2002) 6 SCC 650
7
Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010
Dr.YLR,Jexercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of
this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional
jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private
party.
13. … In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the
procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification
for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should
not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the
trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave
miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such
cases is not warranted.”
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla2 at Paragraph
No.10 held as under:
“The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under
S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by
a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which
the Govt. has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised
only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice
require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the
prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not
ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has
taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on
record.”
8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP3, at
Paragraph No.7 held as under:
“7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set
aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties,
though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this
jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court
only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the
procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and
consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice.
Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a
finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the
more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert
the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method2
AIR 1951 SC 196
3
AIR 1962 SC 1788
8
Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010
Dr.YLR,Jof ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of
acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the
power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in
revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should
be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for
determining such exceptional cases which would cover all
contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind
which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with
a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the
trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted
the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out
evidence which the prosecution wished to produce. or where the
appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by
the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has
been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or
where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence,
which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar
nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature,
where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of
acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that
the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in
view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see
whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of
acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles.”
9. In Mahendra Pratap Singh v Sarju Singh4, at paragraph Nos.7 and 8
it is held as under:
“7. In revision, the learned Judge in the High Court went into
the evidence very minutely. He questioned every single finding of
the learned Sessions Judge and gave his own interpretation of the
evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. He discounted
the theory that the weapon of attack was a revolver and suggested
that it might have been a shot gun or country made pistol which
the villagers in the position of Kuldip and Sarju could not
distinguish from a revolver. He then took up each single
circumstance on which the learned Sessions Judge had found
some doubt and interpreting the evidence de novo held, contrary
to the opinion of the Sessions Judge that they were acceptable. All
the time he appeared to give the benefit of the doubt to the
prosecution. The only error of law which the learned Judge found
in the Sessions Judge’s judgment was a remark by the Sessions
Judge that the defence witnesses who were examined by the
police before they were brought as defence witness ought to have
been cross-examined with reference to their previous statements
4
AIR 1968 SC 707
9
Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010
Dr.YLR,Jrecorded by the police, which obviously is against the provisions of
the Code. Except for this error, no defect of procedure or of law
was discovered by the learned judge of the High Court in his
appraisal of the judgment of the Sessions Judge. As stated
already by us, he seems to have gone into the matter as if an
appeal against acquittal was before him making no distinction
between the appellate and the revisional powers exercisable by
the High Court in matters of acquittal except to the extent that
instead of convicting the appellant he only ordered his retrial. In
our opinion, the learned judge was clearly in error in proceeding as
he did in a revision filed by a private party against the acquittal
reached in the Court of Session.
8.The practice on the subject has been stated by this Court
on more than one occasion, In D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, 1951
SCR 254 = (AIR 1951 SC 196), only two grounds are mentioned
by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in
a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a
manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering
the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In
explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the
High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is
taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation
of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas, 1951
SCR 676 = (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that the High
Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an
error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This
Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment
under revision is “perverse” or “lacking in true correct perspective”.
It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded
against the accused, because however much the High Court may
caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the
evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K
Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR
412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is pointed out that an interference in
revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a
glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no
jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material
evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account
evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some
evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of
all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an
acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment
under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by
this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid
down by this Court was covered in the present case. In fact on
reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the
learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of
view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions
10
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Dr.YLR,J
judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his
duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has
not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned
Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by
this Court and has acted in breach of them.”
10. In Ram Kishan v. Harmit Kaur5, at paragraph No.9 it is held as under:
“9. It is true that the High Court as an appellate Court can set
aside an order of acquittal. In doing so, the High Court has to
review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
The High Court is to consider the views of the trial Judge as to
credibility of the witnesses. The High Court is also to keep in view
the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the
right of the accused to the benefit of doubt. Finally the High Court
is to give reasons that the acquittal was not justified. The acquittal
by the Sessions Judge cannot be said to be against the evidence
or in disregard of evidence. Nor can the acquittal be said to be in
violation of the principles of criminal jurisdiction.”
11. In Kotaiah v. G. Venkateshwara6, at paragraph Nos.19, 20 & 21 it is
held as under:
“19. We are of the opinion that the entire approach made by
the High Court in dealing with the Criminal Revision filed against
acquittal by the private party is contrary to the principles laid down
in the decisions referred to above. Notwithstanding the fact that
sub-section (4) of Section 439 does not authorise the High Court
to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it has in fact
contravened this provision by recording a finding of guilt against
the accused and directing the Trial Court to convict them after a
retrial. There is no question of lack of jurisdiction in the Trial Court
to try the case; nor was any attack made that any evidence has
been shut out at the trial. Whether the dying declaration, Ext. P.
15, by Ratnababu can be taken into account regarding the attack
on Koteswara Rao, is a matter which the Trial Court was entitled
to decide one way or the other. If its view was wrong, the High
Court could have gone into that aspect and differed from this
opinion of the Sessions Court if the State had filed an appeal
against acquittal. Further the mere fact that the learned Trial
Judge held that this piece of evidence is not relevant, while
considering the attack on Koteswara Rao, does not amount to
shutting out of evidence at the trial. In fact that evidence had5
AIR 1972 SC 468
6
AIR 1973 SC 1274
11
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Dr.YLR,Jalready come on record. Therefore, in this case there has been no
shutting out at the trial of any evidence which the prosecution
wanted to adduce or the defence wanted to lead. All available
evidence has been let in by both the prosecution and the accused.
20. Nor can it be stated that there has been any glaring
defect in the procedure or a manifest error on a point of law and
consequently leading to a flagrant miscarriage of justice. As
mentioned earlier, sub-section (4) of Section 439 forbids a High
Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction
by an indirect method of ordering retrial when the High Court itself
cannot directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of
conviction. The High Court, in our opinion, has missed these very
important limitations on its power to set aside the finding of
acquittal in revision which could be done only in very exceptional
circumstances. In the case on hand, the High Court was not
justified in considering the evidence in such detail if it was really
going to order a retrial. Such a detailed consideration of evidence
and an expression of opinion about the guilt of the accused, in our
opinion, has really loaded the dice against the accused when the
case goes back for retrial. Much stress has been laid by the High
Court that though substantive charges had been framed against
the accused read with Section 34 or alternatively with Section 149
I.P.C. the Trial Court has not recorded any finding in this regard.
Here again, the High Court’s view is erroneous. We have already
referred to the finding recorded by the Trial Court that in view of
the definite case of the prosecution and the nature of the
evidence, none of the accused can be held constructively liable. It
is on that ground that the Trial Court has not found the accused
constructively guilty.
21. We have indicated the reasons, which promoted the High
Court to order a retrial. The consequence of this will be to put
considerable strain on the accused who have already gone
through a trial at considerable stress and expense. After going
through the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, we cannot
certainly say, particularly in view of the evidence on record that
either the acquittal of the twenty-two accused or the acquittal of
the eight convicted accused of the rest of the charges was not
justified. At any rate, it may be safely stated that the learned
Sessions Judge has taken into account all the relevant
circumstances. It may be that there are slight mistakes in some of
the reasons given by him but the judgment asa whole shows that
he has really applied his mind to the various pieces of evidence
before passing the order of acquittal in the manner he has done. In
the particular circumstances of this case, the interference in
revision by the High Court at the instance of the private party was
not justified. The two appeals filed by the convicted accused,
namely, Criminal Appeals Nos. 201 and 202 of 1969 have not
been dealt with by the High Court on merits. The appellants
12
Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010
Dr.YLR,Jtherein have a right to have those appeals heard and disposed of
by the High Court according to law.”
12. In Akalu Ahirv. Ramdeo Ram7, AIR 1973 SC 2145 at paragraph No.10
it is held as under:
“10. No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in
the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a Court of
appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its
conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a
private complainant, the High Court is entitled to re-appraise the
evidence for itself as if it is acting as a Court of appeal and then
order a re-trial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by
rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village
Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid
ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as
enunciated by this Court.”
13. In Ramesh Chandra v. A.P. Jhaveri8, at paragraph Nos.6, 7 it is held
as under:
“6. In the case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (1963) 3 SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788) this Court
mentioned the circumstances under which an order of acquittal
can be set aside in revision by the High Court and observed in this
context: “We may however indicate some cases of this kind, which
would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a
finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial
court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the
accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence
which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal
court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial
court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been
overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where
the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is
invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can
properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High
Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such
a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was
doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the
provisions of S. 439 (4).” It would follow from the above that where
an acquittal is based on the compounding of an offence and the
compounding is invalid under the law, the acquittal would be liable7
AIR 1973 SC 2145
8
AIR 1973 SC 84
13
Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010
Dr.YLR,Jto be set aside by the High Court in exercise of its revisional
powers. As the acquittal of the appellant by the trial court in the
present case was based upon the compounding of an offence
which was not compoundable, the High Court in our view rightly
set aside the acquittal of the appellant.
7. It is no doubt true that the High Court acted suo motu in
setting aside the acquittal of the appellant, but that fact would not
show that there was any irregularity in the procedure adopted by
the High Court. The opening words of Section 439 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, viz., “in the case of any proceedings the
record of which has been called for by itself or which has been
reported for orders or which otherwise comes to its knowledge”, as
observed by this Court in the case of The State of Kerala v.
Narayani Amma Kamala Devi, (1962) Supp 3 SCR 943 = (AIR
1962 SC 1530) produce the result that revisional jurisdiction can
be exercised by the High Court by being moved either by the
convicted person himself or by any other person or suo motu on
the basis of its own knowledge derived from any source
whatsoever without being moved by any person at all. All that is
necessary to bring the High Court’s powers of revision into
operation is such information as makes the High Court think that
an order made by a Subordinate Court is fit for the exercise of its
powersof revision.”
14. In Amar Chand v. Shanti Bose9, at Paragraph No.20 it is held as
under:
“20. Even assuming that the High Court was exercising
jurisdiction under Section 439, in our opinion, the present was not
a case for interference by the High Court. The Jurisdiction of the
High Court is to be exercised normally under Section 439, Criminal
Procedure Code, only in exceptional cases, when there is a
glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error of point
of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of
the justice. The High Court has not found any of these
circumstances to exist in the case before us for quashing the
charge and the further proceedings.”
15. In SatyendraNath v. Ram Narain10, at Paragraph No.16 it is held as
under:
“16. The High Court has thus transgressed the narrow limits
of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 (4) of the Code of
9
AIR 1973 SC 799
10
AIR 1975 SC 580
14
Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010
Dr.YLR,J
Criminal Procedure. The judgment of the Sessions Court did not
suffer from any manifest illegality and the interests of justice did
not require the High Court to interfere with the order of acquittal
passed by the Sessions Court. Any fair assessment of the
evidence of the eye-witnesses would show that the acquittal of the
appellants led to no miscarriage of justice.”
16. In Pathumma v. Muhammad11 at Paragraph No.6 it is held as under:
“…We are afraid, the learned Judge of the High Court,
committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence
and coming to a finding that the appellant No. 2 was not the
illegitimate child of the respondent. We have ourselves considered
the evidence on record and we agree with the learned Magistrate,
who had taken much pains in analysing the evidence, that the
appellant No. 2 was the illegitimate child of the respondent. The
High Court in its revisional jurisdiction was not justified in
substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a
question of fact.”
17. In State of Karnataka v. Appa Babu Ingale12, at Paragraph No.2 it is
held as under:
“…Ordinarily it is not open for the High Court to interfere with
the concurrent findings of the courts below specially by re-
appreciating the evidence in its revisional jurisdiction….”
18. In Jagannath Chowdhary v. Ramayan Singh13, at Paragraph Nos.10
to 13 it is held as under:
“10. While it is true and now well-settled in a long catena of
cases that exercise of power under Section 401 cannot but be
ascribed to be discretionary – this discretion, however, as is
popularly informed has to be a judicious exercise of discretion and
not an arbitrary one. Judicial discretion cannot but be a discretion
which stands “informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and
disciplined by system” – resultantly only in the event of a glaring
defect in the procedural aspect or there being a manifest error on
a point of law and thus a flagrant miscarriage of justice, exercise of
revisional jurisdiction under this statute ought not to be called for.
It is not to be lightly exercised but only in exceptional situations
where the justice delivery system requires interference for
11
AIR 1986 SC 1436
12
AIR 1993 SC 1126
13
AIR 2002 SC 2229
15
Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010
Dr.YLR,Jcorrection of a manifest illegality or prevention of a gross
miscarriage of justice. In Nosibolla: Logendranath Jha and
Chinnaswamy Reddy (supra) as also in Thakur Das (Thakur Das
(Dead) by LRs v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., 1978 (1)
SCC 27) this Court with utmost clarity and in no uncertain terms
recorded the same. It is not an appellate forum wherein scrutiny of
evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for
being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view
being otherwise possible. It is restrictive in its application though in
the event of there being a failure of justice there can said to be no
limitation as regards the applicability of the revisional power.
11. The High Court possesses a general power of
superintendence over the actions of courts subordinate to it. On its
administrative side, the power is known as the power of
superintendence. On the judicial side, it is known as the duty of
revision. The High Court can at any stage even on its own motion,
if it so desires, and certainly when illegalities or irregularities
resulting in injustice are brought to its notice call for the records
and examine them. This right of the High Court is as much a part
of the administration of justice as its duty to hear appeals and
revisions and interlocutory applications -so also its right to
exercise its powers of administrative superintendence. Though
however, the jurisdictional sweep of the process of the High Court,
however, under the provisions of Section 401 is very much
circumscribed, as noticed hereinbefore.
12. Having regard to the aforesaid, we do feel it expedient to
record that in the contextual facts presently under consideration
before this Court, the High Court cannot but be said to have
exceeded its revisional jurisdiction in setting aside the order of
acquittal.
13. In any event, writing of a fresh judgment as directed by
the Court is rather a significant departure in the normal disposal of
revisional applications. Opportunities have been given for further
argument but would that by itself tilt the scale – this aspect of the
matter has already been noticed earlier, as such we need not
dilate thereon excepting recording that an extremely significant
departure from the normal form of Court orders stands challenged
in this Court.”
19. Keeping in view of all the principles laid down in the judgments referred
supra, I shall proceed to decide this Revision Case. It was the case of the
prosecution that the de-facto complainant/P.W.1 Jyothi was given in marriage
to Respondent No.1 in the year 1999. At the time of marriage the father of
16
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Dr.YLR,J
P.W.1 gave Rs.3.50 lakhs as dowry to Respondent No.1 besides 30
sovereigns of gold in the presence of mediators and performed their marriage.
They lived happily for 6 months. Then Respondent No.1 started to harass
P.W.1 for want of additional dowry from her parents. Respondent No.1 had
illegal intimacy with another woman in his office and used to stay with her
during night times and neglected P.W.1. On questioning about the same,
Respondent No.1 used to beat her indiscriminately. P.W.1 informed the same
to Respondent No.2, who is the mother of Respondent No.1. But she also
supported her son and further instigated Respondent No.1 for additional
dowry. P.W.1 vexed on life consumed poison, but she was saved by L.W.5
Sai Krishna, who is brother of P.W.1. The father of P.W.1 by name Narayana
Rao (P.W.5) knowing about the acts of Respondent Nos.1 and 2 came along
with P.W.3 Dr.Raja Reddy and P.W.6 Kesava Reddy to the house of
Respondent No.1, held mediation with Respondent Nos.1 and 2 and pacified
the issue. But there is no change in the attitude of Respondent Nos.1 and 2.
20. On 20.12.2004 at 8-30 AM, Respondent No.1 beat P.W.1 with hands
and kicked with legs indiscriminately, and wrongfully restrained P.W.1 in the
house, bolted outside the house and went away. On hearing the cries of
P.W.1 her neighbour LW.3 intimated to LW.4 and P.W.1 was taken to the
Area Hospital, Srikalahasti tor treatment. Basing on the report of P.W.1 a case
in Cr.No.190/04 was registered by P.W.7 – M.Adinarayana, S.I. of Police,
Srikalahasti Urban PS and investigated in to. In the course of investigation
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Dr.YLR,J
Respondent Nos.1 and 2 surrendered before the Court and they were
released on bail. After receiving wound certificate of P.W.1, the charge sheet
was filed in to Court.
21. To prove the guilt of the Respondent Nos.1 & 2, the prosecution had
examined P.Ws.1 to 8 and got marked Exhibits P.1 to P.4 and Exhibits D.1 to
D.4. With regard to the allegation that Respondent No.1 had maintained illegal
intimacy with one woman working in his office and also had several illegal
contacts, except the uncorroborated version of P.W.1, those were not proved
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. In regards the second allegation
that Respondent No.1 beat P.W.1 indiscriminately and locked her in a room
and went away, her evidence is not supported by independent witnesses
cogently and convincingly; in so far as the third allegation that Respondent
Nos.1 & 2 demanded P.W.1 to bring additional dowry from her parents,
though P.Ws.1 & 2, deposed the crucial witness P.W.5, being the father of the
P.W.1, who was a retired Superintendent of Police, did not support their
statements. He categorically stated in his evidence that under the head of
dowry, he had not given any amount to Respondent Nos.1 & 2. There were
disputes between the Revisionist and the Respondent No.1 with regard to
gravity of maintenance.
22. The judgment impugned is not vitiated by manifest error of law or
procedure which had resulted in miscarriage of justice. The learned
Magistrate, having appreciated the evidence on correct perspective, not
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Dr.YLR,J
convinced with the case of the prosecution, acquitted the Respondent Nos.1 &
2 for the offences under Sections 498-A, 323, 342 read with 34 of ‘the I.P.C.,’
and acquitted them under Section 248(1) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ There was neither
misreading of the evidence, nor perverse findings nor any irregularity let alone
material irregularity.
23. For the above reasons, the Criminal Revision Case fails and is,
accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand
closed.
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Dt: 17.02.2025
Note: LR copy to be marked
B/o
VTS