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Supreme Court of India
S.N.Vijayalakshmi vs State Of Karnataka on 31 July, 2025
Author: Sudhanshu Dhulia
Bench: Sudhanshu Dhulia
2025 INSC 917
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.8626 OF 2024]
S. N. VIJAYALAKSHMI & ORS. …APPELLANTS
A1: S. N. VIJAYALAKSHMI
A2: V. S. SRIDEVI
A3: V. S. SRILEKHA
A4: K. V. KRISHNAPRASAD
VERSUS
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
R1: STATE OF KARNATAKA
R2: KEERTHIRAJ SHETTY
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
Leave granted
2. I.A. Nos.141246/2024 and 215072/2024 are allowed; exemptions
Signature Not Verified
from filing Official Translation(s) are granted. I.A. No.215071 of 2024 is
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2025.07.31
16:11:27 IST
Reason:
closed.
Page 1 of 41
3. The respondent no. 2/complainant (Keerthiraj Shetty) had filed
Private Complaint Report No.12357/2022 dated 20.07.2022 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘PCR’), under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CrPC’) before the learned III rd
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘ACMM’). The PCR was referred to the Sanjay Nagar Police Station
for investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC vide Order dated
21.07.2023. After the referral order, First Information Report bearing Crime
No.260/2023 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FIR’) came to be registered on
05.10.2023 against the four appellants and the other accused 1 for offences
punishable under Sections 405, 406, 415, 417, 418, 420, 504, 506, 384 and
120B read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘IPC’).
4. The present appeal impugns the Final Judgment and Order dated
03.06.2024 in Criminal Petition No.12452 of 2023 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Impugned Judgment’) passed by a learned Single Judge of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’),
whereby the appellants’ petition seeking quashing of the FIR was
dismissed.
1
Reference to the accused in this judgment is as per their position in the FIR
Page 2 of 41
FACTUAL SETTING:
5. The case has a chequered history and it would be necessary to
advert, in some detail, to the relevant factual backdrop amidst which the FIR
came to be lodged, as can be culled out from the Impugned Judgment and
pleadings. The complainant has alleged that the accused no.1-K. V.
Jayalakshmamma (in some cases/records, this is spelt as
‘Jayalakshmamma’ but reference is to the one and same person) along with
K. V. Srinivasa Murthy and K. V. Prabhakar (these three have passed away
– the accused appellants are their family members) were joint owners of the
properties in Sy. No.20 measuring 3 acres 33 guntas and in Sy. No.21 to an
extent of 2 acres 32 guntas in Bhoopasandra Village, Bangalore North Taluk
(these properties are hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘subject
property’). One D. Muniswamy executed Sale Deed dated 19.10.1967 in
respect of the said land of Sy. No.20 to one Lakshminarasimhaiah, who
purchased the same in trust for K. V. Shrinivas Murthy and K. V. Prabhakar.
Later, K. V. Shrinivas Murthy and K. V. Prabhakar filed a suit viz. O. S.
No.907/1975 for declaration and permanent injunction against the said
Lakshminarasimhaiah. The said suit came to be decreed on
28.11.1975/19.02.1976. In respect of Sy. No.21 land, occupancy rights for 3
Page 3 of 41
acres in Bhoopasandra Village was conferred vide Order dated 22.06.1994
in proceedings being LRF-924, 941 of 1974-1975 by the Land Tribunal.
Accordingly, Form No.10 was issued in favour of K. V. Jayalakshmamma
and K. V. Shrinivas Murthy.
6. Meanwhile, the Bangalore Development Authority (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘BDA’) came into the picture. The BDA was set up by an
Act of the Karnataka State Legislature on 06.01.1976. It sought to acquire
the subject property and Preliminary Notification dated 19.01.1978 and Final
Notification dated 28.12.1982 was issued. Pursuant to the acquisition, the
lands in the subject property were allotted to other persons. In 1988, there
was a dispute as to the ownership of the subject property between Syed
Bashid and others on one side and K. V. Jayalakshmamma along with K. V.
Srinivasa Murthy and K. V. Prabhakar on the other side. The subject
property was in the possession of Syed Bashid. Later, the Government de-
notified the subject property by Notification dated 27.08.1992. Since the
BDA had already allotted the sites, the allottees filed Writ Petitions
No.37719-25/1992, 3216-17/1993, 11001/1993, 23205/1993, 32221/1993,
15718/1996 and 2154/1996 challenging the de-notification before the High
Court. During the pendency of these petitions in the High Court, both parties
Page 4 of 41
referred above, entered into a Mutual Agreement dated 06.09.1996, which
was arbitrated by Ravishankara Shetty. The possession of the subject
property was purportedly handed over to Ravishankara Shetty and, it is
claimed, he has been in possession since then. Thereafter, the writ petitions
filed by the allottees came to be allowed and the order of de-notification
came to be quashed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court vide Order
dated 23.09.1996. It is around then that the accused sought the help of
Ravishankara Shetty to fight the litigations on the pretext that once the title
becomes marketable, they would sell the subject property to him. The order
of the learned Single Judge dated 23.09.1996 in the writ petitions adverted
to above was sought to be reviewed by filing Writ Petitions No.9517/1999
and 10875-92/1999 which were dismissed by another learned Single Judge
on 03.12.2001. The Order dated 03.12.2001 was subjected to an intra-Court
challenge in Writ Appeals No.679/2002 and 3479-96/2002 connected with
680/2002 and 3497-3514/2002, which were dismissed by a learned Division
Bench on 26.03.2004. Civil Appeal No.6220/2009, with analogous cases,
filed before this Court, emanating from the Writ Appeals, were finally
dismissed on 18.11.2015. It is the complainant’s case that based on the
false assurances by the accused, Ravishankara Shetty spent a lot of time,
Page 5 of 41
money and energy fighting the litigation(s) and on his insistence, and after
much reluctance, the accused agreed to enter into an Agreement to Sell
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘ATS’). Ravishankara Shetty permitted his
nominee (the complainant) to enter into the ATS on his behalf.
7. Accordingly, on 30.11.2015, the accused executed an ATS with the
complainant for a sale consideration of Rs.3,50,00,000/- (Rupees Three
Crores Fifty Lakhs) in respect of the subject property. All the accused
signed the ATS and K. V. Krishna Prasad (appellant no.4) signed as a
consenting witness. On even date, the accused also executed a General
Power of Attorney (hereinafter referred to as ‘GPA’) in favour of the
complainant, which included the power to sell the subject property. Further,
it is alleged that appellant no.4 requested the complainant not to include a
time-stipulation clause in the ATS as they were not aware when they would
get the alienable title to the subject property. A sum of Rs.2,00,000/-
(Rupees Two Lakhs) was paid to the appellant no.4 with the consent of the
other accused.
[
8. Writ Petitions No.53124-53126/2015 were filed by K. V.
Jayalakshmamma, seeking to declare the land acquisition as lapsed in
respect of the subject property as the BDA had failed to implement the
Page 6 of 41
concerned scheme. The said writ petitions came to be allowed by a learned
Single Judge of the High Court vide Order dated 05.02.2016. The
subsequent appeals bearing Writ Appeals No.547-548 and 1483/2016 filed
by BDA were dismissed as withdrawn vide Order dated 07.06.2016. The
allottees of the sites had also filed Writ Appeals No.550-551/2016 and
611/2016, which were disposed of by Order dated 05.12.2016, with liberty to
initiate independent proceedings before the BDA. Thereafter, a
Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as ‘MoU’) dated
10.12.2016 was entered into between one M/s Legacy Global Realty i.e.,
developers with the family of the accused i.e., the appellants and a sum of
Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores) was paid into the account of K.V.
Prabhakar, who in turn remitted a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One
Crore) into the account of appellant no.4 for himself and the rest of the
accused, who are his family members.
9. On 22.04.2020, the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore City issued a
conversion order in respect of the subject property. After the title of the
subject property became marketable, the complainant went to the accused
for making further payment, but the accused refused to honour the ATS. On
12.05.2022, the complainant approached appellant no.4, who extended
Page 7 of 41
death threats to him. Aggrieved, the complainant lodged a complaint by
approaching the jurisdictional Sanjay Nagar police, who issued an
acknowledgment but refused to register an FIR. On 06.06.2022, the
complainant learnt that the accused had revoked the GPA executed by
them in his favour. The complainant issued Legal Notice dated 14.06.2022
to execute the Sale Deed and calling upon the accused to receive the
balance sale consideration of Rs.1,48,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Forty-
Eight Lakhs). The appellants no.1-3 along with accused no.3 executed a
registered Release Deed dated 27.06.2022 in favour of accused no.1 with
regard to the subject property. On the same day, accused no.1 executed a
GPA in favour of the appellant no.4. Subsequently, vide a registered Gift
Deed dated 12.07.2022, accused no.1 conveyed the subject property in
favour of appellant no.4. Pursuant to this, the complainant filed PCR
No.12357/2022 on 20.07.2022 with the ACMM, setting up the case that he
had invested a huge sum of money, but the accused with a clear intention
had cheated him.
[
10. On 22.07.2022, the complainant filed O.S. No.4780/2022 against the
appellants before the learned Principal City Civil Judge at Bengaluru City
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Civil Court’) seeking to declare the Release
Page 8 of 41
Deed and GPA dated 27.06.2022 as not binding and for directing the
defendants therein to perform their part of the ATS. This suit is still pending
adjudication. Meanwhile, on 19.12.2022, the complainant approached the
Deputy Commissioner of Police by filing a complaint under Section 154(3) of
the CrPC. Subsequently, on 21.07.2023, the ACMM referred the complaint
to the Sanjay Nagar Police Station, which registered the FIR. Aggrieved by
the registration of the FIR, the appellants who are accused nos.2, 4, 5, and
6 in the complaint, approached the High Court by filing Criminal Petition
No.12452/2023 under Section 482 of the CrPC praying to quash the FIR,
which has been rejected by way of the Impugned Judgment.
APPELLANTS’ SUBMISSIONS:
11. At the outset, learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted
that this Court in Priyanka Srivastava v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6
SCC 287 mandated following of a certain procedure before invoking the
provisions of Section 200 of the CrPC However, in the present matter, the
complainant did not comply with the requirements as provided under
Section 154(1) and Section 154(3) of the CrPC, and the Impugned
Judgment erred in observing that the said was a curable defect.
Page 9 of 41
12. On merits, it was submitted that the essential ingredients of Sections
415 and 420 of the IPC are conspicuously absent in the FIR. There is no
mention of any inducement by the appellants of the complainant from the
inception nor of any dishonest intention at the time of making of the promise
in question. Reliance was placed on Onkar Nath Mishra v State of NCT
Delhi, (2008) 2 SCC 561 to argue that the essential ingredients of Section
406 of the IPC pertaining to criminal breach of trust i.e., entrustment,
misappropriation, conversion etc. are completely missing from the FIR.
Thus, the sine qua non for maintaining an FIR under the said provisions of
the IPC is missing and the FIR ought to be quashed on this count alone.
13. In contrast, it was pointed out, it is alleged in the FIR by the
complainant himself that ‘after the increase in the market value of the said
property, the accused started cheating the complainant.’ Thus, the
complainant’s own statement militates against any claim of inducement at
the inception or harbouring of a dishonest intention at the time of making the
promise. This statement by itself, it was urged, is fatal to any FIR alleging
cheating.
Page 10 of 41
14. Learned senior counsel relied on the decision in Delhi Race Club
(1940) Limited v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC Online SC 2248 and
argued that it is now settled law that an FIR cannot be maintained under
both Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC as the ingredients of both Sections
are mutually exclusive and cannot co-exist.
15. Reference was made to the decision in G Sagar Suri v State of
Uttar Pradesh, (2000) 2 SCC 636 to contend that the dispute inter-se the
parties is purely of a civil nature, which is maliciously being given a colour of
criminality and the averments in the FIR do not constitute any offence
whatsoever. Further, the averments are substantially the very basis for the
reliefs claimed in the pending civil suit.
16. It was pointed out by the learned senior counsel that in terms of the
ATS, the complainant was required to resolve problems/litigations
concerning the title of the subject property, ensuring it became saleable
within three months of the resolution of litigation. Clearances were obtained
in the year 2016 following the filing of writ petitions related to the acquisition
of the subject property by the BDA. However, no further action occurred nor
were any steps taken for several years thereafter.
Page 11 of 41
17. Therefore, in 2022, the appellants were constrained to take protective
steps like relinquishing the property to their mother-in-law etc., only after
issuing prior Legal Notice to the complainant dated 06.06.2022 and a Public
Notice as well. The Power of Attorney executed in the complainant’s favour
was cancelled only after duly intimating him.
18. It was submitted that the High Court primarily focused on the law
relating to registration of FIRs and private complaints, with no discussion on
whether the ingredients of the alleged offences were made out and there
was absolutely no inquiry on the absence of essential ingredients of the
Sections invoked in the FIR.
19. It was further submitted that a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two
Crores) was paid to one K. V. Prabhakar, who has since passed away,
through a separate MoU executed by a different entity, namely, M/s Legacy
Global Realty. Consequently, funds were never received by the appellants.
The MoU was only restricted to the development of the subject property.
20. Learned senior counsel contended that the statements recorded in
favour of the complainant is of Mrs. Achalavidya, daughter of Late K. V.
Prabhakar, with whom the complainant had entered into a compromise in
Page 12 of 41
the civil suit filed by them. The said compromise has been rejected by the
Civil Court. These two facts establish that the statement of P. Nagalakshmi
(Defendant No.6) and Mrs. Achalavidya (Defendant No.7) cannot be given
any credence since they are not independent, and are evidently siding with
the complainant against the appellants.
21. Learned senior counsel relied on V P Shrivastava v Indian
Explosives Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 361 to argue that it is settled law that
subsequent failure to not honour a promise cannot form basis of initiating
criminal actions alleging cheating or criminal breach of trust. On the basis of
these submissions, learned counsel submitted that the High Court has erred
in not quashing the FIR. It was advanced that the appeal be allowed and the
FIR be quashed by this Court.
RESPONDENT NO.2-COMPLAINANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
22. At the outset, learned senior counsel for the respondent no.2-
complainant submitted that it is well-settled that at the stage of an FIR, the
Court does not interfere if the complaint on the face of it discloses the
commission of offences, as alleged. At this stage, only the complaint has to
be looked into and nothing else. The High Court has, therefore, rightly
Page 13 of 41
declined to interfere and this Court, under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’), ought not interfere
now. Reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Neeharika
Infrastructure Private Ltd. v State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401
and Siddharth Mukesh Bhandari v State of Gujarat, (2022) 10 SCC 525.
23. It was submitted that during the pendency of the complaint with the
ACMM, in order to comply with the requirement of law laid down in
Priyanka Srivastava (supra), the complainant also filed a complaint before
the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru on 19.12.2022. The
complainant filed an affidavit before the ACMM on 12.01.2023. After
compliance of the mandate of law, the ACMM, acting under Section 156(3)
of the CrPC, referred the case to the jurisdictional police to register FIR,
conduct investigation and submit report. It was reiterated that the affidavit as
per Priyanka Srivastava (supra) was filed before the referral order by the
ACMM was passed.
24. It was submitted that the ATS was arrived at between the parties on
account of the fact that the vendors had realised that they had lost their land
in the acquisition proceedings. The consideration for sale was fixed at
Rs.3,50,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores and Fifty Lakhs), out of which
Page 14 of 41
Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) in cash was paid immediately and the
balance sale consideration was payable on the execution and registration of
the deed of conveyance. Along with the ATS, the accused/vendors
executed GPA dated 30.11.2015 acknowledging the execution of the ATS
and conferring upon the complainant all powers, including the power to sell
the subject property. All these facts are evident from the provisions of the
ATS.
25. It was submitted that it is an admitted position that the complainant
took diverse steps over a long period of time to make the land saleable.
Learned senior counsel took us through the steps so taken in this regard
and submitted that the title of the subject property is still not clear as Writ
Petitions No.16093/2021 [Smt K V Jayalakshamma and Anr. v The
Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike and Ors.] and 16179/2020 [Smt K
V Jayalakshamma and Anr. v The Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike
and Ors.] are still pending before the High Court, on account of resistance
by the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (hereinafter referred to as the
‘BBMP’) to Katha registration. It was further submitted that time was clearly
not the essence of the ATS and therefore the stage has yet not been
reached to execute the Sale Deed.
Page 15 of 41
26. The appellants, being clearly aware of this position, decided to
defraud and cheat the Complainant by first cancelling the GPA followed by
execution of release deed dated 27.06.2022 by Accused Nos.2 to 5 in
favour of Accused No.1, coupled with execution of GPA in favour of
Accused No.6-K. V. Krishna Prasad by Accused No.1 on 27.06.2022 and
execution of Gift deeds on 12.07.2022 in favour of Mr. K. V. Krishnaprasad
by Jayalakshmamma. All these actions have been taken with a view to
cheat the complainant of his valuable right to the property in question and
misappropriate the said property which was categorically promised to be
sold to the complainant.
27. It was submitted that all these facts need to be investigated by the
police and therefore the ACMM has rightly passed the order for investigation
which was completed and subsequently Chargesheet dated 28.08.2024 has
been filed and cognizance taken on 30.08.2024.
28. Moreover, it was contended that the accused first received Rs.
2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) and subsequently received
Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores) through the complainant’s efforts
Page 16 of 41
from M/s Legacy Global Realty. This fact has been corroborated by the
manager Shri Sanjay C. of M/s Legacy Global Realty, the statement of Smt.
P. Nagalakshmi w/o Mr. K. V. Prabhakar and the statement of Achalavidya
D/o of Mr. K. V. Prabhakar.
29. On the basis of the above, it was submitted that this is not a fit case
for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution, as the appellants
neither have a case on merits nor does the law support them. Prayer was
made to dismiss the appeal. It was thereafter submitted that in case this
Court was inclined to allow the appeal, in the interest of justice and equity, it
would be necessary to prevent the appellants from creating third-party rights
with respect to the subject property. Hence, alternative prayer was made to
direct the appellants not to create third-party rights in respect of the subject
property.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
30. Learned counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted that offences
under Sections 406, 420, 120B, 34 of the IPC are made out against the
appellants based on the evidence collected during investigation. In this
Page 17 of 41
regard, attention was drawn to the fact that the Chargesheet was filed on
28.08.2024 before the ACMM and cognizance thereupon has been taken on
30.08.2024.
31. It was found during investigation that the appellants had dishonest
intention from the inception and that they never intended to honour the
agreement. In this regard, R. M. Chandran, a witness to the ATS and GPA
dated 30.11.2015, has stated that the accused had no intention of
honouring the agreement and that the accused induced Ravishankara
Shetty and the complainant to enter into the ATS only with the intention of
taking their help to clear the pending litigation. Further, Nagalakshmi and
Achalavidya, wife and daughter of Late Mr. K. V. Prabhakar, respectively
who was one of the executants of the ATS and the GPA, have given a
statement about the execution of the ATS and the GPA on 30.11.2015 and
receipt of sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores) and Rs.2,00,000/-
(Rupees Two Lakhs). Hence, the execution of the ATS and GPA dated
30.11.2015 is clearly established by the said statements.
32. It was submitted that investigation revealed that the complainant has
been fraudulently and dishonestly induced to enter in to the ATS and has
Page 18 of 41
been deceived. It was urged that there is sufficient material on record to
proceed against all the appellants. In these circumstances, prayer was
made to dismiss the appeal.
ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
33. Having heard learned senior counsel for the parties and after going
through the material on record, the issue that emerges is as to whether the
criminal case against the appellants should proceed. This has to be
examined from two angles. Firstly, as to whether any criminal offence in the
background of the factual position is made out to justify criminal
proceedings against the appellants? Secondly, whether on the same cause
of action, based on the afore-noted facts, both civil and criminal proceedings
can simultaneously go on?
34. On the first question, the admitted position is that the appellants have
title over the subject property. They are said to have entered into an ATS
with the complainant, who was himself the nominee of one Ravishankara
Shetty. The ATS stipulated that the complainant’s side would help to get the
legal issues which had cropped up with regard to the ownership of the
subject property resolved in favour of the appellants and upon the same
Page 19 of 41
being done, the appellants agreed to sell the subject property to the
complainant for a total consideration of Rs.3,50,00,000/- (Rupees Three
Crores Fifty Lakhs). The ATS was entered on 30.11.2015. Pursuant thereto,
the appellants also executed a GPA in favour of the complainant on the
same day, which authorised him to take all necessary steps for getting the
title of the appellants clear and marketable and also for selling the property
on their behalf. Writ Petitions No.53124-53126/2015 were filed by
Jayalakshmamma, through the GPA-holder, seeking to declare the land
acquisition as lapsed in respect of the subject property, contending that the
BDA failed to implement the concerned scheme. These writ petitions were
allowed in the favour of the appellants by the learned Single Judge on
05.02.2016. Though, the same was challenged by BDA, the writ appeal(s)
was later on withdrawn. The appeals filed by the allottees were also
disposed of with liberty to initiate proceedings before the BDA. After all this,
the appellants are said to have taken Rs.2,02,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores
Two Lakhs) from one M/s Legacy Global Realty for transferring the subject
property. Thereafter, the accused revoked the GPA executed in favour of
the complainant and executed another GPA and registered Gift Deed by
which the subject property was conveyed in favour of appellant no.4. This
Page 20 of 41
prompted the complainant to institute a civil suit to declare the subsequent
GPA and Release Deed as not binding and also seeking specific
performance of the ATS, taking the stand that he proposed to pay the
remaining Rs.1,48,00,000 (Rupees One Crore Forty-Eight Lakhs) which the
appellants refused and were also not ready to transfer the subject property.
The complainant, having filed the civil suit, soon thereafter filed the FIR.
Chargesheet stands submitted and cognizance has been taken. Challenge
to the same having failed before the High Court, the Impugned Judgment is
under challenge before us.
35. In this background, the Court needs to consider as to whether the
accusations of criminal nature levelled in the FIR are sustainable to permit
the continuance of the criminal proceedings or not. Cognizance has finally
been taken under Sections 120B, 406 and 420 of the IPC. For convenience,
the said provisions are reproduced hereinbelow:
‘120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.- (1) Whoever is a
party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable
with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a
term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision
is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be
punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a
criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as
aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of eitherPage 21 of 41
description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or
with both.
xxx
406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.- Whoever
commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to three years, or with fine, or with both.
xxx
420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of
property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the
person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable
security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is
capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.’
36. It would be useful, in addition, to set out the relevant definitional
Sections from the IPC:
‘120-A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.—When two or more
persons agree to do, or cause to be done,—
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an
agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an
offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act
besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such
agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation.—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the
ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that
object.
xxx
405. Criminal breach of trust.—Whoever, being in any manner
entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property,
dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that
property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property inPage 22 of 41
violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which
such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express
or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such
trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits
“criminal breach of trust”.
Explanation 1.—A person, being an employer of an
establishment whether exempted under Section 17 of
the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions
Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or not] who deducts the employee’s
contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to
a Provident Fund or Family Pension Fund established by any law
for the time being in force, shall be deemed to have been
entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him
and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to
the said fund in violation of the said law, shall be deemed to have
dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in violation
of a direction of law as aforesaid.
Explanation 2.—A person, being an employer, who deducts the
employees’ contribution from the wages payable to the employee
for credit to the Employees’ State Insurance Fund held and
administered by the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation
established under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34
of 1948), shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the
amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he makes
default in the payment of such contribution to the said Fund in
violation of the said Act, shall be deemed to have dishonestly
used the amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction
of law as aforesaid.
Illustrations
(a) A, being executor to the will of a deceased person,
dishonestly disobeys the law which directs him to divide the
effects according to the will, and appropriates them to his own
use. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
(b) A is a warehouse-keeper. Z, going on a journey, entrusts his
furniture to A, under a contract that it shall be returned on
payment of a stipulated sum for warehouse room. A dishonestly
sells the goods. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
Page 23 of 41
(c) A, residing in Calcutta, is agent for Z, residing at Delhi. There
is an express or implied contract between A and Z, that all sums
remitted by Z to A shall be invested by A, according to Z’s
direction. Z remits a lakh of rupees to A, with directions to A to
invest the same in Company’s paper. A dishonestly disobeys the
directions and employs the money in his own business. A has
committed criminal breach of trust.
(d) But if A, in the last illustration, not dishonestly but in good
faith, believing that it will be more for Z’s advantage to hold
shares in the Bank of Bengal, disobeys Z’s directions, and buys
shares in the Bank of Bengal, for Z, instead of buying Company’s
paper, here, though Z should suffer loss, and should be entitled
to bring a civil action against A, on account of that loss, yet A, not
having acted dishonestly, has not committed criminal breach of
trust.
(e) A, a revenue officer, is entrusted with public money and is
either directed by law, or bound by a contract, express or
implied, with the Government, to pay into a certain treasury all
the public money which he holds. A dishonestly appropriates the
money. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
(f) A, a carrier, is entrusted by Z with property to be carried by
land or by water. A dishonestly misappropriates the
property. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
xxx
415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently
or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any
property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain
any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to
do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he
were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind,
reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.
Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception
within the meaning of this section.
Illustrations
Page 24 of 41
(a) A, by falsely pretending to be in the Civil Service, intentionally
deceives Z, and thus dishonestly induces Z to let him have on
credit goods for which he does not mean to pay. A cheats.
(b) A, by putting a counterfeit mark on an article, intentionally
deceives Z into a belief that this article was made by a certain
celebrated manufacturer, and thus dishonestly induces Z to buy
and pay for the article. A cheats.
(c) A, by exhibiting to Z a false sample of an article, intentionally
deceives Z into believing that the article corresponds with the
sample, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to buy and pay for
the article. A cheats.
(d) A, by tendering in payment for an article a bill on a house with
which A keeps no money, and by which A expects that the bill
will be dishonoured, intentionally deceives Z, and thereby
dishonestly induces Z to deliver the article, intending not to pay
for it. A cheats.
(e) A, by pledging as diamonds articles which he knows are not
diamonds, intentionally deceives Z, and thereby dishonestly
induces Z to lend money. A cheats.
(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay
any money that Z may lend to him and thereby dishonestly
induces Z to lend him money, A not intending to repay
it. A cheats.
(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to deliver
to Z a certain quantity of indigo plant which he does not intend to
deliver, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to advance money
upon the faith of such delivery, A cheats; but if A, at the time of
obtaining the money, intends to deliver the indigo plant, and
afterwards breaks his contract and does not deliver it, he does
not cheat, but is liable only to a civil action for breach of contract.
(h) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A has
performed A’s part of a contract made with Z, which he has not
performed, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to pay
money. A cheats.
(i) A sells and conveys an estate to B. A, knowing that in
consequence of such sale he has no right to the property, sells
or mortgages the same to Z, without disclosing the fact of the
Page 25 of 41
previous sale and conveyance to B, and receives the purchase
or mortgage money from Z. A cheats.’
37. Purely from a legal lens, it is now settled that the same person
cannot be simultaneously charged for offences punishable under Sections
406 and 420 of the IPC with regard to one particular transaction, as per the
decision rendered in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited (supra). In this
regard, reference may also be made to a subsequent decision by us in V D
Raveesha v State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 1060 (penned by Ahsanuddin
Amanullah, J.), which noticed the exposition in Delhi Race Club (1940)
Limited (supra). In V D Raveesha (supra), the distinction between Sections
406 and 420 of the IPC was duly taken note of, but charges under Sections
406 and 420 of the IPC against the same person were upheld, not being
part of a single transaction and committed against different persons. The
relevant passage from V D Raveesha (supra) reads thus:
‘21. Though, having regard to the afore-enumerated position of
law, on an overall conspectus of the factual aspects juxtaposed
with the evidence on record, as regards fulfilment of the
ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC, at first sight, it
may appear that the petitioner cannot be convicted both under
Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC, but, in the present case, on a
proper consideration of the issue in its entirety, there is a fine
distinction inasmuch as, there are two different persons against
whom the petitioner has committed the respective offences
under the Sections supra: first, the Company and second,Page 26 of 41
Mallikarjuna (PW4 and husband of purchaser Savithramma).
Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
evidently the petitioner is guilty of offence committed against the
Company punishable under Section 406 of the IPC and also, of
offence committed against Mallikarjuna (PW4 and husband of
purchaser Savithramma) punishable under Section 420 of the
IPC.’
(emphasis supplied)
38. Section 406 deals with punishment for criminal breach of trust, which
itself has been defined under Section 405 of the IPC. Section 420 of the IPC
deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, the
substantive offence of cheating has been defined in Section 415 of the IPC.
We now apply the ingredients to the factual position.
39. From a bare reading of Section 405 of the IPC, criminal breach of
trust would arise only in a situation where the accused in any manner has
been entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property and
dishonestly misappropriates or converts the same to his own use, or
dishonestly uses or disposes of that property. Here, it is not a case where
the accused were entrusted with the subject property. The subject property
belongs to them and they had rights over it as owners with title. Thus, the
very foundation for invoking Section 406 of the IPC falls to the ground.
Page 27 of 41
40. Coming to Section 415 of the IPC, it is required that the person
charged, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces him
to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall
retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or
not to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived,
and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to
that person in body, mind, reputation or property. In the present case, we do
not find that by deceiving the complainant, the appellants had fraudulently or
dishonestly induced him to deliver the property to them or to any other
person or to consent that any person shall retain any property or
intentionally induced the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything
which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. From the case set
up by the complainant himself, as averred, the ATS was entered into
between the appellants and the complainant on 30.11.2015. However, the
subject property is said to have been handed over to Ravishankara Shetty
on 06.09.1996. Thus, if the same was correct, then there is no explanation
as to why possession of the subject property, being prime land, would be
handed over to any other person without any other agreement or safeguard,
for if the version of the complainant is to be taken as correct, then it appears
Page 28 of 41
that Ravishankara Shetty got possession of the subject property way back
on 06.09.1996, but the ATS with the complainant, albeit as a nominee of
Ravishankara Shetty, was only executed much later on 30.11.2015.
However, on a reading of the recitals in the ATS, it is seen that possession
was with the appellants and in fact, Clause 6 of the ATS concerning
possession, it has been postulated that possession of the subject property
would be handed over in ready condition upon execution of the Sale Deed
by the vendors. This version of events, put forth by the complainant, falsifies
the claim of Ravishankara Shetty to have taken over possession of the
subject property on 06.09.1996, for the simple reason that he himself is a
witness cited in the FIR filed at the instance of the complainant. Thus, when
from the own pleadings of the complainant, it emerges that possession of
the subject property was never given to the complainant and rather,
stipulation was made for such possession being handed over after
execution of Sale Deed, Section 420 of the IPC would not be attracted,
regard being had to the definition in Section 415 of the IPC.
41. Thus, we do not find any criminal aspect in the allegations ex-facie.
Moreover, be it noted, the complainant has filed a civil suit for reliefs already
enumerated above.
Page 29 of 41
42. Coming to the second question i.e., whether civil and criminal
proceedings both can be maintained on the very same set of allegations
qua the same person(s), the answer stricto sensu, is that there is no bar to
simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings. If the element of criminality is
there, a civil case can co-exist with a criminal case on the same facts. The
fact that a civil remedy has already been availed of by a complainant, ipso
facto, is not sufficient ground to quash an FIR, as pointed out, inter alia, in P
Swaroopa Rani v M Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765 and Syed Aksari
Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v State (Delhi Admn.), (2009) 5 SCC 528. The
obvious caveat being that the allegations, even if having a civil flavour to
them, must prima facie disclose an overwhelming element of criminality. In
the absence of the element of criminality, if both civil and criminal cases are
allowed to continue, it will definitely amount to abuse of the process of the
Court, which the Courts have always tried to prevent by putting a stop to
any such criminal proceeding, where civil proceedings have already been
instituted with regard to the same issue, and the element of criminality is
absent. If such element is absent, the prosecution in question would have to
be quashed. In this connection, Paramjeet Batra v State of Uttarakhand,
(2013) 11 SCC 673 can be referred to:
Page 30 of 41
‘12. … Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not
depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether
essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to
be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil
transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court
must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature
is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil
remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in
this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the
criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.’
(emphasis supplied)
43. In Usha Chakraborty v State of West Bengal, (2023) 15 SCC 135,
while quashing the FIR therein and further proceedings based thereon, it
was observed ‘…the factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as
also the purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing but the aforesaid
incident and further that the dispute involved is essentially of civil nature.’
44. A further contention urged by the appellants is that the procedure laid
down in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) has not been followed by the
complainant before filing the PCR. As per the guidelines prescribed in
Priyanka Srivastava (supra), any person aggrieved by non-registration of
an FIR by the police is required to approach the concerned Superintendent
of Police and on his failure to take action, can move before the Magistrate
concerned under Section 200 of the CrPC by filing a private complaint. In
Page 31 of 41
this case, the complainant approached the police on 12.05.2022 which
refused to register an FIR. Thereafter, the complainant approached the
ACMM by filing the PCR on 20.07.2022, and while such private complaint
was pending on the file of the ACMM, the complainant approached the
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bangalore City. On nothing being done
even then, faced with such inaction, the complainant finally filed the
requisite affidavit before the ACMM. Subsequently on 21.07.2023, the
ACMM referred the PCR to the police, culminating into the underlying FIR.
45. The High Court has taken a view that this is a curable defect since
before the referral order on the PCR by the ACMM for registering an FIR
under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, the required formalities were done. In our
considered opinion, this approach cannot be labelled erroneous. The
requirement under Priyanka Srivastava (supra) is to safeguard the rights of
the citizenry and to put a stop to unjust criminal action and filing of vexatious
applications to settle personal scores. Thus, such requirement could not be
said to be a mere formality. One of us (Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.) as a Single
Judge of the Uttarakhand High Court, in Sachin Chamoli v State of
Uttarakhand, 2016 (3) NCC 68, where no affidavit had been filed, held that
filing of affidavit was a mandatory requirement as per Priyanka Srivastava
Page 32 of 41
(supra). In Babu Venkatesh v State of Karnataka, (2022) 5 SCC 639, this
Court held that the Magistrate concerned should not have entertained the
complaint/application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC therein, as it was
not supported by an affidavit. In the case at hand, before the ACMM passed
the referral order, the complaint was backed by an affidavit. In Ramesh
Kumar Bung v State of Telangana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 264, the Court,
while stating that the directions in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) are
mandatory, declined to interfere with the order(s) impugned therein, but
noted that the informant had filed the affidavit belatedly. To complete the
discussion on this aspect of the law, we may also refer to our judgment in
Kanishk Sinha v State of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 443 where,
speaking through Sudhanshu Dhulia, J., this Court upheld an order of the
Calcutta High Court, to the effect that the direction in Priyanka Srivastava
(supra) to file the affidavit, was prospective in nature. Therefore, if after the
filing of the complaint/application but before any order thereon is passed,
such requirement is allowed to be fulfilled/complied with by the complainant,
it would not, in our view, run counter to the law exposited in Priyanka
Srivastava (supra). We sum up our conclusions on this score as follows: (i)
Directions issued in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) are mandatory; (ii)
Page 33 of 41
Guidelines laid down in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) operate prospectively;
(iii) Non-filing of the supporting affidavit is a curable defect, but must be
cured before the Magistrate passes any substantive order on the
complaint/application, and; (iv) If the Magistrate proceeds without the
requisite affidavit, such order/any consequential orders/proceedings can be
quashed on the sole ground of non-compliance with Priyanka Srivastava
(supra).
46. In the above view, the Impugned Judgment does not militate against
the law laid down in Priyanka Srivastava (supra). That said, and as
reasoned above, our interference with the Impugned Judgment is
necessitated as the ingredients of offences apropos which cognizance was
taken by the ACMM are not made out. The dicta in State of Haryana v
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Vesa Holdings Private Limited v
State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, and; Gulam Mustafa v State of
Karnataka, (2023) 18 SCC 265 also impel this Court to intervene.
47. Accordingly, for the reasons aforesaid, FIR Crime No.260/2023 along
with all consequential orders including the Chargesheet dated 28.08.2024
and the cognizance order dated 30.08.2024 stand quashed qua the
appellants.
Page 34 of 41
48. It is required to be clarified that though co-accused Vidyasree V. S.,
the daughter of appellant no.1 is not in appeal, for reasons unbeknownst to
us, yet, as all the accused stand on the same footing and we have already
quashed the proceedings against the appellants, in the interest of justice,
the benefit of the quashing supra will enure to the benefit of Vidyasree V. S.
also. Parity would so demand, in the facts and circumstances, as also to
serve the cause of justice. In Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, (2003) 11
SCC 241 and Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v State of Gujarat, (2023) 9
SCC 164, this Court exercised suo motu powers to deliver justice to affected
parties not before it. In like circumstances, albeit in jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the CrPC, one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), as a Single
Judge of the Patna High Court, quashed criminal proceedings of a co-
accused not before the Court as the facts of the case against that accused
and the one before the Court were identical, in Baidyanath Mishra v State
of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 662.
49. The appeal is allowed. Costs made easy.
50. Though the Court has allowed the present appeal but the judicial
conscience of the Court is ill at ease, inasmuch as from the entire story
Page 35 of 41
emerging, it appears that the interest of the common citizens, especially of
Bengaluru, has been compromised due to various extraneous
considerations, including by acts of omission and commission by statutory
bodies.
51. The subject property is said to have been acquired by issuing the
Notification by the BDA, which process was initiated in the year 1978 and
culminated in issuance of the final Notification in the year 1982. After that,
there is no allegation from any quarter that no compensation was paid for
the land acquired and thus, it is deemed that the same was paid over to and
received by the appellants/their predecessors-in-interest. This presumption
is also fortified by the fact that the acquisition in the year 1978/1982 was, for
the first time, challenged by and/or on behalf of the appellants only in the
year 2015 before the High Court, that is after a gap of about 33 years. In the
meantime, certain developments took place, which are required to be taken
note of. BDA, after acquisition, had allotted the lands (out of the subject
property) in favour of various persons. However, it appears that in the year
1992 i.e., after 10 years of the acquisition proceedings having been
completed, the BDA de-notified the acquisition, which was challenged by
the concerned beneficiaries/allottees before the High Court, to whom lands
Page 36 of 41
from the subject property were allotted. The challenge was allowed by a
learned Single Judge and the de-notification by the BDA was quashed. The
matter travelled up to this Court, which dismissed the appeal on 18.11.2015
and the order of the learned Single Judge was upheld. Thus, the matter
attained finality.
52. It is vital to record that all this happened prior to the appellants/their
representatives moving the High Court for declaring acquisition of the
subject property as lapsed. Thus, the presumption operative would be that
all legal formalities required, had been considered in the earlier round of
litigation, and reached conclusion. The writ petition(s) filed by the appellants
was allowed and the acquisition was declared as lapsed in respect of the
subject property. This is where things take an interesting turn. The BDA
surprisingly (nay, shockingly) having filed intra-court appeal(s) against the
order, withdrew the same later. Though many issues were argued before
us, but for the present, we refrain from delving into the same and restrict
ourselves only to the admitted position.
53. It is further noted that in the writ proceedings before the learned
Single Judge, a purchaser of a site in Sy. No.20 (part of the subject
property) from an allottee had filed an application for
Page 37 of 41
intervention/impleadment and prayed for time to bring on record relevant
facts, but the High Court did not afford any such opportunity. This was the
first phase where, in our view, a miscarriage of justice occurred. Thereafter,
the action of the BDA in not pursuing the appeal(s) filed by itself, is the
second phase where the course of justice was thwarted. The fact that the
subject property had been utilised by the BDA is prima facie clear for the
reason that beneficiaries/allottees of the lands of the subject property had
sought impleadment, which would lend credence that the scheme was
implemented, or at the very least, a significant chunk thereof, as the case
may be, had been implemented.
54. Common citizens who were the beneficiaries of the acquisition by the
BDA have been denied the benefits thereof, and we have no hesitation in
saying so, what could only be termed as collusive litigation between the
BDA and the appellants. The obvious reasons are writ large on the facts
and circumstances of the case. This Court cannot, and would not, turn a
blind eye to such blatant misuse of the law and acts of
omissions/commissions, especially by statutory authorities. As such, we do
not propose to leave the matter as is.
Page 38 of 41
55. Thus, we were of the perspective that this is a fit case where the
Court should exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, for
doing complete justice, which reads as under:
‘142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court
and orders as to discovery, etc.—(1) The Supreme Court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make
such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any
cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or
order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of
India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law
made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so
made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by
Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of
the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order
for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the
discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or
punishment of any contempt of itself.’
(emphasis supplied)
56. Exercise of such power has been examined in, amongst others, M
Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple 5J) v Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1;
Anoop Baranwal v Union of India [Election Commissions
Appointments], (2023) 6 SCC 161, and; Shilpa Sailesh v Varun
Srinivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231.
57. However, since what the Court decides eventually would obviously
result in drastic consequences for the parties concerned, including those not
Page 39 of 41
before us, we were proposing to (i) take suo motu cognizance, and (ii) direct
the Registry to institute a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
assailing the Orders passed by the learned Single Judge dated 05.02.2016
[2016:KHC:4079] in Writ Petitions No.53124-53126/2015 as well as of the
learned Division Bench dated 07.06.2016 [2016:KHC:14898-DB] in W.A.
Nos.547-548/2016 and 1483/2016 (withdrawn by BDA) and dated
05.12.2016 [2016:KHC:32666-DB] in W.A. Nos.550-551/2016 and
611/2016 (proposed impleaders’ appeals disposed of by a short order). On
09.01.2025, the BDA woke up from slumber and filed I.A.s 01/2025
(condonation of delay in filing recall application) and 02/2025 (to recall the
Order dated 07.06.2016 of the Division Bench) in the High Court. These
I.A.s were dismissed on 03.02.2025 by a Division Bench holding that no
acceptable reason was available to condone the delay of 2392 days in filing
the recall application.
58. At this stage, we take note of the fact that BDA has filed SLP (C)
Nos.10134-10135/2025 against the Order dated 03.02.2025, wherein a
Coordinate Bench has issued notice on 02.05.2025. That being the position,
though a deeper scrutiny into the saga, as has unfolded above, is
warranted; however, to maintain judicial propriety, in our considered opinion,
Page 40 of 41
the present issue should be left to be gone into in the above-mentioned
case filed by the BDA before this Court.
59. Accordingly, the Registry is directed to place a copy of this Judgment
on the record of SLP (C) Nos.10134-10135/2025.
60. Further, for securing the ends of justice, till such time, the Court
takes a view on the matter in SLP (C) Nos.10134-10135/2025, no third-party
rights will be created or given effect to in the subject property by the
appellants. The civil suit filed by the complainant can also proceed in the
interregnum, subject to orders as may be passed in SLP (C) Nos.10134-
10135/2025.
.……………………………………..J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]
[
……………………………………..J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
NEW DELHI
JULY 31, 2025
Page 41 of 41
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