Kerala High Court
Safiya vs State Of Kerala on 25 July, 2025
Author: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
Bench: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. V. JAYAKUMAR
FRIDAY, THE 25TH DAY OF JULY 2025 / 3RD SRAVANA, 1947
WP(CRL.) NO. 688 OF 2025
PETITIONER/PETITIONER:
SAFIYA, AGED 61 YEARS, ALUNGAL HOUSE, PALAPPETTY,
VELIYANKODE MALAPPURAM, PIN - 679579
BY ADVS.
SMT.K.REEHA KHADER
SMT.SREELAKSHMI SABU
SMT.UMMUL FADLA T.
SMT.HASANATH P.
RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENT:
1 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO
GOVERNMENT, HOME & VIGILANCE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT
SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR & DISTRICT MAGISTRATE MALAPPURAM
DISTRICT COLLECTORATE, CIVIL STATION, MALAPPURAM - 676505
3 THE DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF
MALAPPURAM, DPO ROAD, UP HILL. MALAPPURAM PIN - 676505
4 THE CHAIRMAN ADVISORY BOARD KAAPA
SREENIVAS, PADAM ROAD, VIVEKANANDA NAGAR, ELAMAKKARA,
ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682026
5 THE SUPERINTENDENT OF JAIL
CENTRAL PRISON, VIYYUR, THRSSUR-SHORNUR ROAD VIYYUR,
THRISSUR, KERALA, PIN - 680010
BY ADVS.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: ADV.ANAS K A
THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
15.07.2025, THE COURT ON 25.07.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
2
JUDGMENT
K. V. Jayakumar, J.
Under challenge in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is the order of detention passed by the 2nd respondent under
Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [‘KAA(P)
Act’ for the sake of brevity]. The petitioner herein is the aunt of Hidayathullah,
aged 35 years, S/o.Hussainar, Alungal Veedu, Veliyangodu, Palapetty,
Perumpadappu [hereinafter referred to as ‘the detenu’]. The detenu was
classified as ‘Known Rowdy” under Section 2p(iii) of the KAA(P) Act.
2. The records would reveal that the detenu was involved in five
crimes; the details of those crimes are as follows:
Sl. Crime Police Station Crime Date Offences Involved under Present
N No. various sections Status of the
o. case1 35/2020 Perumpadapp 08.02.2020 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 353, Pending trial
u 506(i) r/w 149 IPC2 42/2020 Perumpadapp 14.02.2020 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324, Pending trial
u 326, 307, 109, 118(a), 120B,
201, 212 r/w 149 IPC
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
3
3 28/2021 Perumpadapp 13.02.2021 341, 323, 324, 326, 506(ii) Pending trial
u r/w 34 IPC4 530/202 Perumpadapp 21.06.2024 452, 341, 323, 324, 427 Pending trial
4 u r/w 34 IPC5 68/2025 Perumpadapp 21.01.2025 189(2), 191(2), 191(3), 333, Under
u 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 74, investigation
351(2), 296(b), 324(5) and
190 BNS 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Adv. Reeha Khader
submitted that the live link between the last prejudicial act and the detention
order has snapped. The last prejudicial activity is Crime No.68/2025 of
Perumpadappu Police Station and the detenu has been implicated as accused
No.3 in the said case. The allegation in this case is that, on 21.01.2025 at about
1.30 p.m., accused Nos. 1 to 7 formed themselves into an unlawful assembly,
trespassed into the house of the de facto complainant, and inflicted grievous hurt
to the complainant. The allegation against the detenu is that he caused damage
to a bicycle kept inside the house. The detenu was arrested in this case on
22.01.2025 and released on bail on 03.03.2025. The report of the sponsoring
authority was submitted on 15.02.2025.The detaining authority, after
considering the relevant materials and arriving at objective and subjective
satisfaction, passed Ext.P1 order on 15.03.2025. The delay in passing the order
has not been explained, asserts the learned counsel.
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
4
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that
the offences alleged against the petitioner pertain to a private dispute between
two individuals and do not adversely affect the public interest, peace, or the
tranquility of society as a whole. It is further submitted that the impugned order
has been passed without proper application of mind and without arriving at
objective and subjective satisfaction.
5. Sri Anas K.A., the learned Public Prosecutor, submitted that the
detenu is involved in five criminal cases, including offences punishable under
Section 307 IPC, and that too against children and women, and was in judicial
custody. There was every possibility that the detenu would indulge in anti-social
activities in the near future. Ext.P1 detention order has been passed after proper
application of mind and arriving at the objective and subjective satisfaction of
the detaining authority. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that there was
a delay of more than one month between the last prejudicial act and the
issuance of the impugned order, which was occasioned by the collection and
scrutiny of relevant materials.
6. The first submission of the petitioner is that the live link has
broken, since there is a delay of one month and 22 days between the last
prejudicial act and the detention order. The Apex Court in T.A.Abdul Rahman
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
5
v. State of Kerala observed as under:
1
“10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised
thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person
necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time
when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial
activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be
precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances
and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It
follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by
merely counting number of months between the offending acts and
the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay
between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order,
the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has
satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and
reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when
called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate
whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances
of each case.”
7. In the present case, it appears that the delay of one month and 22
days has been satisfactorily explained by the detaining authority. Therefore, we
1
(1989)4 SCC 741
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
6
are not persuaded by the submission that the live link gets snapped.
8. The second submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the crime registered against the petitioner would not affect the public at
large and that the alleged activities are merely disputes between individuals.
9. The Apex Court in Ashok Kumar v Delhi Administration and
others2 held that the true distinction between the areas of “public order” and
“law and order” lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and
extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of
“law and order” and “public order” is a fine one, but this does not mean that
there can be no overlapping. Relevant paragraphs of the aforementioned
judgment are extracted hereunder:
“13. The true distinction between the areas of ‘public order’ and
‘law and order’ lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the
degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between
the two concepts of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is a fine one
but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar
in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances
might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific
individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order,2
AIR 1982 SC 1143
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
7
while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself
therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of
the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which
makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That test is
clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the present case.”
10. In the decision in Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana3, the
Apex Court held as under:
“32. The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu
were prejudicial to public order. While the expression ‘law and order’
is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects
order, ‘Public order’ has a narrower ambit, and could be affected by
only such contravention, which affects the community or the public at
large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking
the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction
between the areas of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is one of
degree and extent of the reach, of the act in question on society. It is
the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the
community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the
public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few
individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of
public, it could raise problem of law and order only. In other words,
the true distinction between the areas of law and order and public
order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the
degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature,3
2024 SCC OnLine SC 367
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
8
but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause
different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals
only, and therefore touches the problem of law and order only, while
in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is
not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ
from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on
society, it may be very different. (See: Union of India v. Amrit Lal
Manchanda, 2004 (3) SCC 75.) 22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this
Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal reported in 1969
(1) SCC 10:
“13. … Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of
infraction of order or only some categories thereof. It is manifest that
every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to
public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each
other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is
disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the
powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of
ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the
ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of
any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public
order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this
connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and
aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or
injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace
of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
9
and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of
law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for
action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which
will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act…”
(Emphasis supplied) 11. On perusal of the impugned order, it is seen that the detenu is
involved in as many as five crimes, including offences punishable under Section
307 IPC, and that too against children and women. In such circumstances, we
are not persuaded by the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner.
12. The next submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the impugned order was passed without proper application of mind and
without arriving at objective and subjective satisfaction. It is argued that the
impugned order was passed in a mechanical manner.
13. The records would reveal that to deter the detenu from various
anti-social activities and crimes proceedings under Section 126 BNSS was
initiated on 29.07.2024, and the detenu executed a bond before the SDM Court,
Tirur. Thereafter, the detenu has involved in crime No.68/2025 of Perumpadappu
Police Station registered under section 189(2), 191(2), 191(3), 333, 126(2),
115(2), 118(1), 74, 351(2), 296(b), 324(5) and 190 BNS. Since the authority was
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
10
satisfied that the proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS Act were
insufficient to deter or prevent the detenu, an externment order was passed
under Section 15(1)(b) of the KAA(P) Act on 04.12.2024. Despite this measure,
the detenu was again involved in another crime, registered as Crime No.
68/2025, which is the last prejudicial act.
14. On going through the order, it is also clear that the detaining
authority has considered the efficacy of the bail conditions imposed in the earlier
crimes. Violating the express conditions in the bail bond, the detenu has again
indulged in various anti-social activities to affect the public order, peace, and
tranquility. It appears that steps were initiated for the cancellation of bail. On
going through Ext.P1 order, it is clear that the detaining authority has applied its
mind as to the efficacy and sufficiency of the bail conditions and submitted a
report for the cancellation of bail of the detenu. In Ibrahim Bachu Bafan and
Another v. State of Gujarat & Others4 , the Apex Court has held that it is not
open for the Court to sit in appeal over the subjective satisfaction entertained by
the detaining authority, unless the satisfaction is vitiated by malafides or by total
absence of materials.
15. On a careful examination of the materials available on record, we
are of the view that the detaining authority has reached a conclusion, after
4
1985(2) SCC 24
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
11
thorough scrutiny of the materials and upon due satisfaction. Accordingly, the
petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed
The Writ Petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
JUDGE
Sd/-
K. V. JAYAKUMAR
JUDGE
Sbna/
W.P(Crl).No.688/2025 2025:KER:54812
12
APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 688/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P 1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. DCMPM/2790/2025-S2
DATED 15-03-2025
Exhibit P 2 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF APPROVAL NO. OP.NO.
234 OF 2024 DATED 21.01.2025