Bombay High Court
Sagar Vinayak Bagade vs The Apex Grievance Redressal … on 31 July, 2025
2025:BHC-OS:12308
Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO.33254 OF 2024
Sagar Vinayak Bagade ]
Age: 28 years, Occ : Service, ]
R/o. Room No. 323, 3rd Floor, ]
Siddharth SRA, CHS Ltd., ]
Siddharth Nagar, Aliyawar Jun Marg, ]
Off. Western Express Highway, ]
Bandra (E), Mumbai - 400 051. ] ...Petitioner
Versus
1. The Apex Grievance Redressal ]
Committee, ]
Slum Rehabilitation Authority ]
New Administrative Building, ]
A.K. Marg, Bandra (E), ]
Mumbai - 400 051. ]
2. Deputy Collector (Special Cell) ]
Slum Rehabilitation Authority, ]
Administrative Building, ]
Anant Kanekar Marg, Bandra (E), ]
Mumbai - 400 051. ]
3. The Assistant Registrar, ]
Co-operative Societies (East ]
& West Suburbs) ]
Slum Rehabilitation Authority ]
Building, ]
Ground Floor, A.K. Marg, Bandra ]
(E), Mumbai - 400 051. ]
4. The Tahasildar-1, ]
(Special Unit) ]
Slum Rehabilitation Authority, ]
New Administrative Building, ]
A.K. Marg, Bandra (E), ]
Mumbai - 400 051. ]
5. Siddheshwar SRA CHS Ltd. ]
Digitally
signed by
SUMEDH
SUMEDH
NAMDEO
NAMDEO
SONAWANE 1/21
SONAWANE Date:
2025.07.31
19:25:28
+0530
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Situated at: CTS No. 618, ]
Siddharth Nagar, Aliyawar Jun Marg, ]
Off. Western Express Highway, ]
Bandra (E), Mumbai - 400 051. ]
6. Vishnu Shivram Waghmare, ]
Age: Major, Occ: Business, ]
R/o. Flat No.12, Ground Floor, ]
Riddhi Siddhi SRA, CHS Ltd., ]
Near Teacher Colony, ]
Bandra (E), Mumbai - 400 051. ]
7. Smt. Baby Sitaram Shetty, ]
Age: Major, Occ; Household, ]
R/o. Maharashtra SRA CHS Ltd., ]
Near Govt. Colony, Bandra (E), ]
Mumbai - 400 051. ] ...Respondents
Mr. Nitin Gaware Patil a/w. Adv. Divyesh K. Jain for the Petitioner.
Mr. Vishwanath Patil a/w. Adv. Kedar Nhawkar for Respondent No.1.
Mr. Amogh Singh a/w. Adv. Santosh Pathak, Mr. Nimish Lotlikar for
Respondent No.7.
CORAM : KAMAL KHATA, J.
RESERVED ON : 16th July, 2025.
PRONOUNCED ON : 31st July, 2025.
JUDGMENT:
1) This is a classic case in more ways than one.
2) This matter is “classic” because those who are assumed to
be “poor” as residing in slums governed by the Maharashtra Slum
Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971
(‘Slums Act‘) and are given free housing are, in fact, not genuinely
poor–an inference evident from the factual narration and averments
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contained in the Petition.
3) By this Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, the Petitioner challenges an Order dated 1 st October 2024
passed by the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee (‘AGRC’)-
Respondent No.1. (in Appeal No.96 of 2024) (“impugned Order”). The
impugned Order confirmed the Order dated 28 th March 2024 passed
by the Deputy Collector (Special Cell)-Respondent No.2 under Section
33 of the Slums Act and directed eviction of the occupant from a
premises bearing Room No.323, 3 rd Floor, Siddheshwar CHS Ltd.,
Siddharth Nagar, Aliyawar Jung Marg, Bandra (E), Mumbai-51 (” writ
premises”). The writ premises was allotted to one Mr. Vishnu
Waghmare (“original allottee”) a slum dweller under a Slum
Rehabilitation Scheme (“SRS”).
FACTUAL MATRIX:
4) The Petitioner claims to be a Class IV employee working
with the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (‘BMC’). He claims to
be a licensee in possession of the writ premises under a registered
Leave and License Agreement (L&LA) executed with the original
allottee, having paid a security deposit of ₹ 20,00,000/- in cash,
which is recorded in the L&LA.
5) In contrast, Respondent No. 7 claims possession as a
bonafide purchaser who has acquired title from the original allottee
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Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.docwith due permissions from the Slum Rehabilitation Authority
(‘SRA’).
6) The Petitioner was residing with his grandmother late
Mrs. Yashodhabai Bagade in adjoining tenements (Room Nos. 509
and 510) in the same building as the Mr. Waghmare. The Petitioner
claims that his grandmother advanced a friendly loan of ₹
16,50,000/- to the original allottee, for his catering business. As
collateral, the original allottee executed a Leave and License
Agreement dated 25th January 2019 and handed over possession of
Room No. 323 to the Petitioner. The leave and license agreement for a
period of three years i.e. from 1 st February 2019 to 31st January
2022 as Mr Waghmare was expected to repay the loan within the
stated period. Under a fresh agreement dated 20 th July 2020, which
was registered with Joint Sub Register, Andheri-05 as Document No.
BDR16/4055/2020 an additional sum of ₹ 3,50,000/- was advanced
to the Petitioner. The new leave and license agreement was for a
period 1st February 2020 to 31st January 2022.
7) Subsequently, the Petitioner discovered that bank
officials were visiting the premises to recover dues from the original
allottee. It appears that, the original allottee had collected money
from both parties. In this scenario, the Petitioner issued a legal notice
for refund of the security deposit on 14 th December 2020, followed by
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Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.docfurther notices. The original allottee, in his reply dated 18th January
2021, admitted to the agreement and the Petitioner’s possession and
requested additional time to repay.
8) Instead of repaying the amounts, Mr. Waghmare lodged a
complaint on at Kherwadi Police Station. The Petitioner responded
on 30th June 2023 asserting his rights and non-receipt of the security
deposit.
9) Meanwhile, the original allottee executed a Sale Deed
dated 9th January 2023 in favour of Respondent No.7, who
subsequently issued an eviction notice dated 20th June 2022.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE AUTHORITIES
10) A complaint was filed by Respondent No.5 before the
Assistant Registrar, who forwarded it to the Deputy Collector.
Proceedings under Section 33 of the Slums Act were initiated. The
Petitioner filed written submissions on 9th February 2024,
contending that Section 33 had no application once the statutory
period of 10 years had lapsed.
11) By Order dated 28th March 2024, the Deputy Collector
directed eviction of the Petitioner, stating he was in unauthorised
occupation. The Petitioner contended that the Slum authority ceased
after the 10-year period and the tenement became freehold.
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Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.doc 12) The Petitioner filed Appeal No. 96 of 2024 before the
AGRC under Section 35 of the Slums Act. Due to non-availability of
the Committee, the appeal remained pending.
13) In the interim, Tahsildar-1 issued a notice dated 24th
June 2024, received on 3rd July 2024, seeking police protection for
eviction. The Petitioner applied for urgent hearing. The AGRC listed
the matter for 1st October 2024 but rejected the stay application.
14) The Petitioner then filed Writ Petition (L) No. 21377 of
2024 before this Court. By oral order dated 5th July 2024, the Court
set aside the interim order and directed the AGRC to hear and decide
the appeal by 30th September 2024, granting interim protection.
15) The Petitioner reiterated before the AGRC that Section 33
of the Slums Act was inapplicable, after expiry of the 10-year lock-in
period, post allotment. The tenement, now freehold, was outside the
jurisdiction of SRA, and any eviction must proceed under Section 42
of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (“Rent Act“).
16) On 1st October 2024, the AGRC dismissed the appeal and
upheld the Deputy Collector’s Order.
17) The Petitioner challenges this on multiple grounds,
including failure to consider that:
i. Post the 10-year lock-in period, the writ premises
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was inapplicable,
ii. Eviction of a Licensee can be sought only under Section
42 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (‘Rent Act’)
Rent Act, and not under Section 33 of the Slums Act,
iii. Section 47 of the Rent Act provides express bar from
eviction under any other Act.
18) The Petitioner further alleges that though Vishnu
Waghmare was not even present on 9th August 2024, on the date of
closing of the Order, his arguments are recorded in the Order dated
1st October 2024.
19) Mr. Nitin Gaware Patil, Counsel for the Petitioner, relied
upon the following decisions:
i. Ravi Dutt Sharma vs. Ratan Lal Bhargava1 ii. Shabana Mohammed Hanif Sorathia vs. Siddhique Mohammad Khan & Ors.2 iii. Ritesh Haldar vs. Elite Housing LLP.3 iv. Sarwan Singh vs. Shri Kasturi Lal4 v. Vishal N. Kalsaria vs. Bank of India & Ors.5 vi. Chimanlal Shah vs. Mrs. Farhana Abdul Jabar Sayyad6 1 (1984) 2 SCC 75. 2 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 1107. 3 COARBAPL (L) No.14486 of 2025. 4 (1997) 1 SCC 750. 5 (2016) 3 SCC 762. 6 2009 (6) Mh.L.J. 598. 7/21 ::: Uploaded on - 31/07/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 31/07/2025 22:15:52 ::: Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.doc vii. Union of India & Anr. vs. G.M. Kokil & Ors.7 viii. Shri. Akhilesh Thakur vs. Hari @ Haribhau8 20) Mr. Patil contended that the Rent Act being subsequent
legislation prevails over the Slums Act, citing Sarwan Singh and Ravi
Dutt Sharma followed by the Bombay High Court in Shabana
Mohammed Hanif Sorathia (supra) holding that the Bombay Rent
Act will prevail over the Slums Act.
21) Mr. Patil lastly submitted that Respondent No.7, as
successor-in-title, is bound to refund the security deposit. He
therefore seeks that the Petition be made absolute.
22) Per Contra, Mr. Amogh Singh, learned Counsel for the
Respondent No.7 submits that any argument founded on an
erroneous premise is bound to fail. He contends that Section 3E of the
Slums Act explicitly mandates that the transfer of an allotted
tenement – including through a Leave and License Agreement –
requires prior permission of the Slum Authority, even after expiry of
the statutory 10-year lock-in period.
23) Referring to Sarwan Singh case (supra), he submitted
that it was distinguishable on facts. Respondent-Kasturi Lal was a
government employee and was asked to vacate his official
7
1984 SCC OnLine SC 278.
8
WP No.764 of 2021.
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government accommodation as he owned a residential house in
Delhi. That house was rented to one Sarwan Singh and another.
Kasturi Lal, the Respondent sought immediate possession under
Section 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and Sarwan Singh
had objected citing Section 19 of the Slums Act which required prior
permission for eviction in Slum area. The Court held that Section 14A
and Chapter 3A of the Delhi Rent Act would override Section 19 and
39 of the Slums Act with an intent to cater to the legislatures intent
to grant a special and immediate right to the government allottee to
reclaim their properties thereby preventing the delay on account of
the procedural requirements of the Slums Act.
24) Admittedly, in the present case, the Petitioner had failed
to obtain any permission from the SRA for taking possession through
a Leave and License Agreement. Consequently, the possession of the
writ premises itself was unauthorised as per the Slums Act.
Evidently, facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable from
the decisions in Sarwan Singh case (supra) and therefore
inapplicable.
25) Mr. Singh placed reliance on the decision in Rajendra
Vishwakarma vs. State of Maharashtra9 to contend that Section 3E is
a salutary provision, intended to prevent the commercialization of
slum tenements by slum dwellers. He submitted that the High Court,
9
2019 SCC Online Bom 740.
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in the said decision, held that a violation of Section 3E can attract
action under Section 33, and further clarified that a show cause
notice or order need not specifically refer to Section 3E in order to be
valid.
26) Relying on Anthony Andrade vs. State of Maharashtra 10
Mr. Singh argued that the High Court held that a leave and license
agreement is covered under the ambit of Section 3E in a similar
situation.
27) Referring then to the case of Harshaben Madhu vs. Addl
Collector11, where the Court held that a person who is in possession of
the premises without following provisions of Section 3E, then the
possession itself is unauthorized and illegal, he submitted that such
person in illegal occupation deserves to be evicted.
28) He further relied upon RBANMS Educational Institution
vs. B. Gunashekar & Anr.12 to contend that, the Supreme Court has
held that any cash transaction over and above Rs.2,00,000/- brought
to the notice of the Court, must be compulsorily be intimated to the IT
Authority and such a person’s claim should be investigated.
29) In light of the above he submitted that the Petition
deserves to be dismissed with exemplary costs.
10
2019 BHC-OS 18412.
11
2019 BHC-AS 13375.
12
2025 SCC OnLine 793.
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Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.doc 30) Mr. Vishwanath Patil, learned Advocate for the
Respondent No.1, lent support to the arguments of Respondent No.7
and submitted that, the Petitioner had failed to take permission from
the SRA and consequently was in illegal occupation of the writ
premises. In view thereof, the Petitioner was liable to be evicted.
31) He submitted that by virtue of the powers under Section
3E of the Slums act, the authorities have appropriately followed due
process, by giving a hearing to the Petitioner, have decided the issue.
Therefore, the Orders passed by the Deputy Collector as well as the
AGRC cannot be faulted and deserve to be upheld. Accordingly, he
submitted that, the Petition deserves to be dismissed.
32) Heard all three counsels and perused the papers.
33) The Petition raises several pertinent and troubling
questions that warrant consideration:
i. How did the Petitioner’s grandmother come to be allotted
two rooms in the same building?
ii. Where was Vishnu Waghmare residing after having let
out Room No. 323?
iii. What was the extent of the borrowings made by Vishnu
Waghmare from banks?
iv. Is this an isolated instance, or merely one of the rare few
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that have found their way into the courts? Is this an exception
–or a reflection of a widespread and rampant practice?
v. Do such individuals genuinely qualify as beneficiaries of
free housing under the guise of being slum dwellers?
34) All authorities entrusted with the implementation of the
Slums Act must reconsider their approach. Allotment should confer
only a right of occupation, and any right to transfer or monetize such
tenements ought to be withdrawn. It is not difficult to foresee that the
SRA and similar authorities vested with the power to permit
transfers may begin to function as de facto landlords, extracting a
premium for granting such permissions and thereby monetizing the
premises. However, for the present, these questions are not being
addressed.
35) The issue that arises for consideration is: whether upon
being allotted a premises under an SRS after expiry of the stipulated
ten years, the premises becomes freehold and transferable without
application of the Slums Act?
36) In this context an examination of Section 3E of the Slums
Act would be relevant. The Section is extracted herein for ready
reference:
“3E. Restrictions on transfer of tenements
[(1)] The tenements allotted to the persons under the
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Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.docSlum Rehabilitation Scheme shall not be transferred by
the allottee thereof by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease or
otherwise for a period of first [five years] commencing
from the date of allotment of the tenement. After the
expiry of the said period of [five years] the allottee may,
with the permission of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority,
transfer such tenement in accordance with the
prescribed procedure.
[(2) If the tenement is transferred by the allottee in
contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1), the
Competent Authority shall, by order, direct the eviction of
the person in possession of such tenement in such
manner and within such time as may be specified in the
order, and for the purpose of eviction, the Competent
Authority may use or cause to be used such force as may
be necessary.
Provided that, before issuing any order under this sub-
section, the Competent Authority shall give a reasonable,
opportunity to such person to show cause why he should
not be evicted therefrom.]”
[Emphasis supplied]
37) On a plain reading of the Section 3E (1) and (2) it is
apparent that the premises does not become free from being
governed under Slums Act after the expiry of the statutory 10-year
lock-in period. The 10-year has now reduced to 5-year lock-in. The
premises can be transferred only with the permission of the SRA and
in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
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Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.doc 38) Moreover, sub section 3E(2) empowers the Competent Authority to evict the person who obtains possession in
contravention of the provisions of 3E (1) even with use of force.
Thus, the foundation of the Petition untenable as it is premised on a
misreading of the provisions of the Slums Act. Therefore, on this
ground alone it deserves to fail.
39) I am in complete agreement with the view taken by this
Court in Rajendra Vishwakarma (supra), Anthony Andrade (supra),
Harshaben Madhu (supra).
40) However, to preclude any objection that the other
contentions have not been addressed, I now proceed to deal with the
case law relied upon.
41) The reliance placed on Sarwan Singh (supra) by the
Petitioner is, in my view, misconceived. Far from supporting the
Petitioner, the judgment in fact militates against their case. In
paragraphs 20 and 21, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly holds that
a later enactment must prevail over an earlier one. Section 3E was
inserted into the Slums Act by Maharashtra Act 11 of 2012 with
effect from 19 June 2012, whereas the Maharashtra Rent Control Act
came into force on 31 March 2000. This crucial distinction has been
overlooked by the Petitioner. Moreover, the decision is
distinguishable even on facts–Sarwan Singh dealt with a
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Respondent, Kasturi Lal, who was the owner of a house in a notified
slum area. In contrast, the present case concerns Vishnu Waghmare,
who was an original allottee under a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme
(SRS).
42) The reliance placed on Vishal N Kansaria (supra) is also
misconceived for the following reasons:
i. The judgement is operating in the different field. The ratio
of the judgement would not be applicable to the present case.
ii. Referred case presumes that the premises were owned by
the landlord and mortgaged to the bank. The present case it
that of allotment under the SRS and governed under the
provisions of the Slum Act.
iii. The judgement does not consider the settled proposition
of law that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier
one.
43) The reliance placed on Chimanlal Shah (supra) is also
misplaced. The judgement lays down the effect of non obstante
clauses appearing in the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. It would be
inapplicable as it does not consider the rights of an allottee of a
tenement under the Slums Act.
44) The reliance placed on Union of India (supra) does not aid
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the Petitioner; on the contrary, it supports the Respondent. The
decision affirms that a non obstante clause is a legislative device
employed to give overriding effect to specific provisions over
contrary provisions that may exist either within the same enactment
or in another statute. In the present case, the applicable law is the
Slums Act, and the Petitioner’s reliance on the Maharashtra Rent
Control Act, 1999 is misplaced. The invocation of the non obstante
clause in the Rent Act and the bar under Section 47 is therefore
misconceived and inapplicable.
45) The reliance placed on Shabana Mohammed Hanif
Sorathia (supra) which follows Sarwan Singh (supra) will also be of
no avail to the Petitioner for the reasons stated herein above.
46) Lastly, the reliance placed on Ritesh Haldar (supra) is
also distinguishable on the facts in as much as that was a case of a
premises undergoing redevelopment and the present case is one of an
allottee under the Slums Act.
47) I find that the concurrent orders passed by the Deputy
Collector and the AGRC are in accordance with the law and have been
rendered appropriately. There is no ground to interfere with the
same, as the authorities have followed the due process contemplated
under the Slums Act. The Slums Act is a special legislation enacted
with a specific objective of rehabilitation and incorporates safeguards
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Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.docsuch as Section 3E to prevent misuse and commercial exploitation of
the allotted tenements.
48) Now in light of the decision in RBANMS Educational
Institution vs. B. Gunashekar & Anr. 13 the cash transaction of over
and above Rs.2,00,000/- having come to the notice of the Court it
would be imperative for the Court to intimate the IT Authority and
direct investigation of the Petitioner’s claim.
49) Let the Registry intimate the IT Authority about the
Petitioner’s claim and investigate the transaction of L&LA registered
with the Joint Sub Register, Andheri-05 and bearing Registration No.
BDR16/4055/2020 between the Petitioner and Mr. Vishnu Waghmare
and take appropriate action against all concerned in accordance with
law preferably within a period of six months from the date of
uploading of this Order on the website of the Bombay High Court. The
IT Authority is directed to file a compliance cum status report on or
before 31st January 2026.
50) In my view, the present Petition is clearly an attempt to
extract money from the bona fide purchaser, solely because the
Licensor failed to refund the security deposit paid in cash. This
amounts to a clear abuse of the judicial process. There is an evident
vested interest in obstructing the handover of possession. The bona
13
2025 SCC OnLine 793.
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fide purchaser has been unnecessarily dragged into litigation over a
non-issue. The Petition appears to be a litigative strategy aimed at
depriving the bona fide purchaser of rightful possession. The
Petitioner is fully aware that the transaction was illegal and that, if
any cause of action exists, it lies against the licensee–not the bona
fide purchaser. Even assuming the Petitioner was unaware at the
time of filing the Petition, he was duly informed during the initial
hearing. Despite this, he has chosen to continue prosecuting the
Petition.
51) It is appropriate to reproduce the observations of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik v. Pradnya Prakash
Khadekar.
“13. This Court must view with disfavour any attempt
by a litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the
judicial process will be seriously eroded if such
attempts are not dealt with firmly. A litigant who takes
liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the
Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences
to follow. Others should not venture along the same
path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of
judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and
even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as
in the law which is practised in our country, there is no
premium on the truth.
14. Courts across the legal system–this Court not being
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Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.docan exception–are choked with litigation. Frivolous and
groundless filings constitute a serious menace to the
administration of justice. They consume time and clog
the infrastructure. Productive resources which should
be deployed in the handling of genuine causes are
dissipated in attending to cases filed only to benefit
from delay, by prolonging dead issues and pursuing
worthless causes. No litigant can have a vested interest
in delay. Unfortunately, as the present case exemplifies,
the process of dispensing justice is misused by the
unscrupulous to the detriment of the legitimate. The
present case is an illustration of how a simple issue has
occupied the time of the courts and of how successive
applications have been filed to prolong the inevitable.
The person in whose favour the balance of justice lies
has in the process been left in the lurch by repeated
attempts to revive a stale issue. This tendency can be
curbed only if courts across the system adopt an
institutional approach which penalises such behaviour.
Liberal access to justice does not mean access to chaos
and indiscipline. A strong message must be conveyed
that courts of justice will not be allowed to be disrupted
by litigative strategies designed to profit from the
delays of the law. Unless remedial action is taken by all
courts here and now our society will breed a legal
culture based on evasion instead of abidance. It is the
duty of every court to firmly deal with such situations.
The imposition of exemplary costs is a necessary
instrument which has to be deployed to weed out, as
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Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.docthen that the courts can set apart time to resolve
genuine causes and answer the concerns of those who
are in need of justice. Imposition of real time costs is
also necessary to ensure that access to courts is
available to citizens with genuine grievances.
Otherwise, the doors would be shut to legitimate causes
simply by the weight of undeserving cases which flood
the system. Such a situation cannot be allowed to come
to pass. Hence it is not merely a matter of discretion
but a duty and obligation cast upon all courts to ensure
that the legal system is not exploited by those who use
the forms of the law to defeat or delay justice. We
commend all courts to deal with frivolous filings in the
same manner.”
[Emphasis supplied]
52) Considering the above, the Petition has no merit and is
dismissed with costs of ₹ 5,00,000/-.
(KAMAL KHATA, J.)
53) At this stage, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner
prays that the operation and implementation of the present judgment
be deferred for a period of four weeks to enable the Petitioner to
challenge its correctness.
54) Mr. Singh, learned Counsel for the Respondent, strongly
opposes the request, submitting that the ad-interim order was
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Sumedh 901-oswpl-33254-2024-J.doc
obtained without notice to the Respondents. Considering the plight of
the bona fide purchaser–who is being deprived of possession through
no fault of his own, as elaborately discussed in the foregoing Order–
the request is rejected.
(KAMAL KHATA, J.)
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