Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Saheb Ram @ Rajjo vs State Of Rajasthan on 1 April, 2025
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2025:RJ-JD:13201-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 339/1994
Saheb Ram @ Rajjo S/o Malu Ram, R/o Prempura, P.S.
Suratgarh, District Shri Ganganagar.
(At present lodged in Central Jail at Bikaner)
----Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Ms. Anjali Kaushik
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajesh Bhati, PP
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA PRAKASH SHRIMALI
Judgment
Reserved on : 06/03/2025
Pronounced on : 01/04/2025
(Per Chandra Prakash Shrimali, J.)
1. The present appeal has been preferred by the
accused/appellant viz. Saheb Ram @ Rajjo being aggrieved by the
impugned judgment dated 04.07.1994 passed by the learned
Special Judge Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities Cases), Sri Ganganagar (hereinafter to be referred as
the 'trial court') in Case No.4/94 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Saheb
Ram @ Rajjo), whereby he was convicted for the offences under
Section 376 of IPC read with Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
(hereinafter to be referred as the 'SC/ST Act') and was sentenced
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to undergo life imprisonment with the fine of Rs.100/- and in
default of payment of fine, to undergo one month's additional
simple imprisonment.
2. Before addressing the main issue, it is necessary to clarify
that as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Nipun Saxena Vs. Union of India (Writ Petition
No.565/2012) : 2019 (2) SCC 703, the identity of minor as
well as of an adult victim of rape/sexual abuse must be protected.
Therefore, in the present case, the adult female victim of rape will
be referred as the 'prosecutrix/victim' henceforth.
3. Brief facts of the case are that the husband of the
proxecutrix/victim took forth the share of land from the
accused/appellant situated at village Prempura and on 29.08.1992
at around 05:00 PM, she went to the field of the
accused/appellant for collecting grass, where he was roaming and
asked her why she did not go to the other field to collect grass, to
which she replied that other fields are far away and grass cannot
be brought from there. Thereafter, when prosecutrix/victim
started collecting grass, the accused/appellant caught hold of her,
pinned her down, forcefully opened her salwar and sexually
assaulted her. Upon her screaming loudly, the accused/appellant
put his hand over her mouth and offered her some money to keep
the alleged incident secrete, to which, she inflicted a sickle blow,
but the same went vain. Subsequently, she returned to her home
and told her in-laws and husband about the entire incident,
however, due to unavailability of transport that night, she was
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unable to report the matter to the police on the same day; and
therefore, lodged the FIR on the next day after the incident i.e. on
30.08.1992 at Police Station Suratgarh, District Sri Ganganagar
for the offences under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 3(12)
of SC/ST Act.
3.1. After a thorough investigation, the police filed the
charge-sheet and the learned trial court framed charges for the
offences under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 3(2)(v) of
SC/ST Act against the accused/appellant. After hearing learned
counsel for the parties, the learned trial court vide impugned
judgment dated 04.07.1994 convicted the accused/appellant for
the offences mentioned above and sentenced him to undergo life
imprisonment with the fine of Rs.100/- and in default of payment
of fine, to undergo one month's additional simple imprisonment.
Hence, this criminal appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused submitted that
the incident took place on 29.08.1992 at around 05:00 PM;
however, the FIR was lodged on 30.08.1992 at 02:00 PM with a
significant delay and without any satisfactory explanation for such
a delay, therefore, argued that the prosecutrix/victim lodged the
FIR after deliberation, without any basis and with an intention of
falsely implicating the appellant/accused.
4.1. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused also submitted
that the statement of the prosecutrix/victim recorded before the
learned trial court as PW-1 was corroborated by the medical
evidence because in her statement, she stated that she received
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injuries on her back and other parts of the body; however, no such
injuries are mentioned either in the medical report or in the FIR. It
is further submitted that the story set out by the
prosecutrix/victim is not supported by the other independent
witnesses i.e. PW-3 Daulatram, PW-4 Manaram and PW-8 Jaswant
Singh as they have turned hostile. In such circumstances, the
learned trial court has expressed its opinion on contradictory facts
in its impugned judgment.
4.2. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused further
submitted that as per the FIR, the prosecutrix/victim told about
the alleged incident to the people she met at Gurumukh Gyani's
land while going her home after the alleged incident, however,
none of them have been examined by the prosecution. It is also
submitted that the prosecution has not examined the people
working on the land adjacent to the place of incident and as such
has failed to prove the occurrence of the alleged incident.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the family of the
prosecutrix/victim filed a case for recovery of money in the Labour
Court against the maternal grandfather of the appellant/accused
and that the appellant/accused has falsely been implicated in this
case only to mount pressure.
4.3. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused also submitted
that as per the injury report of the prosecutrix/victim, there were
no injuries on her private parts, which contradicts the statements
of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. Additionally, the
Dy.S.P., who investigated the matter, was not examined. It is
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further submitted that though the allegations were levelled under
the penal provisions of SC/ST Act, the same were not proved and,
therefore, the learned trial court committed a grave error in
convicting and sentencing the appellant/accused for the said
charges. Hence, the impugned judgment dated 04.07.1994
deserves to be quashed and set aside as well as the
appellant/accused deserves to be acquitted of the said charges.
5. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that
though the FIR was lodged by the prosecutrix/victim on the
second day of the incident, it provided a satisfactory explanation
for the said delay and, therefore, the delay in filing the FIR cannot
be considered fatal for the prosecution.
5.1. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that there was
not even a single person present near the place of incident
because had anyone been there, the appellant/accused would not
have been able to sexually assault the prosecutrix/victim. It is
further submitted that the witnesses who turned hostile did not
witness the alleged incident. In this view of the matter, the
testimonies of the other three prosecution witnesses, who have
turned hostile, do not have any adverse effect on the case of
prosecution as they are not the eyewitness.
5.2. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that as per
the Examination Report of Rape i.e. Exhibit-P/5, prepared by PW-5
Dr. O.P. Sharma after examining the prosecutrix/victim, violence
marks were found on the body of the prosecutrix/victim along with
injuries on her private parts. Additionally, as per the FSL Report
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i.e. Exhibit-P/12, human semen stains were found on the salwar of
the prosecutrix/victim. Furthermore, Dr. O.P. Sharma PW-5, in his
cross-examination, has expressed the possibility of sexual
intercourse by force. It is also submitted that the
accused/appellant did not produce any documentary evidence in
support of his contention that the prosecutrix/victim and her
husband filed a suit against his maternal grandfather for recovery
of money; whereas the testimony of the prosecutrix/victim is
supported by the FSL Report Exhibit-P/12 as well as Examination
Report of Rape Exhibit-P/5. Thus, it cannot be said that the
prosecutrix/victim has lodged a false case against the
accused/appellant and the prosecution story cannot be considered
doubtful merely because an investigation officer did not turn up.
In this view of the matter, the learned trial court, after expressing
its opinion in details, vide impugned judgment has rightly
convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant for the alleged
crime. Hence, the present appeal of the accused/appellant
deserves to be dismissed as being without merit.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
impugned judgment as well as the material available on record.
7. The points to be considered in this case are as follows :
(i) Whether the accused/appellant committed the act
of penetration upon the prosecutrix/victim, who is a
woman of Scheduled Caste, against her will and
without her consent?
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(ii) Whether the accused/appellant committed the
offence of rape punishable under IPC, knowing that
the prosecutrix/victim is a member of Scheduled
Caste/Tribe?
(iii) Whether the accused/appellant committed an
offence under IPC in light of the evidences of PW-1,
PW-2 and medical evidence?
8. Before considering the punishment under Section 376 of
IPC, it is pertinent to refer to Section 375 of IPC, which is
reproduced as follows:-
"375. Rape.--A man is said to commit "rape" if he--
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the
vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her
to do so with him or any other person; or
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the
body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or
anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any
other person; or
(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so
as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or
any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so
with him or any other person; or
(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of
a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other
person,
under the circumstances falling under any of the following
seven descriptions:--
First.--Against her will.
Secondly.--Without her consent.
Thirdly.--With her consent, when her consent has
been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is
interested, in fear of death or of hurt.
Fourthly.--With her consent, when the man knows
that he is not her husband and that her consent is given
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because she believes that he is another man to whom she
is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
Fifthly.--With her consent when, at the time of
giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or
intoxication or the administration by him personally or
through another of any stupefying or unwholesome
substance, she is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of that to which she gives consent.
Sixthly.--With or without her consent, when she is
under eighteen years of age.
Seventhly.--When she is unable to communicate
consent.
Explanation 1.--For the purposes of this section, "vagina"
shall also include labia majora.
Explanation 2.--Consent means an unequivocal voluntary
agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any
form of verbal or non-verbal communication,
communicates willingness to participate inthe specific
sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically
resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only
of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual
activity.
Exception 1.--A medical procedure or intervention shall not
constitute rape.
Exception 2.--Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man
with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of
age, is not rape."
9. If we consider 'rape' as defined under Section 375 of IPC,
penetration into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman is
necessary. Therefore, it is essential for the prosecution to
establish that the accused/appellant committed the said act of
penetration upon the prosecutrix/victim against her will and
without her consent in light of the evidence available on record.
10. A bare perusal of the record reveals that the story set out
by the prosecutrix/victim in her statements recorded under
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Sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., as well as in the FIR, is same.
The prosecution examined a total of nine witnesses, out of which
three witnesses viz. Daulatram PW-3, Manaram PW-4 and Jaswant
Singh PW-8 turned hostile and did not support the prosecution
story.
11. It is clear from the statements of the prosecutrix/victim
and her husband that they knew the accused/appellant prior to
the incident. At the time of incident, she was working in the
accused/appellant's share of land situated at Prempura, and her
husband had gone to another field belonging to the
accused/appellant situated at 35 GSTG for irrigation and from
there, he returned to his house at 08:00 PM, and that is when the
prosecutrix/victim told him about the incident.
12. A bare perusal of the examination-in-chief of the
prosecutrix/victim PW-1 and the statement of her husband PW 2,
clearly shows that the accused/appellant committed act of
penetration upon the prosecutrix/victim against her will and
without her consent. It is also clear from the entire statements of
the prosecutrix/victim (PW-1) and her husband (PW-2) particularly
in their cross-examinations, that the accused/appellant had not
told them that he had not done any forcible act of sexual assault
upon her.
13. Dr. O.P. Sharma (PW-5), who prepared the Examination
Report of Rape Exhibit-P/5 after examining the prosecutrix/victim
on 30.08.1992 i.e. second day of the alleged incident, has stated
in his statement that there were marks of violence on her body,
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one ½ cm X ½ cm injury on the right side of the vaginal canal as
well as semen stains on her clothes, and thus, he opined in
Exhibit-P/5 that the sexual intercourse had taken place with her.
He has further stated that he gave two slides of vaginal smear of
the prosecutrix/victim to the police for chemical examination.
According to the statement of this witness, who prepared Exhibit-
P/6 after examining the accused/appellant, the accused/appellant
was found capable of having sexual intercourse.
14. The Examination Report of Rape Exhibit-P/5, prepared by
Dr. O.P. Sharma (PW-5) after examining the prosecutrix/victim,
was accepted by the accused/appellant in his subject-to-cross.
However, nothing was asked to him in his cross-examination
regarding the injury caused on the private part of the prosecutrix/
victim due to sexual assault by him. The testimony of prosecutrix/
victim (PW-1) and Dr. O.P. Sharma (PW-5) along with the
Examination Report of Rape Exhibit-P/5 are not contradicted by
the prosecutrix/victim in her cross-examination and are
irrefutable.
15. As per FSL Report Exhibit-P/12, human semen stains were
detected in Ex.No.3 from packet Marked-B, which is the salwar
Exhibit-P/10 worn by the prosecutrix/victim at the time of the
alleged incident; however no human semen stains were detected
in Ex.Nos.1 and 2 from the packet Marked-A, which are vaginal
smear and vaginal swab respectively. Although no evidence has
been presented to prove that the human semen stains detected on
the salwar belonged to the accused/appellant, the mere absence
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of the same cannot lead to the presumption that the human
semen stains detected on the salwar did not belong to the
appellant/accused.
16. The accused/appellant neither presented any evidence nor
denied in his statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
that the salwar was not recovered from the possession of the
prosecutrix/victim. Further, the accused/appellant did not produce
any evidence to establish that the human semen stains detected
on the salwar did not belong to him but to someone else and he
did not cross-examine his witnesses in this regard. The facts
mentioned in the FSL Report (Exhibit-P/12) have also not been
denied by the appellant/accused. The fact that human semen
stains were detected on the salwar but not on the private parts of
the prosecutrix/victim is confirmed by FSL Report Exhibit-P/12.
The accused/appellant cannot be acquitted on the ground of non-
detection of human semen stains on the private part of the
prosecutrix/victim.
17. In this regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Karnal Singh Vs. State of MP : AIR 1995 SC 2472 has held as
under :
"Applying the above test to the facts of the present case
we are satisfied beyond any manner of doubt that the
prosecutrix, a victim of the crime, had absolutely no reason
whatsoever to falsely involve the appellant nor did her
husband have any reason to do so or tutor his wife to
involve the appellant. No such suggestion was made to the
prosecution witnesses in cross examination nor is there
any evidence on record in that behalf. The prosecutrix is a
poor labourer who was toiling to earn her livelihood to
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augment the family income. She was working in the factory
since the last few days only and the appellant and his
companion, taking advantages of the situation, drove away
Charan by asking him to fetch tea and after he left the
appellant voilated her person. The find of semen stains on
the petticoat and in the vagina lend assurance to the story
narrated by the prosecutrix. The submission that there was
delay in lodging the complaint has to be stated to be
rejected for the simple reason that immediately after the
incident she had to go in search of her husband who was a
Rickshaw Puller, narrate to him the incident, go down to
the police station and then lodge the complaint. She has
explained the absence of injuries by stating that she was
laid on minute sand which was lying on the floor and,
therefore, there were no marks of injury. The only
explanation is by way of suggestion in the cross-
examination of the prosecutrix to the effect that she was
falsely implicating the appellant in order to grab money.
Therefore, taking an overall view of the matter we are
satisfied that it is safe to place reliance on the testimony of
the prosecutrix. Both the courts below relied on her
evidence and we see no reason to take a different view.
For the above reason we see no merit in this appeal and
dismiss the same."
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Phool Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh: AIR 2022 SC 222, after considering several
other cases in detail, has laid down the following decision-making
principle:-
"5.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the
present case, the prosecutrix has fully supported the case
of the prosecution. She has been consistent right from the
very beginning. Nothing has been specifically pointed out
why the sole testimony of the prosecutrix should not be
believed. Even after thorough cross-examination, she has
stood by what she has stated and has fully supported the
case of the prosecution. We see no reason to doubt the
credibility and/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. The
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submission on behalf of the accused that no other
independent witnesses have been examined and/or
supported the case of the prosecution and the conviction
on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix cannot
be sustained is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance.
5.2 In the case of Ganesan (supra), this Court has
observed and held that there can be a conviction on the
sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when the
deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy,
unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling
quality.
In the aforesaid case, this Court had an occasion to
consider the series of judgments of this Court on conviction
on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix. In paragraphs 10.1
to 10.3, it is observed and held as under:
10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual
harassment, molestation, etc., can there be conviction
on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in Vijay [Vijay
v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191], it is observed in
paras 9 to 14 as under: (SCC pp. 195-98)
"9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash
Kewalchand Jain [State of Maharashtra v.
Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC
550] this Court held that a woman, who is the
victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to
the crime but is a victim of another person's lust
and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested
with the same amount of suspicion as that of an
accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p.
559, para 16)
'16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put
on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim
of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that
her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is
corroborated in material particulars. She is
undoubtedly a competent witness under Section
118 and her evidence must receive the same
weight as is attached to an injured in cases of
physical violence. The same degree of care and
caution must attach in the evaluation of her
evidence as in the case of an injured complainant
or witness and no more. What is necessary is that
the court must be alive to and conscious of the
fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person
who is interested in the outcome of the charge
levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and
feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the
prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice
incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to
Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to
look for corroboration. If for some reason the court
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is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the
testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for
evidence which may lend assurance to her
testimony short of corroboration required in the
case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence
required to lend assurance to the testimony of the
prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. But if a
prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding
the court is entitled to base a conviction on her
evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm
and not trustworthy. If the totality of the
circumstances appearing on the record of the case
disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a
strong motive to falsely involve the person
charged, the court should ordinarily have no
hesitation in accepting her evidence.'
10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu [State of U.P. v.
Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594] this Court held that
even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a
girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual
intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the
accused from the charge of rape. It has to be
established that there was consent by her for that
particular occasion. Absence of injury on the
prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the
court to absolve the accused. This Court further
held that there can be conviction on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court
is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix,
it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial,
by which it may get assurance of her testimony.
The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12)
'12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix
complaining of having been a victim of the offence
of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There
is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be
acted upon without corroboration in material
particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than
an injured witness. In the latter case, there is
injury on the physical form, while in the former it
is both physical as well as psychological and
emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it
difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on
its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her
testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as
understood in the context of an accomplice, would
do.'
11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [State of
Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384], this
Court held that in cases involving sexual
harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-
bound to deal with such cases with utmost
sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant
discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix
should not be a ground for throwing out an
otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of
the victim of sexual assault is enough for
conviction and it does not require any
corroboration unless there are compelling reasons
for seeking corroboration. The court may look for
some assurances of her statement to satisfy
judicial conscience. The statement of the
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prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured
witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court
further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual
offence may not be even properly explained, but if
found natural, the accused cannot be given any
benefit thereof. The Court observed as under:
(SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21)
'8. ... The court overlooked the situation in which a
poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the
company of three desperate young men who were
threatening her and preventing her from raising
any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did
not conduct the investigation properly or was
negligent in not being able to trace out the driver
or the car, how can that become a ground to
discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The
prosecutrix had no control over the investigating
agency and the negligence of an investigating
officer could not affect the credibility of the
statement of the prosecutrix. ... The courts must,
while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact
that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman
would come forward in a court just to make a
humiliating statement against her honour such as
is involved in the commission of rape on her. In
cases involving sexual molestation, supposed
considerations which have no material effect on
the veracity of the prosecution case or even
discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix
should not, unless the discrepancies are such
which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out
an otherwise reliable prosecution case. ... Seeking
corroboration of her statement before relying upon
the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to
adding insult to injury. ... Corroboration as a
condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of
the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a
guidance of prudence under given circumstances.
...
***
21. … The courts should examine the broader
probabilities of a case and not get swayed by
minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies
in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not
of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable
prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix
inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without
seeking corroboration of her statement in material
particulars. If for some reason the court finds it
difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony,
it may look for evidence which may lend assurance
to her testimony, short of corroboration required in
the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the
prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background
of the entire case and the trial court must be alive
to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing
with cases involving sexual molestations.’
(emphasis in original)
12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra [State of
Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86], this
Court held that rape is not mere physical assault,
rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole
personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the
very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the
testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated
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in the background of the entire case and in such
cases, non-examination even of other witnesses
may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution
case, particularly where the witnesses had not
seen the commission of the offence.
13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh [State of
H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622], this
Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look
for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence
of the prosecutrix before recording an order of
conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not
counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence
inspires confidence and there is absence of
circumstances which militate against her veracity.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. [Wahid Khan v. State
of M.P., (2010) 2 SCC 9] placing reliance on an
earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of
Rajasthan [Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR
1952 SC 54].”
5.3 In the case of Pankaj Chaudhary (supra), it is
observed and held that as a general rule, if credible,
conviction of accused can be based on sole testimony,
without corroboration. It is further observed and held that
sole testimony of prosecutrix should not be doubted by
court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises. In
paragraph 29, it is observed and held as under:
“29. It is now well-settled principle of law that
conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of
the prosecutrix if it inspires confidence. [Vishnu v.
State of Maharashtra [Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra,
(2006) 1 SCC 283]. It is well-settled by a catena of
decisions of this Court that there is no rule of law or
practice that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be
relied upon without corroboration and as such it has
been laid down that corroboration is not a sine qua non
for conviction in a rape case. If the evidence of the
victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the
“probabilities factor” does not render it unworthy of
credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist
on corroboration except from medical evidence, where,
having regard to the circumstances of the case,
medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming.
[State of Rajasthan v. N.K. [State of Rajasthan v. N.K.,
(2000) 5 SCC 30].”
5.4 In the case of Sham Singh v. State of Haryana,
(2018) 18 SCC 34, it is observed that testimony of the
victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons
which necessitate looking for corroboration of her
statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the
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testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict
an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is
found to be reliable. It is further observed that seeking
corroboration of her statement before relying upon the
same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to
injury. In paragraphs 6 and 7, it is observed and held as
under:
“6. We are conscious that the courts shoulder a great
responsibility while trying an accused on charges of
rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost
sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader
probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor
contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the
statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal
nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution
case. If the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires
confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking
corroboration of her statement in material particulars.
If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place
implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for
evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony,
short of corroboration required in the case of an
accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be
appreciated in the background of the entire case and
the court must be alive to its responsibility and be
sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual
molestations or sexual assaults. [See State of Punjab
v. Gurmit Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh,
(1996) 2 SCC 384] (SCC p. 403, para 21).]
7. It is also by now well settled that the courts must,
while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that
in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would
come forward in a court just to make a humiliating
statement against her honour such as is involved in the
commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual
molestation, supposed considerations which have no
material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case
or even discrepancies in the statement of the
prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are
such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out
an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent
bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal
outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the
courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim
in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling
reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of
her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to
act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone
to convict an accused where her testimony inspires
confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking
corroboration of her statement before relying upon the
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same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult
to injury. (See Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam
[Ranjit Hazarika v. State of Assam, (1998) 8 SCC
635).”
6. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and as
observed hereinabove, we see no reason to doubt the
credibility and/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix. She is
found to be reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, without
any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused
relying upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix can be
sustained.”
19. This Court observes that applying the principle laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions to the
facts of the case at hand, there is no reason to doubt the
credibility and/or trustworthiness of the prosecutrix/victim’s
testimony. Therefore, the conviction of the accused/appellant
relying upon the testimony of the prosecutrix/victim can be
sustained.
20. It is clear from the statement of the prosecutrix/victim
PW-1 that she was subjected to the sexual act of penetration by
the accused/appellant against her will, without her consent and
that he stopped her from screaming by putting his hand over her
mouth.
21. It is true that there were no injuries on the back or any
other part of the body of the prosecutrix/victim except on the
hands and lips; however, from the statement of her husband
PW-2, it is clear that the place of incident was soft and grassy
ground, therefore, it is possible that she did not sustain any other
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[2025:RJ-JD:13201-DB] (19 of 26) [CRLA-339/1994]
injuries or that any other injuries she might have sustained, did
not exist at the time of her examination following the rape.
22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Wahid Khan Vs. State of
M.P. : (2010) 2 SCC 9 has held as under :
“19. It was also contended by learned counsel for the
appellant that since hymen of the prosecutrix was found to
be in tact, therefore, it cannot be said that an offence of
rape was committed on her by the appellant. This
contention cannot be accepted as offence of rape has been
defined in Section 375 of the IPC. Explanation to Section
375 reads thus:
“Explanation. – Penetration is sufficient to constitute
the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of
rape.”
It has been a consistent view of this Court that even a
slightest penetration is sufficient to make out an offence of
rape and depth of penetration is immaterial.
20. It is appropriate in this context to reproduce the
opinion expressed by Modi in Medical Jurisprudence and
Toxicology (Twenty Second Edition) at page 495 which
reads thus:
“Thus, to constitute the offence of rape, it is not
necessary that there should be complete penetration
of penis with emission of semen and rupture of
hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the
Labia majora or the vulva or pudenda with or
without emission of semen or even an attempt at
penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of the
law. It is therefore quite possible to commit legally,
the offence of rape without producing any injury to
the genitals or leaving any seminal stains. In such a
case, the medical officer should mention the
negative facts in his report, but should not give his
opinion that no rape had been committed. Rape is
crime and not a medical condition. Rape is a legal
term and not a diagnosis to be made by the medical
officer treating the victim. The only statement that
can be made by the medical officer is to the effect
whether there is evidence of recent sexual activity.
Whether the rape has occurred or not is a legal
conclusion, not a medical one.”
[Emphasis supplied]
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[2025:RJ-JD:13201-DB] (20 of 26) [CRLA-339/1994]
21. Similarly in Parikh’s Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence
and Toxicology, ‘sexual intercourse’ has been defined as
under:
“Sexual intercourse.- In law, this term is held to
mean the slightest degree of penetration of the
vulva by the penis with or without emission of
semen. It is therefore quite possible to commit
legally the offence of rape without producing any
injury to the genitals or leaving any seminal stains.”
22. If the aforesaid facts are kept in mind, it cannot be
disputed that the act of the appellant would certainly
constitute an offence of rape and leaves no amount of
doubt in our mind.”
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parminder @ Ladka Pola
Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) : (2014) 2 SCC 592 has held as under:
“10. PW-15, the doctor who conducted the medical
examination of the prosecutrix on 31.01.2001, however,
has stated that there was no sign of injury on the
prosecutrix and the hymen was found intact. The High
Court has considered this evidence and has held that the
non-rupture of hymen is not sufficient to dislodge the
theory of rape and has relied on the following passage
from Modi in Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology (Twenty
First Edition):
“Thus, to constitute the offence of rape it is not
necessary that there should be complete penetration
of penis with emission of semen and rupture of
hymen. Partial penetration of the penis within the
Labia majora or the vulva or pudenda with or
without emission of semen or even an attempt at
penetration is quite sufficient for the purpose of the
law. It is, therefore, quite possible to commit legally
the offence of rape without producing any injury to
the genital or leaving any seminal stains.”
11. Section 375, IPC, defines the offence of ‘rape’ and the
Explanation to Section 375, IPC, states that penetration is
sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to
the offence of rape. This Court has accordingly held in
Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2010) 2 SCC 9]
that even the slightest penetration is sufficient to make out
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[2025:RJ-JD:13201-DB] (21 of 26) [CRLA-339/1994]
an offence of rape and depth of penetration is immaterial.
In the aforesaid case, this Court has relied on the very
same passage from Modi in Medical Jurisprudence and
Toxicology (Twenty Second Edition) quoted above. In the
present case, even though the hymen of the prosecutrix
was not ruptured the High Court has held that there was
penetration which has caused bleeding in the private parts
of the prosecutrix as would be evident from the fact that
the underwear of the prosecutrix was stained by blood. In
our considered opinion, the High Court was right in holding
the appellant guilty of the offence of rape and there is no
merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant that there was only an attempt to rape and not
rape by the appellant.”
24. As per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the cases of Wahid Khan (supra) and Parminder (supra) even
the slightest penetration is sufficient to prove the offence of rape
and the depth of penetration is immaterial. Furthermore, the
absence of semen in the vaginal swab and non-rupture of the
hymen do not negate the theory of rape.
25. In the present case, the incident took place on
29.07.1992 at 05:00 PM and the FIR was lodged on 30.08.1992 at
02:00 PM, but there is no evidence on record to suggest that the
buses were available all the time from the place of incident i.e.
village Prempura to the Police Station Suratgarh and, thus, there
is no ground to disbelieve the testimonies of the
prosecutrix/victim and her husband regarding unavailability of
transport at night. It is an accepted situation that the report of the
incident was lodged on the second day of the alleged incident due
to lack of money and means of transport at night. In such
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[2025:RJ-JD:13201-DB] (22 of 26) [CRLA-339/1994]
circumstances, it appears that neither the report of the incident
was lodged deliberately nor with an intention to falsely implicate
the accused/appellant. In cases like rape, if the incident is not
reported on the same day, then it cannot be considered fatal for
the prosecution. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
cases of (i) Motilal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh : (2008) 11
SCC 20 and (ii) Lokmal @ Loku Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
(Criminal Appeal No.325/2011 decided on 07.03.2025) :
2025 INSC 344 has laid down the principle that if the delay in
filing the complaint or FIR is adequately explained then it cannot
be fatal to the case of the prosecution. The Court has also held
that if there is no strong motive for making false allegations, the
sole testimony of the prosecutrix/victim can be accepted as
credible. The relevant part of the judgment rendered in the case
of Lokmal @ Loku (supra) reads as under :
“11. Merely because in the medical evidence, there are no
major injury marks, this cannot a be a reason to discard
the otherwise reliable evidence of the prosecutrix. It is not
necessary that in each and every case where rape is
alleged there has to be an injury to the private parts of the
victim and it depends on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. We reiterate that absence of injuries on the
private parts of the victim is not always fatal to the case of
the prosecution. According to the version of the
prosecutrix, the accused overpowered her and pushed her
to bed in spite of her resistance and gagged her mouth
using a piece of cloth. Thus, considering this very aspect, it
is possible that there were no major injury marks. The
appellant made an attempt to raise the defence of false
implication, however, he was unable to support his defence
by any cogent evidence. Ld. counsel for the appellant
further submitted that there is an inordinate delay in(Downloaded on 02/04/2025 at 09:49:09 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:13201-DB] (23 of 26) [CRLA-339/1994]lodging complaint and registering FIR. However,
considering the evidence on record, we are of the opinion
that the said delay in lodging of the complaint and
registering FIR has been sufficiently explained and is not
fatal to the case of the prosecution.”
26. According to the testimonies of the prosecutrix/victim, no
one was present at the scene of crime; however, just because
three witnesses viz. Daulatram PW-3, Manaram PW-4, Jaswant
Singh PW-8, turned hostile, it cannot be said that the prosecution
story is unreliable and this aspect has been dealt with by the
learned trial court in its impugned judgment, which is not required
to be reiterated. No documentary evidence has been presented by
the accused/appellant to prove that he has been falsely
implicated. The prosecutrix/victim has not filed a false case and
this aspect has also been considered by the learned trial court vide
the impugned judgment. There is no basis on record to interfere
with it.
27. Also, the prosecution story cannot be considered doubtful
merely because the other investigating officer of the case was not
examined. The same has also been dealt with in detail by the trial
court in its impugned judgment.
28. From a bare perusal of the record, it is clear that the
accused/appellant committed the act of penetration upon the
prosecutrix/victim without her will and consent and this fact has
been confirmed by the testimony of the prosecutrix/victim as well
as by the medical evidence.
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[2025:RJ-JD:13201-DB] (24 of 26) [CRLA-339/1994]
29. So far as the injuries found on the body of the
prosecutrix/victim are concerned, the same have also been
confirmed by the testimony of Dr. O.P. Sharma PW-5.
30. As far as human semen stains detected on the salwar
worn by the prosecutrix/victim at the time of the incident are
concerned, the accused/appellant has not refuted the statement of
the prosecutrix/victim, the Examination Report of Rape Exhibit-P/5
prepared by Dr. O.P. Sharma PW-5 and the FSL Report
Exhibit-P/12.
31. It is not clear that the accused/appellant has falsely been
implicated in this case. In our opinion, from the evidence available
on record, the learned trial Court has not committed any illegality
in convicting the accused/appellant under Section 376 of IPC.
32. Regarding the conviction of the appellant/accused under
Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, it is observed that the
prosecution has failed to produce any evidence showing that the
accused/appellant committed rape upon the prosecutrix/victim
knowing that she belonged to the Scheduled Castes. Furthermore,
the prosecution did not examine any witnesses to establish that
the accused/appellant was aware that the prosecutrix/victim was a
member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. In the absence
of any such evidence on record, in our opinion, the learned trial
Court has committed a grave error in convicting the
accused/appellant under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
33. On the basis of the above discussion, the appeal filed by
the accused/appellant is partially accepted and thus, the accused/
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[2025:RJ-JD:13201-DB] (25 of 26) [CRLA-339/1994]
appellant is hereby acquitted for the offence under Section 3(2)(v)
of SC/ST Act.
34. As far as the sentence is concerned, it is an accepted
position that the incident took place in August 1992 and
approximately 33 years have been elapsed since then. At the time
of the incident, the prosecutrix/victim was 21 years old, and as
per remand papers, the accused/appellant was 30 years old. Thus,
the accused/appellant has served 33 years of trial.
35. In light of the aforesaid observations and in view of the
precedent law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Mallan @ Rajan Kani Vs. State of Kerala (Arsing out of
SLP (Crl.) No.7003/2024, decided on 03.09.2024), the
present appeal is partly allowed, while modifying the impugned
judgment dated 04.07.1994. Accordingly, the impugned judgment
dated 04.07.1994 is quashed and set aside only to the extent of
the accused/appellant’s conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the
SC/ST Act, and he is hereby acquitted of the said offence.
35.1. As regards, the sentence of Life Imprisonment, as
awarded to the accused/appellant for his conviction under Section
376 of IPC, the same is reduced to 10 years rigorous
imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs.100/-, in default of which,
the accused/appellant shall undergo further one month’s simple
imprisonment. The accused/appellant shall be entitled to the
benefit under Section 428 Cr.P.C.
35.2. The accused/appellant is on bail, in pursuance of the order
dated 19.08.1994 passed by this Hon’ble Court in D.B. Criminal
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[2025:RJ-JD:13201-DB] (26 of 26) [CRLA-339/1994]
Misc. Bail Application No.340/1994. His bail bonds stand forfeited/
cancelled. The accused/appellant is directed to be taken into
custody forthwith, to be sent to the concerned Jail, to serve out
the period of the sentence, in pursuance of the present judgment.
36. The record of the learned trial court be sent back
forthwith.
(CHANDRA PRAKASH SHRIMALI),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
Abhishek Kumar
S.S.No.1
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