Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Samsuddin Laskar & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 10 January, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 3001 of 2023
SAMSUDDIN LASKAR & ORS.
VS.
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
For the Petitioners : M. Niladri Sekhar Ghosh,
Mr. Sutanuka Chowdhury.
For the State : Mr. Debasish Roy, ld. P.P.,
Mr. Kunal Ganguly.
For the Opposite Party No.2 : None.
Hearing concluded on : 17.12.2024
Judgment on : 10.01.2025
SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. :
1. The present revisional application has been preferred praying for
quashing of the proceeding arising out of Baruipore PS case
no.560 dated 15.03.2019 under Section 302 read with Section
34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Chargesheet submitted
under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 corresponding to GR case no.1894 of 2019, SC-
168/23 pending before the learned Assistant Sessions Judge,
2nd Court, Baruipore, South 24 Paraganas.
Page 2
2. The written complaint in the present case is dated
11.03.2019. In the said complaint it has been alleged that the
date of the incident in the present case is 29.04.2010.
3. From the written complaint it appears that the victim allegedly
died on being given poison by the neighbours about 9 years
back. The opinion of the doctor in the postmortem report in the
present case has been kept pending for receipt of the chemical
examination report of the viscera. The post mortem report is
dated 30.04.2010 and it refers to a postmortem being conducted
in respect of Inquest No.224 dated 30.04.2010. No external or
internal injury was noted by the doctor. Admittedly, the
complaint has been registered after nine longs years.
4. From the case diary it appears at page 38 it is noted that:-
“this time U/D constable Jaydeb Kayal return to PS
and informed me that Baniapukur PS is unable to
identify the viscera of deceased Jahangir Mondal.”
As such, the chemical examination report is unavailable.
5. Chargesheet in the present case has been filed for the
offence under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
Page 3
6. The Supreme Court in CBI Vs. Aryan Singh, Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1025-1026 of 2023, (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.
12794-12795 of 2022), it was held:-
“4. Having gone through the impugned common
judgment and order passed by the High Court
quashing the criminal proceedings and discharging
the accused, we are of the opinion that the High
Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in quashing
the entire criminal proceedings in exercise of the
limited powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or in
exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
4.1 From the impugned common judgment and order
passed by the High Court, it appears that the High
Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if,
the High Court was conducting a mini trial and/or
the High Court was considering the applications
against the judgment and order passed by the
learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the
cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge
and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while
exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the
Court is not required to conduct the mini trial. The
High Court in the common impugned judgment and
order has observed that the charges against the
accused are not proved. This is not the stage where
the prosecution / investigating agency is/are
required to prove the charges. The charges are
required to be proved during the trial on the basis of
the evidence led by the prosecution / investigating
agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially
erred in going in detail in the allegations and the
material collected during the course of the
investigation against the accused, at this stage. At
the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Court has a
very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider
“whether any sufficient material is available to
proceed further against the accused for which the
accused is required to be tried or not”.
4.2 One another reason pointed by the High Court is
that the initiation of the criminal proceedings /
Page 4
proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required
to be noted that the investigation was handed over
to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the
High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the
investigation, the accused persons have been
chargesheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred
in observing at this stage that the initiation of the
criminal proceedings / proceedings is malicious.
Whether the criminal proceedings was/were
malicious or not, is not required to be considered at
this stage. The same is required to be considered at
the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage,
what is required to be considered is a prima facie
case and the material collected during the course of
the investigation, which warranted the accused to be
tried.”
7. The Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR
2012 SC (Cri) 1796, it was held:-
“57. The position that emerges from the above
discussion can be summarised thus: the power of
the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or
FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power
given to a criminal court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with
the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to
secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of
the process of any Court. In what cases power to
quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R
may be exercised where the offender and victim
have settled their dispute would depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case and no category can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such
power, the High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even
though the victim or victim’s family and the offender
have settled the dispute. Such offences are not
private in nature and have serious impact on
society. Similarly, any compromise between the
victim and offender in relation to the offences under
Page 5special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants while
working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any
basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving
such offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour
stand on different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership
or such like transactions or the offences arising out
of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved
their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High
Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the offender
and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and
bleak and continuation of criminal case would put
accused to great oppression and prejudice and
extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal case despite full and complete
settlement and compromise with the victim. In other
words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice
to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of
justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to
an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is
in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its
jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
8. The present case is for quashing of the proceedings under
Section 306/34 of Indian Penal Code.
9. The Supreme Court in Daxaben Vs The State of Gujarat &
Ors., Criminal Appeal No……of 2022, on July 29, 2022, held
that:-
Page 6
“14. The proposition of law enunciated and/or re-
enunciated in the judgments cited above are well
settled. Whether the acts alleged would constitute
an offence, would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of the case. Each case has to be
judged on its own merits.
16. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the
question of whether there was any direct or indirect
act of incitement to the offence of abetment of
suicide, since the High Court has not gone into that
question. Suffice it to mention that even an indirect
act of incitement to the commission of suicide would
constitute the offence of abetment of suicide under
Section 306 of the IPC.
20. In the aforesaid judgment, the High Court
referred to an order dated 6 th December 2019
passed by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Crl.
Appeal No.1852 of 2019 (New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. v. Krishna Kumar Pandey) where this Court
held that in a revision arising out of conviction, the
High Court could not have sealed the right of the
employer to take disciplinary action against the
accused for misconduct in accordance with the
Service Rules.
21. In Krishna Kumar Pandey (supra) this Court
referred with approval, to the judgment of this Court
in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh
Bhullar and Ors. where this Court held that the
High Court was not denuded of inherent power to
recall a judgment and/or order which was without
jurisdiction, or in violation of principles of natural
justice, or passed without giving an opportunity of
hearing to a party affected by the order or where an
order was obtained by abusing the process of Court
which would really amount to its being without
jurisdiction. Inherent powers can be exercised to
recall such orders.
24. Be that as it may, since the initial order dated
20th October 2020 is also under challenge in these
appeals, it is really not necessary for this Court to
delve deeper into the question of whether a final
order passed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
quashing an FIR could have, at all, been recalled by
the High Court, in the absence of any specific
provision in the Cr.P.C. for recall and/or review of
such order. The High Court has, in effect, held that
Page 7
in exceptional circumstances, such orders can be
recalled, in exercise of the inherent power of the
High Court, to prevent injustice.
25. The only question in this appeal is whether the
Criminal Miscellaneous Applications filed by the
accused under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could have
been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 of the
IPC for abetment to commit suicide, entailing
punishment of imprisonment of ten years, could
have been quashed on the basis of a settlement
between the complainant and the accused named in
the FIR. The answer to the aforesaid question
cannot, but be in the negative.
28. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P., this
Court held that inherent jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself.
29. In exceptional cases, to prevent abuse of the
process of the Court, the High Court might in
exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482
quash criminal proceedings. However, interference
would only be justified when the complaint did not
disclose any offence, or was patently frivolous,
vexatious or oppressive, as held by this Court in
Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar.
30. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram
Kishan Rohtagi and Others., a three-Judge Bench
of this Court held:-
“6. It may be noticed that Section 482 of the present
Code is the ad verbatim copy of Section 561- A of the
old Code. This provision confers a separate and
independent power on the High Court alone to pass
orders ex debito justitiae in cases where grave and
substantial injustice has been done or where the
process of the court has been seriously abused. It is
not merely a revisional power meant to be exercised
against the orders passed by subordinate courts. It
was under this section that in the old Code, the High
Courts used to quash the proceedings or expunge
uncalled for remarks against witnesses or other
persons or subordinate courts. Thus, the scope,
ambit and range of Section 561-A (which is now
Section 482) is quite different from the powers
conferred by the present Code under the provisions
Page 8of Section 397. It may be that in some cases there
may be overlapping but such cases would be few
and far between. It is well settled that the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the present Code can
be exercised only when no other remedy is available
to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is
provided by the statute. Further, the power being an
extraordinary one, it has to be exercised sparingly. If
these considerations are kept in mind, there will be
no inconsistency between Sections 482 and 397(2)
of the present Code.
7. The limits of the power under Section 482 were
clearly definedby this Court in Raj Kapoor v. State
[(1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] where Krishna
Iyer, J. observed as follows : [SCC para 10, p. 47 :
SCC (Cri) p. 76]
“Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of
law when a specific provision is made : easy resort
to inherent power is not right except under
compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence
of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not
invade areas set apart for specific power under the
same Code.”
8. Another important consideration which is to be
kept in mind is as to when the High Court acting
under the provisions of Section 482 should exercise
the inherent power insofar as quashing of criminal
proceedings are concerned. This matter was gone
into in greater detail in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna
Shivalingappa Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976
SCC (Cri) 507 : 1976 Supp SCR 123 : 1976 Cri LJ
1533] where the scope of Sections 202 and 204 of
the present Code was considered and while laying
down the guidelines and the grounds on which
proceedings could be quashed this Court observed
as follows : [SCC para 5, p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp. 511-
12]
“Thus it may be safely held that in the following
cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process
against the accused can be quashed or set aside:
(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or
thestatements of the witnesses recorded in support
of the same taken at their face value make out
absolutely no case against the accused or the
complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients
of an offence which is alleged against the accused;
Page 9
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are
patentlyabsurd and inherently improbable so that no
prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate
inissuing process is capricious and arbitrary having
been based either on no evidence or on materials
which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental
legaldefects, such as, want of sanction, or absence
of a complaint by legally competent authority and
the like.
The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative
and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate
contingencies where the High Court can quash
proceedings.”
9. Same view was taken in a later decision of this
Court in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar
[(1977) 1 SCC 505 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 132 : (1977) 2
SCR 357 : 1977 Cri LJ 1146] where Bhagwati, J.
speaking for the Court observed as follows : [SCC
para 2, p. 506 : SCC (Cri) p. 133]
“It is now settled law that where the allegations set
out in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not
constitute any offence, it is competent to the High
Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking
cognizance of the offence.
10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings
against an accused in the initial stages can be
quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the
papers accompanying the same, no offence is
constituted. In other words, the test is that taking
the allegations and the complaint as they are,
without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence
is made out then the High Court will be justified in
quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers
under Section 482 of the present Code.”
31. As held by this Court in State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Gourieshetty Mahesh, the High Court,
while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C, would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry into whether the evidence is reliable or not
Page 10
or whether there is reasonable possibility that the
accusation would not be sustained.
32. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttrakhand,
this Court held:–
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious.
This power is to be used sparingly and only for the
purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether
a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not
depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein.
Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are
present or not has to be judged by the High Court.
…”
33. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, a three Judge
Bench of this Court summarized the law with regard
to quashing of criminal proceedings under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court held:–
“7. The legal position is well settled that when a
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be
quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as made
prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the
court to take into consideration any special features
which appear in a particular case to consider
whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice
to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the
basis that the court cannot be utilised for any
oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the
court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak
and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be
served by allowing a criminal prosecution to
continue, the court may while taking into
consideration the special facts of a case also quash
the proceeding even though it may be at a
preliminary stage.”
34. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal, this Court observed:–
“46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution
is not used as an instrument of harassment or for
seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to
pressurise the accused. On analysis of the
aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is
neither possible nor desirable to lay down an
inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of
Page 11inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High
Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to
be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
and only when it is justified by the tests specifically
laid down in the statute itself and in the
aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal
position, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained.”
35. It is a well settled proposition of law that
criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified, is not
vitiated on account of malafides or vendetta. As said
by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Punjab v. Gurdial
Singh “if the use of the power for the fulfilment of a
legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by
malice is not legicidal.”
36. In Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay Sharma
& Others, this Court observed that Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C. is designed to achieve the purpose of
ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted
to degenerate into weapons of harassment.
37. Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of
abetment to commit suicide is a grave, non-
compoundable offence. Of course, the inherent
power of the High Court under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C. is wide and can even be exercised to quash
criminal proceedings relating to non-compoundable
offences, to secure the ends of justice or to prevent
abuse of the process of Court. Where the victim and
offender have compromised disputes essentially civil
and personal in nature, the High Court can exercise
its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash
the criminal proceedings. In what cases power to
quash an FIR or a criminal complaint or criminal
proceedings upon compromise can be exercised,
would depend on the facts and circumstances of the
case.
38. However, before exercising its power under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal
complaint and/or criminal proceedings, the High
Court, as observed above, has to be circumspect and
have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. Heinous or serious crimes, which are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on
society cannot be quashed on the basis of a
compromise between the offender and the
complainant and/or the victim. Crimes like murder,
Page 12
rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetment to commit
suicide are neither private nor civil in nature. Such
crimes are against the society. In no circumstances
can prosecution be quashed on compromise, when
the offence is serious and grave and falls within the
ambit of crime against society.
39. Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints
relating to grave and serious offences only on basis
of an agreement with the complainant, would set a
dangerous precedent, where complaints would be
lodged for oblique reasons, with a view to extract
money from the accused. Furthermore, financially
strong offenders would go scot free, even in cases of
grave and serious offences such as murder, rape,
brideburning, etc. by buying off
informants/complainants and settling with them.
This would render otiose provisions such as Sections
306, 498A, 304-B etc. incorporated in the IPC as a
deterrent, with a specific social purpose.
40. In Criminal Jurisprudence, the position of the
complainant isonly that of the informant. Once an
FIR and/or criminal complaint is lodged and a
criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a
matter between the State and the accused. The
State has a duty to ensure that law and order is
maintained in society. It is for the state to prosecute
offenders. In case of grave and serious
noncompoundable offences which impact society, the
informant and/or complainant only has the right of
hearing, to the extent of ensuring that justice is done
by conviction and punishment of the offender. An
informant has no right in law to withdraw the
complaint of a noncompoundable offence of a grave,
serious and/or heinous nature, which impacts
society.
41. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court
discussed the circumstances in which the High
Court quashes criminal proceedings in case of a non-
compoundable offence, when there is a settlement
between the parties and enunciated the following
principles:-
“58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute
between the offender and the victim has been
settled although the offences are not compoundable,
it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal
Page 13proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice
in the case demands that the dispute between the
parties is put to an end and peace is restored;
securing the ends of justice being the ultimate
guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have
harmful effect on the public and consist in
wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens
the well-being of the society and it is not safe to
leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim
have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim
has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes
have been made compoundable in law, with or
without the permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or
other offences of mental depravity under IPC or
offences of moral turpitude under special statutes,
like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity, the settlement between the offender and
the victim can have no legal sanction at all.
However, certain offences which overwhelmingly
and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen
out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial,
partnership or such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to
dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is
basically to the victim and the offender and the
victim have settled all disputes between them
amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences
have not been made compoundable, the High Court
may within the framework of its inherent power,
quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint
or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such
settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the
offender being convicted and by not quashing the
criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and
ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is
illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will
depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast
category can be prescribed”.
42. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, this
Court held that in case of heinous and serious
offences, which are generally to be treated as crime
against society, it is the duty of the State to punish
the offender. Hence, even when there is a
settlement, the view of the offender and victim will
Page 14
not prevail since it is in the interest of society that
the offender should be punished to deter others from
committing a similar crime.
43. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai
Doshi, this Court held:-
“26. … availing of money from a nationalised bank
in the manner, as alleged by the investigating
agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a
way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as
narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in the
compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It
is a social wrong and it has immense societal
impact. It is an accepted principle of handling of
finance that whenever there is manipulation and
cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these kinds
of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having
overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil character.
The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a
hazard in the financial interest of the society. The
gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic
spine of the nation. …”
44. In CBI v. Maninder Singh, this Court held:-
“17. … In economic offences the Court must not only
keep in view that money has been paid to the bank
which has been defrauded but also the society at
large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a
trivial amount; but the offence with which we are
concerned was well planned and was committed
with a deliberate design with an eye on personal
profit regardless of consequence to the society at
large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground
that the accused has settled the amount with the
bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the
prosecution against the economic offenders are not
allowed to continue, the entire community is
aggrieved.”
45. In State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Vasanthi
Stanley, this Court held:-
“14. … Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is
neither to be considered nor accepted in economic
offences. The submission assiduously presented on
gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the
criminal law is an offence and it does not depend
upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are
certain provisions in CrPC relating to exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 437, etc. therein but that
Page 15altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person
committing a murder or getting involved in a
financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim
discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender
as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a
valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this
case. We say no more on this score.
15. … A grave criminal offence or serious economic
offence or for that matter the offence that has the
potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of
the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground
that there is delay in trial or the principle that when
the matter has been settled it should be quashed to
avoid the load on the system. …”
46. In Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbathbhai
Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others v. State of
Gujrat and Another, a threeJudge Bench of this
Court quoted Narinder Singh (supra), Vikram
Anantrai Doshi (supra), CBI v. Maninder Singh
(supra), R. Vasanthi Stanley (supra) and held:-
“16. The broad principles which emerge from the
precedents on the subject, may be summarised in
the following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of
the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of
any court or to secure the ends of justice. The
provision does not confer new powers. It only
recognises and preserves powers which inhere in
the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High
Court to quash a first information report or a criminal
proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been
arrived at between the offender and the victim is not
the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the
purpose of compounding an offence. While
compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to
quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the
offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal
proceeding or complaint should be quashed in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the
High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power.
Page 16
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court
has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be
exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first
information report should be quashed on the ground
that the offender and victim have settled the dispute,
revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of
each case and no exhaustive elaboration of
principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482
and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has
been settled, the High Court must have due regard
to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and
serious offences involving mental depravity or
offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the
family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature
but have a serious impact upon society. The decision
to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on
the overriding element of public interest in punishing
persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there
may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming
or predominant element of a civil dispute. They
stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of
the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise
from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership
or similar transactions with an essentially civil
flavour may in appropriate situations fall for
quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise
between the disputants, the possibility of a
conviction is remote and the continuation of a
criminal proceeding would cause oppression and
prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set
out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic
offences involving the financial and economic well-
being of the State have implications which lie
beyond the domain of a mere dispute between
private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is
Page 17
involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic
fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
complained of upon the financial or economic system
will weigh in the balance.”
47. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi
Narayan & Ors., a three-Judge Bench discussed
the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down
the following principles:-
“15. Considering the law on the point and the other
decisions of this Court on the point, referred to
hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of
the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the
non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the
Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and
predominantly the civil character, particularly those
arising out of commercial transactions or arising out
of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and
when the parties have resolved the entire dispute
amongst themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involved heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society;
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for
the offences under the special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis
of compromise between the victim and the offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms
Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and
serious offences and therefore are to be treated as
crime against the society and not against the
individual alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC
and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious
impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise
of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the
ground that the parties have resolved their entire
dispute amongst themselves. However, the High
Court would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or
the charge is framed under this provision. It would
be open to the High Court to examine as to whether
Page 18incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake
of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient
evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the
charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the nature
of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted
on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by
the High Court would be permissible only after the
evidence is collected after investigation and the
charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or
during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible
when the matter is still under investigation.
Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and
29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh
[(2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be
read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in
the circumstances stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482
of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in
respect of noncompoundable offences, which are
private in nature and do not have a serious impact
on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the
offender, the High Court is required to consider the
antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the
accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he
had managed with the complainant to enter into a
compromise, etc.”
48. In Arun Singh and Others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh Through its Secretary and Another,
this Court held:-
“14. In another decision in Narinder Singh v. State
of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54]
it has been observed that in respect of offence
against the society it is the duty to punish the
offender. Hence, even where there is a settlement
between the offender and victim the same shall not
prevail since it is in interests of the society that
offender should be punished which acts as deterrent
for others from committing similar crime. On the
other hand, there may be offences falling in the
category where the correctional objective of criminal
law would have to be given more weightage than the
theory of deterrent punishment. In such cases, the
Page 19court may be of the opinion that a settlement
between the parties would lead to better relations
between them and would resolve a festering private
dispute and thus may exercise power under Section
482 CrPC for quashing the proceedings or the
complaint or the FIR as the case may be.
15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have
been laiddown, we are of the view that offences for
which the appellants have been charged are in fact
offences against society and not private in nature.
Such offences have serious impact upon society and
continuance of trial of such cases is founded on the
overriding effect of public interests in punishing
persons for such serious offences. It is neither an
offence arising out of commercial, financial,
mercantile, partnership or such similar transactions
or has any element of civil dispute thus it stands on
a distinct footing. In such cases, settlement even if
arrived at between the complainant and the
accused, the same cannot constitute a valid ground
to quash the FIR or the charge-sheet.
16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be
unjustified inrefusing to quash the charge-sheet on
the ground of compromise between the parties.”
49. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness
of the allegation in the complaint except in
exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear
that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose
any offence.
50. In our considered opinion, the Criminal
Proceeding cannot be nipped in the bud by exercise
of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. only
because there is a settlement, in this case a
monetary settlement, between the accused and the
complainant and other relatives of the deceased to
the exclusion of the hapless widow of the deceased.
As held by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Laxmi Narayan & Ors. (supra), Section 307 of the
IPC falls in the category of heinous and serious
offences and are to be treated as crime against
society and not against the individual alone. On a
parity of reasoning, offence under section 306 of the
IPC would fall in the same category. An FIR under
Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be quashed on
the basis of any financial settlement with the
Page 20
informant, surviving spouse, parents, children,
guardians, care-givers or anyone else. It is clarified
that it was not necessary for this Court to examine
the question whether the FIR in this case discloses
any offence under Section 306 of the IPC, since the
High Court, in exercise of its power under Section
482 CrPC, quashed the proceedings on the sole
ground that the disputes between the accused and
the informant had been compromised.”
In the said case (Daxaben Vs The State of Gujarat &
Ors. (Supra)) the Court set aside the order of the High Court
quashing proceedings under Section 306 IPC in view of
settlement between the parties.
10. In the present case, the case was initially registered under
Section 302/34 of IPC, but charge sheet has been submitted
under Section 306/34 of IPC. The question of abatement is
subject to the evidence during trial.
11. The case has to thus proceed towards trial, in the interest of
Justice. Interference at this stage shall amount to abuse of
the process of law.
12. Quashing a case of such a nature will cause miscarriage of
justice. (Daxaben Vs The State of Gujarat & Ors. (Supra)).
13. CRR 3001 of 2023 is thus dismissed.
14. Trial court to proceed in accordance with law.
15. Interference will be an abuse of process of law.
16. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.
17. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Page 21
18. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for
necessary compliance.
19. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for,
be supplied to the parties expeditiously after due compliance.
[Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.]
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