Bombay High Court
Sanjay Baban Selar vs State Of Maharashtra Through Secretary … on 15 July, 2025
2025:BHC-AUG:18745
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.15111 OF 2023
Sanjay Baban Selar,
age 45 years, Occ. Agri,
R/o. At Post Padali Rajangaon,
Tq. Parner, District Ahmednagar. Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Maharashtra,
Through the Secretary,
Rural Development and Panchayat Raj
Department, Government of Maharashtra,
Mantralaya, Mumbai.
2. Chief Executive Officer,
Zilla Parishad, Ahmednagar,
At Post, Tq & Dist Ahmednagar
3. Block Development Officer,
near B.S.N.L. Office,
Parner, Tq. Parner, Dist. Ahmednagar.
4. Sarpanch,
Grampanchayat Padali Rajangaon,
At Post Padali Rajangaon,
Tq. Parner, Dist. Ahmednagar. Respondents.
...
________________________________________________
Mr. S.B. Rajebhosale, advocate for petitioner.
Mr. S.P. Joshi AGP for respondent no.1.
Mr. K.N.Lokhande, Advocate for respondent nos.2 and 3.
Mr. N.S. Shah, Advocate for respondent no.4.
_________________________________________________
CORAM : S. G. CHAPALGAONKAR, J.
Reserved on : June 13, 2025.
Pronounced on : July 15, 2025.
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JUDGMENT :
–
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by
consent of the parties.
2. Present writ petition takes exception to the order dated
1.9.2023, passed by the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad,
Ahmednagar, upholding the order dated 17.02.2023 passed by Block
Development Officer, Parner thereby confirming order dated
17.10.2022 passed by Sarpanch, Grampanchayat, Padali Rajangaon
thereby dismissing the petitioner from service of Village Panchayat.
3. Brief facts, giving rise to the present petition, are as
under :-
The petitioner was appointed as Peon on establishment
of Village Panchayat, Padali Rajangaon. On 9.1.2012 he was given
appointment order w.e.f. 1.9.2005. Thereafter, he was confirmed in
service.
4. On 26.11.2015, Crime No.182 of 2015 had been
registered against petitioner for offenses punishable under section
354, 337, 323, 504, 506 of Indian Penal Code, alleging that on
26.11.2015 while informant, her mother-in-law and her son were at
Home, petitioner/accused demanded dues of water tax. Informant
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told him that her husband had gone out for some work and on his
return, tax would be paid. However, petitioner threatened her to
disconnect water connection. He caught hold her hands and
outraged modesty. When her mother-in-law intervened, petitioner
pushed her.
5. In deference to registration of FIR, investigation was
completed, charge-sheet was filed and in R.C.C. No.136 of 2016.
Petitioner was put to trial. On conclusion of Trial, learned J.M.F.C.
Parner convicted petitioner for offences under sections 323, 352 of
the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer Rigorous
Imprisonment for one month, but acquitted of the offences
punishable u/s 354, 337, 504, 506 of the IPC.
6. Petitioner filed Criminal Appeal no.15 of 2021 before
Sessions Court. Eventually, substantive sentence was suspended vide
order dated 17.3.2021 till disposal of the appeal. However, on the
basis of conviction recorded by learned J.M.F.C. in R.C.C. No.136 of
2016, respondent no.4 dismissed petitioner from service. Petitioner
filed appeal against dismissal before Block Development Officer, who
affirmed order of respondent no.4. Aggrieved petitioner preferred
revision before the Chief Executive Officer, Ahmednagar, who
dismissed the revision. In backdrop of sequence of events
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mentioned above, present petition is filed assailing dismissal from
service and impugning orders passed by the Appellate and revisional
authorities.
7. It appears that during pendency of this petition, on
30.11.2023, criminal appeal no.15 of 2021 filed by petitioner has
been allowed by learned Sessions Judge, Ahmednagar thereby
setting aside order of conviction and sentence passed by Learned
J.M.F.C. Resultantly, petitioner has been acquitted. Immediately, on
28.03.2024 petitioner submitted his representations to Chief
Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Block Development Officer and
Grampanchayat seeking reinstatement in service, however no action
is taken by them. Accordingly, petitioner amended petition and
incorporated the prayer clause E-1, seeking directions against
respondent no.4 for re-instatement with continuity of service and
full back wages from date of dismissal of in view of the judgment
and order of acquittal, particularly, in view of Rule 11 of Bombay
Village Panchayats Servants (Recruitment and Conditions of
Service), Rules, 1960 (for short Rules of 1960).
8. Mr. S.B. Rajebhosale, learned advocate appearing for
petitioner assails order of dismissal passed by respondent no.4,
firstly on the ground that same has been passed without following
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principles of natural justice as petitioner was not served with show
cause notice or given opportunity of putting his defence. Secondly,
although, petitioner was tried for various offences in R.C.C. No.136
of 2016, ultimately, conviction was recorded only for the offences
under section 352 and 323 of the IPC, which does not involve moral
turpitude. Respondent No.4 wrongly assumed petitioner’s conviction
under section 354 of the IPC, which shows non-application of mind.
Mr. Rajebhosale would further submit that looking to the scheme of
section 61 (1) of Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959, and
Rules of 1960 framed thereunder, dismissal from service cannot be
ordered without looking to nature of allegations and his conduct
leading such conviction. Lastly, he submits that petitioner has been
acquitted by the Appellate Court, therefore, whole basis of
petitioner’s dismissal from service has been vitiated. Eventually,
respondent no.4 is under obligation to re-instate the petitioner. Mr.
Rajebhosale, in support of his contentions, relies upon the
observations of this Court in case of Ashok Govindrao Sardar Vs. The
Chief Executive Officer, Amravati and others reported in 2016(2)
ALL MR 413 and observations of Supreme Court in case of Sahara
India (Firm) Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax Central and another
reported in (2008) 14 SCC 151.
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9. Per contra, Mr. N.S.Shah, learned advocate appearing
for respondent no.4 and Mr. K.N. Lokhande, learned advocate
appearing for respondent nos.2 and 3 justifies impugned orders
contending that conduct of petitioner was unbecoming of the Public
Servant. He was convicted by the competent court on conclusion of
trial and his dismissal from service is consequence of conviction
under service Rules. Mr. Shah by inviting attention of this Court to
Article 311 of the Constitution of India, strenuously submits that, in
case of dismissal from service in deference to conviction on criminal
trial, deliberation or Departmental Inquiry need not be preceded to
dismissal. In such cases adherence to rule of Audi alteram partem
does not require. In support of his contentions, he relies upon
observations of Supreme Court of India in cases of Hari Pada Khan
Vs. Union of India and others reported in (1996) 1 SCC 536 and
Trikha Ram Vs. V.K. Seth and another reported in 1987 (supp) SCC
39.
10. Having considered the submissions advanced, it is
apposite to refer to relevant provisions under the Maharashtra
Village Panchayats Act as well as Rules of 1960 framed thereunder,
which reads thus :-
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The Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959
(specifically Section 61) –
61.(1)] A panchayat may appoint such servants as may
be necessary for the proper discharge of its duties under
this Act and pay their salaries from the village fund. A
Sarpanch may also, in cases of emergency, engage such
temporary servants as he may deem necessary. A
panchayat may, from time to time, by written order, fine,
suspend or dismiss any servant appointed by it; but an
appeal shall lie against any such order passed by the
panchayat to the 6 [Block Development Officer], within
one month from the date of the communication of the
order to the servant. 7 [An application for revision may
be made to the Chief Executive Officer against the
decision of the Block Development Officer in such
appeal: Provided that, no such application shall be
entertained if it is not made within a period of one
month from the date of such decision:
Provided further that, no such appeal or application shall
be decided unless the servant of the panchayat is given
an opportunity of being heard.]
[(2) Without prejudice to the power of a panchayat
under sub-section (1), the State Government may 2
[make rules to regulate recruitment and] the terms and
conditions of service of servants appointed under sub-
section (1).]
11. Plain reading of aforesaid provision shows that the
Panchayat is empowered to appoint servants for proper discharge of
its duties. Panchayat is further empowered to suspend or dismiss
any servant, so appointed, by written order. Any such order passed
by Panchayat is subjected to the decision by the appellate authority
i.e. Block Development Officer and revisional authority i.e. C.E.O.
Similarly, the State Government is empowered to make the rules to
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regulate recruitment and terms and conditions of the services of
servants appointed under sub-section (1).
12. Pertinently, State Government has framed the Bombay
Village Panchayats Servants (Recruitment and Conditions of service)
Rules, 1960 in exercise of powers conferred under section 176 of the
Act. Rule 3 provides for disqualification and reads thus :-
3. Disqualifications :-
No person shall be employed as a servant of the
panchayat, if –
(a) he is not of good character; or.
(b) he has been dismissed for misconduct from the
service of any other panchayat or any local body or from
Government service; or
(c) he has been convicted by a Criminal Court of any
offence relating to elections or involving moral
turpitude.
Similarly, Rule 11 states as under :-
11. Panchayat not to reinstate person convicted in
Criminal Court :-
The panchayat shall not reinstate any panchayat servant
who has been convicted in a Criminal Court unless he is
honorably acquitted in appeal or revision.
13. The harmonious reading of aforesaid provisions
definitely depicts that village Panchayat is empowered to dismiss its
employee, however, there is no specific provision regulating
procedure to be adopted before dismissal on account of conviction is
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ordered. The harmonious reading of section 61 with relevant rules,
depicts that a person who has been convicted by Criminal Court of
an offence involving moral turpitude is disqualified for employment
of servant of the village Panchayat. Therefore, village Panchayat can
certainly dispense service of employee who has incurred
disqualification on conviction for an offense involving moral
turpitude.
14. Now turning back to facts of the present case, it can be
observed that, although petitioner was charge-sheeted for offenses
punishable under sections 354, 337, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian
Penal Code, ultimately, he was convicted only for offenses
punishable under section 352 and 323 and sentenced for
imprisonment of one month. The impugned dismissal order
assumes that petitioner has been convicted for offences under
sections 323 and 354 of the IPC. Even resolution of Panchayat
dated 11.10.2022 erroneously assumes and records that petitioner
has been convicted for such offence. Unfortunately, Chief Executive
Officer, Zilla Parishad, Ahmednagar as well as Block Development
Officer in their communications dated 29.4.2022 and 12.5.2022
instructed respondent no.4 Panchayat to initiate action against
petitioner under section 61 of the Village Panchayats Act assuming
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that petitioner has been convicted for offence punishable under
section 354 and 323 of the IPC. It is, therefore, eminent that action
of petitioner’s dismissal from service was on misconception of fact
that he has been convicted for offence under section 354.
Pertinently, petitioner was not heard or served show cause notice
before passing impugned order of dismissal from service. It is trite
that while considering penalty to be imposed against convicted
employee, Disciplinary Authority will have to take into account
conduct of the delinquent employee, gravity offence committed by
him and its impact i.e. likely to have at the administration. Hence,
it was incumbent upon respondent No. 4 to ascertain if conviction of
petitioner is for offences involving moral turpitude that brings
disqualification against him under Rule 3 of 1960 Rules from
continuing his employment with Panchayat.
15. The term “Moral Turpitude” is defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary as under :-
“Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. In the
area of legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude such as
fraud or breach of trust. Also termed moral depravity.
Moral turpitude means, in general, shameful wickedness-so
extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest, good
morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of
the community. It has also been defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which one
person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people.”
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16. The Allahabad High court in case of Baleshwar Singh
vs District Magistrate and Collector reported in AIR 1959 All 71
elaborated term ‘Moral Turpitude’ thus :-
“The expression `moral turpitude’ is not defined anywhere.
But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness
of character or disposition of the person charged with the
particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person
may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses
vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social
duty which a person owes to his fellow men or to the society
in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain
conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the
society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act
and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his
conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It
will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between
man and man.”
17. In present case, conviction of the petitioner was for
offenses under section 323 and 352 of IPC, which can not be termed
offenses involving moral turpitude. Further, from contents of the
FIR, one can observe that while petitioner was discharging his duty
of recovery of panchayat taxes, on allegations by family members of
the defaulter, offence had been registered. So, in such cases, unless
village Panchayat forms opinion as to nature of allegations and
effect on administration, action like dismissal from service, having
serious impact on petitioner-employee could not have been taken
only on basis of conviction by Court.
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18. In present case, if respondent No. 4 could have provided
opportunity to petitioner to put up his stand before passing dismissal
order, definitely he would have brought to the notice of respondent
no.4 nature of offence for which he has been convicted. Pertinently,
Rule (3) of 1960 rules provides disqualification of employee as a
servant of Panchayat, only when, he is convicted by the Criminal
Court for offenses relating to elections or involving moral turpitude.
Therefore, respondent no.4 could have dismissed petitioner/
employee only on recording satisfaction that he incurred
disqualification in deference to conviction for the offences involving
moral turpitude. In the present case, conviction of petitioner under
section 352 or 323 can not be encompassed within prescribed
disqualification under Rule 3. The impugned order is a non-
speaking order. It only records that petitioner has been convicted
by court. Patently it depicts non-application of mind and arbitrary
exercise of powers vested with Panchayat. There is no deliberation
as the conduct of petitioner leading to conviction. Therefore, this
Court holds that action taken by respondents under section 61 is not
in conformity with constitutional mandate under Article 14 and 21.
19. Although, Mr Shah, learned advocate appearing for
respondent no.4 heavily relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court
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in case of Hari Pada Khan And Trikha Ram (supra), both the cases
are distinguishable on facts from present case.
20. In case of Hari Pada Khan, relying upon provisions of
standing orders, the applicability of principles of natural justice was
dispensed with hence Supreme Court observed that non-observance
of principles of natural justice was not fatal.
21. In case of Trikha Ram referring to Article 311 (2)
Second proviso it is held that civil servant convicted for criminal
offence, not entitled for hearing by disciplinary authority in
Departmental Inquiry before imposing punishment of dismissal.
Even, such observations are in the facts of that case, which are
clearly distinguishable from the present case. Pertinently in case of
Shankar Dass vs Union of India and Another reported in (1985) 2
SCC 358 Supreme court while dealing with Article 311 (2) of
constitution of India observed in para no 7 thus :-
7. It is to be lamented that despite these observations of
the learned Magistrate the Government chose to dismiss the
appellant in a huff without applying its mind to the penalty
which could appropriately be imposed upon him in so far as
his service career was concerned. Clause (a) of the second
proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution confers on the
Government the power to dismiss a person from service “on
the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a
criminal charge”. But that power like every other power has
to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably. Surely, the
Constitution does not contemplate that a Government
servant who is convicted for parking his scooter in a no-
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parking area should be dismissed from service. He may
perhaps not be entitled to be heard on the question of penalty
since Cl. (a) of the second proviso to Art. 311 (2) makes the
provisions of that article inapplicable when a penalty is to be
imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct
which has. led to his conviction on a criminal charge. But the
right to impose a penalty carries with it the duty to act justly.
Considering the facts of this case, there can be no two
opinions that the penalty of dismissal from service imposed
upon the appellant is whimsical.
22. Pertinently, in the present case, conviction and sentence
imposed against the petitioner has been set aside by the appellate
authority during pendency of this petition. However, even without
looking to aforesaid subsequent events, this Court holds that only on
the basis of conviction and sentence imposed in the criminal case
against petitioner for offences which do not involve moral turpitude,
petitioner could not have been dismissed from service that too under
misconception that he has been convicted for the offence under
section 354. It would not be out of place to mention here that
although, employer can dispense services of employee convicted by
Court, employer will have to apply mind to the circumstances
leading to conviction, particularly when conviction is not for grave
offence. Even in such case, employee needs to be given an
opportunity to put up his stand against proposed action based on
conviction. The punishment should be after evolution of conduct
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and impact on administration. None of the above aspects considered
before passing impugned order.
23. In result writ petition succeeds and allowed in terms of
prayer clauses “A” to “E”. Rule is made absolute in above terms. Writ
Petition stands disposed off.
( S. G. CHAPALGAONKAR )
JUDGE
…
aaa- (f)
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