Delhi High Court
Satya Pal Singh vs Union Of India & Ors on 8 August, 2025
Author: Navin Chawla
Bench: Navin Chawla
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 04.07.2025
Pronounced on:08.08.2025
+ W.P.(C) 7892/2023
SATYA PAL SINGH ........Petitioner
Through: Mr.Anil Nariya, Ms.Sumita
Hazarika, Mr.Prakhar Gupta,
Ms. B. Naaz Jain, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Piyush Beriwal,
Ms.Jyotsana Vyas, Ms.Amisha
P.Dash, Advs. for R-1 to 3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
RENU BHATNAGAR, J.
1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner,
invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226
read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the Order
dated 11.01.2023 passed by the learned Central Administrative
Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred as
‘Tribunal’) in the Original Application No. 3263/2016 (hereinafter
referred to as, ‘OA’), titled Satya Pal Singh v. Union of India,
through the Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Ors., whereby the
learned Tribunal dismissed the OA filed by the petitioner, finding no
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infirmity in the Orders dated 23.09.1997 and 28.08.2015 passed by the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, respectively, vide
which the petitioner had been awarded the punishment of compulsory
retirement from service with effect from 30.09.1997.
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. The relevant facts for adjudication of the present petition as
emerging from the record are that the petitioner/Sh. Satya Pal Singh
was initially appointed as a Clerk in the office of the Controller of
Defence Accounts (Air Force), Dehradun (hereinafter referred to as,
‘CDA (AF) Dehradun’) and was subsequently promoted to the post of
Auditor.
3. While serving in the office of CDA (AF) Dehradun, vide
Judgement dated 31.01.1997, the petitioner was convicted by the
Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur, U.P., under Sections
406/498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as,
‘IPC‘), and was sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment (hereinafter
referred to as, ‘RI’) for one year along with a fine of Rs. 1000/- for the
offence under Section 498A IPC, in failure whereof the period of
imprisonment would further extend for another 9 months, and RI for 6
months along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- for the offence under Section
406 IPC.
4. On taking notice of the above, the Disciplinary Authority, viz.
CDA (AF) Dehradun, after following the due procedure under Rule 19
(i) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, vide Order dated 23.09.1997, imposed
upon him the penalty of ‘Compulsory Retirement’ with effect from
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30.09.1997. This Order was upheld by the Appellate Authority, viz.
Controller General Defence Accounts, vide Order dated 23.07.1998.
5. In the interregnum, the petitioner filed an appeal against the
Judgment of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate before the learned
Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, UP, against his conviction in the criminal
case. The learned Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, UP, vide Order dated
05.06.1998, dismissed the said appeal, upholding the Order of the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur, UP, of his conviction,
however, the petitioner was allowed the benefit under the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘PO Act‘) and instead
of incarceration in jail, he was, accordingly, released on probation.
6. Aggrieved of the Order passed by the Appellate Authority with
regard to his departmental enquiry, the petitioner filed OA No.
21/1999 before the learned Tribunal, which was dismissed by granting
the petitioner the liberty to move a review petition.
7. The review petition so filed was then rejected by the
Revisionary Authority, vide Order dated 11.12.2008.
8. The petitioner filed OA 3321/2009 before the learned Tribunal
challenging the Appellate Authority as well as the Revisionary
Authority’s Orders. While allowing the said OA, the learned Tribunal,
vide Order dated 13.07.2010, quashed and set aside the Orders of the
Appellate Authority and the Revisionary Authority’s Orders, and
remitted the matter back to Appellate Authority with a direction to
issue a speaking order.
9. In compliance of the said Order dated 13.07.2010, the Appellate
Authority again upheld the Order of the Disciplinary Authority, vide
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Order dated 12.10.2010.
10. Being aggrieved by the above-mentioned Order dated
12.10.2010 of the Appellate Authority, the petitioner again filed an
OA no. 2067/2011 before the learned Tribunal, which was dismissed
vide Order dated 18.03.2013, stating that the findings of the Appellate
Authority are supported by reasons and are not perverse in any
manner.
11. Challenging the said Order, the petitioner filed a writ petition,
being W.P.(C) No. 3493/2014, before this Court, which was disposed
of vide Order 06.05.2015, with the direction to the Appellate
Authority to pass a punishment Order after considering the case of the
petitioner along with the case of one, Sh. A.K. Dewan.
12. In compliance of the said Order dated 06.05.2015, the Appellate
Authority passed the Order dated 28.08.2015, again upholding the
Order of the Disciplinary Authority, awarding the punishment of
compulsory retirement from service to the petitioner.
13. The petitioner aggrieved with the said Order, filed the OA
3263/2016 before the Tribunal, which has been dismissed vide the
Impugned Order dated 11.01.2023, finding no infirmity in the Order
dated 28.08.2015 passed by the learned Appellate Authority and
holding that the imposition of penalty is at the discretion of the
departmental authorities and the scope of judicial review is limited.
14. Aggrieved by the said Order, the petitioner has approached this
Court through present petition, seeking quashing of the Impugned
Order dated 11.01.2023 passed by the learned Tribunal and further to
quash the Order dated 23.09.1997 whereby the petitioner was awarded
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the punishment of compulsory retirement and seeking reinstatement of
the petitioner back in service along with full back wages from the date
of removal till the date of his retirement with all consequential
benefits.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has
questioned the correctness of the view expressed in the Impugned
Order dated11.01.2023, asserting that the learned Tribunal gravely
erred in not taking into consideration that the Appellate Authority
failed to comply with the Order dated 06.05.2015 passed by this Court
in W.P. (C)3493/2014 in passing the Order impugned before the
learned Tribunal therein.
16. The core submission advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the penalty of compulsory retirement imposed upon
him is grossly disproportionate, particularly when compared to the
lesser penalties awarded to other similarly placed delinquent. It is
further submitted that, pursuant to the directions issued by this Court
vide Order dated 06.05.2015, whereby the respondents were directed
to reconsider the petitioner’s case in light of the case of one Mr. A.K.
Dewan, a fresh enquiry was to be undertaken. Without due
consideration of the enquiry report, the petitioner’s conduct, and the
representation submitted by him, the respondents proceeded to pass an
order of dismissal and upheld the Order 27.03.1997 passed by the
Disciplinary Authority.
17. The learned counsel further submitted that the mala fides on the
part of the respondent is evident from the fact that the punishment
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imposed upon the petitioner has been set aside on two earlier
occasions–first by the learned Tribunal vide Order dated 13.07.2010,
and subsequently by this Court vide Order dated 06.05.2015, however,
despite the matter being remanded each time, the Appellate Authority
has mechanically reiterated its earlier orders without proper
reappraisal, thereby rendering the remand proceedings as an empty
formality.
18. The learned counsel further places reliance on the Judgement of
the Supreme Court in Lucknow Kshatriya Gramin Bank (Now
Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) & Anr. v. Rajendera
Singh, AIR 2013 SC 3540, submitting that although there is limited
judicial review available to interfere with the punishment imposed by
the Disciplinary Authority, the same is necessitated in cases where the
co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the Disciplinary
Authority even when the charges of misconduct was identical or the
co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. The learned
counsel further places reliance on the Judgement of the Supreme
Court in Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj v. Bank of India and Ors., AIR
2019 SC 2075.
19. He submits that in the present case, the petitioner was charged
for demanding dowry and failure to return the streedhan to his wife
whereas, in the case of Sh. A.K Dewan, he was charged with treating
his wife with cruelty which ultimately drove her to take her life by
committing suicide. While Sh. A.K Dewan was let off with a penalty
of reduction in rank, the petitioner was penalised by compulsorily
retiring him from service.
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20. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the respondent
while imposing punishment should have acted in a fair and just
manner. He places reliance on the Judgement of the Supreme Court in
Shankar Dass v. Union of India and Anr., (1985) 2 SCC 358.
21. He states that as per the Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965,
there should have been an active application of mind by the
Disciplinary Authority after considering the entire circumstances in
order to decide the nature and extent of penalty to be imposed on
delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. He
submits that his conviction under Section 498A and 406 IPC cannot
amount to charge of moral turpitude and has no relevance to his
service.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
22. The learned counsel appearing on the behalf of the respondent,
while refuting the pleas raised on behalf of the petitioner, submitted
that allegations levelled against the petitioner were grave in nature and
the charges against him were proved beyond reasonable doubt leading
to his conviction in the criminal case.
23. He further submits that the learned Sessions Judge in its
appellate jurisdiction, vide Order dated 05.06.1998, confirmed the
conviction of the petitioner and instead of incarceration of the
petitioner, he was given the benefit of the first offender under PO Act.
He submits that, however, this had no difference on the penalty of
‘Compulsory Retirement’ as the petitioner was not completely
exonerated of the charges. He submits that when a Government
servant has been convicted on grounds of moral turpitude, there is
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ample justification for holding the view that retention of such
individual in public service is not desirable in terms Rule 19 of CCS
(CCA) Rules, 1965. To this effect, he places reliance on the
Judgement of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ramesh
Kumar, (1997) 7 SCC 514.
24. The learned counsel submits that Section 12 of the PO Act
merely states that a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with
under the provisions of Section 4 thereof, shall not suffer any
‘disqualification’, which has not happened in the present case. He
highlights that the purpose of Section 12 of the PO Act, therefore, is
not to exonerate the offender from departmental punishment.
25. He further submits the petitioner’s claim for reinstatement
cannot be sustained, particularly in light of the Judgment of this Court
in Jahan Singh v. Tribal Cooperative Marketing Development
Federation of India Ltd. & Anr., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 406. In the
said case, this Court held that even when an employee is acquitted of
criminal charges on the technical ground of failure to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, such acquittal does not automatically entitle
the individual to reinstatement, especially where concerns remain
regarding the integrity and trustworthiness of the public servant.
26. He further submits that in the present case, the petitioner was
not merely facing a trial, but was convicted in a criminal case. This
fact alone precludes the petitioner from seeking indulgence from this
Court.
27. The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the
Judgment of the Supreme Court in Lucknow Kshatriya Gramin Bank
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(supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is not
applicable to the facts of the present case as the present case is not a
case of co-delinquent being treated differently or being given
preferential treatment. In the present case, the petitioner is trying to
compare his punishment order with that of Mr. A.K.Dewan, who
though faced similar charges, however, cannot be referred as co-
delinquent. He submits that such a comparison is impermissible. The
relevant portion of the said Judgment is reproduced as under-
“It is made clear that such comparison is
permissible only when the other employee(s)
who is given lighter punishment was co-
delinquent. Such a comparison is not
permissible by citing the cases of other
employees, as precedents, in all together
different departmental enquiries.”
28. The learned counsel lastly submits that, in compliance with the
Order of this Court dated 06.05.2015, the Appellate Authority, after
due consideration of all relevant aspects, has imposed a proportionate
penalty upon the petitioner, having duly taken into account the
punishment awarded in the case of Sh. A.K. Dewan, to ensure
consistency and parity in disciplinary treatment. The same was rightly
refused to be interfered with by the learned Tribunal.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
29. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties.
30. In the present case, the petitioner was working as a Clerk in the
Office of CDA (AF), Dehradun. He got married to one Geeta Devi on
27.06.1988 and due to incompatibility, his wife filed a complaint
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under Section 156 (3) the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
implicating the petitioner and his six family members in an FIR
registered under Sections 498A/406A IPC at Police Station Gangoh,
District Saharanpur, UP. The six family members of the petitioner,
however, were acquitted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur,
UP vide Judgment dated 18.03.1997, but the petitioner was held guilty
under Sections 498A/406 IPC and was sentenced to RI for one year
along with a fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine to
undergo imprisonment for 9 months, for the offence under Section
498A IPC and RI for 6 months along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in
default of payment of fine imprisonment for 6 months, for the offence
under Section 406 IPC.
31. The said conviction of the appellant was upheld in the Criminal
Appeal No. 7/1997 before the Sessions Judge, Shahranpur, U.P.,
however, his sentence was reduced considering the facts and
circumstances of the case and the petitioner was given the benefit of
the PO Act. The relevant portion of the Order dated 05.06.1998 of the
learned Sessions Judge, reads as under:
“So far the sentence is concerned I have
considered the arguments advanced by the learned
counsel for the appellant. It has been alleged that
it is the first offence of the appellant and he is in
Government service and the sentence of
imprisonment will effect his service, I am of the
view that instead of sending the appellant to Jail,
he be given benefit of First Offenders Probation
Act with a compensation of Rs. 1000/- to Smt.
Geeta.
ORDER
The appeal regarding conviction is dismissed. The
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section 498 A and 406 I.P.C. is hereby maintained.
So far a sentences awarded by the learned
magistrate are concerned, instead of sending the
appellant to Jail to save his service, he is given
benefit of the First Offenders probation Act and is
released on probation on his executing a personal
bond of Rs. 5000/- with two sureties each of the
like amount to the satisfaction of the Magistrate
concerned for keeping peace and be of good
behaviour for a period of one year and he shall
pay Rs. 1000/- as compensation to Smt. Geeta. In
case of breach of any condition the appellant shall
serve out the sentences awarded by the learned
Magistrate. The appellant is given 15 days time to
file the required bonds.”
(emphasis supplied)
32. Subsequent to the passing of the above-mentioned Order, the
Appellate Authority, vide its Order dated 23.07.1998, confirmed the
penalty of compulsory retirement from service imposed upon the
petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority vide Order dated 13.10.1997,
without taking into consideration that the petitioner had been extended
the benefit of the PO Act.
33. The petitioner challenged the above Order before the learned
Tribunal by way of O.A. No. 21/1999, which was disposed of vide
Order dated 14.11.2007 opining that the petitioner has a remedy of
filing of Revision Petition.
34. The petitioner then filed a Revision Petition, which was
disposed of by the Revisionary Authority vide Order dated
11.12.2008, observing that the petitioner had been convicted on
grounds of moral turpitude and therefore, the penalty was justified.
35. The petitioner challenged the above Order before the Tribunal
by way of OA No. 3321/2009, which was disposed of vide Order
dated 13.07.2010, observing that the effect of the petitioner being
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extended the benefit under the PO Act had not been considered by the
Appellate or Revisionary Authority and therefore, the matter was
remitted back to the Appellate Authority to reconsider the same. We
quote from the order as under:
“7. On perusal of the order passed by the appellate
authority, it appears that despite a specific of
Probation of Offenders Act and release of the
applicant on probation without any sentence
undergone by him, the aforesaid fact has not been
discussed or controverted nor any finding has been
recorded on such a legal plea. The revisional
authority has not considered this aspect of the
matter. Release on probation may have an impact of
removing any disqualification of conviction
regarding service but an apt methodology has been
provided under Rule 19 by the Government DOPT
Vig.dated 30.8.1971 wherein it has been decided
that the oraer of dismissal/removal should be on the
ground on conduct which led to applicant’s
conviction and not the conviction itself. As the
appellate and revisional authorities has not
discharged their obligation to consider the appeal
and grounds raised thereof, the order passed by the
appellate authority which required reasons and
consideration of all the contentions is vitiated as per
the decision of the Apex Court in Chairman,
Disciplinary Authority Rani Laxmi Bai Kshetriya
Gramin Bank Vs. Jagdish Sharan Varshney,
2009(4) SCALE 169.
8. Inequality or differential treatment which amounts
to invidious discrimination is an ante thesis to
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle
also applies to the penalty imposed on a Govt.
servant. There may be circumstances where the
disciplinary authority, by virtue of rank or post held
by the Govt. servant may be different but the
principle enunciated on the basis of charges, more
particularly, in conviction when Mr. Diwan and the
applicant were alleged and convicted on the same
offence. Mr. Diwan had not been undergone
imprisonment, which is not in the case of the
applicant, the cases were footed on identical basis,Signature Not Verified
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yet a discriminatory treatment whereby the conduct
which emanates from the same offence led to a
lesser punishment in case of Sh. Diwan, yet
imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement is the
clear cut case of discrimination in law.
9. Resultantly, OA is allowed to the extent of
quashing the appellate and revisional order. The
matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to
reconsider the above aspect having regard to our
observations and the case law cited by a speaking
order to be passed within three months from the date
of receipt of a copy of this order.
10. It goes without saying that outcome of the
appellate order shall determine the interregnum in
accordance with rules, instructions and law on the
subject. No costs.”
36. The Appellant Authority, however, vide its Order dated
12.10.2010 again reiterated the punishment of compulsory retirement
on the petitioner. In the Order, the Appellate Authority observed that
unlike in the case of Sh. A.K. Dewan, the Court had found evidence
against the petitioner of him having tortured his wife. It was further
observed that these cases, therefore, cannot be treated as identical. As
far as the extension of benefit under the PO Act is concerned, it was
observed that Section 12 of the PO Act is not intended to exonerate
the petitioner from departmental punishment and the punishment of
compulsory retirement imposed on the petitioner does not entail any
disqualification for future employment under the Government and,
therefore, meets the end of justice.
37. Aggrieved of the above Order, the petitioner challenged the
same before the learned Tribunal by way of O.A. No. 2067/2011. The
learned Tribunal by its Order dated 18.03.2013 observed that as far as
the plea of discrimination vis-a-vis the penalty imposed on Sh. A.K.
Dewan is concerned, there was material difference between two cases.
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It was further observed that, in the present case, the basis of award of
penalty was the conduct of the petitioner and not the mere conviction.
The OA was, accordingly, dismissed.
38. The petitioner challenged the above Order before this Court by
way of W.P.(C) 3493/2014, and this Court by its Order dated
06.05.2015 again remanded the matter back for reconsideration for
taking a fresh decision on the quantum of punishment by the
Appellate Authority. Highlighting that the petitioner had been released
on probation while the other similarly placed person, namely, Sh.
A.K. Dewan had remained in jail for 40 days. It was observed that
unlike the petitioner, against Sh. A.K. Dewan; there was a dying
declaration of his wife; and also the statement made by her brother
wherein clear allegations of torture and cruelty had been levelled
against him, the Court observed that, therefore, the Appellate
Authority had not properly appreciated the facts of both the cases.
39. On such remand, however, the Appellate Authority again vide
its Order dated 28.08.2015 reiterated the penalty of compulsory
retirement on the petitioner distinguishing the case of the petitioner
and Sh. A.K. Dewan as under:
“9. WHEREAS, the undersigned has gone through
the Court orders available on record with respect to
Shri Satya Pal Singh and Shri A.K.Diwan and has
after careful scrutiny of both the cases, drawn a
comparison based on findings of the Hon’ble Courts
and other relevant records.
Sl Sh. Satya Pal Singh Sh. A.K.Dewan
No.
The allegation The allegation against
against Shri Satya Shri A.K. Dewan are
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Pal Singh are that he that he demanded dowry
repeatedly from his wife and
demanded dowry pressurized her to bring
from his wife and dowry from her father,
used to mercilessly he did not beat or try to
beat his pregnant burn her. He also did
wife in drunken not abet her to commit
condition and suicide. From the
expelled her out of Judgment of Hon'ble
his house in helpless Court it is observed that
condition. He even he, even suffered burn
went to the extent of injuries to rescue his
confining her in a wife from burning and
room, sprinkling also gave one bottle of
kerosene oil over her blood to save her life.
in order to burn her
and refused to return
stridhan to her. He
was also alleged to
enter into a re
marriage without
divorce from his
wife. It is important
to note that his
mother and other
persons were also
involved in misdeed
of Sh. Satya Pal
Singh. However,
case against mother
(Smt.Chando) was
closed due to her
death during trial
and others, except
Shri Satya Pal
Singh, were
discharged giving
benefit of doubts.
2. Shri Satyapal Singh Shri A. K. Dewan was
was charged and although charged under
convicted under section 306 and 498A of
section 498A and IPC and under section 3
406 of IPC by the 2nd and 4 of dowry
Addl. CJM and Prohibition Act, he was
Hon'ble Session convicted only under
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Judge Saharanpur section 498A of IPC and
vide order dated section 4 of Dowry
30.01.1997 and Prohibition Act vide
05.06.1998 Additional Sessions
respectively. Judge, Meerut order
dated 21.02.1990.
3. Shri Satyapal Singh Shri A.K. Dewan was
was sentenced by the sentenced to a fine of Rs
2nd Addl.CJM, 1000/- besides the
Saharanpur to imprisonment of 40 days
undergo RI for one already suffered by him
year and a fine of during investigation for
Rs. 1000/- for the offence under
offence under section 498A IPC and a
Section 498A IPC fine of Rs. 1000/- for the
and in default of offence under section 4
payment of fine to of the Dowry
further undergo Prohibition Act with
imprisonment for additional imprisonment
nine months. Six for three months in
Months RI and a fine default of payment of
of Rs, 5000/ for fine awarded under
offence under section 498A and also
Section 406 IPC and an imprisonment for
imprisonment for three months for
nine months in nonpayment of fine
default of payment of awarded under section 4
fine. of Dowry Prohibition
Act.
4. The Hon’ble Court In case of Sh. Dewan,
took into Hon’ble Court took
consideration the cognizance of dying
statement of statement of his wife.
witnesses and other
evidences
5. In the case of Shri In the case of Shri A.K.
Satya Pal Singh the Dewan there was no
above conviction appeal against the
awarded by the 2nd conviction.
Addl. CJM,
Saharanpur was
maintained by the
Session Judge,
Saharanpur in its
order dated
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05.06.1998 but
instead of being sent
him to jail to save
his service he was
given benefit of the
First Offender's
Probation Act and
was released on
probation on his
executing a personal
bond of Rs.5000/-
with two sureties
each of the like
amount to the
satisfaction of the
Magistrate
concerned for
keeping peace and
be of good behaviour
for a period of one
year and on paying
Rs.1000/- as
compensation to this
wife. In the case of
breach of any
condition he was to
serve out the
sentences awarded
by the Magistrate.
"
40. The Appellate Authority observed that while there may be
similarity in respect of basic charge, that is, harassment by the spouse
culminating in the registration of the FIR under Section 498A of IPC,
but there is difference in conduct of both the persons and the degree of
actions which led to their respective convictions. It was observed that,
therefore, the two cases cannot be considered equal.
41. Aggrieved of the above Order, the petitioner filed O.A.
No.3263/2016, which has resulted in the Impugned Order. The learnedSignature Not Verified
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Tribunal in its Impugned Order dated 11.01.2023 held that there was
no glaring infirmity which shocks of the conscience of the learned
Tribunal to arrive at a different conclusion with respect to the penalty
imposed on the petitioner and, therefore, dismissed the OA.
42. From the above narration of facts, it would be apparent that this
Court had remanded the matter back to the Appellate Authority for
cumulatively considering the effect of the petitioner being granted the
benefit of the PO Act vis-a-vis Sh. A.K. Dewan who had been
convicted, however, still visited with a lesser penalty.
43. At the outset we may note that the reliance placed by the
learned counsel for the petitioner on the Judgement of Supreme Court
in Lucknow Kshatriya Gramin Bank (supra) is misplaced and
untenable in the present context as the Judgement is distinguishable
from the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, in the said case, the
employees seeking parity in the punishment were co-delinquents,
which is not the case here as Sh. A.K. Dewan was not put on the trial
along with the petitioner in the same case.
44. Be that as it may, it is settled law that the Competent Authority
is expected to exercise its powers under Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India after due caution and considerable application of
mind.
45. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya
Pradesh & Ors. v. Hazarilal, (2008) 3 SCC 273, has held that
conviction for a criminal offence does not imply that dismissal must
be imposed in every case, Disciplinary power must be exercised
reasonably and fairly, keeping in view nature of offence and sentenceSignature Not Verified
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imposed. The relevant portion is reproduced herein under-
“7. By reason of the said provision, thus,
“the disciplinary authority hasbeen
empowered to consider the
circumstances of the case where any
penaltyis imposed on a government
servant on the ground of conduct which
has led to his conviction on a criminal
charge”, but the same would not mean
thatirrespective of the nature of the case
in which he was involved or
thepunishment which has been imposed
upon him, an order of dismissal must be
passed. Such a construction, in our
opinion, is not warranted.
8. An authority which is conferred with a
statutory discretionary power is bound
to take into consideration all the
attending facts and circumstances ofthe
case before imposing an order of
punishment. While exercising
suchpower, the disciplinary authority
must act reasonably and fairly.
Therespondent occupied the lowest rank
of the cadre. He was merely
acontingency peon. Continuation of his
service in the department would notbring
a bad name to the State. He was not
convicted for any act involving moral
turpitude. He was not punished for any
heinous offence.”
46. At this juncture we quote the relevant provisions of the PO Act,
which read as under:
“4. Power of court to release certain
offenders on probation of good conduct.
(1) When any person is found guilty of having
committed an offence not punishable with
death or imprisonment for life and the court by
which the person is found guilty is of opinion
that, having regard to the circumstances of the
case including the nature of the offence and
the character of the offender, it is expedient toSignature Not Verified
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release him on probation of good conduct,
then, notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, the
court may, instead of sentencing him at once
to any punishment direct that he be released
on his entering into a bond, with or without
sureties, to appear and receive sentence when
called upon during such period, not exceeding
three years, as the court may direct, and in the
meantime to keep the peace and be of good
behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such
release of an offender unless it is satisfied that
the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed
place of abode or regular occupation in the
place over which the court exercises
jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to
live during the period for which he enters into
the bond.
(2) Before making any order under sub-
section (1), the court shall take into
consideration the report, if any, of the
probation officer concerned in relation to the
case.
(3) When an order under sub-section (1) is
made, the court may, if it is of opinion that in
the interests of the offender and of the public it
is expedient so to do, in addition pass a
supervision order directing that the offender
shall remain under the supervision of a
probation officer named in the order during
such period, not being less than one year, as
may be specified therein, and may in such
supervision order impose such conditions as it
deems necessary for the due supervision of the
offender.
(4) The court making a supervision order
under sub-section (3) shall require the
offender, before he is released, to enter into a
bond, with or without sureties, to observe the
conditions specified in such order and such
additional conditions with respect to
residence, abstention from intoxicants or any
other matter as the court may, having regard
to the particular circumstances, consider fit to
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impose for preventing a repetition of the same
offence or a commission of other offences by
the offender.
(5) The court making a supervision order
under sub-section (3) shall explain to the
offender the terms and conditions of the order
and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the
supervision order to each of the offenders, the
sureties, if any, and the probation officer
concerned.
xxx
12. Removal of disqualification attaching to
conviction.
Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law, a person found guilty of an offence
and dealt with under the provisions of section
3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification,
if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence
under such law:
Provided that nothing in this section shall
apply to a person who, after his release under
section 4 is subsequently sentenced for the
original offence.”
47. Under Section 4 of the PO Act, the Court is empowered to
release an offender on probation of good conduct instead of
sentencing him to imprisonment, if the offence is not punishable with
death or life imprisonment and the circumstances of the case justify
such leniency. The object of the provision is reformative, enabling the
offender, particularly first-time convicts, to reintegrate into society
without undergoing the rigors of incarceration. Further, Section 12 of
the said Act provides that a person released on probation under
Section 4 shall not suffer any disqualification or disability attached to
a conviction under any other law. Thus, the conviction may stand, but
its adverse legal consequences are neutralized to ensure that the
offender is not permanently handicapped in civil life.
48. It is in this context that the Supreme Court in Shankar Dass
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(supra), has held that in cases where the competent authority has not
applied its mind in a fair, just and reasonable manner in order to assess
what appropriate penalty could have been imposed on an individual
who has been granted benefit under the PO Act, intervention by the
Court is not only justified but also necessary.
49. Applying this principle to the facts of the present case we find
that when a criminal court has extended leniency by granting the
benefit of the PO Act, to the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority’s
decision to impose the one of the harshest departmental penalties of
compulsory retirement appears disproportionate and excessive,
especially if the same is viewed from the point that in the case of a co-
employee, who has been convicted for the same offence, under
Section 498A IPC and was not extended the benefit of PO Act but was
retained in service by the department. This factor should have been
taken into consideration by the Appellant Authority in a just and fair
manner and the upholding of the punishment despite this stark
disparity undermines the principle of proportionality in administrative
justice.
50. At this stage it is also pertinent to mention that each case has to
be examined separately. Hence the Judgement passed by this Court in
Jahan Singh(supra) involving a specific situation of an acquittal on
technical grounds and the implication thereof on the disciplinary
proceedings, cannot come to the aid of the respondents in the present
case.
51. On an overall consideration of the above facts and
circumstances, we find that the view taken by the Competent
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Authority was not justified and the penalty of compulsory retirement
was disproportionate especially given the observations made the
learned Sessions Judge while granting the petitioner the benefit of the
PO Act.
52. One of the options open to us would have been to again remand
the matter back to the Competent Authority of the respondents to pass
a fresh order. However, in the facts of the present case, where we have
already remanded the matter back to the Competent Authority
multiple times, and the Competent Authority has failed to consider the
case wholistically taking into consideration elements of
proportionality and the principles of natural justice,we are of the
opinion that again remanding the matter back to the Competent
Authority shall cause injustice to the petitioner.
53. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate in the peculiar facts of the
present case to set aside the Impugned Order dated 11.01.2023 passed
by the learned Tribunal as well as the Orders dated 23.09.1997 and
28.08.2015 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellant
Authority, respectively.
54. The petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service with effect
from the date of his Compulsory Retirement from service, that is,
30.09.1997, granting him notional seniority and other service benefits
considering him to be in service throughout the period between his
dismissal and the reinstatement. However, we make it clear that the
petitioner will not be entitled to grant of any pay and other
emoluments/allowances for the period between the date of
Compulsory Retirement from service to the date of his reinstatement.
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55. The respondents shall pass the order of reinstatement of the
petitioner in service within a period of eight weeks of the present
order.
56. The petition, along with the pending application, is disposed of
in the aforesaid terms.
RENU BHATNAGAR, J.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
AUGUST 8, 2025/pr/KZ
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Signed By:PALLAVI
VERMA
Signing Date:11.08.2025
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