Chattisgarh High Court
Satyendra Kumar @ Sonu Patel vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 14 July, 2025
1
CRA No.706 of 2016
2025:CGHC:32658
Digitally
signed by
SHOAIB
SHOAIB ANWAR
ANWAR Date:
2025.07.16
10:33:03
NAFR
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 706 of 2016
1 - Satyendra Kumar @ Sonu Patel S/o Govind Patel Aged About 19
Years R/o Purani Basti, Police Station City Kotwali, Baloda Bazar,
District Baloda Bazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Of
Police Station City Kotwali, District Baloda Bazar - Bhatapara
Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
(Cause title taken from CIS)
For Appellant : Shri Tapan Kumar Chandra, Advocate
appears on behalf of Shri Tarendra Kumar
Jha, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : Shri Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer
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CRA No.706 of 2016
Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru
Judgment on Board
14.07.2025
1. This criminal appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C
is against impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 03.05.2016 passed in Special S.T. No. 01/2016 by the
learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Baloda Bazar, District
Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, (C.G.), whereby the appellant has been
convicted and sentenced as under:-
Conviction Sentence
U/s 456 of the IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 01
year along with fine of Rs. 500/-
and in default of payment
additional R.I. for one month
U/s 354 of the IPC and Rigorous imprisonment for 03
Section 8 of the Protection of years with fine of Rs. 1000/-, and
Children from Sexual Offence in default of payment additional
Act, 2012 R.I. for 03 months.
All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
(Fine amount has already been deposited)
2. Case of the prosecution in brief is that on 12.12.2005 at about
04:00 am victim was going to answer the nature’s call, at that time
appellant jumped from terrace into the courtyard of the prosecutrix
and went towards the bathroom and thereafter caught hold of the
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prosecutrix and tried to outrage her modesty. Victim cried and
upon hearing her cry her parents came to the place of incident
and caught the appellant and subsequently FIR (Ex. P/7) was
registered to Police Station City Kotwali, Baloda Bazar.
3. During investigation, Spot Map (Ex.P/2) was prepared. With
regard to date of birth of the Victim, Dakhil Kharij register
(Ex.P/5C) was seized. The mark-sheet produced by the Victim
was seized vide Ex.P/1. Statement of the witnesses were
recorded. Subsequently after completing the investigation, a
charge-sheet under Section 354, 456 of the IPC and Sections 8
of the POCSO Act was submitted before the Court.
4. After framing the charges against the accused/appellant, the
charges were read out and explained to the appellant, he denied
committing the crime and demanded trial.
5. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution has examined
11 witnesses in its support. Statement of the accused/appellant
under Section 313 Cr.P.C was recorded, wherein he has pleaded
his innocence and false implication in the matter. However, no
evidence was adduced by him in his defence.
6. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence
available on record, by its judgment dated 03.05.2016 convicted
and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in paragraph one of
this judgment. Hence, this appeal.
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7. Mr. Tapan Kumar Chandra, learned counsel for the appellant
submits that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the
present case. He would submit that there is discrepancy
between statement recorded u/s 164 of Cr.P.C. and statement
given by the complainant in the court. In the evidence of the
witnesses, it can be seen that there are material contradiction and
omissions. Learned counsel would submit that the prosecution
has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and the
judgment of conviction passed by learned trial court is bad in law
as well as facts available on record.
8. Mr. Shailendra Sharma, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the
State opposes the submissions made by the counsel for the
appellant and submits that the conviction of the appellant is well
merited which does not call for any interference. There is clear
evidence regarding age of the prosecutrix, therefore, this appeal
deserves to be dismissed.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the
record with utmost circumspection.
10. The first question arises before this Court whether the victim was
minor on the date of incident or not?.
11. The Victim (PW8) in her deposition has stated that her date of
birth is 13.09.2000 and she has presented the progress card of
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class 8th ( Ex.-P/1) in which the date of birth of the victim is
mentioned as 13.09.2000.
12. Satyaprakash Pandey (PW3) Principal has deposed in his
statement that with regard to the date of birth of the Victim, the
Dakhil Kharij Register was seized from him. Though this witness
has accepted that the entries at serial No. 11092 in Ex.P/5 has
not been made by him, he has also disclosed that he cannot tell
who came to write down the date of birth of the victim. He further
stated that admission is given on the basis of Transfer Certificate.
however, there was no document with regard to the age of the
Victim. The prosecution has brought on record Class- VIII report
card of the victim to prove the age of the victim, however, there is
no one examined to prove the entries made in the said report
card. Even, there is no medical evidence with regard to actual
age of the victim.
13. Perusal of the aforesaid statements of the witness would show
that though there is entry regarding date of birth of the victim in
the Dakhil Kharij register, but on what basis, the entry was made,
is not mentioned in the register and even the class-VIII report card
of the Victim.
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of
its judgment in Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by
Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385, the Supreme Court has
observed as under:
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“40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16
indicates that the girl’s date of birth was 15th June,
1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid
certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16
years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged
incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate
has been issued by a Government School and has
been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it
would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of
the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of
such a document would be of not much evidentiary
value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the
material on the basis of which the age was recorded.
The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate
would have no evidentiary value unless the person,
who made the entry or who gave the date of birth
is examined.
42. Considering the manner in which the facts
recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in
the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1,
observed as follows:-
“The date of birth mentioned in the scholars’
register has no evidentiary value unless the
person who made the entry or who gave the
date of birth is examined….Merely because the
documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were
proved, it does not mean that the contents of
documents were also proved. Mere proof of the
documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not
tantamount to proof of all the contents or the
correctness of date of birth stated in the
documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely,
the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj
Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the
documents as produced by the aforesaid two
witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth
of the facts or contents of the documents. The
truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely,
the date of birth of the two candidates as
mentioned in the documents could be proved by
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CRA No.706 of 2016admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of
those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth
of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such
kind was produced by the respondent to prove
the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of
Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the
circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in
the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604
have no probative value and the dates of birth as
mentioned therein could not be accepted.”
43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this
Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra
Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as
follows:-
“The legal position is not in dispute that mere
production and marking of a document as exhibit
by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of
its contents. Its execution has to be proved by
admissible evidence, that is, by the “evidence of
those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of
the facts in issue”.”
44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has
not been discharged by the prosecution. The father
says nothing about the transfer certificate in his
evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at
all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can
not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.
48. We may further notice that even with reference to
Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public
document has to be tested by applying the same
standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this
context, it would be appropriate to notice the
observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder
Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:-
“The age of a person as recorded in the school
register or otherwise may be used for various
purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for
obtaining an appointment; for contesting election;
registration of marriage; obtaining a separate
8
CRA No.706 of 2016unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the
purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g.
necessity of being represented in a court of law
by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the
ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not
appropriately represented therein or any
transaction made on his behalf was void as he
was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of
determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party
to the lis, having regard to the provisions of
Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply
the same standard. No different standard can be
applied in case of an accused as in a case of
abduction or rape, or similar offence where
the victim or the prosecutrix although might have
consented with the accused, if on the basis of the
entries made in the register maintained by the
school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the
accused would be deprived of his constitutional
right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that
case the accused may unjustly be convicted.”
15. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:
“33. What emerges on a cumulative
consideration of the aforesaid catena of
judgments is as follows:
33.2. If an application is filed before the
Court claiming juvenility, the provision of
sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act,
2015 would have to be applied or read
along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so
as to seek evidence for the purpose of
recording a finding stating the age of the
person as nearly as may be.
XXXX XXXX
XXXX
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33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is
raised, the burden is on the person raising
the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge
the initial burden. However, the documents
mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of
the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ
Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of
JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima
facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis
of the aforesaid documents a presumption
of juvenility may be raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not
conclusive proof of the age of
juvenility and the same may be rebutted by
contra evidence let in by the opposite side.
33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a
Court is not the same thing as declaring the
age of the person as a juvenile sought
before the JJ Board when the case is
pending for trial before the concerned
criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the
Court records a prima facie conclusion but
when there is a determination of age as per
sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a
declaration is made on the basis of
evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ
Board shall be deemed to be the true age
of the person brought before it. Thus, the
standard of proof in an inquiry is different
from that required in a proceeding where
the determination and declaration of the
age of a person has to be made on the
basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted
only if worthy of such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable
to lay down an abstract formula to
determine the age of a person. It has to be
on the basis of the material on record
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CRA No.706 of 2016and on appreciation of evidence adduced by
the parties in each case.
33.7 This Court has observed that a
hypertechnical approach should not be
adopted when evidence is adduced on
behalf of the accused in support of the plea
that he was a juvenile.
33.8. If two views are possible on the same
evidence, the court should lean in favour of
holding the accused to be a juvenile in
borderline cases. This is in order to ensure
that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made
applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law.
At the same time, the Court should ensure
that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by
persons to escape punishment after having
committed serious offences.
33.9. That when the determination of age is
on the basis of evidence such as school
records, it is necessary that the same would
have to be considered as per Section 35
of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any
public or official document maintained in
the discharge of official duty would have
greater credibility than private documents.
33.10. Any document which is in
consonance with public documents, such as
matriculation certificate, could be accepted
by the Court or the JJ Board provided such
public document is credible and authentic as
per the provisions of the Indian Evidence
Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.
33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole
criterion for age determination and a
mechanical view regarding the age of a
person cannot be adopted solely on the
basis of medical opinion by radiological
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examination. Such evidence is not
conclusive evidence but only a very useful
guiding factor to be considered in the
absence of documents mentioned in Section
94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.”
16. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by
Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under :
“14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly
indicates that the date of birth certificate from the
school or matriculation or equivalent certificate
by the concerned examination board has to be
firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth
certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal
Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in
the absence of these such documents the age is
to be determined through “an ossification test” or
“any other latest medical age determination test”
conducted on the orders of the concerned
authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In
the present case, concededly, only a transfer
certificate and not the date of birth certificate or
matriculation or equivalent certificate was
considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer
certificate showed the date of birth of the victim
as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer
certificate was produced not by the prosecution
but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e.,
CW-1. The burden is always upon the
prosecution to establish what it alleges;
therefore, the prosecution could not have been
fallen back upon a document which it had never
relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned
Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated
on oath that the records for the year 1997 in
respect to the births and deaths were missing.
Since it did not answer to the description of any
class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i)
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as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1
could not have been relied upon to hold that M
was below 18 years at the time of commission of
the offence.
15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court
outlined the procedure to be followed in cases
where age determination is required. The court
was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile
Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia)
with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:
“20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals
with the procedure to be followed in
determination of age. The juvenility of a
person in conflict with law had to be decided
prima facie on the basis of physical
appearance, or documents, if available. But
an inquiry into the determination of age by
the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking
evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation
or equivalent certificates, if available and in
the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth
certificate from the school (other than a play
school) first attended; and in the absence
whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a
corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i),
(ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could
be sought from a duly constituted Medical
Board to declare the age of the juvenile or
child. It was also provided that while
determination was being made, benefit
could be given to the child or juvenile by
considering the age on lower side within the
margin of one year.”
16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile
Justice Act, especially the various options in
Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in
Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar
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Pradesh & Ors that:
“Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date
of birth certificate from the school and the
matriculation or equivalent certificate from
the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735
concerned examination board in the same
category (namely (i) above). In the absence
thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining
the birth certificate of the corporation,
municipal authority or panchayat. It is only
in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age
determination by means of medical analysis
is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a
significant change over the provisions
which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of
the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of
2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the
matriculation or equivalent certificate was
given precedence and it was only in the
event of the certificate not being available
that the date of birth certificate from the
school first attended, could be obtained. In
Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth
certificate from the school as well as the
matriculation or equivalent certificate are
placed in the same category.
17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs.
State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-
judge bench, held that the burden of proving that
someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed
age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that
decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of
documents that would be accepted in order of
preference.”
17. Thus, the evidence brought on record by the prosecution with
regard to the age of the victim cannot be held reliable in absence
of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in the above
judgment.
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18. Now, the questions comes whether the appellant jumped from
terrace into the courtyard of the prosecutrix and went towards the
bathroom and thereafter caught hold of her arm and has tried to
outrage the modesty of the Victim or not?.
19. The Victim (PW8) in her statement has deposed that when she
slept in her house with her mother and siblings at around 04:00
AM, she went to the bathroom in the house, at that time accused
came into her bathroom from the roof and started pressing her
breast by holding her arm then she shouted calling her parents,
her parents came and caught the accused. She has admitted in
her cross examination that during the recording of her statement
under Section 164 of Cr.P.C she stated that when she got up to
answer the nature’s call on the terrace, accused came and twisted
her hand.
20. Mother of the Victim (PW-7) has deposed that she is uneducated
and cannot tell the date. She stated that four months ago at 04:00
AM upon hearing her daughter’s voice, she looked up and saw
the accused standing near the prosecutrix, on seeing them, the
accused tried to run away, then they caught hold of the accused.
She further deposed that her daughter told her that accused had
come to her with a wrong intention.
21. Father of the Victim (PW9) has deposed in his examination-in-
chief that he is sleeping in his room when he heard the scream of
his daughter which was coming from the bathroom situated on the
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first floor, he went there with his wife, the accused was trying to
run away after seeing them. He further deposed that they caught
the accused and asked him how he had come, but the accused
did not answer.
22. After going through the statements of the Victim (PW8), the victim
has categorically stated in her statement recorded under Section
164 of Cr.P.C. that she got up to answer the call of nature and
went to the terrace where the accused came and twisted her
hand, thereafter she screamed and on which her parents came to
the terrace. However, in the cross-examination of Court statement
she has deposed that the accused came into the bathroom from
the roof and started pressing her breast by holding arms.
23. On perusal of her statement, it is apparent that there are
contradictions and creates doubt in the statement of the Victim
because in the statement before the Magistrate she has stated
that the accused came to the terrace and caught hold of her hand,
but no statement has been given by the victim about the physical
abuse and in her cross examination before the Court she has
stated that the accused came to the bathroom and pressed her
breasts by holding the hands. Thus, the act of the Victim does not
inspire the confidence of this Court towards the guilt of the
appellant because of the material contradictions in the statements
and particularly there is doubt in respect of the place of incident.
24. Upon considering the entire evidence available on record, this Court
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found that there are major contradictions and omissions in the
statement of the Victim, which does not inspire confidence over the
credibility of her statement because she had given statement under
Section 164 Cr.P.C contradictory to her statement given before the
trial Court, which in the opinion of this Court, seems unreliable.
25. It is the trite law that a statement recorded under Section 164 of the
Cr.P.C can be relied upon for the purpose of corroborating
statements made by witnesses in the committal court or even to
contradict the same. The Supreme Court in the matter of R. Shaji v.
State of Kerala1 has held as under:-
“27. So far as the statement of witnesses recorded under
Section 164 is concerned, the object is twofold; in the first
place, to deter the witness from changing his stand by
denying the contents of his previously recorded statement;
and secondly, to tide over immunity from prosecution by
the witness under Section 164. A proposition to the effect
that if a statement of a witness is recorded under Section
164, his evidence in court should be discarded, is not at all
warranted.
28. Section 157 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that a
statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C can be
relied upon for the purpose of corroborating statements
made by witnesses in the committal Court or even to
contradict the same. As the defence had no opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses whose statements are
recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., such statements
cannot be treated as substantive evidence. ”
1 (2013) 14 SCC 266
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26. For the foregoing reasons, the accused is acquitted of the charges
for which he was tried. The appellant is reported to be on bail. His
bail bonds are not discharged at this stage and the bonds shall
remain operative for a period of six months in view of Section 481 of
the BNSS. Accordingly, the Criminal appeal is allowed.
27. The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back
immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and
necessary action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Shoaib