Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Seetaben Laghdhirbhai vs The State Of Gujarat on 16 January, 2025
Author: Abhay S. Oka
Bench: Abhay S. Oka
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.771 OF 2016
SEETABEN LAGHDHIRBHAI APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF GUJARAT RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. Heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant and
learned counsel appearing for the State.
2. The present appeal is by accused No.3. The case of
the prosecution is that on 24th April, 2008, the accused
no.1 abducted PW8 (victim) who was a minor studying in 8 th
standard from the lawful guardian of her mother. The
allegation against accused no.1 is that he committed
offence of rape. The allegation against the other accused
is that they aided and abetted accused no.1 in committing
the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’).
2. Accused no.4 is the husband of the appellant.
According
Signature Not Verified
to the version of PW8 (the victim of the
Digitally signed by
offence), she was abducted by accused no.1 on 22nd April,
KAVITA PAHUJA
Date: 2025.01.24
17:59:09 IST
Reason:
2008. The prosecution’s case is that the appellant and her
2husband (accused no.4) are staying in a house owned by
accused no.4 with three children. The appellant and accused
no.4 accommodated accused no.1 and the victim in the said
house. The appellant secured a job to accused no.1 and
PW8. According to PW8, though she requested the appellant
to permit her to leave the house she did not allow her to
leave the house. Her version in the examination-in-chief
is that she had informed the appellant that accused no.1
had lured her and brought her to her house.
The Trial Court convicted accused no.1 for the
offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the
IPC. The appellant and her husband – Accused No.4 were
convicted for the offence punishable under Section 212 read
with Section 114 of the IPC. Both of them were also
convicted for the offence punishable under Section 114 read
with Section 376 of the IPC. The conviction of the
appellant was confirmed by the High Court in appeal.
With the assistance of the learned counsel appearing
for the appellant and learned counsel appearing for the
State, we have carefully perused the evidence on record and
in particular, the evidence of the victim of the offence.
The first question is whether the appellant abetted offence
punishable under Section 376 of the IPC and whether she is
the abettor under Section 108 of the IPC. Section 107
3which defines abetment reads thus:…
107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the
doing of a thing, who—First.—Instigates any person to do that thing;
or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person
or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of
that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes
place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in
order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or
illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful
misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of
a material fact which he is bound to disclose,
voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to
cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said
to instigate the doing of that thing.”
It is pertinent to note that allegation against the
appellant is of abetment of commission of an offence
punishable under Section 376 and not Sections 363 and 366
of the IPC. If we consider the evidence of PW8 (victim),
we find that she has not even made any allegation which
will cover any of the clauses firstly, secondly and thirdly
in Section 107 as far as offence punishable under Section
376 is concerned. Therefore, the conviction of the
appellant for the offence punishable under Section 114 read
with Section 376 of the IPC cannot be sustained.
Now we may come to the offence alleged under section
4
212 of the IPC. Section 212 of the IPC reads thus:
“212. Harbouring offender.— Whenever an offence
has been committed, whoever harbours or
conceals a person whom he knows or has reason
to believe to be the offender, with the
intention of screening him from legal
punishment,if a capital offence.—shall, if the offence is
punishable with death, be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to five years, and shall also
be liable to fine;
if punishable with imprisonment for life, or
with imprisonment.—and if the offence is
punishable with [imprisonment for life], or
with imprisonment which may extend to ten
years, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend
to three years, and shall also be liable to
fine;
and if the offence is punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to one year, and
not to ten years, shall be punished with
imprisonment of the description provided for
the offence for a term which may extend to one-
fourth part of the longest term of imprisonment
provided for the offence, or with fine, or with
both.
[“Offence” in this section includes any act
committed at any place out of [India], which,
if committed in [India], would be punishable
under any of the following sections, namely,
302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397,
398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458,
459 and 460; and every such act shall, for the
purposes of this section, be deemed to be
punishable as if the accused person had been
guilty of it in [India].]Exception.—This provision shall not extend to
any case in which the harbour or concealment is
by the husband or wife of the offender.”
5Offence of harbouring an offender is made out when (a)
an offence has been committed, (b) when the accused
harbours or conceals a person whom he knows or has reason
to believe to be the offender and (c) the harbouring or
concealing must be with the intention of screening him from
legal punishment. Therefore, the knowledge on the part of
the person who has allegedly committed offence under
Section 212 of the IPC of the offence committed by the
person allegedly harboured is a necessary ingredient.
Either there has to be a knowledge that the person
harboured has committed a crime or that the accused had
knowledge of certain facts on the basis of which he or she
had a reason to believe that the person harboured appears
to be an offender. Careful perusal of the examination-in-
chief of the victim shows that the only allegation made by
the victim against the appellant on this aspect is as
under:
“…Thereafter I had talked to Sitaben to
let me go to my house. So Sitaben was not
allowing me to go anywhere outside the
house. I had informed Sitaben that Sunil
had lured and brought me.”Even assuming that the appellant did not permit the
victim to leave her house, no offence under Section 212 of
the IPC is made out. There is only one sentence which
6attempts to impute the appellant with the knowledge of the
offence committed by the person allegedly harboured by her.
The sentence is that the victim had informed the appellant
that accused no.1 had lured her and brought her to the
house of the appellant. However, in the cross-examination,
the victim admitted that
“It is true that in my statement before
the police I had not stated that, I had
informed Sitaben that Sunil had lured and
brought me.
It is not true that Sitaben was not
allowing me to go out, this fact that I am
stating is false. It is not true that I had
asked Sunil to talk to my mother and father,
but Sunil was not allowing me to talk with
them this fact that I have stated is false.
It is not true that after we had descended
from the bus I have not seen the driver ever.
It is not true that I am making false
deposition.”
(Underline Supplied)Thus, the statement made by the victim in her
examination-in-chief that she had informed the appellant
about the illegal act of accused no.1 is an omission. This
is a significant and relevant omission in the context of
allegation of commission of offence under Section 212 of
the IPC. Therefore, it amounts to contradiction which will
be a major one. Therefore, the statement made by the
victim that she had informed the appellant that accused
no.1 has lured her and brought her to the house of the
7appellant appears to be clearly an after thought.
Therefore, even the offence punishable under Section 212
read with Section 114 of the IPC is not proved against the
appellant.
Accordingly, the impugned judgments only insofar as
the appellant is concerned are quashed and set aside and
the appellant is acquitted of the offences alleged against
her. The bail bonds furnished by the appellant stand
cancelled.
We make it clear that we have made adjudication
limited to the allegations made by the prosecution against
the appellant and we have made no adjudication on the role
attributed to the other co-accused who have been convicted
by the courts.
The appeal is allowed on above terms.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
……………………..J.
(ABHAY S.OKA)……………………..J.
(UJJAL BHUYAN)NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 16, 2025.
8
ITEM NO.106 COURT NO.5 SECTION II-B
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Criminal Appeal No(s). 771/2016
SEETABEN LAGHDHIRBHAI Appellant(s)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF GUJARAT Respondent(s)
(IA No. 9112/2016 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT, IA No. 9113/2016 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING
O.T.)Date : 16-01-2025 This matter was called on for hearing
today.
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY S. OKA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYANFor Appellant(s) :
Mr. Haresh Raichura, AOR
Mrs. Saroj Raichura, Adv.
Mr. Kalp Raichura, Adv.
For Respondent(s) :Ms. Swati Ghildiyal, AOR
Ms. Devyani Bhatt, Adv.
Mr. Ojaswa Pathak, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E RThe appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of.
KAVITA PAHUJA) (AVGV RAMU) AR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
[Signed order is placed on the file]
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