Delhi District Court
Sh Adarsh Chaudhary vs The State Of Nct Of Delhi on 25 January, 2025
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
IN THE COURT OF SH. VIJAY SHANKAR,
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE - 04, (WEST DISTRICT)
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
CR NO.:- 156/2023
CNR NO.:- DLWT01-002360-2023
IN THE MATTER OF :-
Adarsh Chaudhary
S/o Late Sh. D.P. Chaudhary
R/o B-9/2, Ring Road, Rajouri Garden,
New Delhi-110015 .... Revisionist
VERSUS
1. The State (NCT of Delhi)
2. Ramesh Sharma
C/o M/s Sharma Kalypso Pvt. Ltd.
23, Community Centre,
Basant Lok, First Floor,
Vasant Vihar, New Delhi-110057
Also at :-
A-10/8, Vasant Vihar,
New Delhi-110057 .... Respondents
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:26:29 -0200
CR No. 156/2023 Page No.1 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Date of institution of the revision petition : 15/03/2023
Date on which judgment was reserved : 09/01/2025
Date of judgment : 25/01/2025
JUDGMENT
1. By way of present judgment, this Court shall
conscientiously adjudicate upon criminal revision petition under
Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) filed by the revisionist
against the order dated 11/01/2023 (‘hereinafter referred to as
‘impugned order’) passed by Sh. Karanbir Singh, Ld. MM
(NI Act-05), West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, in complaint
case No. 14755/2018 titled as ” Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. Ramesh
Sharma & Anr.”.
In the present revision petition, the revisionist has
prayed to call the trial court record, to set-aside the impugned
order dated 11/01/2023 passed by the Ld. Trial Court and to
direct the respondent No.2/accused to pay 1/5th amount of the
cheque in question i.e. Rs.2,00,000/- to the
revisionist/complainant.
2. Brief facts necessary for just adjudication of the
present revision petition as stated in the present revision petition
are that the complainant (revisionist herein) had filed a complaint
case u/s. 138 Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:26:36 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.2 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
as “NI Act“) against the accused (respondent No.2 herein) in
respect of cheque No.629474 dated 20/08/2018 amounting to
Rs.10,00,000/- and the said case is pending before the Ld. Trial
Court. Vide order dated 11/01/2023 passed by the Ld. Trial
Court, the application u/s. 143-A NI Act of the complainant was
dismissed. No other similar application/ petition has been filed
by the revisionist against the impugned order before the Hon’ble
High Court or any other Court.
3. The revisionist has challenged the impugned order
on the grounds, as mentioned in the present revision petition.
Grounds of revision- The impugned order dated 11/01/2023
passed by the Ld. Trial Court is based on conjecture and surmises
and the same is against the law as well as facts of the case. Ld.
Trial Court has failed to consider that the legal notice dated
22/10/2018 issued by the complainant/ revisionist was duly
served upon the respondent No.2 at his address i.e. H.No.A-10/8,
Vasant Vihar, New Delhi-110057 but the respondent No.2 did not
replied the same. Ld. Trial Court has ignored the complainant’s
story of friendly loan of Rs.10,00,000/-. Ld. Trial Court while
passing the impugned order dated 11/01/2023 has wrongly
mentioned that “no delay tactics have been adopted by the
accused till date”, which is against the record. Ld. Trial Court has
issued the summons to respondent No.2 but despite service,
respondent No.2 did not appear and thereafter, NBWs were
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:26:42 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.3 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
issued against the accused/respondent No.2. Even thereafter,
exemption application of accused/ respondent No.2 was filed by
his counsel as accused did not appear before the Ld. Trial Court
and the Ld. Trial Court has imposed the cost of Rs.4,000/- upon
the accused/respondent No.2 vide order dated 03/08/2022.
Impugned order is unsustainable and unwarranted and liable to
be set-aside. Ld. Trial Court has wrongly observed that in the
present matter, accused has not filed any frivolous and false
application to delay the present matter. Upon the service of
summons, accused/ respondent No.2 did not appear and filed
exemption application but the said fact was not considered and
overlooked by the Ld. Trial Court. Ld. Trial Court has committed
grave error while passing the impugned order and dismissing the
application u/s. 143-A NI Act filed by the complainant. Ld. Trial
Court has totally failed to consider that the liability of the
accused/respondent No.2 is independent/exclusive towards the
friendly loan of Rs.10,00,000/- taken by him from the
complainant/ revisionist. Moreover, the proceeding of the present
case u/s. 138 NI Act is criminal in nature, which could be
continued even if proceeding, if any, with regard to any company
is/was pending or going on before the NCLT. Further, case of the
revisionist is of the friendly loan of Rs.10,00,000/-, which was
given to the accused/ respondent No.2 and not to the company of
the accused/respondent No.2. Ld. Trial Court has mixed the
independent and separate liability of the accused/respondent No.2
towards the friendly loan of Rs.10,00,000/-. Case lawDigitally
titled as
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:26:48 -0200
CR No. 156/2023 Page No.4 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
“G.J. Raja Vs. Tej Raj Surana” {7 (2019) SLT 257} was not
appreciated and considered while dismissing the said application.
Ld. Trial Court has wrongly relied upon the judgment as
mentioned in the impugned order. Impugned order is against the
well settled law and judicial pronouncements on the point
involved in the present matter. Accused/respondent No.2 has
failed to put forth the prima-facie defence in his favour and no
document was produced/shown by the accused/respondent No.2
in his favour till date before the Ld. Trial Court. No plausible
defence was shown/given by the accused/respondent No.2 in this
case. Impugned order is perverse in nature and against the
judicial record as well as on the law.
4. This Court heard the arguments on the present
revision petition advanced by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, Ld.
Substitute Addl. PP for the State/respondent No.1 and Ld.
Counsel for the respondent No.2. Perused the material available
on record.
During the course of arguments, it was submitted by
Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that the impugned order is not an
interlocutory order and the present revision petition against the
impugned order is maintainable and impugned order is liable to
be set-aside on the grounds, as mentioned in the present revision
petition. On the other hand, it was submitted by Ld. Counsel for
the respondent No.2 that the Ld. Trial Court has passed the
impugned order in accordance with law and there is no merits in
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:26:57 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.5 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
the present revision petition and the same is liable to be
dismissed.
Counsel for the revisionist in support of his
contentions has relied upon following case laws:-
(1) Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava Vs. The State of
Jharkhand & Anr. {2024 (4) SCC 419}(2) Tedhi Singh Vs. Narayan Dass Mahant,
{(2022) 6 SCC 735}(3) Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka Vs.
Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd.
{CRL. Appeal No.170/2023, 171/2023 and
172/2023 decided by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India on 15/03/2023}
(4) Kalamani Tex & Another Vs. P.
Balasubramanian, {(2021) 5 SCC 283}
(5) Gorantla Venkateswara Rao Vs. Kolla Veera
Raghava Rao & Anr. {2006 Cri. LJ 1}
(6) Rangappa Vs. Mohan {AIR 2010 SC 1898}
(7) General Auto Sales Vs. Vijaylakshmi D {II
(2005) BC 597}
(8) Rajneesh Aggarwal Vs. Amit J. Bhalla
{ AIR 2001 SC 518}
5. By way of present revision petition, the revisionist
has challenged the order dated 11/01/2023 passed by the Ld.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:27:04 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.6 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Trial Court. The impugned order is reproduced as under:-
“11.01.2023
Argued by: Sh. SK Gupta & Ms. Monika Devi,
Ld. Counsel for the complainant
with complainant.
Sh. Sumit Kumar, Ld. Counsel for
the accused with accused.
Vide this order, I shall dispose off an
application filed u/s 143A of NI Act.
1. Learned counsel for complainant has admitted
that the amendment of Negotiable Instruments
Act came into force on 01.09.2018. He
submitted that cheque in the present case was
dishonoured on 12.10.2018 and thereafter the
legal notice was sent and hence the amendment
is applicable to the facts of the present case as
the offence was committed after the amendment
came into force. He relied on the judgement of
honourable Supreme Court in GG Raja versus
Tej Raj Surana 7 (2019) SCT.
It was further submitted that accused did not
reply to legal notice. It was submitted that costs
have been imposed on the accused earlier seeing
his conduct and therefore interim compensation
should be awarded to the complainant.
2. On the other hand learned counsel for the
accused had submitted that date of handing over
of cheque is 20th August 2018 and they have re
bounced the cheque. It was submitted that they
cannot be allowed to take benefit of bouncing
the cheque again. It was further submitted that
the power to award interim compensation is
discretionary under section 143A of the
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:27:11 –
0200
CR No. 156/2023 Page No.7 of 34
Negotiable Instruments Act. Ld. council for
accused relied on judgement of M/s GSV Cargos
and Freight versus state and another in criminal
miscellaneous number 2663 of 2021 to argue
that before awarding interim compensation the
court has to see prime facie satisfaction,
plausible defence of the accused, and economic
condition of both the parties. It was submitted
that the cheque in question belongs to the
company which is accused number 2 in the
present case and the said company is undergoing
insolvency proceedings before the NCLT. It was
further submitted that when the company is in
NCLT, only director as accused #1 cannot be
made liable without determining the liability of
the company. It was further argued that no
Ledger book, no books of accounts and no
documents have been shown to prove the legal
liability of the accused.
3. I have given my careful consideration but the
arguments. Record produced.
4. Before proceeding to decide the present
application, a reference be made to section 143A
of the Act:
143A. Power to direct interim compensation.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),
the Court trying an offence under section 138
may order the drawer of the cheque to pay
interim compensation to the complainant
(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where
he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in
the complaint; and
(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:27:17 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.8 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
(2) The interim compensation under subsection
(1) shall not exceed twenty per cent of the
amount of the cheque.
(3) The interim compensation shall be paid
within sixty days from the date of the order
under subsection (1), or within such further
period not exceeding thirty days as may be
directed by the Court on sufficient cause being
shown by the drawer of the cheque.
(4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the
Court shall direct the complainant to repay the
drawer the amount of interim compensation,
with interest at the bank rate as published by the
Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the
beginning of the relevant financial years, within
sixty days as may be directed by the Court on
sufficient cause being shown by the
complainant.
(5) The interim compensation payable under this
section may be recovered as if it were a fine
under section 421 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(6) The amount of fine imposed under section
138 or the amount of compensation awarded
under section 357 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall be reduced by
the amount paid or recovered as interim
compensation under this section.
[Emphasis added]
5. It should be noted that the word “may” is used
in the said provision in place of “shall”. It shows
that some discretion is vested with the Court to
award interim compensation on case to case
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:27:24 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.9 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
basis, and not in a mechanical manner in every
case where the twin requirements envisaged in
the said provision are fulfilled. At this stage, a
reference may be made to the decision of the
Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of
L.G.R. Enterprises & Ors. v. P. Anbazhagan,
Cr.O.P. No. 15438 of 2019, wherein it has been
observed as under:
A reading of the above provision makes it clear
that the Court trying an offence under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act “may”
(emphasis supplied) order the drawer of the
cheque to pay interim compensation to the
complainant. The provision itself shows that the
discretion is vested with the Trial Court to direct
interim compensation to be paid to the
complainant. It is not necessary that in all cases,
the trial Court must necessarily direct the
complainant to pay interim compensation and
such a direction should be given only on a case-
to-case basis, by taking into consideration the
facts of each case. The legislature has
intentionally not used the word “shall”, since it
would have prevented the accused persons, even
in genuine cases, from defending themselves
without paying 20% as interim compensation
amount to the complainant. This would have
directly affected the fundamental right of an
accused person to defend himself in a criminal
case. This is the reason why the legislature had
thoughtfully used the word “may” under Section
143A(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Therefore, it is not possible to read the word
“shall” into the word “may” which is used in the
provision. In view of the above finding, the
word “may”, gives the discretion to the Trial
Court to direct the accused to pay interim
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:27:30 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.10 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
compensation to the complainant. The exercise
of discretion must always be supported by
reasons, failing which the exercise of discretion
will become arbitrary.
[Emphasis added]
6. Similarly, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has
also held that section 143A of NI Act is
discretionary in nature (JSB Cargo and Freight
Forwarder (P) Ltd. v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine
Del 5425). This discretion, as highlighted above
by the Hon’ble Madras High Court and the
Hon’ble Delhi High Court, must be exercised on
case-to-case basis by the court in light of the
facts and circumstances of each case. Legislative
intention must be kept in mind by the court
while granting interim compensation. The
interim compensation cannot be granted
mechanically in every case. Some of the
circumstances in which interim compensation
can be granted was laid down in L.G.R.
Enterprises (supra), as highlighted below:
(i) the accused person would have absconded for
a longtime and thereby would have protracted
the proceedings; or
(ii) the accused person would have intentionally
evaded service for a long time and only after
repeated attempts, appears before the Court; or
(iii) the enforceable debt or liability in a case, is
borne out by overwhelming materials which the
accused person could not on the face of it deny;
or
(iv) where the accused person accepts the debt
or liability partly; or Digitally
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VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
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(v) where the accused person does not cross
examine the witnesses and keeps on dragging
with the proceedings by filing one petition after
another.
As laid down by the Hon’ble Madras High
Court, the aforesaid list is not exhaustive and it
is more illustrative as to the various
circumstances under which the trial Court will
be justified in exercising its jurisdiction under
Section 143A(1) of the Act, by directing the
accused person to pay interim compensation of
20% to the complainant.
7. Considering the aforesaid legal principles in
mind, I shall now proceed to decide the present
application.
Conduct of the accused
The present matter was instituted in 2018
however summoning was done only on 4th
March 2022. Therefore the delay caused from
2018 to 2022 cannot be attributed to the accused
person.
The accused appeared only when the NBWs
were issued against him and furnished his bail
bonds. Thereafter copy of complaint was applied
to the accused on 26.07.2022 and it was
submitted that the accused company is
undergoing insolvency proceedings and a
liquidator has been appointed. The exemption
application moved on behalf of accused on
03.08.2022 was dismissed and accused was
burdened with the cost of rupees 4000. The cost
has been paid on 03.12.2022.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:27:43 -
0200
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Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Acceptance of liability by the accused/ existence
of prima facie case in favour of the complainant.
It is pertinent to note that in the present matter
the accused has not admitted his liability either
in part or whole. The materials available on
record are not so overwhelming to order interim
compensation at this stage. In the present
matters the accused has not filed any frivolous
or false application to delay the present matter.
Infact, he has already started cross examination
of complainant.
8. Coming to the arguments in the present
matter, it is well known that a cheque can be
bounced as many times within the three months
validity period of the cheque. Therefore the said
argument of learned counsel for the accused that
they cannot be allowed to take the benefit of the
re-bouncing of the cheque is rejected. The
amendment is clearly applicable to the facts of
the present case. The Hon’ble SC in GG Raja
versus Tej Raj Surana 7 (2019) SCT observed as
follows:
22. In our view, the applicability of Section
143A of the Act must, therefore, be held to be
prospective in nature and confined to cases
where offences were committed after the
introduction of Section 143A, in order to force
an accused to pay such interim compensation.
ARGUMENT REGARDING MORATORIUM
Coming to the argument of moratorium,
accused has already furnished the orders of
NCLT bench where in moratorium has been
declared against the accused number one
company. And the proceedings against accused
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date: 2025.01.25
17:27:50 -0200
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Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
number one company have been stayed. Perusal
of the record would reveal that the cheque
belongs to the accused no.2 company. In view of
the same ordering any interim compensation
would have a significant impact on the
operational creditors of accused no. 2 company.
The claims of accused no.2 company and its
operational creditors fall under the ambit of
insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. The ordering
of any interim compensation by this court would
mean that court is also adjudicating on the
claims which fall under insolvency and
bankruptcy code. This court does not have any
jurisdiction over claims falling under insolvency
and bankruptcy code. The said claims are to be
settled by the insolvency resolution professional.
9. Therefore, in view of this Court no delaying
tactics have been adopted by the accused till
date. The accused has not admitted the amount
partly. In view of the facts of the case, I am not
inclined to order interim compensation.
Therefore, the present application is dismissed.
10. It is made clear that this order shall have no
bearing on the merits of the complaint, since the
parties have to prove their case as per law during
the trial.
11. Application stand disposed off accordingly.
[Karanbir Singh]
MM NI Act-05/(West )/Delhi
11.01.2023″
6. For the sake of ready reference, section 397 Cr.P.C.
is reproduced as under:-
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:27:57 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.14 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Section 397:- Calling for records to exercise
powers of revision: (1) The High Court
or any Sessions Judge may call for and
examine the record of any proceeding before
any inferior Criminal Court situate within its
or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any
finding, sentence or order, recorded or
passed, and as to the regularity of any
proceedings of such inferior Court, and may,
when calling for such record, direct that the
execution of any sentence or order be
suspended, and if the accused is in
confinement, that he be released on bail or
on his own bond pending the examination of
the record.
Explanation- All Magistrates, whether
Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising
original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be
deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge
for the purposes of this sub-section and of
section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by
sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in
relation to any interlocutory order passed in
any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section
has been made by any person either to the
High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no
further application by the same person shall
be entertained by the other of them.
7. A plain reading of Section 397 Cr.P.C. makes it
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
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Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
manifest that Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. enables the aggrieved parties
to question the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding,
sentence or order recorded or passed by the inferior court before
the revisional court i.e. the High Court or the Sessions Judge as
concurrent jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court and the
Sessions Judge by the Section. Now, it is significant to note that
Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. mandates that the power of revision
conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. shall not be
exercised in relation to any interlocutory order in any appeal,
enquiry, trial or other proceeding. Therefore, express bar is
created by the legislation under section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. to
entertain revision against an interlocutory order.
The term “interlocutory order” as mentioned in
section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. denotes orders of a purely interim or
temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important
rights or liabilities of the parties. An order which is pure and
simple interlocutory order, which do not decide anything finally
is to be considered as interlocutory order and no revision against
that interlocutory order is maintainable under section 397(1)
Cr.P.C. in view of the express bar imposed under section 397(2)
Cr.P.C.
There are three categories of orders that a Court can
pass- final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that
in respect of a final order, a Court can exercise its revision
jurisdiction- that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or
conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
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Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
interlocutory order, the Court cannot exercise its revision
jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the
Court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an
interlocutory order. An intermediate order is one which is
interlocutory order in nature but when reversed, it has the effect
of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final
order.
8. It was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
case titled as ” Amar Nath & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr.”
{(1977) 4 SCC 137} that:-
“The main question which falls for determination
in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of
the term “interlocutory order” as appearing in sub-
section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision
of such an order by the High Court. The term
“interlocutory order” is a term of well-known
legal significance and does not present any serious
difficulty. It has been used in various statutes
including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters
Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes.
In Webster’s New World Dictionary
“interlocutory” has been defined as an order
other than final decision. Decided cases have laid
down that interlocutory orders to be appealable
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:28:17 –
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must be those which decide the rights and
liabilities of the parties concerning a particular
aspect. It seems to us that the term “interlocutory
order” in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has
been used in a restricted sense and not in any
broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of
a purely interim or temporary nature which do not
decide or touch the important rights or the
liabilities of the parties. Any order which
substantially affects the right of the accused, or
decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said
to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision
to the High Court against that order, because that
would be against the very object which formed
the basis for insertion of this particular provision
in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for
instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning
cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports
and such other steps in aid of the pending
proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory
orders against which no revision would lie under
Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders
which are matters of moment and which affect or
adjudicate the rights of the accused or a
particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be
interlocutory order so as to be outside the
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:28:24 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.18 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court”.
It was also held by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in case titled as ” V.C. Shukla Vs. State through C.B.I.” (AIR
1980 SC 962] that:-
(1) that an order which does not determine the
rights of the parties but only one aspect of the suit
or the trial is an interlocutory order;
(2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to
be explained, in contradistinction to a final order.
In other words, if an order is not a final order, it
would be an interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by
the English Courts and the Federal Court is to see
if the order is decided in one way, it may
terminate the proceedings but if decided in
another way, then the proceedings would
continue; because, in our opinion, the term
‘interlocutory order’ in the Criminal Procedure
Code has been used in a much wider sense so as
to include even intermediate or quasi final orders;
(4) that an order passed by the Special Court
discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a
final order inasmuch as it finally decides the
rights of the parties and puts an end to the
controversy and thereby terminates the entire
proceedings before the court so that nothing is
left to be done by the court thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:28:30 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.19 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
against an interlocutory order the accused is
not left without any remedy because in suitable
cases, the accused can always move this Court in
its jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution
even against an order framing charges against the
accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not
allowing an appeal against an order framing
charges, the Act works serious injustice to the
accused.
It was also held by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in case titled as “Poonam Chand Jain and Anr. Vs. Fazru“
{(2004) 13 SCC 269} that:-
“Wharton’s Law Lexicon (14th Edn. p. 529)
defines interlocutory order thus:
“An interlocutory order or judgment is one made
or given during the progress of an action, but
which does not finally dispose of the rights of the
parties.”
“Thus, summing up the natural and logical
meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion
is inescapable that an order which does not
terminate the proceedings or finally decides the
rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order.
In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an
interlocutory order is one which only decides a
particular aspect or a particular issue or a
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:28:36 –
0200
CR No. 156/2023 Page No.20 of 34
particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but
which does not however conclude the trial at all.”
The principles/guidelines regarding the scope of
criminal revision petition have also been laid-down by Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in case titled as “Girish Kumar Suneja
Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation” {(2017) 14 SCC 809} and it
was held that :-
“15. While the text of sub-section (1) of Section
397 Cr.P.C. appears to confer very wide powers
on the court in the exercise of its revision
jurisdiction, this power is equally severely
curtailed by sub-section (2) thereof. There is a
complete prohibition on a court exercising its
revision jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory
orders. Therefore, what is the nature of orders in
respect of which a court can exercise its revision
jurisdiction?
16. There are three categories of orders that a
court can pass final, intermediate and
interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a
final order, a court can exercise its revision
jurisdiction – that is in respect of a final order of
acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt
that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:28:42 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.21 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as
an intermediate order is concerned, the court can
exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an
interlocutory order.
21. The concept of an intermediate order
was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye Vs.
State of Maharashtra by contradistinguishing a
final order and an interlocutory order. This
decision lays down the principle that an
intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in
nature but when reversed, it has the effect of
terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting
in a final order. Two such intermediate orders
immediately come to mind – an order taking
cognizance of an offence and summoning an
accused and an order for framing charges. Prima
facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but
when an order taking cognizance and summoning
an accused is reversed, it has the effect of
terminating the proceedings against that person
resulting in a final order in his or her favour.
Similarly, an order for framing of charges if
reversed has the effect of discharging the accused
person and resulting in a final order in his or her
favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one
which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:28:48 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.22 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
would terminate but if passed in another way, the
proceeding would continue.
22. The view expressed in Amar Nath and
Madhu Limaye was followed in K.K. Patel V.
State of Gujarat wherein a revision petition was
filed challenging the taking of cognizance and
issuance of a process. It was said: (K.K.Patel
case, SCC p.201, para11)
“11. ….. It is now well-nigh settled
that in deciding whether an order
challenged is interlocutory or not
as for Section 397 (2) of the Code,
the sole test is not whether such
order was passed during the interim
stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of
Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharastra, V.C. Shukla v. State
and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande
v. Uttam). The feasible test is
whether by upholding the
objections raised by a party, it
would result in culminating the
proceedings, if so any order passed
on such objections would not be
merely interlocutory in nature as
envisaged in Section 397(2) of the
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:28:54 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.23 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Code. In the present case, if the
objection raised by the appellants
were upheld by the Court the entire
prosecution proceedings would
have been terminated. Hence, as per
the said standard, the order was
revisable.”
27. Our conclusion on this subject is that
while the appellants might have an entitlement
(not a right) to file a revision petition in the High
Court but that entitlement can be taken away and
in any event, the High Court is under no
obligation to entertain a revision petition – such a
petition can be rejected at the threshold. If the
High Court is inclined to accept the revision
petition it can do so only against a final order or
an intermediate order, namely, an order which if
set aside would result in the culmination of the
proceedings. As we see it, there appear to be
only two such eventualities of a revisable order
and in any case only one such eventuality is
before us. Consequently the result of para 10 of
the order passed by this Court is that the
entitlement of the appellants to file a revision
petition in the High Court is taken away and
thereby the High Court is deprived of exercising
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:29:01 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.24 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
the extraordinary discretionary power available
under Section 397 Cr.P.C.”
It was held by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case
titled as ” Neelam Mahajan and Anr. Vs. The State & Ors.”
{(2016) 229 DLT (CN) 29} that:-
“…….. In this regard catena of judgments of
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has settled the
legal principle while holding that the meaning of
the two words “final” and “interlocutory” has to
be considered separately in relation to the
particular purpose for which it is required.
However, generally speaking, a judgment or order
which determines the principal matter in question
is termed final and simultaneously, an
interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the
main dispute may be conclusive as to the
subordinate matter with which it deals. Therefore,
in the considered opinion of this Court, if the
decision on an issue puts an end to the suit, the
order is undoubtedly a final one but if the suit is
still left alive and has yet to be tried in the
ordinary way, no finality could be attached to the
order.”
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:29:07 –
0200
CR No. 156/2023 Page No.25 of 34
9. By way of present revision petition, the revisionist
has challenged the impugned order dated 11/01/2023 passed by
the Ld. Trial Court thereby application u/s. 143-A NI Act of the
complainant/ revisionist was dismissed.
Now this Court has to see as to whether the
impugned order is interlocutory, intermediate or final order.
It was held by Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in case
titled as “Sanjay P.S. Vs. Abhishek M.” {Criminal Petition No.
5944/2023 decided on 28/07/2023} that order on the application
u/s. 143-A NI Act is not an interlocutory order but an intermediate
order.
Hence, the present revision petition qua the order on
the application u/s. 143-A NI Act is maintainable.
10. By way of present revision petition, the revisionist
has challenged the impugned order dated 11/01/2023 passed by
the Ld. Trial Court thereby application u/s. 143-A NI Act of the
complainant/revisionist was dismissed.
Law relating to exercise of power and parameters for
exercising the discretion u/s 143-A NI Act has been elaborated by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as “Rakesh
Ranjan Shrivastava Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr.” {Criminal
Appeal No. 741/2024, decided on 15/03/2024} that :-
“Subject to what is held earlier, the
main conclusions can be summarised
as follows: Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:29:12 –
0200
CR No. 156/2023 Page No.26 of 34
a)The exercise of power under sub-
section (1) of Section 143A is
discretionary. The provision is
directory and not mandatory. The
word “may” used in the provision
cannot be construed as “shall.”
b)While deciding the prayer made
under Section 143A, the Court must
record brief reasons indicating
consideration of all relevant factors.
c)The broad parameters for exercising
the discretion under Section 143A are
as follows:-
i) The Court will have to prima facie
evaluate the merits of the case made
out by the complainant and the merits
of the defence pleaded by the accused
in the reply to the application. The
financial distress of the accused can
also be a consideration.
ii) A direction to pay interim
compensation can be issued, only if
the complainant makes out a prima
facie case.
iii) If the defence of the accused is
found to be prima facie plausible, the
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:29:19 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.27 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
Court may exercise discretion in
refusing to grant interim
compensation.
iv) If the Court concludes that a case
is made out to grant interim
compensation, it will also have to
apply its mind to the quantum of
interim compensation to be granted.
While doing so, the Court will have to
consider several factors such as the
nature of the transaction, the
relationship, if any, between the
accused and the complainant, etc.
v)There could be several other
relevant factors in the peculiar facts of
a given case, which cannot be
exhaustively stated. The parameters
stated above are not exhaustive.
11. It is well settled law that scope of revisional
jurisdiction is very limited and same cannot be exercised in a
routine manner.
It was held by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case
titled as “Taron Mohan Vs. State & Anr.” {AIRONLINE 2021
DEL 687} that :-
“The scope of interference in a
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:29:27 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.28 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
revision petition is extremely narrow.
It is well settled that Section 397
Cr.P.C. gives the High Courts or the
Sessions Courts jurisdiction to
consider the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding inter se an
order and as to the regularity of the
proceedings of any inferior court. It is
also well settled that while
considering the legality, propriety or
correctness of a finding or a
conclusion, normally the revising
court does not dwell at length upon
the facts and evidence of the case. A
court in revision considers the
material only to satisfy itself about the
legality and propriety of the findings,
sentence and order and refrains from
substituting its own conclusion on an
elaborate consideration of evidence.”
12. It is well settled law that the Revisional Court will
usually not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Ld.
Trial Court and the Revisional Court will interfere only, if it is
found that the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily,
capriciously, perversely or if it is found that the Ld. Trial Court
has ignored settled principles of law.
13. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to mention
here the relevant proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court.
The complainant (revisionist herein) had filed the
complaint u/s. 138 N.I. Act against the accused (respondent No.2
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:29:34 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.29 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
herein) on 10/12/2018. On 04/03/2022, an application for
amendment of complaint has been filed by the complainant to
implead Sharma Kalypso Pvt. Ltd. as an accused and the
aforesaid application was allowed by the Ld. Trial Court vide
order dated 04/03/2022 and Sharma Kalypso Pvt. Ltd. was
impleaded as accused No.2. Vide order dated 04/03/2022 passed
by the Ld. Trial Court, accused Ramesh Sharma and accused
company M/s Sharma Kalypso Pvt. Ltd. were summoned for
05/05/2022. As per order-sheet dated 05/05/2022, summons were
received with a report of ‘refused’ and Bailable Warrants were
issued against the accused No.2 for 03/06/2022. On 03/06/2022,
Bailable Warrants were received back un-executed and Non-
Bailable Warrants were issued against the accused Ramesh
Sharma for 26/07/2022. On 16/07/2022, accused Ramesh Sharma
had filed an application for cancellation of Non-Bailable
Warrants and Non-Bailable Warrants were cancelled. On
26/07/2022, it was submitted that the accused company is under
going insolvency proceedings and a liquidator has been
appointed. On 03/08/2022, copy of order dated 02/06/2022
passed by NCLT, Delhi was placed on record, as per which,
insolvency proceedings have been initiated against accused
company M/s Sharma Kalypso Pvt. Ltd. and moratorium
u/s. 14 IBC has been declared. Accordingly, proceedings against
the accused company were stayed till the moratorium u/s. 14 IBC
is in effect, however, it was directed by the Ld. Trial Court that
the proceedings against the accused No.1 shall continue. On
Digitally signed
by VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:29:40 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.30 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
13/09/2022, notice u/s. 251 Cr.P.C. for the offence u/s. 138 NI Act
was served upon the accused, to which, he pleaded not guilty and
claimed trial. On 13/09/2022, at the oral request of the accused,
plea of the accused u/s. 145(2) NI Act was allowed and matter
was fixed for cross-examination of the complainant for
15/10/2022. On 15/10/2022, an application u/s. 143-A NI Act
was filed by counsel for the complainant and CW-1 was partly
cross-examined and further cross-examination was deferred for
want of documents. On 03/12/2022, arguments on the application
u/s. 143-A NI Act were heard and CW-1 was partly cross-
examined and further cross-examination was deferred for want of
documents. Vide order dated 11/01/2023 passed by the Ld. Trial
Court, application u/s. 143-A NI Act of the complainant was
dismissed. On 11/01/2023, CW-1 was further cross-examined and
discharged and matter was fixed for statement of accused u/s. 313
Cr.P.C. On 17/05/2023, statement of the accused u/s. 313 Cr.P.C.
was recorded and matter was fixed for DE. On 26/07/2023, it was
submitted on behalf of the accused that he does not wish to lead
DE and DE was closed. On 28/08/2023, an application u/s. 311
Cr.P.C. was filed on behalf of the complainant. Vide order dated
15/02/2024, application u/s. 311 Cr.P.C. of the complainant was
allowed and matter was fixed for CE. On 30/03/2024, CW-1 was
cross-examined and discharged and CE was closed. On
04/05/2024, further statement of the accused u/s. 313 Cr.P.C. was
recorded and matter was fixed for DE. On 04/05/2024, it was
submitted that accused No.1 company has undergone liquidation.
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:29:45 -0200
CR No. 156/2023 Page No.31 of 34
On 29/05/2024, it was submitted that the accused does not wish to
lead defence evidence and the matter was fixed for final
arguments. On 01/10/2024 and 24/01/2025, part final arguments
were heard. Now, the matter is fixed for further final arguments
for 11/02/2025.
14. The complaint u/s. 138 N.I. Act was filed by the
complainant on 10/12/2018 and vide order dated 04/03/2022
passed by the Ld. Trial Court, accused Ramesh Sharma and
accused company M/s Sharma Kalypso Pvt. Ltd. were
summoned. In view of the same, the delay from 10/12/2018 to
04/03/2022 cannot be attributed to the accused/ respondent No.2.
There is nothing on the record to show that the
accused/respondent No.2 has evaded the service for a long time
before the Ld. Trial Court. There is also nothing on the record to
show that the accused/respondent No.2 has deliberately delayed
the case/trial before the Ld. Trial Court. Accused/ respondent
No.2 has not admitted his legal liability either in part or whole
towards the cheque in question. The application u/s. 143-A NI
Act of the complainant was dismissed on 11/01/2023 and on the
very same date, CW-1 was further cross-examined by counsel for
the accused/respondent No.2. As per Trial Court Record,
insolvency proceedings stated to be initiated against accused
company M/s Sharma Kalypso Pvt. Ltd. and moratorium u/s. 14
IBC has been declared and accused No.1 company stated to be
undergone liquidation. In the present revision petition,
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:29:51 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.32 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
M/s Sharma Kalypso Pvt. Ltd. or Official Liquidator/ IRP has not
been made as party by the revisionist. No reasonable explanation
has been adduced on record by the revisionist for the same. Part
final arguments have already been heard by the Ld. Trial Court
and now, the matter is fixed before the Ld. Trial Court for further
final arguments.
15. It is well settled law that exercise of power
u/s. 143-A NI Act is discretionary and the provision is directory
and not mandatory and while deciding the application/prayer
u/s. 143-A NI Act, the Court must record brief reasons indicating
consideration of all relevant factors.
On perusal of impugned order, this Court is of the
considered opinion that all the parameters for exercising the
discretion u/s. 143-A NI Act have been duly dealt with by the Ld.
Trial Court while passing the impugned order. All the points and
contentions of both the parties were duly dealt with by the Ld.
Trial Court in the impugned order.
There is nothing on the record to show that the Ld.
Trial Court has exercised its discretion arbitrarily, capriciously
and perversely. There is also nothing on the record to show that
the Ld. Trial Court has ignored the settled principles of law. There
is no illegality, impropriety and infirmity in the impugned order
passed by the Ld. Trial Court.
Case laws relied upon by counsel for the revisionist
are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present
Digitally
signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:29:56 -0200CR No. 156/2023 Page No.33 of 34
Adarsh Chaudhary Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
case for the purpose of grant of interim compensation u/s. 143-A
NI Act in favour of the complainant.
16. Applying priori and posteriori reasonings and the
aforesaid case laws, this Court is held that there is no illegality,
impropriety and infirmity in the impugned order passed by the
Ld. Trial Court. Accordingly, the present revision petition of the
revisionist is dismissed. No order as to costs. Nothing stated
herein shall tantamount to be an expression of opinion on the
merits of the case.
Trial Court Record be sent back alongwith the copy
of this judgment. Revision file be consigned to record room after
Digitally
due compliance. signed by
VIJAY
VIJAY SHANKAR
SHANKAR Date:
2025.01.25
17:30:02 –
0200 Announced in the open Court on 25/01/2025 (VIJAY SHANKAR) ASJ-04 (West) Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi CR No. 156/2023 Page No.34 of 34
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