Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
Shafeeq Ahmad Mir vs ) Ut Of J&K And Others on 1 August, 2025
Page 1 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
IN THE HIGH COURT 0F JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
WP(C ) No. 2698/2023
Reserved on:05.06..2025
Pronounced on: 01.08.2025
Shafeeq Ahmad Mir ...Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s)
S/o Ghulam Mohi-Ud-Din Mir
R/o Kadalbal Pampore
Through: Mr. Danish Majid Dar, Advocate with
Ms. Ahra Syed and Ms. Monisa Advocate
Vs.
1) UT of J&K and others.
Through its Under Secretary to Government, Industries and Commerce
Department, Civil Secretariat, Srinagar/Jammu.
2) Director,
Industries & Commerce, Kashmir. Sanat Ghar Bemina
3) General Manager,
District Industries Centre, Pulwama.
4) Managing Director,
Jammu& Kashmir State Industrial Development Corporation Limited.
Sanat Ghar Bemina
5) General Manager (K),
Jammu & Kashmir State Industrial Development Corporation Limited
Sanat Ghar Bemina
6) Safder Ali Wani
S/o Mukhtar Ahmad Wani
R/o Sazgaripora Hawal, Sringar
7) Bilal Hassan Anim
s/o Ghulam Hassan Anim
R/o Hyderpora, Srinagar
...Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Shariq J. Reyaz, Advocate with
Ms. Humaira Sajad, Advocate
Mr. Waseem Gul, G.A
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Page 2 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
1. The petitioner, through the medium of instant writ petition, has invoked
the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India seeking inter alia quashment of Order No. SIDCO/ROK/18/27
dated 29.06.2018 issued by the Respondent No.4, whereby change in the
Constitution and name of an industrial unitoriginally allotted in the name
of the Petitioner’s proprietorship concern, M/s S.A. Steel Rolling
Millswas approved in favour of a Private Limited Company, namely M/s
Mir S.A. Steel Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd.
2. The grievance of the petitioner is that the said change in constitution was
effected without his consent, at his back, and by misusing certain signed
documents. It is alleged that the said transfer was in gross violation of
the applicable Industrial Policy of 2016 and the Procedural Guidelines
notified thereunder. The Petitioner also assails the legality of a
registered lease deed dated 26.10.2018 executed between SIDCO and
the said Pvt. Ltd. Company, allegedly signed by the Petitioner in his
capacity as Director, which he contends was either forged or signed
under deception.
Factual Background.
3. Briefly stated, the Petitioner claims to be the original allottee of the
industrial unit under the Industrial Policy of 2004-2005. The unit was
allotted land in Lassipora Industrial Growth Centre and was being run
under the proprietorship concern M/s S.A. Steel Rolling Mills. It is the
case of the Petitioner that sometime in 2018, Respondent Nos. 6 and 7,
who were initially engaged in financial arrangements with the Petitioner
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for expansion of the business, fraudulently got the constitution of the
unit changed and had it transferred to a Private Limited Company
without the Petitioner’s knowledge.
4. The Petitioner alleges that a declaration-cum-confirmation, a surrender
deed dated 25.10.2018, and a lease deed dated 26.10.2018 were
executed without proper authority and were a product of fraud,
impersonation, and misrepresentation. Even FIR No. 18/2018 was
registered at the Petitioner’s instance. However, the investigation
concluded with a closure report based on FSL findings that confirmed
the signatures to be those of the Petitioner.
5. The Petitioner further states that the financial consideration for the
alleged transfer was never honoured and cheques issued towards the
same were dishonoured. Proceedings under Section 138 of the
Negotiable instrument Act and a civil suit for recovery of approximately
₹125 crores are pending.
6. The Petitioner seeks, inter alia, the quashment of the impugned order
dated 29.06.2018 and all consequential documents, including the
registered lease deed, on the grounds of fraud, illegality, and
constitutional violation of Article 14.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS
7. Mr. Danish Majid Dar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the petitioner is aggrieved by an order No. SIDCO/ROK/18/27
dated 29.06.2018 issued by Respondent No. 4, whereby sanction
has purportedly been granted for change in the constitution of the
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Petitioner’s unit from proprietorship to private limited company and
consequent change of its name from M/s S. A. Steel Rolling Mills
to M/s Mir S. A. Steel Rolling Mills. It is submitted that impugned
order, suffers from multiple legal infirmities and procedural
irregularities, rendering it unsustainable in the eyes of law.
8. It is contended that the said order was issued unilaterally, in gross
violation of the principles of natural justice, without affording the
Petitioner any opportunity of being heard. The Petitioner, who is
the original allottee and proprietor of the unit in question, was not
issued with notice prior to issuance of the impugned order, despite
the fact that the change of constitution has extensive legal
consequences upon his proprietary rights and interest in the
industrial unit.
9. Learned counsel further submits that the entire edifice of the
impugned order is built upon a “No Objection Certificate (NOC)”
issued by Respondent No. 3, which itself was obtained through
suppression of material facts and in connivance with the Private
Respondents. It is submitted that the NOC, and consequently the
impugned order based upon it, were secured through fraudulent
means and in collusion with certain officials of the Respondent
Corporation, thereby vitiating the order on the grounds of fraud,
deception, and lack of transparency.
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10. It is further argued that the impugned order is in direct
contravention of the Industrial Policy of 2016 and the Procedural
Guidelines of 2017, which categorically stipulate that any change in
the constitution or transfer of leasehold rights in favor of a third
party is permissible only after the unit comes into production. The
Petitioner’s unit, it is submitted, has remained provisionally
registered and has not yet commenced commercial production due
to extraneous and unforeseen factors beyond the Petitioner’s control,
including socio-political unrest, power supply issues, and statutory
restrictions on electric arc and induction furnaces. Thus, the
Petitioner contends that any alteration in constitution or lease in
violation of these policy prescriptions is legally impermissible.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also invited the
attention of this Court to a sequence of agreements entered into
between the Petitioner and the Private Respondents, wherein a
transaction involving sale of infrastructure and shares worth ₹125
Crores. It is argued that although substantial consideration was
promised through cheques and land exchange, the Private
Respondents failed to honor their part of the agreement. The
cheques issued towards consideration were dishonored, leading to
the filing of criminal complaints under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. Interim relief in the form of
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compensation of ₹15 Crores was granted by the Trial Court, though
the said order was stayed ex parte in revision proceedings.
12. It is further submitted that the failure of the Private Respondents
to honor their contractual and financial obligations resulted in
severe economic hardship to the Petitioner, culminating in the
initiation of insolvency proceedings against him by J&K Bank
under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Petitioner
was constrained to approach the High Court through writ
proceedings, and the Hon’ble High Court was pleased to pass a
status quo order in relation to the manufacturing units, recognizing
the gravity and complexity of the dispute.
13. Further, it is alleged that the Private Respondents, acting in
grossviolation of agreements, have proceeded to enter into third-
party transactions with respect to the industrial units, despite having
no legal authority to do so. The Petitioner asserts that these acts
amount to criminal breach of trust and wrongful interference with
property rights.
14. Most significantly, learned counsel for petitioner contends that
the impugned order dated 29.06.2018 was procured through forgery,
suppression of material facts, and collusion, and that the change of
name and constitution was effected without legal mandate, and in
clear contravention of earlier cancellation order issued by the
District Industries Centre. Reference is made to Order Nos. 91-DIC
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of 2017 and 266-DIC of 2017, whereby an earlier attempt to change
the constitution and nomenclature was withdrawn in light of
registered criminal complaints and forgery allegations.
15. Mr. Dar further submits that the impugned action has resulted in
gross violation of the Petitioner’s legal and constitutional rights,
including the right to carry on trade and business under fair and
lawful conditions. The Petitioner’s repeated representations
highlighting the illegality and seeking redressal have not evoked
any response from the authorities, thereby leaving him with no
efficacious remedy except to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction
of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
16. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the instant writ
petition has been necessitated by grave and continued violations of
the Petitioner’s legal and proprietary rights, arising out of impugned
Order No. SIDCO/ROK/18/27 dated 29.06.2018, whereby
Respondent No. 4 (SIDCO) sanctioned a change in the constitution
of the Petitioner’s industrial unitM/s S.A. Steel Rolling Millsinto a
private limited company, namely M/s Mir S.A. Steel Rolling Mills,
allegedly based upon a No Objection Certificate (NOC) dated
17.05.2018 issued by Respondent No. 3 (District Industries Centre).
It is submitted that the said order, as well as the subsequent
execution of a lease deed dated 26.10.2018 and related documents,
have been obtained through fraudulent means, in collusion with
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private Respondents and without the knowledge, consent, or
participation of the Petitioner.
17. It is vehemently argued that the Petitioner, being the original
allottee of the unit in question and having made substantial
investments to the tune of ₹125 Crores, was never served with any
notice nor granted an opportunity of being heard prior to the
issuance of the impugned order. The procedural impropriety is
compounded by the fact that the unit remains a provisionally
registered industrial unit, which has not commenced production due
to reasons beyond the Petitioner’s control, including law and order
disruptions, power constraints, and statutory restrictions on electric
arc furnaces. As per the Industrial Policy of 2016 and the
Procedural Guidelines of 2017, no change in constitution or transfer
of leasehold rights is permissible prior to commencement of
production.
18. Learned Counsel further submits that a prior attempt to change
the name and constitution of the unit had already been rescinded by
the District Industries Centre through Order No. 266-DIC of 2017
dated 06.11.2017, following concerns about document authenticity
and the registration of a criminal complaint. Thus, SIDCO’s
subsequent issuance of the impugned order is alleged to be in direct
contradiction of DIC’s actions, rendering it ultra vires and void.
Page 9 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
19. The learned counsel for Petitioner, has also brought to the
Court’s attention that the impugned order dated 29.06.2018 based
on an NOC, purportedly issued by respondent No.3 upon enquiry
conducted on the basis of complaint filed by petitioner, it was found
that no such NOC exists in the official record. Rather, the earlier
NOC was rescinded, and no fresh or valid NOC was ever issued
thereafter.
20. It is further contended that the Private Respondents had entered
into agreements with the Petitioner for transfer of the
manufacturing units and assets for a total consideration of ₹125
Crores. However, the said Private Respondents defaulted on these
commitments, including issuing dishonoured cheques amounting to
₹100 Crores, which are now the subject matter of criminal
proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
A parallel civil suit for recovery of ₹25 Crores is also pending
before the District Court, Pulwama. It is further submitted that
despite having defaulted on their obligations, the Private
Respondents managed to obtain the impugned order and execute
subsequent documentsincluding a lease deed, declaration cum
confirmation of ownership rights, and surrender of lease dated in
October 2018, at the back of the Petitioner.
21. It is asserted that these documents were either signed
fraudulently or bear forged signatures of the Petitioner, and none of
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them were executed with the Petitioner’s participation or consent.
The documents, it is alleged, were merely notarized and not duly
registered, thereby failing to satisfy mandatory legal requirements.
It is emphasized that fraud vitiates all transactions, and hence, these
documents are void ab initio.
22. Additionally, FIR No. 18 of 2018 stands registered against the
Private Respondents under Sections 420, 467, and 468 of the
Ranbir Penal Code, lending further credence to the Petitioner’s
claim of fraud, misrepresentation, and collusion in the execution of
these transactions.
23. Lastly, it is urged that the Private Respondents has taken
contradictory stand in various legal proceedings, on one hand, he
asserts that the agreements with the Petitioner were invalid and
unenforceable, while simultaneously securing official orders and
leasehold rights on the basis of those very agreements. The
Petitioner submits that this inconsistency underscores the fraudulent
character of their conduct.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS
24. Per contra, Learned counsel Mr. Shariq J. Reyazappearing on
behalf of Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 has raised preliminary
objections with regard to the maintainability of the present writ
petition. At the outset, it is submitted that the writ petition is liable
to be dismissed on multiple grounds, including bar of limitation,
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lack of a public law element, suppression of material facts, and the
existence of disputed questions of fact that fall outside the scope of
writ jurisdiction.
25. It is submitted that the present writ petition suffers from gross
delay and laches, having been filed more than five years after the
accrual of the alleged cause of action. The impugned order was
passed on 29.06.2018, and the related lease deed was executed on
26.10.2018, yet the Petitioner has approached this Court only in the
year 2023, without offering any plausible or legally sustainable
explanation for the delay. Such inordinate delay, it is argued, is
fatal to the maintainability of the petition.
26. It is further contended that the Petitioner’s civil remedies, if any,
are also barred by limitation. The writ petition is an attempt to
circumvent this bar and achieve through a public law remedy what
is otherwise not permissible under private law.
27. Mr. Shariq, further submit that the Petitioner has consciously
suppressed the fact that the lease deed dated 26.10.2018,
declaration of assignment dated 25.10.2018, and surrender deed
dated 25.10.2018 were executed post the impugned NOC and
SIDCO order. Initially, these documents were not even placed on
record. Though subsequently introduced through an amendment,
the Respondents contend that the initial suppression is fatal and
indicative of mala fide intent. It is asserted that had these
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documents been disclosed at the very the outset, the writ petition
would have been liable for rejection at the threshold.
28. It is further submitted that the registered lease deed was signed
by the Petitioner himself in his capacity as Director of the Private
Respondent company, and therefore, he is estopped from
challenging the same. Moreover, FIR No. 18 of 2018, registered at
the Petitioner’s instance alleging forgery, has culminated in a
closure report based on the FSL opinion that the signatures on the
lease deed match those of the Petitioner, thereby nullifying the
allegation of fraud or impersonation.
29. It is contended that the dispute essentially arises out of private
commercial dealings and is devoid of any public law element. The
Petitioner’s grievance pertains to alleged default in payment of
consideration, dishonour of cheques, and alleged fraudwhich fall
squarely within the domain of private civil law. A writ petition, it is
argued, is not the proper remedy to adjudicate such disputes.
30. Lastly, learned counsel for respondents submits that the core
issues raised by the Petitionersuch as the validity of the lease deed,
alleged forgery, and the question of consentall fall within the realm
of disputed questions of fact that require oral and documentary
evidence. These issues can only be appropriately adjudicated
through a civil suit after full-fledged trial and cannot be resolved in
summary writ proceedings.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
31. With a view to decide the preliminary objections raised by
Mr. Shariq R. Jan, this court at the very outset, is inclined to
begin with the following quote:
“The Writ Court is a forum of constitutional redressal, not a
substitute for civil trials. While justice must be swift, it cannot
be blind to procedural boundaries. The extraordinary writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 is to be exercised with caution,
especially where disputed facts threaten to cloud judicial
clarity.”
32. The present writ petition, as amended, has been filed under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, wherein the Petitioner seeks, inter alia,
a declaration that the lease deed dated 26.10.2018, the declaration-cum-
confirmation of assignment of ownership rights dated 25.10.2018, and
the surrender of lease deed dated 25.10.2018 are null, void, and non-est
in the eyes of law.
33. At the threshold, this Court is confronted with certain preliminary
objections raised with regard to the maintainability of the petition. These
objections, touching upon the very jurisdictional competence of this
Court to entertain the present writ, require due consideration before
delving into the merits, if at all required to deal.
Issues for Determination
34. In light of the pleadings and preliminary objections, the following
issues arise for determination:
Issue No. i:Whether the present writ petition raises complex and
substantial disputed questions of fact that render the
Page 14 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226
impermissible?
Issue No. ii: Whether the petition involves any infringement of
public law right or raises public law concern
warranting interference under Article 226 of the
constitution?
Issue No. iii:Whether the writ petition suffers from delay and laches,
and is thus barred by limitation, disentitling the
Petitioner to equitable relief under Article 226?
Issue No. iv:Whether the concealment of material facts by petitioner
amount to abuse of the writ jurisdiction, warranting
dismissal of the petition for lack of bona fides?
Issue No.v: Whether this court ought to decline exercise of its writ
jurisdiction under 226 of the Constitution and direct
the petitioner to avail alternate remedies before the
competent civil court ?.
Issue I: Whether the present writ petition raises complex and
substantial disputed questions of fact that render the
exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226
impermissible?
35.Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and
perused the material on record, the above issues which arise for
consideration in the instant petition will be addressed and
answered as follow:
36.At the outset, it must be observed that the reliefs sought pertain to
adjudication of private civil rights arising out of a contractual
arrangement between the parties. The core prayer in the petition
is one which essentially seeks cancellation or invalidation of a
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lease deed, a relief that squarely falls within the domain of the
civil courts under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
37. The core issue raised by the petitioner pertains to the validity of a
lease deed executed between private parties, which involve
factual controversies relating to execution, consent, and
enforceability. These are matters requiring detailed examination
of evidence, both oral and documentary, which is within the
domain of the civil courts and not amenable to determination
under Article 226.
38. However, the record demonstrates that the lease deed dated
26.10.2018 is a registered document signed by the petitioner
himself in the capacity of Director of the respondent company.
The petitioner had lodged an FIR in 2018 alleging impersonation
and fraud, but forensic reports matched his signatures, and the
case was closed accordingly. The petitioner seeks, indirectly
through this petition, to invalidate contractual instruments and
resurrect a cause of action that would otherwise be barred in a
civil suit.
39. These contentions raise serious factual disputes including the
genuineness of signatures, the petitioner’s role and knowledge in
the execution of the lease, and the sequence of ownership transfer
that cannot be resolved on affidavit evidence or legal submissions
alone.
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40. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the
judgment titled Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade
Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 383, and has contended that the present
case falls within the exceptions carved out therein, thereby
justifying the invocation of writ jurisdiction despite the
availability of an alternative remedy. Furthermore, there is no
public law element in the present case, nor does it fall within the
exceptions carved out in Whirpool case, justifying the exercise
of jurisdiction by the writ court. The petitioner has tried to justify
the delay on false and flimsy grounds which are not tenable in the
eyes of law. As a matter of fact, the alleged cause of action has
accrued to him in the year 2018. It was only after an objection
was raised by the private respondent with regard to the
maintainability of the instant petition, the petitioner has amended
the instant writ petition, despite having waived of his right earlier
to challenge those orders.This Court while exercising writ
jurisdiction is precluded from recording any finding on the
validity of the document in question, as the remedy lies elsewhere.
The instant writ petition raises disputed questions of fact, which
cannot be gone into writ proceedings, more particularly when the
determination of fraud has yet to be established by the civil court.
41. Further, the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment
titled as Meghmala V. G Narasimha Reddy, 2010(8) SCC 383
relating to the fraud will not be applicable to the instant case as
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the issue of fraud is speculation of petitioner which till date has
not been adjudicated by any civil court after due appreciation of
evidence. Assuming the orders have been procured by way of
fraud then the same to have been challenged in the year 2018,
when alleged cause of action first arose, but having failed to do
so and allowed five years to lapse, the petitioner is now
“estopped in law” to question the same at this belated stage after
a gap of five years, moreso when the amended was sought only
after an objection with regard to the maintainability was raised by
the other side. This raises serious doubt with regard to allegation
of fraud which is far from truth in the light of the closure report
based on FSL opinion by holding that the signatures on the lease
deed matches with those of petitioner, thereby nullifying the
allegation of fraud or impersonation. The petitioner after the
objection was raised by other side, has become wiser and has
sought amendment of the instant petition and tried to justify the
delay by projecting that the document has been procured by way
of fraud. The principle relied upon by petitioner that fraud vitiates
everything and does not apply to the facts of the present case.
42. The law is settled that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot
be invoked to resolve complex factual controversies which
require trial, oral evidence, and cross-examination. This principle
has been consistently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
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the case titled as ShubhasJain vs Rajeshwari Shivam& Ors.
Reported as 2021(20) SCC 454wherein it has been held:
“25. It is well settled that the High Court exercising
itsextraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate
hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the
High Court to make a comparative assessment of
conflicting technical reports and decide which one
is acceptable.”
43. Therefore, it is well settled that the writ jurisdiction under Article
226 is not to be invoked where the dispute involves serious
disputed questions of fact, or where the petitioner has an
efficacious and adequate alternative remedy under ordinary civil
law.
44. This Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ
petition hinges on complex and disputed questions of fact,
particularly concerning the execution, validity, and
consequences of the registered lease deed dated 26.10.2018
and associated documents of assignment/surrender. The
Petitioner, while alleging fraud and impersonation, seeks to
challenge a series of private transactions governed by
contract law, supported by documentary evidence including a
registered lease deed bearing his own signatures and a
forensic report ruling out forgery. Such issues whether the
petitioner was defrauded, whether the lease was executed
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under duress or impersonation, or whether valid
consideration was exchanged, cannot be adjudicated in the
summary writ jurisdiction under Article 226, which is not
equipped to conduct a full-fledged trial involving oral
evidence and cross-examination,any declaration as to the
validity or otherwise of the lease deed necessarily involves
consideration of factual issues which cannot and ought not to be
gone into in writ proceedings.
45. This Court is of the considered view that the present writ petition
hinges uponcomplex and substantial disputed questions of fact,
particularly concerning the execution, validity, and legal
implications of the registered lease deed dated 26.10.2018 and
related documents of assignment and surrender. The petitioner,
while leveling allegations of fraud and impersonation, essentially
seeks to annul a chain of private contractual transactions that are
substantiated by registered instruments and corroborated by
forensic evidence. In the considered opinion of this Court, such
disputed and interwoven questions of fact demand a full-fledged
trial, and are not appropriate for adjudication under writ
jurisdiction. Such issues must be pursued before an appropriate
civil forum competent to undertake a detailed examination of
evidence.
46. Issue 1 is accordingly answered in favour of the private
respondent and against the petitioner.
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Whether the petition involves any infringement of public law
right or raises public law concern warranting interference
under Article 226 of the constitution ?
47. The primary relief sought by the petitioner pertain to alleged
irregularities and fraud surrounding the execution of a registered
lease deed dated 26.10.2018, subsequent assignment and
surrender documents, and internal dealings between private
parties relating to ownership and management of an industrial
unit. The petitioner also assails the issuance of NOCs by the
official respondents, alleging that such permissions were granted
without due notice and contrary to the applicable industrial policy.
48. At its core, however, the dispute stems from private commercial
dealings between the petitioner and the private respondents,
concerning rights flowing from a lease and contractual
transactions. These are matters squarely falling within the realm
of private law and contract, rather than involving any breach of
statutory duty or violation of constitutional or public law rights.
49. Merely because official respondents are impleaded does not, by
itself, confer a public law character upon the lis. There must be a
demonstrable breach of public duty or violation of
constitutional/statutory provisions for the invocation of writ
jurisdiction under Article 226.
50. The present petition, viewed in its entirety, is an attempt to give a
public law colour to what is fundamentally a private dispute. No
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specific statutory provision has been pointed out as having been
violated by the official respondents in granting permissions or
inaction. Even assuming procedural lapses, such claims would
require detailed factual adjudication better suited to civil
proceedings.
51. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that writ
jurisdiction is not the appropriate remedy, where the dispute
involving private rights, contractual obligations, particularly
where serious disputed questions of fact arise. Reference may be
made to State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics & Chemicals Ltd.,
(2002) 1 SCC 216, the relevant para is reproduced as under:
“2. Settled law writ is not the remedy for enforcing
contractual obligations. It is to be reiterated that writ
petition under Article 226 is not the proper
proceedings for adjudicating such disputes. Under
the law, it was open to the respondent to approach
the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate
relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that
when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy
is open to the litigant, he should be required to
pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence
of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction
of the court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be
a good ground in refusing to exercise the discretion
under Article 226.”
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52. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled “Joshi
Technologies International Inc. v. Union of India, (2015)
7SCC 728,has held that the writ jurisdiction is primarily designed
to ensure public law remedies, and is not to be employed for
adjudication of private contractual disputes, particularly where
such disputes require adjudication of facts and are governed by a
complete and adequate statutory remedy. The relevant para is as
under:
“55. Law in this aspect has developed through
catena of judgments of this Court and from the
reading of these judgments it would follow that in
pure contractual matters the extraordinary remedy
of writ under Article 226 or Article 32 of the
Constitution cannot be invoked. However, in a
limited sphere such remedies are available only
when the non-Government contracting party is able
to demonstrate that it is a public law remedy which
such party seeks to invoke, in contradistinction to
the private law remedy simpliciter under the
contract. Some of the case law to bring home this
cardinal principle is taken note of hereinafter.”
53. In the present petition the specific case of the petitioner and the
subject matter of the present petition is essentially a private
dispute between the petitioner and private respondents and
through material concealment, a camouflage of a writ petition is
given to a purely private civil dispute. From the record, it
emerges that the case of the petitioner is essentially a private
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dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents.
However. under the guise of invoking the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction of this Court, the petitioner has attempted to give a
colour of public law to what is, in substance, a purely private lis.
The pleadings disclose material concealment and selective
disclosure of facts, thereby camouflaging a civil dispute as falling
within the purview of Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
54. This Court, therefore, holds that the writ petition does not
disclose any public law element or breach of statutory duty that
would justify invoking its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The petitioner’s grievance pertains essentially to a
private dispute governed by contract and property law, and the
proper remedy lies before a civil court. The writ petition is thus
liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
55. Therefore, this Court refrains from entertaining the present writ
petition on the issue of maintainability, leaving it open to the
petitioner to avail the appropriate remedy before the competent
civil court in accordance with law.This court in the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the case ,will not venture into the merits of
the controversy and the merits of the case have been discussed
only for a limited purpose of deciding the instant petitioner on the
ground of maintainability. This issue is accordingly answered in
favour of the private respondents.
Page 24 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
56. Whether the writ petition suffers from delay and laches, and is
thus barred by limitation, disentitling the Petitioner to equitable
relief under Article 226?
57. It is an admitted position on record that the petitioner seeks to
assail certain actions, including the execution of the registered
lease deed dated 26.10.2018 and issuance of NOCs/notifications
dated 17.05.2018 and 29.06.2018. The present writ petition,
however, has been filed in 2023 after a delay of nearly more than
five years from the accrual of the alleged cause of action.
58. The petitioner has failed to offer any cogent, credible, or
satisfactory explanation for this inordinate delay. The only
justification faintly suggested is the alleged fraudulent conduct of
the private respondents and lack of prior notice. However,
records reveal that the petitioner had knowledge of the lease deed
as early as 2018, as evidenced by the filing of an FIR in that very
year. That being the case, the plea of lack of knowledge or
discovery of fraud at a later stage is untenable and contrary to
admitted position.
59. It is well settled that though Article 226 does not prescribe a rigid
limitation period, the principles of equity, delay, and laches apply
with full force. A writ remedy is discretionary, and a litigant who
sleeps over his rights cannot be permitted to approach the writ
court belatedly and seek equitable relief.
Page 25 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
60. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda
Koley, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551, reiterated that:
“13. Reinterring the aspect of delay and latches
would disentitle the discretionary relief being
granted, this court in the case of Chennai
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v
T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held:
16Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should
not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is
required to weigh the explanation offered and the
acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it
has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the
primary principle that when an aggrieved person,
without adequate reason, approaches the court at
his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be
under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis
at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be
it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In
certain circumstances delay and laches may not be
fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay
would only invite disaster for the litigant who
knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects
inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a
litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely,
“procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and
second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise
like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and
causes injury to the lis.”
Page 26 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
61. The Hon’ble Apex court in case titled as Shiv Dass vs Union Of
India And Ors reported as 2007(9) SCC 274 has laid down
that:
“Normally, in the case of belated approach writ
petition has to be dismissed. Delay or laches is one
of the factors to be borne in mind by the High
Courts when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). In an
appropriate case the High Court may refuse to
invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of the applicant
to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the
lapse of time and other circumstances, causes
prejudice to the opposite party. Even where
fundamental right is involved the matter is still
within the discretion of the Court.”
62. Furthermore, it is significant that even a civil suit for challenging
the lease deed or related documents would now be barred by
limitation. Permitting the petitioner to agitate the same issue
through a writ petition would amount to circumventing the
statutory bar through indirect means which is something this
Court cannot tolerate.
63. It is further submitted that the question of delay assumes
particular significance in the present case, especially in view of
the fact that the petitioner’s remedy before the civil court stands
extinguished by the law of limitation. The petitioner has allowed
Page 27 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
more than five years to pass before approaching this court to
invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction to indirectly secure
relief that is otherwise time-barred.The present writ petition thus
appears to be a calculated attempt to circumvent the statutory bar
and resurrect a stale cause of action through this petition unwhich
is impermissible in law and cannot be countenanced by this Court.
64. This Court, therefore, finds that the writ petition suffers from
unexplained and inordinate delay and laches, and is also barred
by the principles of limitation. The petitioner, having slept over
his rights for nearly more than five years without adequate
justification, is not entitled to invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. The petition, on this
ground as well, deserves to be dismissed.
This issue is decided accordingly.
Whether the Petitioner has suppressed material facts relevant to
the controversy, thereby affecting the bona fides of the petition
and warranting dismissal on that ground alone?
65. The petitioner’s challenge is predicated on the assertion that the
lease deed dated 26.10.2018 and related documents were
executed without his knowledge, and in violation of policy and
procedural safeguards. However, on scrutiny of the record, it is
found that the petitioner himself was a signatory to the said lease
deed and other consequential documents, including the surrender
deed and the assignment confirmation.
Page 28 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
66. Not only was the petitioner aware of these documents, but he had
also pursued criminal proceedings in 2018, indicating his
knowledge and active participation in the underlying events.
Despite this, the original writ petition failed to disclose the
existence of these critical documents. It is only when objection
was raised by the respondents in the unamended petition with a
view to condone his fault/omission moved an amendment
application to incorporate the said documents into the pleadings.
67. Such deliberate omission of material facts particularly documents
that go to the root of the petitioner’s case amounts to suppression
and undermines the foundational principle that “one who seeks
equity must come with clean hands”. The writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 is discretionary in nature, and the concealment of
facts disentitles a litigant from invoking this extraordinary
jurisdiction.
68. This principle has been consistently reaffirmed by the Hon’ble
Supreme CourtIn K.D. Sharma v. SAIL, (2008) 12 SCC 481,
the Court held:
“34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under Article 32 and of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution is
extraordinary, equitable and discretionary.
Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for
doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost
necessity that the petitioner approaching the Writ
Court must come with clean hands, put forward all
Page 29 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023the facts before the Court without concealing or
suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief.
If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and
material facts or the petitioner is guilty of
misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed
at the threshold without considering the merits of
the claim.”
69. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI, reported as (2007) 8 SCC 449,
the Supreme Court held:
“33. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is
not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary
power, therefore, a Writ Court will indeed bear in
mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such
jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full
facts or suppresses relevant materials or is
otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court
may dismiss the action without adjudicating the
matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public
interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from
abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The
very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure
of true, complete and correct facts. If the material
facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or
are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts
would become impossible..”
70. Recently, The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Shri K.
Jayaram vs Bangalore Development Authority reported as
(2022)12 SCC 815 held that :
“13………..39.If the primary object as highlighted
in Kensington Income Tax Commrs.(supra) is kept
in mind, an applicant who does not come with
Page 30 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023candid facts and “clean breast” cannot hold a writ
of the court with “soiled hands”. Suppression or
concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It
is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or
misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable
and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does
not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but
states them in a distorted manner and misleads the
court, the court has inherent power in order to
protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process
to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed
further with the examination of the case on merits.
If the court does not reject the petition on that
ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In
fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for
contempt of court for abusing the process of the
court.”.”
71. In the present case, the petitioner not only suppressed material
facts but also attempted to project a misleading narrative to
establish a cause of action that may not have otherwise existed.
The suppression is not incidental or minor, but goes to the very
core of the lis. This Court cannot countenance such conduct.
72. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the petitioner has indulged in suppression and concealment of
material facts deliberately which vitiates the very foundation of
the writ petition. Given the equitable and discretionary nature of
writ jurisdiction, such conduct disqualifies the petitioner from
seeking any relief. The petition, therefore, deserves to be
Page 31 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
dismissed on this ground alone, irrespective of other grounds.
The issue is answered accordingly.
Whether this court ought to decline exercise of its writ
jurisdiction under 226 of the Constitution and direct the
petitioner to avail alternate remedies before the competent civil
court ?.
This Court finds that in the circumstances of the instant case,
writ jurisdiction should not be exercised and the Petitioner
should be relegated to pursue appropriate remedies before the
competent civil and criminal forums.
73. The disputes center on alleged forgery, breach of contract,
dishonored cheques, and execution of lease and assignment
documents. These arematters that are contractual and civil in
nature, not public law in character. The Petitioner has already
initiated Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act proceedings
and a civil suit for ₹25 Crores. These remedies are equally
efficacious and exclusively designed for such disputes.
74. It is well settled that were an effective alternate remedy exist,
writ jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly, particularly in
matters arising out of contractual disputes involving
disputed question of fact. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics & Chemicals Ltd. (2002) 1
SCC 216 held:
Page 32 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
“3. Settled law-A writ is not the remedy for enforcing
contractual obligations. A writ petition under Article
226 is not the proper proceedings for adjudicating
such disputes. Under the law, it was open to the
respondent to approach the court of competent
jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of
contract. When an alternative and equally efficacious
remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required
to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence
of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction
of the court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be
a good ground in refusing to exercise the discretion
under Article 226.”
75. Similarly, The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State
Industrial Development & Investment Corp. v. Diamond
& Gem Dev. Corp. (2013) 5 SCC 470 reaffirmed that:
“39……..It is a settled law that writ does not lie
merely because it is lawful to do so. A person may be
asked to exhaust the statutory \/ alternative remedy
available to him in law.”
76. The Telangana High Court in case titled asKotagiri jay Kumar
VersusState of Telangana, through its Principal Secretary
(MAUD) and Others reported as 2024 SCC OnLine TS 45has
unequivocally held that:
“18…….70.11. The scope of judicial review in
respect of disputes falling within the domain of
contractual obligations may be more limited and in
doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to
adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies
provided for adjudication of purely contractual
disputes.”
Page 33 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
77. In light of the above, Issue No. 5 is decided in favor of the
Respondents.
CONCLUSION.
78. In light of the foregoing, and also keeping in view the law laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, submissions of the
learned counsel for the parties and upon a careful perusal of
the record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
present writ petition is not maintainable. The petitioner’s
grievances fundamentally arise from private contractual disputes
involving allegations of impersonation, forgery, and lack of
consent, all of which necessitate detailed factual inquiries,
examination of evidence, and credibility assessments that lie
beyond the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The writ
jurisdiction, being extraordinary and discretionary, is not
designed to supplant civil courts in adjudicating private disputes
hinging on contested facts and documentary evidence.
79. Moreover, the nature of the lis, in substance and effect, is
clearly rooted in the realm of private law. The dispute
pertains to commercial dealings and transfer of rights in
immovable property pursuant to a lease deed, assignment
agreement, and related instruments, all executed in a private
capacity. The involvement of official respondents in granting
NOCs or permissions, though sought to be portrayed as
Page 34 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
giving rise to a public law concern, does not alter the
essential character of the controversy. There is no allegation
of any statutory duty breached by public authorities, nor any
assertion of violation of constitutional or fundamental rights.
The mere presence of official respondents in a matter
otherwise dominated by private contractual disputes does not
elevate the cause to one warranting judicial review under
80. Further, the petitioner’s conduct in approaching this Court
suffers from serious infirmities. The record reveals that the
petitioner was fully aware of the lease deed and its
consequences as far back as the year 2018. He had even
initiated criminal proceedings alleging impersonation, which
were closed after forensic evidence confirmed the
authenticity of the signatures. Yet, the petitioner chose to
remain silent for over five years, making no effort to
approach any competent forum for redressal. The delay is not
only inordinate but also unexplained in any credible manner.
A party who sleeps over his rights for years together cannot
be permitted to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court at
his convenience, particularly when the cause of action is
stale and appears to be resurrected only after having
Page 35 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
exhausted other forums or facing procedural barriers due to
limitation.
81. The conduct of the petitioner further weakens his claim to
equitable relief. A careful reading of the pleadings indicate
material suppression of facts and selective disclosure.
Crucial documents, including the registered lease deed
bearing the petitioner’s own signatures, and subsequent
instruments of surrender and assignment, were conspicuously
omitted from the original pleadings and were introduced only
after objections were raised by the respondents. Such
conduct strikes at the root of the petitioner’s bona fides and
undermines the credibility of his narrative. A party seeking
the discretionary relief of writ must approach the Court with
candor and full disclosure. Any attempt to mislead the Court
or suppress material documents disqualifies such a litigant
from invoking the equitable jurisdiction of this Court.
82. In addition to these legal infirmities, it is evident that the
petitioner already has, and indeed has availed, adequate and
efficacious alternative remedies. The pendency of
proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act and a civil
suit for recovery of substantial sums arising out of the same
transaction are clear indicators that the petitioner is well
aware of the proper legal avenues available. The writ
Page 36 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
jurisdiction is not a forum of first recourse in matters
governed by the law of contracts, torts, and property. It is to
be invoked sparingly and only in exceptional cases where
public law elements are clearly established or where gross
injustice would occur in the absence of intervention.
83. This Court is also conscious of its obligation to maintain
judicial discipline, coherence, and procedural efficiency.
Entertaining such a petition would not only blur the well-
established boundaries between private and public law
remedies but would also set an undesirable precedent of
allowing parties to bypass the ordinary forums of civil
adjudication by clothing their grievances in the language of
constitutional rights. The writ court must guard against such
attempts which, if entertained, would dilute the sanctity and
purpose of Article 226 and encourage parallel proceedings in
matters better left to adjudication before the civil courts.
84. In light of the aforesaid circumstances and the private nature
of the dispute, and also the presence of disputed and complex
factual issues, the material suppression of relevant
documents, the inordinate and unexplained delay in
approaching the Court, and the existence of alternative
efficacious remedies,this Court finds no justification to
exercise its writ jurisdiction.
Page 37 of 37 WP(C) No.2698/2023
85. Accordingly, the present writ petition stands dismissed as not
maintainable. However, it is made clear that nothing
contained in this judgment shall come in the way of the
petitioner from seeking appropriate relief before the
competent civil or criminal courts having jurisdiction in
accordance with law and if the law of limitation permits so,
and the said court, if approached will decide the controversy
on merits without being influenced by the observation made
by this court which is only for a limited purpose to decide the
issue of maintainability of the instant petition.
(WASIM SADIQ NARGAL)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR:
01.08-2025
Mubashiri. Whether the Judgment is Reportable: Yes
ii. Whether the Judgment is Speaking: Yes