Shaik Masthan Vali, Guntur Dist vs Kummaru Durga, Guntur Dist Three Others on 28 August, 2025

August 28, 2025

Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati

Shaik Masthan Vali, Guntur Dist vs Kummaru Durga, Guntur Dist Three Others on 28 August, 2025

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
****
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BL SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

LAND GRABBING APPEAL Nos. 20, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29,
31 of 2016,
1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 24, 25, 28, 30, 32 of 2017,
and 1 & 2 of 2024

LGA.No.20 of 2016

Between:
Shaik Masthan Vali, Guntur Dist
.....APPELLANT
AND
Kummaru Durga Guntur Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.19 of 2016

Between:
Meriga Mallikarjunaiah, Nellore Dist
..... APPELLANT
AND
Gorla Kousalyamma Nellore Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.21 of 2016

Between:
Shaik Sulthan, Guntur Dist
..... APPELLANT
AND
Kanchal Venkayamma Guntur Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.24 of 2016

Between:
Aabthina Chia Madhava Rao, Vja, Krishna Dist and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
Padala Sanjeeva Rao and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
RNT, J & MRK, J
2 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

LGA.No.25 of 2016

Between:
G. Sakunthalamma, Anantapur Dist & Another
..... APPELLANTS
AND
B Rameeja Anantapur Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.26 of 2016
Between:
Ammen Shah Fakira Moque, Hyd and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
S Anwar Cuddapa Dist Nineteen and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.27 of 2016

Between:
Nagari Ramanamma, Guntur Dist
..... APPELLANT
AND
Shaik Pyari Jan Guntur Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.29 of 2016
Between:
Gudikandula Prasad, Guntur Dist
..... APPELLANT
AND
Mahankali Aruna Guntur Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.31 of 2016

Between:
M V Jagannadham, Visakhapatnam
..... APPELLANT
AND
D Demudu Kothavalasa Mandal and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.1 of 2017

Between:
Rajiya Sulthana, Hyderabad
..... APPELLANT
AND
Vemula Punyavathi Guntur Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
RNT, J & MRK, J
3 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

LGA.No.2 of 2017

Between:
Mohammed Nasirunnisa Begum
..... APPELLANT
AND
Shaik Saleema and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.3 of 2017
Between:
J.M.Bazul Ahhab
..... APPELLANT
AND
The Vizianagaram Municipality and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.5 of 2017

Between:
J.M.Zainul Abdeen
..... APPELLANT
AND
The Vizianagaram Municipality and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.7 of 2017
Between:
Mohammed Amanuddin
..... APPELLANT
AND
Perupogu Mariyakumari and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.9 of 2017

Between:
Nellore Masthanamma and Others
..... APPELLANT
AND
Kommi Sankaraiah
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.11 of 2017

Between:
Rizwana Sulthana, Hyderabad
..... APPELLANT
AND
Burri Anasuya Guntur and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
RNT, J & MRK, J
4 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

LGA.No.12 of 2017

Between:
Ameen Shah Fakira Mosque, Cuddapah and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
Penugonda Siva Prasad Cuddapah Town and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.13 of 2017
Between:
Padala Sanjeeva Rao and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
Annabathina China Madhava Rao and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.17 of 2017

Between:
Ankem Krishna and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
Rudrau Jagapathi Raju and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.18 of 2017

Between:
Kalepalli Samrajyam
..... APPELLANT
AND
Chintala Lakshmi Rajyam and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.24 of 2017

Between:
Ameen Shah Fakira Mosque
..... APPELLANT
AND
S Sattar and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.25 of 2017
Between:
Ameen Shah Fakira Mosque, Kadapa Dist and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
S Ramthu Miah Kadapa Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
RNT, J & MRK, J
5 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

LGA.No.28 of 2017

Between:
Sanka Koteswara Rao
..... APPELLANT
AND
Akumarthi Durgalaxmi and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.30 of 2017

Between:
Karri Akkulanaidu and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
The Tahsildar Visakhapatnam Dist
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.32 of 2017

Between:
Ameen Shah Fakira Mosqque and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
P Showkar Ali Khan and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.1 of 2024

Between:
Varanasi Satyanarayana
..... APPELLANT
AND
Goddu Sitamahalakshmi and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.2 of 2024

Between:
Gadiyaram Siddardha Sankar Das
..... APPELLANTS
AND
Kolakattala Siva Rami Reddy and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
RNT, J & MRK, J
6 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 28.08.2025

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the Yes/No
fair copy of the Judgment?

_______________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J

____________________________
MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM, J
RNT, J & MRK, J
7 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

+ LAND GRABBING APPEAL Nos. 20, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27,
29, 31 of 2016,
1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 24, 25, 28, 30, 32 of 2017,
and 1 & 2 of 2024

% 28.08.2025
LGA.No.20 of 2016

Between:
Shaik Masthan Vali, Guntur Dist
.....APPELLANT
AND
Kummaru Durga Guntur Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.19 of 2016

Between:
Meriga Mallikarjunaiah, Nellore Dist
..... APPELLANT
AND
Gorla Kousalyamma Nellore Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.21 of 2016

Between:
Shaik Sulthan, Guntur Dist
..... APPELLANT
AND
Kanchal Venkayamma Guntur Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.24 of 2016

Between:
Aabthina Chia Madhava Rao, Vja, Krishna Dist and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
Padala Sanjeeva Rao and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
RNT, J & MRK, J
8 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

LGA.No.25 of 2016

Between:
M V Jagannadham, Visakhapatnam
..... APPELLANT
AND
D Demudu Kothavalasa Mandal and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.1 of 2017

Between:
Rajiya Sulthana, Hyderabad
..... APPELLANT
AND
Vemula Punyavathi Guntur Dist and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
RNT, J & MRK, J
9 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

LGA.No.2 of 2017

Between:
Nellore Masthanamma and Others
..... APPELLANT
AND
Kommi Sankaraiah
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.11 of 2017

Between:
Rizwana Sulthana, Hyderabad
..... APPELLANT
AND
Burri Anasuya Guntur and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
RNT, J & MRK, J
10 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

LGA.No.12 of 2017

Between:
Ankem Krishna and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
Rudrau Jagapathi Raju and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.18 of 2017

Between:
Kalepalli Samrajyam
..... APPELLANT
AND
Chintala Lakshmi Rajyam and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.24 of 2017

LGA.No.28 of 2017

Between:
Sanka Koteswara Rao
..... APPELLANT
AND
Akumarthi Durgalaxmi and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.30 of 2017

Between:
Karri Akkulanaidu and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
The Tahsildar Visakhapatnam Dist
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.32 of 2017

Between:
Ameen Shah Fakira Mosqque and Others
..... APPELLANTS
AND
P Showkar Ali Khan and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.1 of 2024

Between:
Varanasi Satyanarayana
..... APPELLANT
AND
Goddu Sitamahalakshmi and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
LGA.No.2 of 2024

Between:
Gadiyaram Siddardha Sankar Das
..... APPELLANTS
AND
Kolakattala Siva Rami Reddy and Others
.....RESPONDENTS
RNT, J & MRK, J
12 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

! Counsel for the Appellants : Sri T. N. M. Ranga Rao
In LGA No.9 of 2017

Sri Unnam Sravan Kumar,
In LGA No.1 of 2024

(No other counsel appeared to argue
in remaining batch of Appeals)

Counsel for the Respondents : Sri Dammalapati Srinivas
Advocate General
For State Respondent

Sri S. Vivek Chandrasekhar,
Standing Counsel for APHC

Sri C. Venkaiah,
For 1st Respondent in
LGA.No.1/2024

Sri Kalangi Manohar,
For 2nd Respondent in
LGA.No.1/2024

< Gist :

> Head Note:

? Cases Referred:

1. LGA No.1 of 2019, APHC
Decided on 28.08.2019
2. (2022) 6 SCC 704
3. AIR 1957 SC 540
4. AIR 1967 SC 344
5. (2022) 2 SCC 161
6. (2014) 5 SCC 219
7. 2024 SCC OnLine All 7422
8. (1989) 1 SCC 345
9. AIR 1964 SC 648
10. (2003) 1 SCC 506
11. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 150
RNT, J & MRK, J
13 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

12. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1584
13. (2025) 2 SCC 1
14. (2024) 3 SCC 799
15. (2024) 14 SCC 179
16. 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 1808
17. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1009
18. (1955) 1 SCC 553
19. (2001) 6 SCC 534
20. (2003) 10 SCC 121
21. (2003) 6 SCC 675
22. 2012 SCC OnLine AP 573
RNT, J & MRK, J
14 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BL SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

LAND GRABBING APPEAL Nos. 20, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29,
31 of 2016,
1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 24, 25, 28, 30, 32 of 2017,
and 1 & 2 of 2024

COMMON JUDGMENT: (per Hon'ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)

The aforesaid batch of Land Grabbing Appeals involve common question

as to their maintainability in this Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Act 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982').

2. L.G.A.No.1 of 2024, in which also the same question is involved and

was reserved separately is also being decided with this batch.

3. Heard Sri T. N. M. Ranga Rao, learned counsel for the appellants in

LGA. No.9 of 2017. No other counsel appeared to advance the arguments for

the appellants in batch of Appeals.

4. We also heard Sri Dammalapati Srinivas, learned Advocate General for

the State respondent.

5. We provided by the Order dated 02.04.2025 that the High Court of

Andhra Pradesh through Registrar General be also impleaded as party in one of

the appeals, LGA No.20 of 2016, which shall be the leading case of the batch of

appeals and such impleadment, only for the purpose of granting opportunity of

hearing to the High Court in view of there being the resolution by the

Administrative Committee of the then common High Court of Judicature for the
RNT, J & MRK, J
15 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

State of Telangana and for the State of Andhra Pradesh. As such the

impleadment was made.

6. We also heard Sri S. Vivek Chandrasekhar, learned standing counsel

for Andhra Pradesh High Court.

7. In LGA No.1 of 2024 - We heard Sri Unnam Sravan Kumar, learned

counsel for the appellant, Sri C. Venkaiah, learned counsel for respondent No.1

and Sri Kalangi Manohar, learned counsel for respondent No.2.

8. We would briefly refer to the facts of the aforesaid LGAs as follows:

I Facts:

i) LGA No.20 of 2016:

L.G.O.P.No.8 of 2009 under Section 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of A. P. Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Tribunal (District Judge) at Guntur, was filed by

the appellant/applicant for eviction of the respondents therein from the

application schedule property and surrender vacant possession of the same to

the applicant. The same was dismissed vide Order dated 25.07.2013.

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.11 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A (3)

of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

1982 at B. R. K. R. Bhavan, Tankbund, Hyderabad. After abolition of the

Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated

02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.11 of 2014 was transferred to the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it

was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.20 of 2016. After bifurcation of the State, as the
RNT, J & MRK, J
16 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Guntur, it was transferred

to this Court, maintaining the same number.

ii) LGA No.19 of 2016:

O.P.No.7 of 1994 under Section 7 (2) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of Special Tribunal

constituted under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act (Principal

District Judge) at Nellore, was filed by the respondents against the

appellant for direction to the respondent/appellant to deliver the site and award

compensation of Rs.5,000/- by way of damages. The same was allowed vide

Order dated 18.11.2010. Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.3 of 2012 was

filed under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad. After abolition of the Special Court vide

G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated 02.09.2016, the

L.G.A.No.3 of 2012 was transferred to the High Court of Judicature for the State

of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it was re-numbered as

L.G.A.No.19 of 2016. After bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to the

jurisdiction of the District Court, Nellore, it was transferred to this Court,

maintaining the same number.

iii) LGA No.21 of 2016:

L.G.O.P.No.10 of 2009 under Section 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of A. P. Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Tribunal (District Judge) at Guntur, was filed by

the appellant/applicant for eviction of the respondents therein from the
RNT, J & MRK, J
17 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

application schedule property and surrender vacant possession of the same to

the applicant. The same was dismissed vide Order dated 25.07.2013.

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.7 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A (3)

of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

1982 at B. R. K. R. Bhavan, Tankbund, Hyderabad. After abolition of the

Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated

02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.7 of 2014 was transferred to the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it

was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.21 of 2016. After bifurcation of the State, as the

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Guntur, it was transferred

to this Court, maintaining the same number.

iv) LGA No.24 of 2016:

L.G.O.P.No.356 of 2008 under Sections 7 & 8 of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of District Judge,

Krishna, Machilipatnam, was filed by the appellants/applicants for eviction of

the respondents therein from the application schedule property and put the

applicants in possession of the same and award costs and compensation. The

same was dismissed vide Judgment dated 22.07.2013. Challenging the said

Judgment, L.G.A.No.20 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982

before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 at

Hyderabad. After abolition of the Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue

(EA & AR) Department, dated 02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.20 of 2014 was

transferred to the High Court of Judicature for the State of Telangana and the
RNT, J & MRK, J
18 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

State of Andhra Pradesh, where it was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.24 of 2016.

After bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to the jurisdiction of the

District Court, Krishna, Machilipatnam, it was transferred to this Court,

maintaining the same number.

v) LGA No.25 of 2016:

O.P.No.390 of 2005 under Section 7-A (1) and Section 8 (1) of the A. P.

Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of

the Chairman, Tribunal under the Land Grabbing Act, Anantapur, was

filed by the appellants/applicants to declare the right of the applicants to the

petition schedule property and direct delivery of possession of the same. The

same was dismissed vide Order dated 14.06.2012. Challenging the said Order,

L.G.A.No.5 of 2013 was filed under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982 before the

Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act at Hyderabad. After

abolition of the Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR)

Department, dated 02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.11 of 2014 was transferred to the

High Court of Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra

Pradesh, where it was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.25 of 2016. After bifurcation of

the State, as the matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court,

Anantapur, it was transferred to this Court, maintaining the same number.

vi) LGA No.26 of 2016:

L.G.O.P.No.5 of 1990 under Section 7-A (1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of the Special

Tribunal (District Judge) appointed under the Andhra Pradesh Land
RNT, J & MRK, J
19 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, at Cuddapah, was filed by the

appellants/applicants for eviction of the respondents therein from the

application schedule property and to deliver the vacant possession of the same

to the applicants. The same was dismissed vide Judgment dated 11.12.1998.

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.11 of 2000 was filed under Section 7-A (3)

of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

1982 at B. R. K. R. Bhavan, Tankbund Road, Hyderabad. After abolition of the

Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated

02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.11 of 2014 was transferred to the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it

was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.26 of 2016. After bifurcation of the State, as the

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Cuddapah, it was

transferred to this Court, maintaining the same number.

vii) LGA No.27 of 2016:

L.G.O.P.No.1 of 2010 under Section 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of A. P. Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Tribunal (District Judge) at Guntur, was filed by

the appellant/applicant for eviction of the respondents therein from the

application schedule property and surrender vacant possession of the same to

the applicant. The same was dismissed vide Order dated 15.07.2013.

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.(SR)No.692 of 2014 was filed under Section

7-A (3) of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 at B. R. K. R. Bhavan, Tankbund, Hyderabad. After
RNT, J & MRK, J
20 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

abolition of the Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR)

Department, dated 02.09.2016, the L.G.A.(SR)No.692 of 2014 was transferred

to the High Court of Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of

Andhra Pradesh, where it was numbered as L.G.A.No.27 of 2016. After

bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to the jurisdiction of the District

Court, Guntur, it was transferred to this Court, maintaining the same number.

viii) LGA No.29 of 2016:

L.G.O.P.No.16 of 2009 under Section 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of A. P. Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Tribunal (District Judge) at Guntur, was filed by

the appellant/applicant for eviction of the respondents therein from the

application schedule property and surrender vacant possession of the same to

the applicant. The same was dismissed vide Order dated 25.07.2013.

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.13 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A (3)

of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

1982 at B. R. K. R. Bhavan, Tankbund, Hyderabad. After abolition of the

Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated

02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.13 of 2014 was transferred to the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it

was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.29 of 2016. After bifurcation of the State, as the

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Guntur, it was transferred

to this Court, maintaining the same number.
RNT, J & MRK, J
21 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

ix) LGA No.31 of 2016:

L.G.O.P.No.34 of 2003 under Section 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of the Special

Tribunal-cum-District Judge at Vizianagaram, was filed by the

appellant/applicant for eviction of the respondents from the schedule property

and put the applicant in vacant possession of the same. The same was

dismissed vide Order dated 15.06.2007. Challenging the said Order,

L.G.A.(SR)No.2992 of 2007 was filed under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982

before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 at

Hyderabad. After abolition of the Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue

(EA & AR) Department, dated 02.09.2016, the L.G.A.(SR)No.2992 of 2007 was

transferred to the High Court of Judicature for the State of Telangana and the

State of Andhra Pradesh, where it was numbered as L.G.A.No.31 of 2016. After

bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to the jurisdiction of the District

Court, Vizianagaram, it was transferred to this Court, maintaining the same

number.

x) LGA No.1 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.13 of 2009 under Section 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of A. P. Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Tribunal (District Judge) at Guntur, was filed by

the appellant/applicant for eviction of the respondents therein from the

application schedule property and surrender vacant possession of the same to

the applicant. The same was dismissed vide Order dated 25.07.2013.
RNT, J & MRK, J
22 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.814 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A

(3) of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition)

Act, 1982 at B. R. K. R. Bhavan, Tankbund, Hyderabad. After abolition of the

Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated

02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.814 of 2014 was transferred to the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it

was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.1 of 2017. After bifurcation of the State, as the

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Guntur, it was transferred

to this Court, maintaining the same number.

xi) LGA No.2 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.17 of 2009 under Section 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of A. P. Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Tribunal (District Judge) at Guntur, was filed by

the appellant/applicant for eviction of the respondents therein from the

application schedule property and surrender vacant possession of the same to

the applicant. The same was dismissed vide Order dated 25.07.2013.

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.5114 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A

(3) of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition)

Act, 1982 at B. R. K. R. Bhavan, Tankbund, Hyderabad. After abolition of the

Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated

02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.5114 of 2014 was transferred to the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it

was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.2 of 2017. After bifurcation of the State, as the
RNT, J & MRK, J
23 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Guntur, it was transferred

to this Court, maintaining the same number.

xii) LGA No.3 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.776 of 2004 under Section 7 of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of the Land

Grabbing Tribunal-cum-District Judge, Vizianagaram, was filed by the

appellant/applicant to declare him as absolute owner of the petition schedule

property and direct the respondents 7 to 17 therein to vacate the schedule

property and to put the petitioner in vacant possession of the same. The same

was dismissed vide Order dated 21.03.2014. Challenging the said Order,

L.G.A.(SR)No.1693 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982

before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 at

Hyderabad. After abolition of the Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue

(EA & AR) Department, dated 02.09.2016, the L.G.A.(SR)No.1693 of 2014 was

transferred to the High Court of Judicature for the State of Telangana and the

State of Andhra Pradesh, where it was numbered as L.G.A.No.3 of 2017. After

bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to the jurisdiction of the District

Court, Vizianagaram, it was transferred to this Court, maintaining the same

number.

xiii) LGA No.5 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.775 of 2004 under Section 7 of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of the Land

Grabbing Tribunal-cum-District Judge, Vizianagaram, was filed by the
RNT, J & MRK, J
24 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

appellant/applicant to declare him as absolute owner of the petition schedule

property and direct the respondents 7 to 11 therein to vacate the schedule

property and to put the petitioner in vacant possession of the same. The same

was dismissed vide Order dated 21.03.2014. Challenging the said Order,

L.G.A.(SR)No.1696 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982

before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 at

Hyderabad. After abolition of the Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue

(EA & AR) Department, dated 02.09.2016, the L.G.A.(SR)No.1696 of 2014 was

transferred to the High Court of Judicature for the State of Telangana and the

State of Andhra Pradesh, where it was numbered as L.G.A.No.5 of 2017. After

bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to the jurisdiction of the District

Court, Vizianagaram, it was transferred to this Court, maintaining the same

number.

xiv) LGA No.7 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.18 of 2009 under Section 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of A. P. Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Tribunal (District Judge) at Guntur, was filed by

the appellant/applicant for eviction of the respondents therein from the

application schedule property and surrender vacant possession of the same to

the applicant. The same was dismissed vide Order dated 25.07.2013.

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.10 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A (3)

of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

1982 at B. R. K. R. Bhavan, Tankbund, Hyderabad. After abolition of the
RNT, J & MRK, J
25 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated

02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.10 of 2014 was transferred to the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it

was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.7 of 2017. After bifurcation of the State, as the

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Guntur, it was transferred

to this Court, maintaining the same number.

v) LGA No.9 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.5 of 2003 under Section 7 of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of the Chairman,

Tribunal constituted under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act

(Principal District Judge) at Nellore, was filed by the respondent against

the appellants for declaration that the applicant/respondent is the absolute

owner of the petitioner schedule property and for eviction of the respondents

therein therefrom and for damages. The same was allowed vide Order dated

17.08.2011. Challenging the said Order, the respondents therein filed

L.G.A.No.13 of 2011 under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982 before the Special

Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad. After abolition of the

Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated

02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.13 of 2011 was transferred to the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it

was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.9 of 2017. After bifurcation of the State, as the

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Nellore, it was transferred

to this Court, maintaining the same number.
RNT, J & MRK, J
26 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

xvi) LGA No.11 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.14 of 2009 under Section 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of A. P. Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Tribunal (District Judge) at Guntur, was filed by

the appellant/applicant for eviction of the respondents therein from the

application schedule property and surrender vacant possession of the same to

the applicant. The same was dismissed vide Order dated 25.07.2013.

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.12 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A (3)

of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

1982 at B. R. K. R. Bhavan, Tankbund, Hyderabad. After abolition of the

Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated

02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.12 of 2014 was transferred to the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it

was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.11 of 2017. After bifurcation of the State, as the

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Guntur, it was transferred

to this Court, maintaining the same number.

xvii) LGA No.12 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.4 of 1990 under Section 7-A (1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of the Special

Tribunal (District Judge) appointed under the Andhra Pradesh Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, at Cuddapah, was filed by the

appellants/applicants for declaration of the sale deeds of the respondents 1, 3,

6 and 9 therein, if any, as null and void, to declare the leases made by
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27 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

respondents 1, 3, 6 and 9 to the respondents 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10 and 11 therein as

void in law and not binding on the applicants therein and to order all the

respondents therein to deliver vacant possession of the land occupied by them,

as described in the schedule property to the petitioners. The same was

dismissed vide Judgment dated 11.12.1998. Challenging the said judgment,

L.G.A.No.10 of 2000 was filed under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982 before the

Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 at Hyderabad. After

abolition of the Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR)

Department, dated 02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.10 of 2000 was transferred to the

High Court of Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra

Pradesh, where it was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.12 of 2017. After bifurcation of

the State, as the matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court,

Cuddapah, it was transferred to this Court, maintaining the same number.

xviii) LGA No.13 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.356 of 2008 under Sections 7 & 8 of the A. P. Land Grabbing)

Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of District Judge, Krishna,

Machilipatnam, was filed by the appellants/applicants for eviction of the

respondents therein from the application schedule property and put the

applicants in possession of the same and award costs and compensation. The

same was allowed in part vide Judgment dated 22.07.2013. Challenging the

said Judgment, L.G.A.No.3 of 2014 was filed by the respondents therein under

Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 at Hyderabad. After abolition of the Special Court vide
RNT, J & MRK, J
28 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated 02.09.2016, the

L.G.A.No.3 of 2014 was transferred to the High Court of Judicature for the State

of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it was re-numbered as

L.G.A.No.13 of 2017. After bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to the

jurisdiction of the District Court, Krishna, Machilipatnam, it was transferred to

this Court, maintaining the same number.

xix) LGA No.17 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.342 of 1997 under Sections 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land

Grabbing) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of District Judge,

Krishna, Machilipatnam, was filed by the applicant/respondent for eviction of

the respondents therein from the petition schedule property and put the

applicant in possession of the same. The same was allowed vide Judgment

dated 25.04.2016. Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.17 of 2017 was filed

by the respondents therein under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982 before the

High Court of Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra

Pradesh as the Special Courts were abolished vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA

& AR) Department, dated 02.09.2016. After bifurcation of the State, as the

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Krishna, Machilipatnam, it

was transferred to this Court, maintaining the same number.

xx) LGA No.18 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.341 of 1997 under Sections 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land

Grabbing) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of District Judge,

Krishna, Machilipatnam, was filed by the applicant/respondent for eviction of
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29 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

the respondents therein from the petition schedule property and redeliver the

same to the applicant. The same was allowed vide Judgment dated 25.04.2016.

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.18 of 2017 was filed by the 1st respondent

therein under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982 before the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh as the

Special Courts were abolished vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR)

Department, dated 02.09.2016. After bifurcation of the State, as the matter

related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Krishna, Machilipatnam, it was

transferred to this Court, maintaining the same number.

xxi) LGA No.24 of 2017:

O.S.No.1 of 1994 was filed by the plaintiff for declaration of title and for

delivery of possession of the plaint schedule properties on the file of District

Judge, Cuddapah, and the same was dismissed along with connected LGOPs

vide common Judgment dated 11.12.1998. Challenging the said judgment, the

plaintiff filed A.S.No.1717 of 1999 before the High Court of Judicature for the

State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh. The appeal was re-

numbered as LGA.24 of 2017, as per office Order, dated 29.09.2008. After

bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to the jurisdiction of the District

Court, Cuddapah, it was transferred to this Court, maintaining the same

number.

xxii) LGA No.25 of 2017:

O.S.No.2 of 1994 was filed by the plaintiff for declaration of title and for

delivery of possession of the plaint schedule properties on the file of District
RNT, J & MRK, J
30 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

Judge, Cuddapah, and the same was dismissed along with connected LGOPs

vide common Judgment dated 11.12.1998. Challenging the said judgment, the

plaintiff filed A.S.No.1765 of 1999 before the High Court of Judicature for the

State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh. The appeal was re-

numbered as LGA.25 of 2017, as per office Order, dated 29.09.2008. After

bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to the jurisdiction of the District

Court, Cuddapah, it was transferred to this Court, maintaining the same

number.

xxiii) LGA No.28 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.15 of 2009 under Section 7-A(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of A. P. Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Tribunal (District Judge) at Guntur, was filed by

the appellant/applicant for eviction of the respondents therein from the

application schedule property and surrender vacant possession of the same to

the applicant. The same was dismissed vide Order dated 25.07.2013.

Challenging the said Order, L.G.A.No.6 of 2014 was filed under Section 7-A (3)

of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

1982 at B. R. K. R. Bhavan, Tankbund, Hyderabad. After abolition of the

Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated

02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.6 of 2014 was transferred to the High Court of

Judicature for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it

was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.28 of 2017. After bifurcation of the State, as the
RNT, J & MRK, J
31 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

matter related to the jurisdiction of the District Court, Guntur, it was transferred

to this Court, maintaining the same number.

xxiv) LGA No.30 of 2017:

L.G.C.No.25 of 1994 under Section 7(1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of the Principal

District Judge-cum-Special Court constituted under A. P. Land

Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 at Visakhapatnam, was filed by the

applicant/respondent for declaration that the respondents therein as land

grabbers and to evict them from the schedule property. The same was allowed

vide judgment dated 30.06.2010. Challenging the said judgment, L.G.A.No.2 of

2012 was filed under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982 before the Special Court

under Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 at Hyderabad by the respondents

in L.G.C.No.25 of 1994. After abolition of the Special Court vide G.O.Ms.No.420

Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated 02.09.2016, the L.G.A.No.2 of 2012 was

transferred to the High Court of Judicature for the State of Telangana and the

State of Andhra Pradesh, where it was re-numbered as L.G.A.No.30 of 2017.

After bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to the jurisdiction of the

District Court, Visakhapatnam, it was transferred to this Court, maintaining the

same number.

xxv) LGA No.32 of 2017:

L.G.O.P.No.7 of 1990 under Section 7-A (1) of the A. P. Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act 1982'), on the file of the Special

Tribunal (District Judge) appointed under the Andhra Pradesh Land
RNT, J & MRK, J
32 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, at Cuddapah, was filed by the

appellants/applicants for eviction and delivery of possession of the schedule

property. The same was dismissed vide common Judgment dated 11.12.1998.

Challenging the said judgment, L.G.A.No.13 of 2000 was filed under Section 7-A

(3) of the Act 1982 before the Special Court under Land Grabbing (Prohibition)

Act, 1982 at Hyderabad. After abolition of the Special Court vide

G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated 02.09.2016, the

L.G.A.No.13 of 2000 was transferred to the High Court of Judicature for the

State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, where it was re-numbered

as L.G.A.No.32 of 2017. After bifurcation of the State, as the matter related to

the jurisdiction of the District Court, Cuddapah, it was transferred to this Court,

maintaining the same number.

xxvi) LGA No.2 of 2024:

AP LGOP.No.01 of 2009 on the file of the Principal District Judge,

Prakasam at Ongole, was filed by the appellant/applicant for eviction and

delivery of possession of the schedule property. The same was dismissed vide

Judgment dated 18.06.2024. Challenging the said judgment, L.G.A.No.2 of

2024 was filed under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982 before this Court, as the

Special Courts were abolished as per G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR)

Department, dated 02.09.2016.

9. In LGA.No.1 of 2024 the facts are as follows:

i) The appellant-Varanasi Satyanarayana filed L.G.O.P.No.193 of 2015 (in

short 'LGOP') under Section 1 (8) (1) of Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing
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33 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short 'the Act') to declare the respondents No.1 & 2

as land grabbers and to evict them from the petition schedule property and

deliver vacant possession of the same to the applicant. The LGOP was filed in

the Court of the Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru.

ii) Respondents No.1 and 2 filed counter/defence, denying the applicant

as the absolute owner and also the identity of the property by submitting that

the schedule property boundaries were not properly mentioned. They also

denied to have encroached or grabbed the vacant property and submitted that

the authorities gave the enjoyment certificate to them and they were paying

the property tax and special taxes. Various other pleas were also raised.

iii) The 4th respondent Tahsildar, Eluru Mandal, Eluru also filed defence,

inter alia, raising the plea that on physical verification of the site in Town and

Government records, the site wherein the respondents 1 and 2 were said to

have made encroachments was the canal poramboke, the government land and

any dispute with respect thereto was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court in

LGOP. Various other pleas were also taken including about W.P.No.5761 of

2015, as also W.P.No.167 of 2015, in which some interim orders were passed.

iv) LGOP No.193 of 2015 was finally dismissed by the learned Principal

District Judge, West Godavari on 26.02.2024, recording the findings, inter alia,

that the respondents 1 and 2 could not be said as the land grabbers and they

could not be evicted, as the matter was also sub judice before the High Court.

v). Challenging the Order, dated 26.02.2024 the present appeal under
RNT, J & MRK, J
34 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

Section 7A (3) of the Act read with Rule 16 of the A.P.Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Rules, 1988 (in short 'the Rules 1988') has been filed.

10. Thus, the Appeals mentioned in para-5, Sl.Nos. (i) to (xviii), (xxiii),

(xxiv) and (xxv) arise out of the Orders passed by the Special Tribunal under

the Act 1982 and against the said Orders, the Appeals were filed before the

Special Court constituted under the said Act. But after G.O.Ms.No.420, dated

02.09.2016, those Appeals were transferred to the erstwhile High Court of

Andhra Pradesh, from where, on bifurcation of the State, the Appeals were

allotted to this Court on the point of territorial jurisdiction.

11. The Appeals at Sl.Nos. (xix) and (xx) against the Order of the Special

Tribunal under the Act 1982 were filed in the erstwhile High Court of Andhra

Pradesh as by that time the Special Courts were abolished vide G.O.Ms.No.420,

dated 02.09.2016. After bifurcation of the State, the Appeals were allotted to

this Court on the point of territorial jurisdiction.

12. The Appeals at Sl.Nos. (xxi) and (xxii) were also filed before the

District Judge, Kadapa and against the Orders, initially A.S (s) were filed in the

erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, where they were re-numbered as Land

Grabbing Appeals. After bifurcation of the State, the Appeals were allotted to

this Court on the point of territorial jurisdiction.

13. The Appeal at Sl.No.(xxvi) arises out of the LGOP filed before the

Special Tribunal under the Act 1982 and against the Order dated 18.06.2024

the Appeal has been filed in this Court under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982.
RNT, J & MRK, J
35 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

14. So far as the Appeal mentioned in Para-6 (supra) is concerned, the

same arises out of the Order of the Special Tribunal and against the Order of

dismissal dated 26.02.2024, the Appeal has been filed in this Court under

Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982.

15. So, there are two sets of Appeals. One, finally transferred to the

erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which were pending before the Special

Court under the Act 1982 filed under Section 7-A (3) of the said Act in view of

the abolition of the Special Courts vide G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016. The

other set of appeals are those which have been filed in the High Court of

Andhra Pradesh either erstwhile or present after reorganization, directly, after

the Order of the Special Tribunal, in view of its abolition vide G.O.Ms.No.420,

dated 02.09.2016. But all the Appeals are filed under the Act 1982.

II Point for consideration:

16.The point for determination is the maintainability of the Land

Grabbing Appeals before the High Court under the Act 1982.

17. We heard on the point of maintainability of the appeal before this

Court under Section 7A (3) of the A.P.Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

III Consideration / Analysis:

18. To consider the above point, we would refer to the provisions of the

Act 1982.

i) Statutory Provisions:

19. Section 7A of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act,

1982 reads as under:
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36 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

"7A. Special Tribunals and its powers, etc.

(1) Every Special Tribunal shall have power to try all cases not taken
cognizance of by the Special Court relating to any alleged act of land grabbing,
or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of the land
grabbed whether before or after the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act,1987 and brought before it and
pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) as it deems fit:
Provided that if, in the opinion of the Special Tribunal, any case brought
before it is prima facie frivolous, or vexatious it shall reject the same without
any further enquiry:
Provided further that if, in the opinion of the Special Tribunal any case
brought before it is a fit case to be tried by the Special Court it may for reasons
to be recorded by it transfer the case to the Special Court for its decision in the
matter.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, a Special Tribunal shall, in the
trial of cases before it, follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil
Procedure,1908.
(3) An appeal shall lie, from any judgment or order not being
interlocutory order of the Special Tribunal, to the Special Court on any
question of law or of fact. Every appeal under this sub-section shall be
preferred within a period of sixty days from the date of Judgment or order
of the Special Tribunal:
Provided that the Special Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of
the said period of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of sixty days.
(4) Every finding of the Special Tribunal with regard to any alleged act of
land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing, and of the
persons who committed such land grabbing and every Judgment of the Special
Tribunal with regard to the determination of the title and ownership to, or
lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having
interest in such land:
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37 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

Provided that the Special Tribunal shall by notification specify the fact of
taking cognizance of the case under this Act. Such notification shall state that
any objection which may be received by the Special Tribunal from any person
including the custodian of evacuee property within the period specified therein
will be considered by it:
Provided further that where the custodian of evacuee property objects to
the Special Tribunal taking cognizance of the case, the Special Tribunal shall
not proceed further with the case in regard to such property:
Provided also that the Special Tribunal shall cause a notice of taking
cognizance of the case under the Act served on any person known or believed
to be interested in the land, after a summary enquiry to satisfy itself about the
persons likely to be interested in the land.
(5) It shall be lawful for the Special Tribunal to pass an order in any
case decided by it, awarding compensation in terms of money for wrongful
possession, which shall not be less than an amount equivalent to the market
value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order and profits accrued from
the land payable by the land grabber to the owner of the grabbed land and may
direct the re-delivery of the grabbed land to its rightful owner. The amount of
compensation and profits so awarded and cost of re-delivery, if any, shall be
recovered as an arrear of land revenue if the Government are the owner or as a
decree of a Civil Court, in any other case:
Provided that the Special Tribunal shall, before passing an order under
this sub-section, give to the land grabber an opportunity of making his
representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in this regard and consider every
such representation and evidence.
(6) Any case, pending before any Court or other authority immediately
before the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
(Amendment) Act,1987 as would have been within the jurisdiction of a Special
Tribunal, shall stand transferred to the Special Tribunal, having jurisdiction, as
if the cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based had arisen after
such commencement.
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38 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

(7) Every case brought before the Special Tribunal shall be disposed of
finally by the Special Tribunal, as far as possible, within a period of six months
from the date of its having been brought before it.
(8) The Special Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for
purposes of review."

20. A perusal of the Section 7A makes it clear that under sub-section (3)

an appeal lies from any judgment or order not being interlocutory order of the

'Special Tribunal', to the 'Special Court' on any question of law or of fact.

21. The period of limitation has been prescribed for filing appeal. The

power has also been conferred on the Special Court to entertain the appeal

after the expiry of the period of limitation on being satisfied that there is

sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation.

22. The 'Special Tribunal' has been defined under Section 2 (i-b) as

under:

"Section 2: Definitions:

(i-b): "Special Tribunal" means a Court of the District Judge having
jurisdiction over the area concerned and includes Chief Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad"

23. The "Special Court" has been defined under Section 2 (i-a) as under:

"(i-a): Special Court" means a Special Court constituted under Section 7"

24. Section 7 of the Act 1982 reads as under:

"Section7. Constitution of Special Courts- (1) The Government may, for the
purpose of providing speedy enquiry into any alleged act of land grabbing, and
trial of cases in respect of the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of,
the land grabbed, by notification, constitute 1[a Special Court].
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39 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

(2) A Special Court shall consist of a Chairman and four other members, to
be appointed by the Government.
(3) The Chairman shall be a person who is or has been a Judge of a High
Court and of the other four members, two shall be persons who are or have been
District Judges (hereinafter referred to as Judicial Members) and the other two
members shall be persons who hold or have held a post not below the rank of a
District Collector (hereinafter referred to as Revenue Members).
Provided that the appointment of a person who was a Judge of a High Court
as the Chairman of the Special Court shall be made after consultation with the
Chief Justice of the High Court concerned:
Provided further that where a sitting Judge of a High Court is to be
appointed as Chairman, such appointment shall be made after nomination by
the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned, with the concurrence of the
Chief Justice of India.
(4) The Government may, from time to time likewise, reconstitute the
Special Court constituted under sub-section (1) or may, at any time,
abolish such Special Court.
(4A) The Chairman or other member shall hold office as such for a term of
two years from the date on which he enters upon his office, or until the Special
Court is reconstituted or abolished under sub-section (4), whichever is earlier.
(4B)(a) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the jurisdiction, powers
and authority of the Special Court may be exercised by benches thereof one
comprising of the Chairman, a judicial member and a Revenue member and the
other comprising of a Judicial Member and a Revenue Member.
(b) Where the bench comprises of the Chairman, he shall be the Presiding
Officer of such a bench and where the bench consists of two members, the
Judicial Member shall be the Presiding Officer.
(c) It shall be competent for the Chairman either suo motu or on a reference
made to him to withdraw any case pending before the bench comprising of two
members and dispose of the same or to transfer any case from one bench to
another bench in the interest of justice.
RNT, J & MRK, J
40 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

(d) Where it is reasonably apprehended that the trial of Civil Liability of a
person accused of an offence under this Act, is likely to take considerable time,
it shall be competent for the Chairman to entrust the trial of the criminal
liability of such offender to another bench in the interest of speedy disposal of
the case.
(e) Where a case under this Act is heard by a bench consisting of two
members and the members thereof are divided in opinion, the case with their
opinions shall be laid before another judicial member or the Chairman and that
member or Chairman, as the case may be after such hearing as he thinks fit,
shall deliver his opinion and the decision or order shall follow that opinion.
(5) The quorum to constitute a meeting of any bench of the Special Court
shall be two.
(5A) The Special Court may, by notification, make regulations not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder
relating to the procedure to be followed for the conduct of the cases and for
regulating the manner of taking decisions.
(5B) The Special Court may cause a public notice of the substance of such
regulations for the information of the general public.
(5C) Every regulation made under this section shall, immediately after it is
made, be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State if it is in session, and
if it is not in session in the session immediately following for a total period of
fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive
sessions and if before the expiration of the session in which it is so laid or the
session immediately following the Legislative Assembly agrees in making any
modifications in the regulation or in the annulment of the regulation, the
regulation shall from the date on which the modification or annulment is
notified, have effect only in such modified form or shall stand annulled, as the
case may be, so however that any such modification or annulments shall be
without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that
regulation.
(5D) (i)Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V
of 1908) the Special Court may follow its own procedure which shall not be
RNT, J & MRK, J
41 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

inconsistent with the principles of natural justice and fair play and subject to the
other provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder while deciding
the Civil liability.
(ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 260 or Section 262 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) every offence punishable under
this Act shall be tried in a summary way and the provisions of Sections 263 to
265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial.
(iii) When a person is convicted of an offence of land grabbing attended by
criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and it appears to the
Special Court that, by such force or show of force or intimidation the land of
any person has been grabbed, the Special Court may if it thinks fit, order that
possession of the same be restored to that person after evicting by force, if
necessary, any other person who may be in possession of the property.
(6) No act or proceeding of 1[the Special Court] shall be deemed to be
invalid by reason only of the existence of any vacancy among its members or
any defect in the constitution or re-constitution thereof."

25. As per Sub-Section (2) of Section 7 of the Act, the Special Court

consists of a Chairman and four other members to be appointed by the

Government. Sub-section (3) provides for the Chairman, who is or has been a

Judge of a High Court and of the other four members, two shall be the persons,

who are or have been District Judges, as Judicial Members, and the other two

members shall be persons who hold or have held a post not below the rank of a

District Collector. Under sub-section (4), the Government has the power to

reconstitute and may also abolish such Special Court.
RNT, J & MRK, J
42 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

ii) G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016:

26. In exercise of powers under Section 7 (4) of the Act 1982, the

G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 was notified, inter alia, to abolish the Special

Court.

27. G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 reads as under:

"GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
ABSTRACT

The Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (Act No.12 of
1982) - Abolition of Special Court constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and transfer of the pending cases under the
Act No.12 of 1982 to the respective Civil Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh
- Notification - Issued.

REVENUE (EA&AR) DEPARTMENT

G.O.Ms.No.420 Dated: 02-09-2016
Read the following:

1. Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (Act No.12 of 1982)
2. G.O.Ms.No.561, Desk Officer (LR) Revenue Department, Dated 04-08-1988
3. Lr.Dis.No.229/2016/Reqr/Estt/SC of the Registrar, Special Court under Andhra
Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, dated: 04-06-2016.

ORDER:

Whereas, in the reference 2nd read above, Government have issued
notification for constitution of Special Court under Sub-Section (1) read with
sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
Act for the purpose of providing speedy enquiry into any alleged act of land
grabbing, and trial of cases in respect of the ownership and title to, or lawful
possession of, the land grabbed.

2. In the reference 3rd read above, the Registrar I/c.Special Court under A.P.
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 has made certain proposals for
appointment of members to the Special Court. The proposal has been examined
and it was decided not to utilize the services of Special Court under A.P.
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, as only small number of cases are
pending in respect of the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh.

RNT, J & MRK, J
43 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

3. Government after careful examination of the matter, have decided to abolish
the Special Court constituted under the provisions of Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, 1982 and to transfer the pending cases under the said Act
to the respective Civil Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Accordingly,
the following notification will be published in an Extra ordinate issue of State
of Andhra Pradesh Gazette dated: 02-09-2016.

NOTIFICATION

In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (4) of section 7 of
A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (Act 12 of 1982), the Governor
of Andhra Pradesh hereby abolish the Special Court constituted under the
provisions of Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982; save as otherwise
provided hereunder:

(i) All cases of post cognizance pending before the Special Court relating to the
State of Andhra Pradesh along with the notification charges that were deposited
by the parties to the case and lying to the credit of the Special Court under A.P.
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act shall stand transferred to the Principal district
Judges of the respective District Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh and the
pending cases shall be tried and disposed off as Land Grabbing Original
Petitions (LGOPs) in terms of Act 12 of 1982.

(ii) All Land Grabbing Case S.Rs (LGCSRs) and Taken Up Cases relating to the
State of Andhra Pradesh that are pending for taking cognizance shall stand
transferred to Principal District Judges of the respective District Courts in the
State of Andhra Pradesh and the said cases shall be tried and disposed off as
Land Grabbing Original Petitions (LGOPs) in terms of said Act 12 of 1982.

(iii) All Land Grabbing Appeal S.Rs (LGASRs) relating to the State of Andhra
Pradesh that are pending for taking cognizance and Transfer Suit(s) that
are received from the Hon’ble High Court for trial along with the pending
cases before this Court, shall stand transferred to Hon’ble High Court of
Andhra Pradesh. The LGASRs shall be disposed off in terms of Act of
1982.

(iv) All the disposed cases relating to the State of Andhra Pradesh shall stand
transferred to respective District Courts in Andhra Pradesh for preservation of
disposed records in the District Courts.

(v) The personnel working under the control of the Special Court who are allotted
to the State of Andhra Pradesh shall be transferred by way of accommodating
them in the office of the Spl.CS&CCLA or as the Government of Andhra
Pradesh may decide, by an appropriate order.

RNT, J & MRK, J
44 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

5. The Registrar (I/c), Special Court Under Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing
(Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad shall take necessary action accordingly.

(BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA
PRADESH)

J.C.SHARMA
SPECIAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT”

iii) Submissions of learned counsels &
the Report of the Registrar Judicial:

28. Sri Dammalapati Srinivas, learned Advocate General, on 02.04.2025

submitted and such submission is on record in the Order dated 02.04.2025 in

the batch of the Appeals that the G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 was issued

by the Government without any prior approval or consultation with the High

Court, but after G.O.Ms.No.420, the then administrative committee of the

common High Court consisting of seven Hon’ble Judges resolved to direct the

Registrar, Land Grabbing Court, Hyderabad for transferring all the cases

pending before the Special Court at the time of abolition, to the High Court to

be decided by it.

29. Report was also called from the Registrar Judicial, Andhra Pradesh

High Court, on the aspect of filing of the Appeals before this Court under which

provision of law, as also various appeals which were transferred to this Court

from the Special Court under the Act 1982, which Special Court was abolished

vide G.O.Ms.No.420, then also by virtue of what provision of law.

30. The Registrar Judicial submitted the report dated 27.03.2025 to the

effect that vide resolution dated 20.10.2016 on subject No.4 of the then

administrative committee of the common High Court of Judicature for the State
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45 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

of Telangana and for the State of Andhra Pradesh resolved to direct the

Registrar, Land Grabbing Court, Hyderabad to transfer;

(a) All pending Land Grabbing cases, post cognizance stage, to respective

District Courts.

(b) All pending Land Grabbing cases, at pre-cognizance stage, to respective

District Courts.

(c)All Land Grabbing Appeals, Land Grabbing Suits and the Land

Grabbing Appeals at SR stage to the Hon’ble High Court of

Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and State of

Andhra Pradesh.

(d) All disposed case records pertaining to the District Courts to the

respective Districts for preservation.

Pursuant to the aforesaid, the Registrar of the Land Grabbing Court, Hyderabad

had transferred the respective cases to the High Court for disposal in

accordance with law.

31. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Section 7A sub-

section (3) provides for an appeal from the judgment or order, other than the

interlocutory order of a Special Tribunal to the Special Court on any question of

law or of fact. He submitted that the Special Court was abolished vide

G.O.Ms.No.420 Revenue (EA & AR) Department, dated 02.09.2016, but in spite

thereof, in his submission, the appeal would be maintainable, as the statute

provides the remedy of appeal under Section 7A (3) of the Act and in the

absence of the Forum of the Special Court, the appeal shall lie to the High
RNT, J & MRK, J
46 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

Court. He submitted that the constitution of the Special Courts is provided by

Section 7 of the Act and under sub-section (4), the Government from time to

time likewise reconstitute the Special Court constituted under sub-section (1) or

may, at any time abolish such Special Court. Referring to the notification

G.O.Ms.No.420, clause (iii), he submitted that all Land Grabbing Appeal S.Rs

(LGASRs) relating to the State of Andhra Pradesh that were pending for taking

cognizance and Transfer Suits that were received from the High Court for trial

along with the pending cases before the Special Court, shall stand transferred

to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The LGASRs shall be disposed of in terms

of the Act 1982. Based thereon, he submitted that the present appeal would be

maintainable before the High Court even after abolition of the Special Court.

32. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance in the case of Patil

Chandramouliswar Reddy v. Madige Pedda Dasthagiri1, to contend that

Section 7A of the Act states about the constitution of the Special Tribunal. A

Special Court constituted in terms of Section 7 of the Act, as defined in Section

2 (i) (ia) of the Act, is a Forum, which has jurisdiction over the then State of

Andhra Pradesh, which is now abolished.

33. Learned counsel for the respondents 1 & 2 in LGA No.1 of 2024

submitted that the respondents have filed counter affidavit, supporting the

judgment of the Principal District Judge, in which there is no illegality.

34. On the point of maintainability, he submitted that the Act 1982

provides for appeal before the Special Court but by G.O.Ms.No.420, dated

1
LGA No.1 of 2019, APHC
Decided on 28.08.2019
RNT, J & MRK, J
47 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

02.09.2016 while abolishing Special Court, pending appeals have been passed

to the High Court for decision under the Act 1982. He submitted that,

otherwise, the High Court is not the appellate Court under the Act 1982.

iv) Right of Appeal and Appellate Forum:

35. It is the settled principle of law that, the Right of Appeal is not a

matter of procedure but is a substantive Right. The institution of a suit carries

with it the implication that all remedies in force at the time of the filing of the

suit were to be preserved to the parties till the rest of the career of the suit.

The appeal or a remedy to go to higher Court accrues to a litigant on the very

date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the

adverse judgment is pronounced, such right is to be governed by the law

prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit.

36. It is also well settled position in law that any repealing law which

repeals an earlier law shall not affect the remedies available to a party which

were available to the party on the date when the suit was filed. It would

continue to be in existence for the litigant just as it was available to him or to

her on the date of the filing the lis. However, a vested right to go to a higher

Court can be taken away by the subsequent enactment, if the latter expressely

provides or a bare reading of it shows that the right of going to a higher Court

as per the earlier law had been taken away by a necessary intendment.

37. The Hon’ble Apex Court in ECGC Limited v. Mokul Shriram EPC

JV2 with respect to the accrual of the Right of Appeal and Right to Forum,

2
(2022) 6 SCC 704
RNT, J & MRK, J
48 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Garikapati Veeraya v. N.

Subbiah Choudhry3 and held in para-12 as under, in which, in sub-para 23,

the following principles were laid down.

“12. Subsequently, the Constitution Bench in a judgment in Garikapati
Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry [Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry,
AIR 1957 SC 540] approved the judgment in Hoosein Kasam Dada [Hoosein
Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of M.P., (1953) 1 SCC 299 : 1953 SCR 987 :

AIR 1953 SC 221] , though the issue was in respect of right of appeal to the
Federal Court under the Government of India Act, 1935. The argument was that
the appellant had a right to file an appeal as the suit, out of which the
proceedings arose before this Court, was filed on 22-4-1949. Hence, he had
acquired a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court which has since been
replaced by the Supreme Court. It was the said argument which was accepted
by the Constitution Bench when the following principles were delineated :
(Garikapati Veeraya case [Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR
1957 SC 540] , AIR p. 553, paras 23-24)
“23. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge:

(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are
really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and
are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.

(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive
right.

(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of
appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career
of the suit.

(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the
superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis
commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse
judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at

3
AIR 1957 SC 540
RNT, J & MRK, J
49 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that
prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.

(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent
enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not
otherwise.”

38. The Hon’ble Apex Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment

in Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. CST4 wherein it was observed that when a

lis commences, all rights get crystalised and no clog upon a likely appeal can be

put, unless the law was made retrospective, expressly or by clear implication.

39. From Section 7 of the Act, it is evident that the High Court is not the

Special Court under Section 2 (i) (i-a) read with Section 7. There is no dispute

on this aspect, as it is also submitted by the appellant’s counsel that the High

Court is not the Special Court for the purposes of the Act. So, it becomes clear

that under the Act, from the Order of the Special Tribunal, the appeal lies to the

Special Court, but not to the High Court.

40. The law is also well settled with respect to the Forum that Right to

Forum is not an accrued right. In Neena Aneja v. Jai Prakash Associates

Ltd.5 it was held that right to forum is not an accrued right. Section 6(e) of the

General Clauses Act protects the pending legal proceeding for enforcement of

the accrued right from the effect of repeal; it does not mean the legal

proceeding at a particular forum was saved from the effect of repeal. Referring

to the said judgment in Neena Aneja (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in ECGC

Limited (supra) observed in Para-29 as under:

AIR 1967 SC 344
5
(2022) 2 SCC 161
RNT, J & MRK, J
50 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

“29. It is to be noted that in Neena Aneja [Neena Aneja v. Jai Prakash
Associates Ltd., (2022) 2 SCC 161 : (2022) 1 SCC (Civ) 768] , this Court held
that right to forum is not an accrued right. Section 6(e) of the General Clauses
Act protects the pending legal proceeding for enforcement of the accrued right
from the effect of repeal; it does not mean the legal proceeding at a particular
forum was saved from the effect of repeal. This Court found that there was no
express intention in the repealing enactment that all pending cases would stand
transferred to the fora created under the 2019 Act. This Court held as under :

(SCC pp. 216 & 219, paras 83-84 & 89)
“83. Having stated the above position, we need to harmonise it with the
principle that the right to a forum is not an accrued right, as discussed in Part
C of this judgment. Simply put, while Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act
protects the pending legal proceedings for the enforcement of an accrued right
from the effect of a repeal, this does not mean that the legal proceedings at a
particular forum are saved from the effects from the repeal. The question
whether the pending legal proceedings are required to be transferred to the
newly created forum by virtue of the repeal would still persist. As discussed,
this Court in New India Assurance [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti
Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840] and Maria Cristina [Maria Cristina De Souza
Sodder v. Amria Zurana Pereira Pinto, (1979) 1 SCC 92] has held that forum is
a matter pertaining to procedural law and therefore the litigant has to pursue the
legal proceedings at the forum created by the repealing Act, unless a contrary
intention appears. This principle would also apply to pending proceedings, as
observed in Ramesh Kumar Soni [Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of M.P., (2013)
14 SCC 696 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 340] , Hitendra Vishnu Thakur [Hitendra
Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri)
1087] and Sudhir G. Angur [Sudhir G. Angur v. M. Sanjeev, (2006) 1 SCC 141]
. In this backdrop, what is relevant to ascertain is whether a contrary intent to
the general rule of retrospectivity has been expressed under the 2019 Act to
continue the proceedings at the older forum.

84. Now, in considering the expression of intent in the repealing enactment
in the present case, it is apparent that there is no express language indicating
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51 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

that all pending cases would stand transferred to the fora created by the 2019
Act by applying its newly prescribed pecuniary limits. In deducing whether
there is a contrary intent, the legislative scheme and procedural history may
provide a relevant insight into the intention of the legislature.

***

41. In H. P. State Electricity Regulatory Commission v. H. P. SEB6

the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down three basic principles with respect to the right

of appeal, after referring to the judgment in the case of Garikapati Veeraya

(supra) in paragraph – 22 which read as under:

“22. On a proper understanding of the authority in Garikapati
Veeraya [Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540] ,
which relied upon the Privy Council decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co.
Ltd. [Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, 1905 AC 369 : (1904-07) All
ER Rep Ext 1620 (PC)] , three basic principles, namely,
22.1. The forum of appeal available to a suitor in a pending action of an
appeal to a superior tribunal which belongs to him as of right is a very different
thing from regulating procedure;

22.2. That it is an integral part of the right when the action was initiated at
the time of the institution of action; and
22.3. That if the court to which an appeal lies is altogether abolished
without any forum constituted in its place for the disposal of pending
matters or for lodgment of the appeals, vested right perishes;
are established.”

42. Para-22.3 in H. P. State Electricity Regulatory Commission

(supra) makes it clear that one of the basic principles is that if the Court to

which an appeal lies is altogether abolished without any forum constituted in its

6
(2014) 5 SCC 219
RNT, J & MRK, J
52 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

place for the disposal of pending matters or for lodgment of the appeals, vested

right perishes.

43. Recently, in Charan Singh v. State of U.P.7, the Allahabad High

Court reiterated the principles on right of appeal in Paragraphs 14 and 15 as

under:

“14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having gone through
the record, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge, who had made the
reference, had not considered the provisions of Section 230(2)(d) of the U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006, in its right perspective, and therefore, while only
considering the provision of Section 231 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 the
reference was made. Had the court been shown the provisions of
Section 230(2)(d) of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 then it would have become
clear that such remedies as were available to the party which had filed any lis
before the commencement of the new Act then all the remedies would have
continued as were available to the litigant at the time of the filing of the Suit.
All remedies upon the filing of the Suit namely the filing of Appeals, Second
Appeals, Revisions etc. are really but steps in a series of proceedings connected
by an intrinsic unity and are to be treated to be as a one legal proceeding. The
Right of Appeal is not a matter of procedure but is a substantive Right. The
institution of a Suit carries with it the implication that all remedies in force at
the time of the filing of the Suit were to be preserved to the parties till the rest
of the career of the Suit. The Appeal or a remedy to go to higher Court accrues
to a litigant on the very date the lis commences and although it may be actually
exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be
governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the Suit. In the
instant case, since all remedies available at the time of the notification of
the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, had to continue, the remedy of Revision would
also continue, even if it was not an inherent right which had accrued to the
litigant as would be the case with an appeal.

2024 SCC OnLine All 7422
RNT, J & MRK, J
53 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

15. Any repealing law which repeals an earlier law shall not affect the
remedies available to a party which were available to the party on the date when
the suit was filed. It would continue to be in existence for the litigant just as it
was available to him or her on the date of the filing the lis. A vested right to go
to a higher Court can be taken away by a subsequent enactment if the
latter expressly provides or a bare reading of it shows that the right of
going to a higher Court as per the earlier law had been by a necessary
intendment taken away.

44. The question therefore for our consideration is, in the present

appeals, as to whether the Right of Appeal to the Special Court from the Order

of the Special Tribunal under the Act 1982 has been taken away expressly or by

necessary intendment. We make it clear that Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982

providing the remedy of appeal to the Special Court has remained unchanged.

There is no amendment to the Act 1982 taking away the Right of Appeal to the

Special Court. But, the Forum of the Special Court for appeal has been

abolished. The question therefore is whether such abolition of the Forum by

necessary intendment, read in the light of Section 7 (4) of the Act 1982 which

permits the State to abolish the Forum is to be considered as taking away the

Right of Appeal under Section 7-A (3) of the Act 1982 by necessary intendment,

though in the presence of Section 7A (3), the Right of Appeal cannot be said to

have been taken away expressly.

45. The factual position in the present case is that, the appellate Forum

has been abolished by issuing G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 by the State

Government. The said G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 has been issued in

exercise of powers under Section 7 (4) of the Act 1982. In Section 7-A (3) of
RNT, J & MRK, J
54 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

the Act 1982 conferring the Right of Appeal and creating the Forum of Special

Court i.e., Appellate Court from the Orders of the Special Tribunal, there is no

amendment. In other words, that provision has not been repealed. Any

alternative Forum therefore to pursue the Right of Appeal has not been created

by the legislature. We emphasis by the legislature or by legislation. The

question therefore is whether by G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 the appeals

pending before the Special Court constituted under the Act 1982 on abolition of

the Special Court, without there being repeal of the provision for appeal and

also without conferring any power on the State to create a new appellate

forum, those appeals pending before the Special Court could, by the said

G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 be transferred to the High Court to be

decided as per the provisions of the Act 1982 i.e., exercising the appellate

jurisdiction. The question is whether the Right of Appeal conferred by the

statute and to be exercised before a particular Forum created under the Act of

1982, could be changed by the Government order and a new Appellate Forum

(High Court) could be created, which is not provided by the Statute i.e., Act of

1982.

46. The Forum is a matter pertaining to procedural law and therefore,

the litigant has to pursue the legal proceedings at the Forum provided or

created by the Act or in case of repeal the Forum provided by the repealing Act

unless contrary intention appears. That principle applies to the pending

proceedings as well. So, if by the repealing Act, the Forum has been abolished
RNT, J & MRK, J
55 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

and substituted by a new Forum, unless the contrary intention appears, the

appeals pending before the abolished forum would be before the new Forum.

47. In other words, we may say that if the proceedings under the Act

1982 instituted before the Special Tribunal were pending on the date

G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 was issued, the person aggrieved from the

decision of the Tribunal would have still Right of Appeal which accrued on the

date of the institution of the proceedings, but he cannot claim as of right to be

heard in appeal before particular Forum and he will have to approach the new

Forum, unless a contrary intention is expressed.

48. But, here the complexity is that there is no repeal of the statute nor

of the provision, providing for appeal to a particular Forum i.e., the Special

Court under the Act 1982. The abolition of the Special Court for appeals is by

the G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016, which provides for transfer of the

pending appeals to the High Court and such provision in our view is in conflict

with Section 7A (3) of the Act 1982, which provides that appeals would be

before the Special Court. The constitution of the Special Court itself has been

provided under Section 7 (1) of the Act 1982. The High Court is not the Special

Court under the Act 1982 under Section 7 read with Section 2 (ia).

49. The abolition of the forum by G.O.Ms.No.420 dated 02.09.2016 is

within the powers conferred by Section 7-A of the Act 1982. So, vested right to

appeal either in the pending appeals before Special Court at the time of

abolition, or for the proceedings pending in the Special Tribunal at the first

instance on the date of abolition, in our view had perished on abolition of forum
RNT, J & MRK, J
56 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

of appeal vide G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016. It is true that by the same

G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016, the pending appeals were provided to be

decided by the High Court exercising the powers under the Act 1982, but that

part of the G.O.Ms.No.420, in our view, is beyond the power of the State

Government under Section 7-A of the Act 1982 and also contrary to the

provision of Section 7-A of the Act 1982. On abolition, the Special Court might

have come to an end, but in the absence of any legislation by the Legislature,

creating a new Forum, the pending appeals could not be either transferred to

the High Court to be decided under the Act 1982 nor the High Court could be

the appellate forum for the appeals under the Act 1982. It could be so made,

only by the Legislature, which has not been done.

50. We are not saying that in place of the Special Court under the Act

1982, the High Court cannot be made the Appellate Court under the Act 1982,

but what we are saying is that, that can be done only by the amendment in the

Act 1982, as the appeal and the appellate Forum are the creation of the

statutes. The High Court not being the Special Court under the Act 1982, and

the High Court not having been conferred the appellate power under the Act

1982, and the Order of the Special Tribunal being of the Special Tribunal under

the Act 1982 and not by the regular Civil Courts, under the Code of Civil

Procedure, the High Court cannot be the appellate Court for the orders passed

under the Act 1982.

51. The provision made by the Government under the G.O.Ms.No.420,

dated 02.09.2016, changing the Forum, in the manner it has been done, is, in
RNT, J & MRK, J
57 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

our view, unknown to law. Any such power was also not given to the

Government under Section 7-A of the Act 1982 by the Legislature/Parliament to

substitute the appellate Forum created by the Act 1982 itself. The only power

given by the Act 1982 was to constitute, reconstitute or abolish the Special

Court. On abolition of the Special Court what could be constituted or

reconstituted was only the Special Court as per Section 7 read with Section 2

(1a) of the Act, but not an entirely different forum, different from the statutory

Forum of which the constitution was also provided by the Act, as to who shall

be the Chairman & Members etc. We are of the considered view that the High

Court could not be made an appellate Court under the Act 1982, may be for the

appeals pending before the abolished Special Courts, by issuing a Government

Order, beyond the scope of powers given by Section 7-A of the Act 1982.

v) Notification contrary to or in excess of power given by,
Statute:

52. The case in Collector of Central Excise v. Parle Exports (P)

Ltd.8 was cited by the learned standing counsel for the High Court to contend

that while interpreting an exemption clause, liberal interpretation should be

imparted to the language thereof and the notification must be read as a whole

in the context of other relevant provisions. When a notification is issued in

accordance with the power conferred by the statute, it has statutory force and

validity and therefore, the exemption under the notification is as if it were

contained in the Act itself.

8
(1989) 1 SCC 345
RNT, J & MRK, J
58 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

53. In the aforesaid case, the notification was issued under Rule 8 of the

Central Excise Rules. It was observed that the notification should be read along

with the Act. It was also observed that the principle is well settled that when

two views of a notification are possible, it should be construed in favour of the

subject as notification is part of fiscal enactment. Para-17, on which reliance

was placed, reads as under:

“17. How then should the courts proceed? The expressions in the Schedule
and in the notification for exemption should be understood by the language
employed therein bearing in mind the context in which the expressions occur.
The words used in the provision, imposing taxes or granting exemption should
be understood in the same way in which these are understood in ordinary
parlance in the area in which the law is in force or by the people who ordinarily
deal with them. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind certain principles. The
notification in this case was issued under Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules
and should be read along with the Act. The notification must be read as a whole
in the context of the other relevant provisions. When a notification is issued in
accordance with power conferred by the statute, it has statutory force and
validity and, therefore, the exemption under the notification is as if it were
contained in the Act itself. See in this connection the observations of this Court
in Orient Weaving Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1963 SC 98 : 1962
Supp 3 SCR 481] . See also Kailash Nath v. State of U.P. [AIR 1957 SC 790 :

(1957) 8 STC 358] The principle is well settled that when two views of a
notification are possible, it should be construed in favour of the subject as
notification is part of a fiscal enactment. But in this connection, it is well to
remember the observations of the Judicial Committee in Coroline M.
Armytage v. Frederick Wilkinson [(1878) 3 AC 355, 370] that it is only,
however, in the event of there being a real difficulty in ascertaining the
meaning of a particular enactment that the question of strictness or of
liberality of construction arises. The Judicial Committee reiterated in the said
decision at p. 369 of the report that in a taxing Act provisions
RNT, J & MRK, J
59 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

establishing (sic enacting) an exception to the general rule of taxation are to be
construed strictly against those who invoke its benefit. While interpreting an
exemption clause, liberal interpretation should be imparted to the language
thereof, provided no violence is done to the language employed. It must,
however, be borne in mind that absurd results of construction should be
avoided.”

54. There is no dispute on the principles of law that in taxing statute

while interpreting an exemption clause, liberal interpretation should be

imparted. There can also be no dispute that when a Notification is issued in

accordance with the power conferred by the statute, it has statutory force and

validity. There would also be no dispute that the Notification should be read

along with the Act. But at the same time, the settled principle is, which is also

reflected from Parle Exports (supra) that while interpreting the Notification no

violence is to be done to the language employed by the statute. The

Notification no doubt has a statutory force and validity, but when the

Notification is issued in accordance with the power conferred by the statute. If

there is no power conferred by the statute or the notification issued in

purported exercise of the power is in fact beyond the power conferred by the

statute, to accord statutory force and validity to such notification would not be

the intendment of the legislature. Such notifications cannot be held to have the

statutory force or/and validity to the extent of being beyond the scope of the

power conferred by the statute.

55. In the present case, as observed, in the earlier part of this judgment,

the Act 1982 did not confer any power on the State to issue notification for
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60 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

creation of a new Forum for the appeals under the Act 1982. Though the State

had the power in terms of Section 7A to re-constitute and also to abolish the

Special Court, but other than the Special Court, it has no power to create a

distinct Forum and making the same as the Appellate Authority under the Act

1982. The Special Court is defined under the Act, so, constitution or re-

constitution by the notification should only be in terms of that Section. Any

different constitution even of the Special Court, contrary to the provisions of the

Act could not be, by issuing notification by the State.

56. So, we are of the considered view that the judgment cited by the

learned standing counsel for the High Court in Parle Exports (P) Ltd. (supra)

does not support his contention that the notification should be construed

liberally to provide the appellate forum and as the notification provides for the

appellate forum on abolition of the forum created by the statute to provide the

remedy of appeal in that new forum, the notification would have the statutory

force and validity. We reject such contention being without substance.

57. In Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan v. F. N. Rana9 on which, learned

standing counsel for the High Court placed reliance, in particular paragraph-16

thereof, to contend that the notification will have a statutory force, the Hon’ble

Apex Court held in Para-16 which reads as under:

“16. In this background we may consider the effect of the Presidential
notification. It cannot be and has not been denied that it was open to the
Legislature by making an express provision in the Act to entrust the
functions of the Central Government that is to confer powers and impose

9
AIR 1964 SC 648
RNT, J & MRK, J
61 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

duties under Article 258(2) in relation to matters under Sections 4, 5 A, 7, 9
and 11 and related sections to Commissioners of Divisions in the State.
Such entrustment of power would not be open to challenge on the ground
that it was unauthorised. If entrusted by enactment, it would have the force
of law. It was open to the Parliament by appropriate legislation
incorporated in the Land Acquisition Act or otherwise to provide that the
power to issue notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act, and to appoint the Collector, be exercised by an officer to be named by
the appropriate Government. Issue of a notification by the appropriate
Government designating the officer to exercise the powers would
unquestionably have the force of law, within the meaning of Section 2(d).
Instead of making detailed provisions and cataloguing the entrustment of
functions in the different statutes which may be entrusted to the authorities of
the State by the exercise of legislative power, the Constitution has invested the
President with authority to entrust the functions to the Government of the State
or their officers. The effect of Article 258(1) is merely to make a blanket
provision enabling the President by notification to exercise the power which the
Legislature could exercise by legislation, to entrust functions to the officers to
be specified in that behalf by the President and subject to the conditions
prescribed thereby. By the entrustment of powers under the statute, the
notification merely authorises the State or an officer of the State in the
circumstances and within the limits prescribed to exercise the specified
functions. Effect of the Presidential notification is that, wherever the
expression “appropriate Government” occurs in the Act in relation to provisions
for acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the words “appropriate
Government or the Commissioner of the Division having territorial jurisdiction
over the area in which the land is situate”, were deemed to be substituted. In
other words, by the issue of the Presidential notification, the Land Acquisition
Act must be deemed pro tanto amended. It would be difficult to regard such an
amendment as not having the force of law.”

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62 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

58. In Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court

has laid down the principle of law that it is open for the legislature by making

an express provision in the Act to entrust the functions of the Central

Government that is to confer powers and enforce duties under Article 258 (2) of

Constitution of India in relation to the specified matters and such entrustment

of power would not be open to challenge on the ground that it was

unauthorised, and if entrusted by the enactment, it would have the force of

law. There cannot be any dispute so far as the principle of law is concerned

that if a statute confers the power on the State, then such entrustment of

power could not be challenged.

59. But, Section 7-A confers the power on the State Government to do

act as specified therein by issuing Notification. That entrustment of power is

not an issue here. The notification issued by the Government of

G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 under Section 7, no doubt, shall have the

force of law, but to the extent of entrustment of power and duties by the said

provision and not beyond that.

60. In Subhash Ramkumar Bind Alias Vakil v. State of

Maharashtra10 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that Notification in common

English acceptation means and implies a formal announcement of a legally

relevant fact and in the event of a statute speaking of a notification being

published in the Official Gazette, the same cannot but mean a notification

published by the authority of law in the Official Gazette. It is on formal

10
(2003) 1 SCC 506
RNT, J & MRK, J
63 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

declaration and publication of an order and shall have to be in accordance with

the declared policies or in the event the requirement of the statute then in that

event in accordance therewith. Relevant part of para-20 of Subhash

Ramkumar Bind Alias Vakil (supra) reads as under:

“20……….We find, however, that there is some justification in such a
contention but the second count is rather important inasmuch as the requirement
of the statute is the issuance of a notification. Notification in common English
acceptation means and implies a formal announcement of a legally relevant fact
and in the event of a statute speaking of a notification being published in the
Official Gazette, the same cannot but mean a notification published by the
authority of law in the Official Gazette. It is on formal declaration and
publication of an order and shall have to be in accordance with the declared
policies or in the event the requirement of the statute then in that event in
accordance therewith.”

61. In Subhash Ramkumar Bind Alias Vakil (supra) the Hon’ble Apex

Court further observed and held that the question of there being any

notification even in the guise of an administrative order does not and cannot

arise. The requirement of the statute is sacrosanct. We lay emphasis that the

requirement of the statute is sacrosanct. So, even if a notification is there,

what is of utmost importance is that, if that notification fulfils the requirement

of the statute. Any notification in contravention of the statutory provisions

would have no validity. A notification issued in exercise of the power conferred,

can also not be permitted to override the statutory provisions.

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64 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

62. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. G. S. Dall and Flour Mills11 the

Hon’ble Apex Court held that executive instructions can supplement a Statute or

cover areas to which the Statute does not extend. But they cannot run

contrary to the statutory provisions or whittle down their effect.

63. In Jaiveer Singh v. The State of Uttarakhand12 the Hon’ble

Apex Court recently held that it is a trite law that the Government cannot

amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions. It can, if the

rules are silent on any particular point, fill up the gaps and supplement the

rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed. It

was further held that an authority cannot issue orders/office

memorandum/executive instructions in contravention of the statutory rules.

vi) Resolution of the Administrative Committee:

64. We would now also advert to the resolution of the Administrative

Committee of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of

Telangana and State of Andhra Pradesh, dated 20.10.2016, as already

mentioned in earlier part of this judgment.

65. In Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajastan High Court13 the Hon’ble

Apex Court reiterated that where the statutory rules are silent, they can be

supplemented in a manner consistent with the object and spirit of the Rules by

an administrative order. There, the administrative order was by the

administrative committee of the High Court.

11
1992 Supp (1) SCC 150
12
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1584
13
(2025) 2 SCC 1
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65 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

66. In Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to

a three-Judge Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Apex court in Sivanandan C.T

v. High Court of Kerala14 Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of

Manipur15. In Salam Samarjeet Singh (supra) the decision of the Full Court

to depart from the expected exercise of preparing the merit list as per the

unamended rules was held clearly violative of the substantive legitimate

expectation of the candidate. The Hon’ble Apex court observed and held that

where there are no rules or rules are silent on the subject, administrative

instructions may be issued to supplement and fill in gaps in the rules. In that

event administrative instructions would govern the field provided they are not

ultra vires the provisions of the rules or the statute or the Constitution. But

where the rules expressly or impliedly cover the field, the recruiting body would

have to abide by the rules.

67. Paragraphs – 60 to 62 of Tej Prakash Pathak (supra) reads as

under:

“(E) Procedure prescribed in the extant rule not to be violated

60. In Sivanandan C.T. [Sivanandan C.T. v. High Court of Kerala, (2024) 3
SCC 799 : (2024) 1 SCC (L&S) 67 : 2023 INSC 709] the issue before the
Constitution Bench was whether for selection minimum marks could be
prescribed contrary to the extant rules and the advertisement. Answering in the
negative, the Constitution Bench, speaking through one of us (Dr D.Y.
Chandrachud, C.J.), held : (SCC pp. 811-12, paras 15-16)
“15. … The Administrative Committee of the High Court decided to impose
a cut-off for the viva voce examination actuated by the bona fide reason of

14
(2024) 3 SCC 799
15
(2024) 14 SCC 179
RNT, J & MRK, J
66 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

ensuring that candidates with requisite personality assume judicial office.

However laudable that approach of the Administrative Committee may
have been, such a change would be required to be brought in by a
substantive amendment to the rules which came in much later as noticed
above. This is not a case where the rules or the scheme of the High Court
were silent. Where the statutory rules are silent, they can be supplemented
in a manner consistent with the object and spirit of the Rules by an
administrative order.

16. In the present case, the statutory rules expressly provided that the select
list would be drawn up on the basis of the aggregate of marks obtained in the
written examination and the viva voce. This was further elaborated in the
scheme of examination which prescribed that there would be no cut-off marks
for the viva voce. This position is also reflected in the Notification of the High
Court dated 30-9-2015. In this backdrop, we have come to the conclusion that
the decision of the High Court suffered from its being ultra vires the 1961
Rules besides being manifestly arbitrary.”

61. Following Sivanandan C.T. [Sivanandan C.T. v. High Court of Kerala,
(2024) 3 SCC 799 : (2024) 1 SCC (L&S) 67 : 2023 INSC 709] , a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of
Manipur [Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur, (2024) 14 SCC
179 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2316 : 2024 INSC 647] held : (Salam Samarjeet
Singh case [Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur, (2024) 14 SCC
179 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2316 : 2024 INSC 647] , SCC para 34)
“34. … Prescribing minimum marks for viva voce segment may be
justified for the holistic assessment of a candidate, but in the present case
such a requirement was introduced only after commencement of the
recruitment process and in violation of the statutory rules. The decision of
the Full Court to depart from the expected exercise of preparing the merit list as
per the unamended rules is clearly violative of the substantive legitimate
expectation of the petitioner. It also fails the tests of fairness, consistency and
predictability and hence is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”

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67 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

62. There can therefore be no doubt that where there are no rules or the rules
are silent on the subject, administrative instructions may be issued to
supplement and fill in the gaps in the rules. In that event administrative
instructions would govern the field provided they are not ultra vires the
provisions of the rules or the statute or the Constitution. But where the
rules expressly or impliedly cover the field, the recruiting body would have
to abide by the rules.”

68. In High Court of Judicature at Madras v. Thirumalai16, the

Madras High Court held that an administrative order passed by the High Court

is subject to judicial scrutiny and not vice-versa.

69. In R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu17 the Hon’ble Apex

Court observed and held as under in paragraphs-20 & 21:

“20. This Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.S. Dall and
Flour Mills, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 150 has held that executive instructions can
supplement a Statute or cover areas which the Statute does not extend. They
cannot run contrary to the statutory provisions or whittle down their effect. In
the present case, the G.O. dated 13.07.1995, G.O. dated 24.10.1996 and G.O.
dated 10.06.2009 are executive instructions and based upon the executive
instructions, the statutory provisions as contained under the statutory rules
could not have been made applicable as has been done in the present case.

21. This Court in the case of Jaiveer Singh v. The State of
Uttarakhand, 2023 INSC 1024 has held as under:

“34. It can thus be seen that it is a trite law that the Government cannot
amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the
rules are silent on any particular point, it can fill up the gaps and supplement
the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed.
It is a settled proposition of law that an authority cannot issue orders/office
memorandum/executive instructions in contravention of the statutory rules.

2023 SCC OnLine Mad 1808
17
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1009
RNT, J & MRK, J
68 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

However, instructions can be issued only to supplement the statutory rules but
not to supplant it.

This Court has again held in the aforesaid case that the Government
cannot issue executive instructions in contravention of the statutory rules.”

vii) Separation of powers:

70. In Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab18 the Hon’ble Apex

Court held that ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of

governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are

taken away. The functions of the different parts or branches of the

Government have been sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very

well be said that our Constitution does not contemplate assumption by one

organ or part of the State, of functions that essentially belong to another. The

executive indeed can exercise the powers of departmental or subordinate

legislation when such powers are delegated to it by the legislature. It can also

when so empowered, exercise judicial functions in a limited way. The executive

Government can never go against the provisions of the Constitution or of any

law. Paragraph – 14 of Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra) reads as under:

“14. It may not be possible to frame an exhaustive definition of what
executive function means and implies. Ordinarily the executive power connotes
the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial
functions are taken away. The Indian Constitution has not indeed recognised the
doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute rigidity but the functions of the
different parts or branches of the Government have been sufficiently
differentiated and consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution
does not contemplate assumption, by one organ or part of the State, of

18
(1955) 1 SCC 553
RNT, J & MRK, J
69 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

functions that essentially belong to another. The executive indeed can
exercise the powers of departmental or subordinate legislation when such
powers are delegated to it by the legislature. It can also, when so
empowered, exercise judicial functions in a limited way. The executive
Government, however, can never go against the provisions of the
Constitution or of any law. This is clear from the provisions of Article 154 of
the Constitution but, as we have already stated, it does not follow from this that
in order to enable the executive to function there must be a law already in
existence and that the powers of the executive are limited merely to the carrying
out of these laws.”

71. In the present case, we are of the view that the executive has

certainly transgressed these powers in providing that the Appeals pending

before the Special Court under the Act 1982 on the abolition of the Special

Court by G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016, would be transferred to the High

Court which the High Court will decide under the Act 1982.

72. Similarly, we are of the view that the executive power exercised by

the High Court in passing the resolution to the same effect and thus giving

effect to the Government Order for the said purpose has also transgressed its

power on administrative side by conferring to it the appellate powers making it

an Appellate Court, under the Act 1982 which were not conferred on the High

Court by the Statute i.e., Act of 1982, but were conferred on the Special Court

under the said Act.

viii) Devolution:

73. Sri S. Vivek Chandrasekhar, learned standing counsel for the High

Court, submitted that by the devolution, the right of appeal on the abolition of

the Special Court, would be with the High Court. We are of the view that any
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70 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

such doctrine of devolution cannot be attracted or pressed. The expression

‘devolution’, is defined in Oxford Dictionary 8th Edition as follows:

“The act of giving power from a central authority or government to an
authority or a government in a local region”.

74. The devolution in its ordinary sense threfore entails the transfer of

power from Central Authority to a lower tier of government. It may be referred

as the “de-concentration of power”. On abolition of the Special Court created

under the Act 1982, how the appellate powers conferred on a Special Court

constituted under the Act 1982, would devolve upon the High Court by applying

the said principle of ‘devolution’ could not be addressed or explained by the

learned standing counsel.

75. In Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University19 the

devolution has been dealt with but in the context of a civil suit, where during

pendency of the suit, the plaintiff dies and so with the leave of the Court, the

matter can be pursued by the person upon whom the interests of the deceased

devolves, in the context of the Order 22 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure. We

do not find the applicability of such principle of ‘devolution’ in the case of the

present nature.

76. We are not in agreement with any such submission advanced by the

learned standing counsel for the High Court, which is rejected having no

substance.

(2001) 6 SCC 534
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71 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

ix) Successive Forum:

77. The learned standing counsel for the High Court further submitted

that because the Special Court is subordinate to the High Court and therefore,

on the abolition of the Special Court, the High Court being superior Court, by

applying the doctrine of ‘successive forum’ the High Court would be the

appellate Court. Successive Forum may succeed to the forum abolished, but for

that the successive forum has to be created by the competent authority and

legislation. In the present case, the High Court has not been made the

successive forum or the appellate Court under the Act 1982 on abolition of the

Special Court, by any legislation/statute. Consequently, we do not find force in

the submission based on the alleged doctrine of ‘successive forum’.

x) Consideration of the authorities cited
by the appellants ‘counsel

78. In State of A.P. v. P.V.Hanumantha Rao (Dead) through

LRs.20 upon which learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance, the

Hon’ble Apex Court on examination of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh

Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 and in the light of its objects and reasons

observed that in cases of alleged land grabbing, exclusive jurisdiction is

conferred on Special Court. Jurisdiction of a civil Court on such subject matter

stands ousted. The Special Court has been conferred powers of a civil court to

examine all questions of title and possession with respect to the land alleged to

have been grabbed. The findings of the Special Court are binding and

conclusive on the parties and all others having interest in the land which is

20
(2003) 10 SCC 121
RNT, J & MRK, J
72 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

alleged to have been grabbed. Against the decision of the Special Court, no

appeal is provided. The only remedy of the aggrieved party is to approach the

High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India.

79. That matter in P. V. Hanumantha Rao (Dead) through LRs.

(supra) had arisen out of the order passed by the Special Court before the

learned Single Judge and from the order in the writ petition the matter was

taken to the Hon’ble Apex Court. The question was with respect to the scope

of interference by the High Court in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction in the

order of the Special Court. It was held that the remedy of the writ petition was

not against the decision of the subordinate court, tribunal or authority but it

was against the decision making process. In the decision-making process, if the

court, tribunal or authority deciding the case, had ignored vital evidence and

thereby arrived at erroneous conclusion or had misconstrued the provisions of

the relevant Act or misunderstood the scope of its jurisdiction, the constitutional

power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 could be invoked to set

right such errors and prevent gross injustice to the party complaining. The

Hon’ble Apex Court referred to its decision in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander

Rai21 to reiterate that in the exercise of power under Article 226 or 227 of the

Constitution, the High Court had the right to interfere (1) where there was an

error manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings, such as when it

was based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and

(2) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice had occasioned thereby. In the

21
(2003) 6 SCC 675
RNT, J & MRK, J
73 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 or in exercise of the power under

Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court would not convert itself into a

court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence.

80. From the aforesaid judgment, it is evident that when the Order of

the Special Court was final under the Act 1982, the remedy would be to file writ

petition or petition under Article 227 of the Constitution to the High Court.

81. Consequently, if the Order of the Special Tribunal under the Act

1982, which exercises original jurisdiction, if the remedy of appeal has been

taken away, as the Forum of Appeal has been abolished, i.e., the Special Court,

and so, the Order of the Special Tribunal becomes final under the Act 1982 or

even with respect to the appeals pending before the Special Court against the

Order of the Special Tribunal, on abolition of the Special Court, the Order of the

Special Tribunal would be open to challenge in a writ petition under Article 226

or may be under Article 227 of the Constitution in the exercise of supervisory

powers to this Court.

82. The scope of interference with such order by this Court may be

different i.e., within the scope and on the parameters as laid down in various

judgments, including as referred to above, but on that count, i.e., the abolition

of the Appellate Forum or a Special Court, we are of the view that, that would

not make this Court an Appellate Court like the Special Court or the Appellate

Court like under Section 96 or 106 CPC from the decree or order of the regular

Courts passed in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction. Neither it can be said

that the appeal would lie to this Court nor that this Court would become
RNT, J & MRK, J
74 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

appellate authority/court under the Act of 1982 nor that the appellate powers

as under the Act 1982 vested with the Special Court or by virtue of any other

provision conferring the appellate powers, would be available for interference in

the Order of the Special Tribunal.

83. The aforesaid authority in P. V. Hanumantharao (Dead) through

LRs (supra) is of no help to the appellants for the contention that the appeal

would lie to this Court against the Order of the Special Tribunal or the appeals

pending against the Order of the Tribunal before the Special Court, could be

transferred to this Court, to be decided as an appellate Court under the Act

1982.

84. In V. Visalakshi v. Special Court under A.P.Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad22 upon which also learned counsel for the

appellant placed reliance, a Coordinate Bench of the erstwhile High Court of

Andhra Pradesh on consideration of the provisions of the Act 1982, as also the

authority in P. V. Hanumantha Rao (Dead) through LRs (supra), observed

with respect to the scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226

and 227 of the Constitution, and finding that, on the analysis of the material

available, which material was categorically and properly examined by the

Special Court, refused to interfere with the Order of the Special Court in the

exercise of the writ jurisdiction. That was a matter, where the Order of the

Special Court was challenged before the High Court in a petition under Article

226 of the Constitution of the India. The question of maintainability of appeal

22
2012 SCC OnLine AP 573
RNT, J & MRK, J
75 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

before the High Court, as Special Court or on abolition of the Special Court,

under the Act 1982 was not an issue for consideration nor was decided.

85. In Patil Chandramouliswar Reddy (supra) on which the

appellants’ counsels placed reliance, is not relevant to the controversy involved

herein. There, the points for determination were with respect to the jurisdiction

of the Special Tribunal and the sustainability of the order passed by the Special

Tribunal in the facts and in law as in that case. Simply an observation was

made in paragraph – 9.4 that, the Special Court constituted in terms of Section

7 of the Act, as is defined in Section 2 (i) (ia) of the Act, is a Forum, which has

jurisdiction over the then State of Andhra Pradesh, which is now abolished.

That is a fact, on which there is no dispute that the Special Court has been

abolished. But, this judgment is not on the point whether the High Court would

become the appellate Court under the Act 1982, on abolition of the Special

Court by G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016.

IV Conclusions:

86. We are of the view that for the consideration made above and the

settled legal position as discussed in this judgment, notwithstanding the

G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 and the Administrative Resolution of the

Committee of the then Common High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Subject Item

No.4, dated 20.10.2016, the Land Grabbing Appeals would not be maintainable

before this Court. The High Court is not the Appellate Court for the purpose of

the appeals under the Act 1982.

RNT, J & MRK, J
76 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

87. However, the powers of this Court under Article 226/227 of the

Constitution of India are available. An Order even if made final under the

Statute either by not providing the appeal or subsequently taking away that

appeal right, may be retrospectively, expressly or by necessary intendment, as

in the present case by abolition of the appellate Forum under the Act 1982,

shall be open to judicial review and a party, if aggrieved from the Order of the

Special Tribunal, will have the right, being aggrieved person, to approach this

Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

88. In Nawab Shaqafath Ali Khan (supra), it was held that the High

Court has the jurisdiction in appropriate cases to convert a revision application

or writ petition into an appeal or vice versa in exercise of its inherent power,

but subject to the fulfillment of other conditions. In the said judgment, it was

further held that for the said purpose, an appropriate case for exercise of such

jurisdiction must be made out. We are of the view that there is no jurisdiction

to entertain the appeal and the writ petition requires fulfillment of procedural

requirements. We therefore do not find the present cases appropriate for

conversion into writ petitions.

89. We may sum up by holding that;

(i) Right to Appeal is a statutory right. Right to Appellate Forum is

only procedural;

(ii) Right to Appeal vests on the date the lis is commenced. It can be

taken away by a subsequent enactment, if the latter expressly
RNT, J & MRK, J
77 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

provides or even by a necessary intendment of the reading of the

subsequent enactment;

(iii) If the Court to which an appeal lies is abolished without any

Forum constituted in its place for the disposal of pending matters

or for filing of the appeals, the vested right to appeal perishes;

(iv) Section 7 of the Act 1982 confers the right of appeal from the

Order of the Special Tribunal before the Special Court.

Constitution of the Special Court is prescribed by the Act itself

under Section 2 (1a) read with Section 7. The High Court is not

the Special Court under the Act 1982. The High Court is not the

Appellate Court under the Act 1982;

(v) Section 7 (4) of the Act 1982 confers the power on the State

Government by notification to re-constitute the Special Court or

may at any time abolish such Special Court. The power given to

the State Government by the Statute is to constitute, re-constitute

or abolish the Special Court. The Statute does not confer any

power on the State Government to create a new appellate Court

for the purposes of the Act 1982, other than the constitution, re-

constitution of the Special Court which is defined under the Act;

(vi) The State Government has no power to provide for an Appellate

Forum/Court, different from the Appellate Forum, i.e., the Special

Court as provided by the Act 1982;

RNT, J & MRK, J
78 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

(vii) The G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 to the extent of abolition of

the Special Court by notification is within the powers of the State

Government, but to the extent the said G.O.Ms.No.420 provided

for the High Court as the Appellate Court to which the Appeals

under the Act 1982 will be transferred and decided as the

Appellate Court under the Act 1982, is beyond the statutory

powers conferred on the State Government and to that extent,

the Government Order is in transgression of the executive powers

of the State and in excess of the power conferred by the Act

1982;

(viii) The Resolution No.4, dated 20.10.2016 of the Administrative

Committee of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the

State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, directing for

transfer of the pending appeals before the Special Court under the

Act at the time of its abolition to the High Court to be decided

pursuant to the G.O.Ms.No.420, dated 02.09.2016 would also not

confer the appellate powers on the High Court nor make it an

Appellate Court under the Act 1982, as the right to appeal and the

appellate Forum are creation of the Statute. By the said

resolution, the power could not be conferred on itself, contrary to

the statutory provisions;

(ix) There is no repeal of Section 7A of the Act 1982, which provides

that the appeal under the said Act from the Order of the Special
RNT, J & MRK, J
79 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

Tribunal shall lie to the Special Court. There is only abolition of

the Special Court by the Government Order/Notification;

(x) Any Notification can only supplement but not supplant the

statutory provisions. The notification in the present case has the

effect of supplanting the legal provisions of the statute of the Act

1982 to the extent of creation of the appellate Forum, other than

the one provided by the Act 1982;

(xi) The doctrine of ‘devolution’ and ‘successive forum’, as argued by

the learned standing counsel are not attracted. Thereby it cannot

be said that on abolition of the Special Court, the High Court

would become the appellate Court for the purposes of the appeals

under the Act 1982;

(xii) The Land Grabbing Appeals are not maintainable and the High

Court is not the Appellate Court for the appeals under the Act

1982.

(xiii) The Orders of the Special Tribunal under the Act 1982 are

therefore final under the Act 1982, but they shall be open for

judicial review by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction

under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India;

V Result:

90. In the result, it is held that all the aforesaid Appeals are not

maintainable in this Court. The right of appeal of the appellants against the

orders of the Special Tribunal under the Act 1982, against which the appeals
RNT, J & MRK, J
80 LGA Nos.20 of 2016 & batch

have been filed before this Court directly or the appeals filed before the then

Special Court and transferred to this Court to decide as Appellate Court under

the Act 1982 are not maintainable. The aforesaid Appeals are therefore

dismissed as not maintainable.

91. As the Appeals were pending since long and we find those not to be

maintainable, while dismissing the appeals as not maintainable, to secure the

interest of the parties, we provide that in case the appellants seek to prefer writ

petitions, they can do so, within a reasonable period, say a period of 3 (three)

months from the date of this judgment. For a period of 3 (three) months, the

interim orders, if granted earlier in the Appeal(s), in those appeals such interim

order shall continue to operate.

92. We make it clear that we have considered and decided only the

maintainability of the appeals and not considered the merits of the impugned

orders either way.

93. No order as to costs.

Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in

consequence.

_______________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J

______________________________
MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM, J
Date: 28.08.2025
Dsr
Note:

LR copy to be marked
B/o
Dsr

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