Jharkhand High Court
Shailesh Kumar Aged About 61 Years vs The Steel Authority Of Indian Limited … on 5 August, 2025
Author: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
Bench: Anubha Rawat Choudhary
( 2025:JHHC:21843 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (C) No. 4007 of 2020
Shailesh Kumar aged about 61 years, son of Late Jainandan Prasad,
resident of Plot No. GA-4, City Centre, Sector-4, Bokaro Steel City,
Bokaro-827004, P.O. and P.S.-Sector-IV, District Bokaro
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The Steel Authority of Indian Limited through its Chairman
having its office at ISPAT Bhawan, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-
110002, P.O., P.S Lodhi Road.-and District- New Delhi.
2. The Managing Director, Steel Authority of India Limited,
Bokaro Steel Plant, having its office at Main Administrative
Building, Bokaro Steel City, P.O., P.S. Bokaro Steel City and
District- Bokaro.
3. The General Manager, Town Administration Department, Steel
Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant having its office
at Nagar Seva Bhawan, Bokaro Steel City, P.O., P.S. Bokaro
Steel City and District-Bokaro.
4. The Deputy General Manager (TA-LRA), Town Administration
Department, Steel Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel
Plant having its office at Nagar Seva Bhawan, Bokaro Steel
City, P.O., P.S.- Bokaro Steel City and District-Bokaro.
5. The Superintendent, Land and Estate, Town Administration
Department, Steel Authority of India, Limited, Bokaro Steel
Plant having its office at Nagar Seva Bhawan, Bokaro Steel
City, P.O., P.S. Bokaro Steel City and District-Bokaro.
6. The Manager (Land and Estate) Steel Authority of India
Limited, Land Estate, Town Administration Department,
Bokaro Steel Plant having its office at Nagar Seva Bhawan,
Bokaro Steel City, P.O., P.S.- Bokaro Steel City and District-
Bokaro.
7. The Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel City, Bokaro Steel City, P.O.,
P.S.- Bokaro Steel City and District- Bokaro.
... Respondents
---
CORAM :HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
—
For the Petitioner : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Senior Advocate
Mr. Sanjeev Thakur, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
: Mr. Bibhash Sinha, Advocate
—
19/05.08.2025 This amended writ petition has been filed for the following
reliefs: –
“(a) For quashing and setting aside the letter with Ref.
No. TA/LRA/2020-1081dated 27.10.2020 (Annexure-13)
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vide which the Respondent Steel Authority of India
Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant has terminated the indenture
of Lease dated 13.07.2000 issued in favour of the
petitioner with a prospective date i.e. 90th day from the
date of service of the said letter, arbitrarily and in
violation of the settled principles of law without issuing
any show cause notice or without giving any opportunity
of hearing.
(b) For showing cause the Respondent No. 4 as to
whether they can take the harass and disproportionate
action of termination of lease of the petitioner
considering that the lease pertained to only a piece of
barren and vacant land whereupon, as per the terms of
the lease and as per the sanctioned plan by the
Respondents, the petitioner has constructed commercial-
cum- residential buildings (G+2) by investing huge
amount of money which if taken away so abruptly and
unmindfully, cause immense personal loss to the
petitioner and may amount to profiteering so far
Respondents are concerned.
(c) For further directing the Respondents to take decision
and/or to pass appropriate orders for remedying the
alleged breach, if any, which has taken place in view of
the ambiguities in Clause 6 and 15 of the lease deed
which otherwise also is condonable on the basis of
permission of the Respondents, thus remediable in any
case and for direction upon the Respondents not to
disturb the peaceful possession of the petitioner over the
landed/constructed property in concern.
(d) During pendency of the instant writ petition, the letter
of termination dated 27.10.2020 (Annexure-14) issued by
Respondent No.4 may be stayed or status quo may be
granted by this Hon’ble Court.
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(e) Further issuance of writ(s)/orders(s)/direction(s) for
quashing of letter no. TA/LRA/2022-1805 dated
25.04.2022 (Annexure-15) issued by Respondent
company and notice dated 20.05.2022 u/s 4(a)/7 (3) of
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act issued by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel City
(Annexure-16 & 16/1).”
2. The matter arises out of termination of lease.
Arguments of the petitioner.
3. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has placed the
order of termination of the lease as contained in Annexure-13 of the
writ petition. The lease is admittedly dated 13.07.2000 with respect to
plot No. GA-4 in City Center, Sector-IV, Bokaro Steel City and the
date of termination is 27.10.2020. The lease is between Steel
Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant and the petitioner.
4. By referring to the termination order dated 27.10.2020, the
learned senior counsel has submitted that on the face of the document,
it is apparent that the lease has been terminated on the ground that
during the course of investigation by the Central Bureau of
Investigation, Ranchi, the premises was found to have been sublet and
it has been terminated with further allegation that there is criminal
conspiracy amongst the petitioner and those persons to whom the
premises was sublet. It has been mentioned therein that there has been
violation of clause 6 and 15 of the indenture of lease dated 13.07.2000
on the part of the petitioner and after completion of investigation by
CBI, it has been approved for cancellation of the plot in the name of
the petitioner where the branch office of the accused company was
operating and crime had taken place.
5. He has further submitted that a reference has been made to
clause 27(b) of the lease dated 13.07.2000 notifying that the lease will
stand terminated upon expiry of 90 days from the date of issuance of
the letter and the petitioner has been directed to vacate the demised
land and deliver its possession immediately to the lessor company on
expiry of the notice period. He has also submitted that a decision has
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also been taken that the petitioner will not be entitled for payment of
any compensation by the lessor irrespective of the fact that structure,
building etc. is erected on the demised land by the lessee at his cost
and the petitioner has been set free to remove at his own cost, the
structure, building etc. built on the premises.
6. The learned senior counsel has submitted that serious
allegations have been levelled while terminating the lease and
admittedly no notice or prior hearing was granted to the petitioner
while passing the order of termination. He submits that a serious
allegation of connivance of the petitioner with the other persons on the
premises have been made. The learned senior counsel has submitted
that on the ground of determination of lease, the respondents have also
initiated proceedings under the provision of the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 which is pending
consideration.
7. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the impugned order
of termination dated 27.10.2020 is unjustified, unwarranted and has
been passed ignoring the terms and conditions of the lease in question
and by misconstruing the clause 6 and 15 of the lease deed. The
petitioner has referred to various clauses of the lease deed particularly
clause 3, 6 and 15 of the lease deed are quoted as under: –
“3. THAT the LESSEE hereby covenants with the lessor as
follows:-
a) That the Lessee shall during the said term pay the
annual rent hereinbefore mentioned on the day and
in the manner aforesaid without any deduction or
abatement whatsoever.
b) THAT the Lessee shall also during the said term pay
all Municipal taxes and other levies and assessments
and all other outgoings of any kind which are now, or
which may at any time hereafter become payable in
respect of the land hereby demised and/or in respect
of the buildings and structures to be erected on the
demised land as hereinafter mentioned whether the
same be payable by law by the Lessor as owner or by
the lessee or the actual occupier and the lessee shall
keep the lessor indemnified against the same.
c) THAT the lessee shall minimise the use of wood,
wooden products in the construction of the building4
( 2025:JHHC:21843 )by using substitute of woods wherever possible to
preserve the diminishing forest reserve.
6. THAT the lessee will not use the demised land and/or
the building to be erected as aforesaid for any purpose other
than that for which it has been demised, without prior consent
in writing of the lessor whose decision will be final and binding
on the lessee.
15. THAT the lessee will use and occupy the demised land and
the messuage and building erected or to be erected thereon as
aforesaid or permit the same to be used or occupied as dwelling
house, office or shop or for any other lawful purpose without
causing any obstruction, annoyance or nuisance to the lessor,
or the nearby residents. The lessee shall not make any
permanent structures so as to cause any hindrance or
obstruction to the public/pedestrian. The lessee shall see that
the public area/pedestrian areas such as verandahs/connecting
links/pavements, etc. are kept free of any hindrance so as to
allow free flow of the pedestrian movement/users, etc, which
shall not be obstructed in any way.
The lessee will not assign, transfer, sublet or underlet or part
with the possession of the demised land or the buildings erected
thereon without the prior written consent and permission of the
lessor. Notwithstanding the covenant above if the lessee is
unable to run the business he may inform the lessor of his
inability to run the business and lessor may in its sole
discretion either take over the premises for leasing it out to a
fresh lessee or make such arrangements as the lessor may deem
fit and proper on such terms and Conditions as the lessor may
think fit. The lessor will not be called upon to assign any
reason for making fresh allotment or such arrangement and
the decision of the lessor in this regard would be final and
binding on the lessee. The lessor in the event of breach on the
part of the lessee in observance of the aforesaid covenants,
shall have the right to re-entry on the demised land and or the
building erected thereon.
PROVIDED always that the lessee may mortgage the premises
to a recognised registered financial institution with the prior
permission of the lessor in writing. In such event a tripartite
agreement shall be executed amongst the lessor, lessee and the
proposed mortgagee before such mortgage is created.”
8. While interpreting the aforesaid clauses of the lease deed , it is
the case of the petitioner that the respondent authorities misconstrued
the provisions of Clause 6 and Clause 15 of the lease deed and failed
to take into consideration that subletting is not completely prohibited
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rather it is permissible subject to prior consent of lessor. Further,
subletting with respect to a part of building is also permissible under
the lease deed. It is their further case that the petitioner has never
sublet the demised land and the building thereon as a whole and as
such there is no requirement of prior consent of lessor under Clause
15. It is also their case in the writ petition that Clause 15 of the lease
deed uses an expression that the lessee will use and occupy the
demised land and the messuage and building erected or to be erected
thereon “or permit the same to be used or occupied”. The additional
words “permit to be used” itself imply that the petitioner had the right
to sublet the property and allow someone else to use the property.
9. It is the specific case of the petitioner that the respondent SAIL
in the present case has merely on the basis of a presumption without
conducting any inspection and without issuing any show cause notice
has come to a conclusion that the demised property was sublet and has
terminated the lease deed solely on that ground arbitrarily.
10. It is further case of the petitioner that during the pendency of
the writ petition the petitioner was asked to vacate the premises vide
letters dated 25.04.2022 (Annexure-15) and the respondents have
taken steps under section 3 and 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 for which notices dated
20.05.2022 was also issued.
Arguments of the respondents.
11. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents at the
threshold raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability
of the writ petition and has submitted that the writ petition arises out
of indenture of lease entered into between the parties and neither the
terms and conditions of the lease can be interpreted by this Court
under writ jurisdiction at the first instance nor the disputed questions
of fact can be adjudicated. It is submitted that the agreement between
the parties is purely contractual in nature and hence the writ petition is
not maintainable. The petitioner has a remedy under the provisions of
Transfer of Property Act and may go to the civil Court for
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adjudication of his right, title and interest in connection with the lease
hold property.
12. The lease involved in this case is non-statutory in nature and
merely because the public authority has entered into lease, the contract
involved in this case is not a statutory contract.
13. The learned counsel has in particular referred to the provision
of clause 6, 15, and 27 (b) of the lease deed and has also referred to
clause 21 to submit that in case of any dispute regarding
compensation, the arbitration clause is available. He has submitted
that if the petitioner has any grievance in connection with refusal of
grant of compensation, the petitioner could invoke clause 21.
14. It has been submitted that writ cannot be issued unless there is
an existing legal right with the petitioner and there is a correspondent
legal duty on the part of the respondents. He has submitted that the
respondent herein has acted in terms of the agreement and therefore
the writ jurisdiction has been wrongly invoked by the petitioner.
15. The learned counsel has also submitted that after the
termination of the lease by the impugned order, a proceeding under
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to Act of 1971) is also pending for consideration.
16. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the
following judgements: –
a. (1994) 3 SCC 552 (State of Gujarat and Others versus
Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust and Others) paragraph
22 to submit that the principles of natural justice have no
applicability in the case of termination of contract.
b. (2000) 6 SCC 293 (Kerela State Electricity Board and
Another Versus Kurien Em Kalathil and Others) para 11 to
submit that the dispute relating to interpretation of terms and
conditions of the contract cannot be agitated in writ
jurisdiction.
c. (2011) 13 SCC 446 (Banatwala and Company versus Life
Insurance Corporation of India and Another) para 52 to
submit that the proceedings have been rightly initiated under
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the Act of 1971 which is a special procedure for recovery of
premises in connection with which the lease has been
terminated and determined.
d. (2013) 5 SCC 470 (Rajasthan State Industrial Development
and Investment Corporation and Another versus Diamond
and Gem Development Corporation Limited and Another)
para 19,20,21 and 22 to submit that the present case is not a
case of statutory contract and therefore the writ jurisdiction is
not maintainable.
e. 1994 Supp. (3) 694 (Jiwan Dass versus Life Insurance
Corporation of India and Another) paragraph 4 to counter the
argument of relating to Article 21 of the Constitution of India
and has submitted that the respondent has the right to terminate
the lease in terms of the Transfer of Property Act.
f. (2007) 14 SCC 517 (Jagdish Mandal versus State of Orissa
and Others) para 22, to submit that the contract involved in this
case is primarily a commercial contract relating to letting out of
property and there is no arbitrariness or unreasonableness on
the part of the respondents and therefore the judicial review of
the impugned action of the respondents is not attracted in the
present case.
g. 2022 SCC Online 151 (R. Muthukumar and Others versus
Chairman and Managing Director TANGDEO and Others)
paragraph 28 and 29 to submit that though the petitioner has
raised certain points in the rejoinder with regard to other
similarly situated persons but negative equality has no role to
play and the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of
the lease.
h. The learned counsel has also submitted the fact that the
petitioner had sublet the property is not in dispute and only
when the CBI had ultimately concluded about illegality
committed by the petitioner, action was taken in the year 2020
by the impugned order terminating the lease. He has submitted
that merely because any natural justice has not been followed
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prior to issuance of letter of termination, the same will have no
role to play on account of the admitted fact of subletting.
Rejoinder arguments of the Petitioner
17. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner while responding
to the point regarding maintainability of the writ petition has relied
upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Express Newspaper Private Ltd. Reported in (1986) 1 SCC 133
and has in particular referred to paragraph 70,73, 75,76,85,86 and 87
to submit that in the said case also the matter was relating to
termination of lease and merely because there is commercial contract
between the parties, the same does not mean that the writ petition
would not lie in the circumstances where the provisions of part-III of
the Constitution are involved. He has referred to Article 14 19(1) (g)
and 21 of the Constitution of India.
18. He has also submitted that only the land was given to the
petitioner and at the cost of petitioner he has erected the building and
the building is being utilized for residential cum commercial purpose.
The learned counsel submits that it is not in dispute that while issuing
the impugned letter of termination as contained in Annexure-13, no
show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and by virtue of the
same letter allegation has been leveled against the petitioner which is
also the letter of termination. The learned counsel submits that the
impugned letter of termination of lease is fit to be set aside on account
of gross violation of principles of natural justice.
19. He has also submitted that after the issuance of letter of
termination, the proceeding under the provisions of aforesaid Act of
1971 Act has been initiated by treating the petitioner as unauthorized
occupant.
20. The learned counsel has further referred to the terms and
conditions of the lease and has submitted that the allegation was only
in connection with subletting a portion of the property. He submits
that the remaining portion of the property remained with the
petitioner. Since the entire property was not assigned or sub-let to
anybody, the clauses of agreement for terminating the lease are not
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attracted. He has in particular referred to clause 6,15 and 27(b) and
(c)of the lease agreement. The learned counsel submits that in the
allotment letter, it has been mentioned that the land can be utilized for
the business of electrical goods, but in clause 15 of the lease
agreement it has been mentioned that the building can be used for all
the purposes including residential and commercial. The learned
counsel has also submitted that even as per the records of this case,
there was subletting only for a period of six months way back in the
year 2012-13 and the letter of termination has been issued in the year
2020 and in the meantime, the petitioner continued to pay the rent
without any objection from the side of the respondents.
21. The learned counsel submits that the respondents are public
sector organization and their Acts are to be tested on the touchstone of
the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He has referred to
paragraph 19,20, 21,22,25,28 and 35 of the said judgment. He has also
referred to Section 106 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act.
22. The learned counsel has relied upon the following judgments: –
i. Judgement passed by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court reported in
1999(39) DRJ page 87 (B. Banerjee v. Romesh Mahajan) and
submitted that merely because the portion of the constructed
building was sublet, the same does not amount to violation of
the terms and conditions of the agreement. He has in particular
referred to paragraph 7 of the aforesaid judgment.
ii. (1989) 3 SCC 293 to submit that merely because there is an
agreement the same does not exclude applicability of Article 14
of the Constitution of India.
iii. (2015) 8 SCC 519 (Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. V. Deputy
Commissioner of Central Excise, Guahati and Others) and
has submitted that the principles of natural justice are not
excluded merely because there is a lease deed entered into
between the parties.
Findings of this court.
23. The respondents Steel Authority of India Limited / Bokaro
Steel Plant Town Administrative Department, Bokaro Steel City
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floated an advertisement in 1987 inviting applications for allotment of
plots in different Sectors/City Centre of Bokaro Steel City for
transaction of business in which the petitioner participated and after
much litigation and after due scrutiny the respondent-SAIL issued
allotment letter dated 13.05.2000 (Annexure-7) with respect to the plot
no. GA-4 in city centre on lease basis initially for a period of 33 years
for trading in electronic goods. Thereafter an indenture of lease dated
13.07.2000 was entered into between the parties for a period of 33
years and possession certificate dated 18.12.2000 (Annexure-9) was
also handed over to the petitioner. The petitioner applied for building
plan design which was duly approved vide letter dated 09.11.2001
(Annexure-10). The petitioner constructed G +2 building and it is the
case of the petitioner that he has been regularly paying the electricity
charges and other demand made by the respondent authorities and tax
invoice has been placed as Annexure-12 series. The petitioner has
been using the property for commercial cum residential purpose.
24. The cause of action for the writ petition arose when the
respondent no. 4 issued letter dated 27.10.2020 (Annexure-13)
terminating the lease dated 13.07.2000 (annexure-8) on the ground of
violation of clause 6 and 15 of the lease deed by alleging that the first
floor of the building over the lease property was sub-let to one
M/s.Angel Agritech Limited on 10.08.2012 without prior written
consent from the lessor. The petitioner was directed to vacate the
property and deliver its possession to the respondent on expiry of
notice period of 90 days. The body of the letter of termination
(Annexure-13), which is the subject matter of the present writ petition
and is under challenge reveals that-
a) the letter of termination is based on the revelation by
CBI, Ranchi during investigation of CBI case No. RC-
78(S)/2017-EOW-R registered against M/s Angel
Agritech Limited that the first floor of the building was
sublet by the petitioner to M/s Angel Agritech Limited
on 10.08.2012 without the prior written permission from
the respondent.
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b) It has been alleged that M/s Angel Agritech Limited, in
criminal conspiracy among themselves and others
collected money from the public at large during the year
2010 to 2013 under various schemes with the false
assurance of high and better return.
c) It has been alleged that during this period i.e. from 10-
08-2012 branch office of M/s Angel Agritech Limited
was opened in the premises leased out to the petitioner
which is violation of clause 6 and 15 of Indenture of
lease dated 13. 07.2000.
d) It has been also stated that after completion of
investigation by CBI, it has been approved for
cancelation of plot where the branch office of the
accused company was operated and crime took place.
e) clause 27 (b) of the Lease was invoked to notify the
petitioner that the Lease dated 13.07.2000 shall stand
terminated and the corresponding Allotment of land vide
letter dated 18.05.2000 shall also stand withdrawn
immediately after 90 days from 27.10.2020 and the
petitioner was required to vacate the land and deliver
possession immediately to the respondents on expiry of
the notice period.
f) The petitioner will not be entitled for payment of any
compensation by the respondents, irrespective of the fact
that structure, building etc. is erected on the land by the
petitioner at his cost and the petitioner was set free to
remove, at his own cost, any structure, building etc.,
built on the land within the notice period falling which
the same shall become the absolute property of the
respondents.
25. The fact that a portion of the property was let out to M/s. Angel
Agritech Limited is not in dispute. Admittedly no-show cause/notice
was issued to the petitioner prior to issuance of impugned letter of
termination dated 27.10.2020.
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26. During the course of argument, it has been submitted by the
learned senior counsel for the petitioner that there was subletting only
for a period of six months way back in the year 2012-13 and the letter
of termination has been issued in the year 2020 and in the meantime
the petitioner continued to pay rent and other charges without any
objection from the side of the respondents.
27. This court finds that as per the lease deed, rent was payable
before 31st of March every year at the office of the lessor at Bokaro
Steel City. The annual lease rent is Rs. 802.50 and service charge of
Rs. 99.50 (provisional total Rs. 902.00). The documents Exhibit-12
series reveal that the petitioner has been paying the electricity,
sanitation and water charges, but it is not clear from the records as to
whether the petitioner has been paying the annual rent and as to
whether the respondents have been accepting such payment of annual
rent even after the termination of lease. The conduct of the parties
assumes importance as the action of termination has been taken after 8
years of the alleged violation of terms of lease and the petitioner has
claimed that the period of sub-letting was only for a period of 6
months way back in the year 2012.
28. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties have
referred to terms and condition of the lease deed and were trying to
interpret the same in their own manner. During the course of
argument, the learned counsel for the respondents has also referred to
clause 6 to submit that there is a clear bar that the lessee will not use
the land and/or the building to be erected for any other purpose other
than for which it has been demised without prior permission and
consent of the lessor whose decision would be final; clause 15
provides that the lessee shall not assign transfer, sub- let or under let
or part with the possession of the demised land or the buildings
erected thereon without prior permission and consent of the lessor.
Action has been taken for violation of clause 6 and 15 of the lease
deed.
29. At the same time the learned counsel for the petitioner has tried
to interpret the clauses in his own manner and has also taken a plea in
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the rejoinder that the respondents have taken arbitrary action against
the petitioner only on the dictate of CBI and bypassing the terms and
conditions of the lease deed. The petitioner has raised a plea of waiver
and estoppel by stating that several other lessees have sublet their
portion of building and for that purpose the permission has never been
insisted as a rule. The petitioner has also taken a stand that there has
been a custom or tradition that whenever the entire premises of a
lessee is to be let out, there is to be requirement of seeking permission,
but whenever a small portion is to be let out and the remaining
portion of the building is held in the occupation of the lessee, no such
permission to sub-let has been insisted upon by the respondents . For
this, the petitioner has cited a number of plots stating that in those
plots there has been subletting but the respondents have never insisted
for permission. The petitioner has alleged that the respondents have
adopted double standard. The petitioner has tried to make out a case
that the permission was required only for subletting the entire land and
building but for sub- letting small portion, no such permission was
required and for that purpose the petitioner has also pleaded waiver,
estoppel and cited certain examples.
30. This Court is of the considered view that this case involves the
interpretation of terms and conditions of the lease and also the plea of
waiver and estoppel and also certain unwritten norms which has been
set by the respondents while implementing the terms and conditions of
the lease.
31. This court also finds that such plea has been raised for the first
time in rejoinder and a reply to the same has been filed by the
respondents who in their reply have again referred to the terms and
conditions of the lease deed. It has also been stated that the plots have
been allotted for commercial purpose only and the lessees of the plot
have not been allowed to sublet buildings without prior permission of
the lessor. It has also been stated that as of now, the respondents do
not have any complaint regarding subletting of leased premises
without permission from the lessor and that the lessees of the plots
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have not been allowed to sub- let their building without prior
permission of the lessor.
32. This court is of the considered view that there is dispute
regarding interpretation of terms and conditions of the contract of the
indenture of lease and also dispute with regard to conduct of the
respective parties. The petitioner has also taken a plea of waiver and
estoppel and also that the respondents, have themselves implemented
the terms and conditions of the lease deed with regard to subletting in
such a manner that prior permission is required only when the entire
land or building is sublet and for small subletting, no permission is
required. This court is of the view that these disputed questions of fact
cannot be decided under writ jurisdiction.
33. The fact remains that during the pendency of the writ petition
the respondents had initiated proceeding against the petitioner under
the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized
Occupants) Act, 1971 wherein two different notices have been issued
in connection with case No. A/E-142 of 2022 which are-
a) notice under Sections 4(1) of the Act of 1971
observing that the petitioner is in unauthorized
occupation of the premises w.e.f. 26.01.2021 and
calling upon the petitioner to show cause on or
before 04.06.2022 as to why the order of eviction
should not be passed. It has also been mentioned that
if the petitioner does not participate in the
proceedings the case will be decided ex-parte.
b) The other notice has been issued under Section 7(3)
of the aforesaid Act of 1971 claiming damages after
termination of lease agreement w.e.f. 27.10.2020
(annual rent Rs. 802.50 and service charges Rs.
99.50) and further electricity and other charges till
the date of vacation and also for cost of removal of
building structure along with compound interest
thereon @ 10% per annum till final payment.
34. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents
that the said proceeding under the aforesaid Act of 1971 seeking
eviction of the petitioner and also claiming damages is still pending
although there has been no order of stay by this court. The petitioner
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has challenged the said proceedings, in which two notices [one under
Section 4(1) and another under section 7(3) of the Act of 1971] have
been issued, through I.A. No. 4471 of 2022 and the said amendment
has been allowed vide order dated 22.06.2024, amended writ petition
has been filed, counter affidavit has also been filed. So far as the
petition seeking stay being I.A. No. 4472 of 2022 is concerned, the
same was closed as the matter was to be listed for final disposal on
07.08.2024. On 07.08.2024 the matter was placed before a co-ordinate
Bench and ultimately the case was assigned to this Bench and was
heard on two days i.e. on 02.04.2025 and on 14.07.2025.
35. In the judgement passed in the case of State of Gujarat v. M.P.
Shah Charitable Trust, (supra) it has been held that if the matter is
governed by a contract, the writ petition is not maintainable since it is
a public law remedy and is not available in private law field, e.g.,
where the matter is governed by a non-statutory contract.
36. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Banatwala
and Company (supra) in paragraph 99(b) that the provisions of the
aforesaid Act of 1971 govern the relationship between public
undertakings covered under the Act and their occupants to the extent
they provide for eviction of unauthorized occupants from public
premises, recovery of arrears of rent or damages to such unauthorized
occupation and other incidental matters specified under the Act of
1971. This court is of the considered view that the authority under the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 has
the jurisdiction to decide as to whether the petitioner has violated the
terms and conditions of the lease and as to whether the termination of
lease was valid on the alleged violation of terms and conditions of
lease and as to whether the petitioner could be termed as unauthorized
occupant within the meaning of the aforesaid Act of 1971.
37. This court is not inclined to entertain the writ petition on the
plea of violation of principles of natural justice as the factum of
subletting is not in dispute and the extent/ period of subletting and its
consequences requires evidence, which cannot be adjudicated under
writ jurisdiction. Further this has also to be examined in the light of
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the lease deed and conduct of the parties with attending circumstances
for which also evidence is required.
38. The authorities under the aforesaid Act of 1971 have the
required jurisdiction to examine the nature of violation of terms and
conditions of the lease and also the extent of violation and
consequences flowing out of such violation as per the terms and
condition of the lease. The authorities under the aforesaid Act of 1971
certainly have the jurisdiction to interpret the terms and conditions of
lease, the alleged violation and its consequences including its
proportionality vis-à-vis the extent and nature of violation and also
period of violation.
39. The dispute arises out of lease granted for commercial purpose
by the respondents and this court finds that there is no element of
public right or public interest involved in this case. This court also
finds that no element of malafide on the part of the respondents has
been demonstrated. This court is of the considered view that the
impugned action or decision cannot be said to be such that no
responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with
relevant law could have reached. This is over and above the fact that
the validity of the impugned action and decision itself requires
interpretation of the lease deed and also examination of the conduct of
the parties.
40. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and that
disputed questions of facts are involved in this case which have direct
bearing on the merits of the case which cannot be adjudicated in writ
proceedings, this court is of the considered view that the writ petition
is not maintainable.
41. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
42. However, it is observed that the authorities under the aforesaid
Act of 1971 would decide the pending proceedings in accordance with
law and without being prejudiced by the dismissal of this writ petition.
43. Pending I.A, if any is closed.
Binit/AFR (Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
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