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Supreme Court of India
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi vs Vidhi Rawal on 19 May, 2025
Author: Abhay S. Oka
Bench: Abhay S. Oka
2025 INSC 734
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2688 OF 2025
(arising out of Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 9493 of 2024)
Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi … Appellant
versus
Vidhi Rawal … Respondent
with
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2689 OF 2025
(arising out of Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 13896 of 2024)
JUDGMENT
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The main question involved in the appeals is whether the
High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’) or
Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for
short, ‘the BNSS’) to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12
of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for
Signature Not Verified
short ‘the DV Act, 2005’).
Digitally signed by
ASHISH KONDLE
Date: 2025.05.19
19:20:43 IST
Reason:
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 1 of 33
FACTUAL ASPECTS
3. The two connected appeals involve a challenge to the common
order passed by the High Court rejecting the appellants’ prayer to
quash proceedings initiated under Section 12(1) of the DV Act,
2005. The appellant in the Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP(Crl)
9493 of 2024, Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi, is the respondent’s
brother-in-law whereas the appellants in the Criminal Appeal
arising out of SLP(Crl) 13896 of 2024, Prateek Tripathi,
Vivekanand Tiwari and Mira Tiwari, are the respondent’s husband,
father-in-law and mother-in-law respectively. Prateek Tripathi
married the Respondent, Vidhi Rawal, on 12th December 2019 as
per Hindu rites and rituals at Dewas. After two years of marriage,
on 8th December 2021, the respondent made a complaint to the
Station House Officer at the Police Station Women Consultancy
Centre, Dewas, against Prateek Tripathi, and Vivekanand Tiwari
alleging that dowry was demanded by them. On 7th January 2022,
the respondent lodged FIR No.3 of 2022 at P.S Mahila Thana,
Dewas under Section 498A, 504, 506 and 34 of the IPC against the
appellants alleging mental and physical harassment on account of
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 2 of 33
non-payment of dowry. The respondent claimed that on her return
from work in Johannesburg, South Africa, the appellants tortured
her, demanding a sum of Rs. 20 Lakh cash and a top model SUV
car.
4. Aggrieved by the threats, the respondent on 2nd March 2022
filed an application against the appellants bearing MJCR No.
215/2022, before the District and Sessions Judge, Dewas, Madhya
Pradesh, under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. She claimed that
Prateek Tripathi would beat her and throw her out of the house
while they were abroad. The respondent prayed for reliefs provided
under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act, 2005. The
appellants filed two separate petitions under Section 482 of the
CrPC to quash the application under Section 12 of the DV Act,
2005. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court
dismissed the quashing of the petitions on the ground that the
proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, being of a civil
nature, cannot be quashed.
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 3 of 33
SUBMISSIONS
Appellants
5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants
submitted that the learned Magistrate has been conferred
jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act, 2005. The term Magistrate is
defined under Section 2(i) of the DV Act, 2005 to mean a Judicial
Magistrate of first class or, as the case may be, a Metropolitan
Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the CrPC. Therefore, the
Court of a Judicial or Metropolitan Magistrate is a Criminal Court
constituted under the provisions of the CrPC.
6. The learned senior counsel further contended that, although
remedies under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 can be availed of
in a Civil Court or Family Court as per Section 26, Section 26
cannot be read to understand the scheme of the DV Act, 2005.
7. The learned senior counsel invited our attention to various
provisions under the CrPC where the nature of relief which can be
granted by the Courts is, in essence, a relief which can be granted
by a Civil Court. Similarly, certain provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’), were pointed
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 4 of 33
out by him, where the relief granted by a Civil Court can also be
granted in criminal proceedings. Therefore, the answer to the
question which arises for consideration is not dependent upon the
nature of the proceedings or the nature of the relief that can be
granted in those proceedings.
8. The learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of the High
Court of Allahabad in the case of Devendra Agarwal and 3
Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another1 and a decision
of the High Court of Bombay in the case of Nandkishor Pralhad
Vyawahare v. Mangala2. In these cases, the High Courts held
that an application under Section 482 CrPC is maintainable
against orders passed under the DV Act, 2005 to prevent abuse of
the process of Court and to secure the ends of justice. It is relevant
to point out that the case of Devendra Agarwal and 3 Others v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another1 has been referred to a
larger bench of the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Ram
Lotan Vishwakarma and Ors v. State of U.P and Anr3.
1
Application u/s 482 NO. – 18994 OF 2024
2
2018 SCC OnLine Bom 923
3
2025 AHC-LKO 7572
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9. The learned senior counsel submitted that because an
application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, is maintainable
before a Criminal Court under the CrPC, it is amenable to the
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the
CrPC.
Respondent
10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits
that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, cannot be
quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC. He contended that the
High Court rightly held that the proceedings under the DV Act,
2005, are civil in nature. He relied upon the objects and reasons
of the DV Act, 2005, to submit that the Legislature intended the
proceedings thereunder to be civil in nature. The learned counsel
relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kunapareddy
alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna
Kumari and Another4, which held that proceedings under the DV
Act, 2005 are predominantly civil in nature.
4
2016 11 SCC 774
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11. The learned counsel argued that an application under
section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, is not a “complaint” under section
2(d) of the CrPC. Further, he argued that Sections 200 to 204 of
the CrPC do not apply to proceedings under the DV Act, 2005 and
a Magistrate cannot treat an application under the DV Act, 2005
as a complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC. The notice issued
to the respondent on an application under Section 12 of the DV
Act, 2005 is not a summons under Section 61 of the CrPC but is a
notice set out in Form VII of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 (for short, ‘the DV
Rules 2006’). He supported the view taken by the High Court.
CONSIDERATIONS
The provision of the DV Act, 2005
12. The DV Act, 2005 was enacted with the object of providing
more effective protection to the rights of women guaranteed under
the Constitution who are the victims of violence of any kind
occurring within the family. The DV Act, 2005, has been enacted
to tackle the menace of domestic violence faced by women in our
society. A very wide meaning has been assigned to the term
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‘domestic violence’ in the DV Act, 2005. Section 3 of the DV Act,
2005 reads thus:
“3. Definition of domestic violence.—For the purposes
of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of
the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case
it—
(a) harms or injures or endangers the health,
safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or
physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so
and includes causing physical abuse, sexual
abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic
abuse; or
(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the
aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any
other person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any dowry or other property or valuable
security; or
(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved
person or any person related to her by any conduct
mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether
physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Explanation I—For the purposes of this section,—
(i) “physical abuse” means any act or conduct
which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain,
harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair
the health or development of the aggrieved person
and includes assault, criminal intimidation and
criminal force;
(ii) “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a sexual
nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or
otherwise violates the dignity of woman;
(iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes—
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(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and
insults or ridicule specially with regard to not
having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any
person in whom the aggrieved person is interested.
(iv) “economic abuse” includes—
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial
resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled
under any law or custom whether payable under
an order of a court or otherwise or which the
aggrieved person requires out of necessity
including, but not limited to, household necessities
for the aggrieved person and her children, if any,
stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by
the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to
the shared household and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of
assets whether movable or immovable, valuables,
shares, securities, bonds and the like or other
property in which the aggrieved person has an
interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the
domestic relationship or which may be reasonably
required by the aggrieved person or her children or
her stridhan or any other property jointly or
separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to
resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is
entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic
relationship including access to the shared
household.
Explanation II—For the purpose of determining
whether any act, omission, commission or conduct
of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence”
under this section, the overall facts and
circumstances of the case shall be taken into
consideration.”
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13. Even ‘domestic relationship’ has been defined widely under
clause (f) of Section 2 of the DV Act, 2005, which reads thus:
“(f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship
between two persons who live or have, at any point
of time, lived together in a shared household, when
they are related by consanguinity, marriage or
through a relationship in the nature of marriage,
adoption or are family members living together as
a joint family”13.1 An aggrieved person has been defined in clause (a) of
Section 2, which reads thus:
“(a) aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or
has been, in a domestic relationship with the
respondent and who alleges to have been subjected
to any act of domestic violence by the respondent”
14. Chapter IV of the DV Act, 2005, lays down what kind of
reliefs can be granted to a person aggrieved who has been
subjected to any act of domestic violence. There are different
categories of reliefs which can be granted under the DV Act, 2005.
These reliefs can be sought either by making an application under
Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 or by making an application in
pending legal proceedings affecting aggrieved person before a Civil
Court, Family Court or a Criminal Court. The reliefs are provided
in Sections 17 to 22, which read thus:
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“17. Right to reside in a shared household.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
the time being in force, every woman in a domestic
relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared
household, whether or not she has any right, title or
beneficial interest in the same.
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded
from the shared household or any part of it by the
respondent save in accordance with the procedure
established by law.
18. Protection orders.—The Magistrate may, after giving
the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity
of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that
domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place,
pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person
and prohibit the respondent from—
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic
violence;
(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved
person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or
any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever,
with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or
written or electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank
accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties,
jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or
singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any
other property held either jointly by the parties or
separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or
any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from
domestic violence;
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(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection
order.
19. Residence orders.—(1) While disposing of an
application under sub-section (1) of Section 12, the
Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence
has taken place, pass a residence order—
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any
other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved
person from the shared household, whether or not the
respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared
household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the
shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from
entering any portion of the shared household in which the
aggrieved person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing
off the shared household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights
in the shared household except with the leave of the
Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of
alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as
enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for
the same, if the circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed
against any person who is a woman.
(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions
or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably
necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the
aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person.
(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to
execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing
the commission of domestic violence.
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(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be
an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be dealt with
accordingly.
(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), sub-
section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may also pass an
order directing the officer in-charge of the nearest police
station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to
assist her or the person making an application on her
behalf in the implementation of the order.
(6) While making an order under sub-section (1), the
Magistrate may impose on the respondent obligations
relating to the discharge of rent and other payments,
having regard to the financial needs and resources of the
parties.
(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the
police station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has
been approached to assist in the implementation of the
protection order.
(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to
the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any
other property or valuable security to which she is entitled
to.
20. Monetary reliefs.—(1) While disposing of an
application under sub-section (1) of Section 12, the
Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary
relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by
the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person
as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may
include, but is not limited to,—
(a) the loss of earnings;
(b) the medical expenses;
(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or
removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved
person; and
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(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her
children, if any, including an order under or in addition to
an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for
the time being in force.
(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall be
adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the
standard of living to which the aggrieved person is
accustomed.
(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an
appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of
maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case
may require.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for
monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the parties
to the application and to the in-charge of the police station
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent
resides.
(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to
the aggrieved person within the period specified in the
order under sub-section (1).
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make
payment in terms of the order under sub-section (1), the
Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the
respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to
deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or
debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent,
which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary
relief payable by the respondent.
21. Custody orders.—Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force, the
Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the application
for protection order or for any other relief under this Act
grant temporary custody of any child or children to the
aggrieved person or the person making an application on
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her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for
visit of such child or children by the respondent:
Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any
visit of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of
the child or children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow
such visit.
22. Compensation orders.—In addition to other reliefs as
may be granted under this Act, the Magistrate may on an
application being made by the aggrieved person, pass an
order directing the respondent to pay compensation and
damages for the injuries, including mental torture and
emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence
committed by that respondent.”
Application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005
15. Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 reads thus:
“12. Application to Magistrate.—(1) An aggrieved
person or a Protection Officer or any other person on
behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application
to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this
Act:
Provided that before passing any order on such
application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration
any domestic incident report received by him from the
Protection Officer or the service provider.
(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include
a relief for issuance of an order for payment of
compensation or damages without prejudice to the right
of such person to institute a suit for compensation or
damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic
violence committed by the respondent:
Provided that where a decree for any amount as
compensation or damages has been passed by any court
in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid
or payable in pursuance of the order made by theCrl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 15 of 33
Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the
amount payable under such decree and the decree shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time
being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if
any, left after such set off.
(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in
such form and contain such particulars as may be
prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.
(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which
shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of
receipt of the application by the court.
(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every
application made under sub-section (1) within a period of
sixty days from the date of its first hearing.”
16. The term ‘Magistrate’ has been defined under Section 2(i)
which is as under:
“2(i) “Magistrate” means the Judicial Magistrate of the first
class, or as the case may be, the Metropolitan Magistrate,
exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) in the area where the aggrieved person
resides temporaily or otherwise or the respondent resides or
the domestic violence is alleged to have taken place”
17. Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 makes a provision enabling
an aggrieved person, a Protection Officer or any other person on
behalf of an aggrieved person to make an application to the
learned Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs provided in Chapter
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IV. In exercise of the rule-making power under Section 37 of the
DV Act, 2005, the DV Rules, 2006 have been framed. Rule 6(1) of
the DV Rules, 2006 provides that every application of the
aggrieved person made under Section 12 shall be in Form II
appended to the Rules.
18. As can be seen from the scheme of the DV Act, 2005 and in
particular Section 12, it is not a complaint under Section 200 of
CrPC or Section 223 of the BNSS. While dealing with a complaint
under Section 200 of the CrPC, the learned Magistrate cannot
mechanically take cognizance of the offences alleged in the
complaint. To ascertain the truth about the allegations made in
the complaint, the learned Magistrate is required to examine the
complainant and witnesses, if any. Only after the learned
Magistrate is satisfied that a case is made out to proceed against
the accused, a process is issued and cognizance is taken. This is
also true about a complaint under Section 223 of the BNSS.
However, Section 223(2) of the BNSS takes it a step further. It
provides that no cognizance of an offence can be taken by the
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Magistrate without giving an opportunity of being heard to the
accused.
19. In case of an application under Section 12 of the DV Act,
2005, as provided in Sub-section (4) thereof, the learned
Magistrate is duty-bound to fix the first date of hearing, which
shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt
of the application by the Court. Section 13(1) provides that a
notice of the date fixed in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 12
shall be served on the respondent or any other person in the
manner laid down therein. Rule 2 of the DV Rules, 2006 lays down
the methods and means of service of notice issued under Section
13(1).
20. We may also note that under Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of
the DV Act, 2005, a power has been conferred on the learned
Magistrate to pass interim and ex-parte orders.
21. Therefore, an application under Section 12 of the DV Act,
2005, cannot be equated with a complaint within the meaning of
Section 200 of the CrPC (Section 223 of the BNSS). As provided in
Sub-section (4) of Section 12, read with Sub-section (1) of Section
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13, the normal rule is that a notice of hearing must be issued on
the application. The scheme of Section 12 is completely different
from Section 200 of the CrPC or Section 223 of the BNSS.
22. Section 28 of the DV Act, 2005 reads thus:
“28. Procedure.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in this
Act, all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22
and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed
by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974).
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from
laying down its own procedure for disposal of an
application under Section 12 or under sub-section (2) of
Section 23.”22.1 It is true that the proceedings of an application under
Sections 12 and 23 are governed by the CrPC. However, Sub-
section (2) of Section 28 confers overriding power on the Court to
lay down its own procedure for the disposal of an application
under Section 12 or under Sub-section (2) of Section 23.
Jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 12
23. Now we come to the issue of jurisdiction of the Courts to
entertain applications under Section 12. Section 27 of the DV Act,
2005 deals with jurisdiction, which reads thus:
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“27. Jurisdiction.—(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate
of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the
case may be, within the local limits of which—
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily
resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is
employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen,
shall be the competent court to grant a protection order
and other orders under this Act and to try offences
under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable
throughout India.”
(emphasis added)23.1 So, the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or
the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, has jurisdiction
to entertain applications under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 as
can be seen from the provisions of Sections 12 and 27 read with
clause (i) of Section 2 of the DV Act, 2005.
24. There is one more provision of the DV Act which deals with
the power of other Courts (other than the Courts mentioned in
Section 27) to grant reliefs under the DV Act, i.e. Section 26 which
reads thus:
“26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any
relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also
be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, familyCrl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 20 of 33
court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and
the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before
or after the commencement of this Act.
(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for
in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved
person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil
or criminal court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved
person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this
Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant
of such relief.”
(emphasis added)
24.1 Therefore, in a given case, in any legal proceedings pending
before a Civil Court or Family Court affecting the aggrieved
person, the reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 can be sought.
Similarly, in a Criminal Court other than the Courts of Judicial
Magistrate of the First Class and Metropolitan Magistrate, reliefs
under Sections 18 to 22 can be sought. For example, in
proceedings before a Court of Session, such reliefs can be sought
provided the proceeding affects the aggrieved person. We must
note here that Section 26 does not confer jurisdiction on Courts
other than the Courts mentioned in Section 27 to entertain an
application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. It only enables
the Courts mentioned therein to grant the reliefs under Sections
18 to 22 in the pending legal proceedings.
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25. Before we proceed further, we must clarify that in these
appeals, we are confining our adjudication to the question
whether the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section
482 of CrPC or Section 528 of the BNSS can be exercised to quash
proceedings arising out of an application under Section 12(1) filed
before the learned Magistrate in accordance with Section 27 of the
DV Act, 2005. We are not dealing with other legal proceedings in
which reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 are sought in the Courts
referred to in Section 26 of the DV Act.
CRIMINAL COURTS
26. Under the CrPC, Chapter II deals with the constitution of
Criminal Courts and Offices. The Courts of Session, Judicial
Magistrates of the First Class and in any metropolitan area,
Metropolitan Magistrates, Judicial Magistrates of the Second
Class and Executive Magistrates are Criminal Courts as provided
in Section 6 of the CrPC. Therefore, the Courts of Metropolitan
Magistrates and Judicial Magistrates of First Class, which are
empowered to entertain applications under Section 12 and to
grant reliefs under the DV Act, 2005, are Criminal Courts.
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 22 of 33
Similarly, under the BNSS, Section 6 thereof provides that Courts
of Session, Judicial Magistrates of the First Class, Judicial
Magistrates of the Second Class and Executive Magistrates are
Criminal Courts. Under the BNSS, there is no category of
Metropolitan Magistrates. Therefore, the jurisdiction to entertain
a complaint vests in a Criminal Court under the CrPC.
The nature of proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V Act,
2005
27. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent tried to
rely upon the nature of proceedings under the DV Act, 2005. He
invited our attention to a decision of this Court in the case of
Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy
Swarna Kumari and Anr.4 He relied upon paragraphs 11 and
12 of the said decision which read thus:
“11. We have already mentioned the prayers which
were made by Respondent 1 in the original petition
and Prayer A thereof relates to Section 9. However, in
Prayer B, Respondent 1 also sought relief of grant of
monthly maintenance to her as well as her children.
This prayer falls within the ambit of Section 20 of the
DV Act. In fact, Prayer A is covered by Section 18
which empowers the Magistrate to grant such a
protection which is claimed by Respondent 1.
Therefore, the petition is essentially under Sections 18Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 23 of 33
and 20 of the DV Act, though in the heading these
provisions are not mentioned. However, that may not
make any difference and, therefore, no issue was raised
by the appellant on this count. In respect of the
petition filed under Sections 18 and 20 of the DV Act,
the proceedings are to be governed by the Code, as
provided under Section 28 of the DV Act. At the same
time, it cannot be disputed that these proceedings are
predominantly of civil nature.
12. In fact, the very purpose of enacting the DV Act was to
provide for a remedy which is an amalgamation of civil
rights of the complainant i.e. aggrieved person. Intention
was to protect women against violence of any kind,
especially that occurring within the family as the civil law
does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. It is
treated as an offence under Section 498-A of the Penal
Code, 1860. The purpose of enacting the law was to
provide a remedy in the civil law for the protection of
women from being victims of domestic violence and to
prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the
society.
.. .. .. .. …. .. .. .. ..”
(emphasis added)
28. Reliance is also placed by the respondent on a decision of
this Court in the case of Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi5 and in
particular paragraph 50 which reads thus:
“50. In our view, the DV Act is a piece of civil code
which is applicable to every woman in India
irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social
background for a more effective protection of her
rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order
to protect women victims of domestic violence
occurring in a domestic relationship. Therefore, the5
(2022) 8 SCC 90Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 24 of 33
expression “joint family” cannot mean as understood in
Hindu Law. Thus, the expression “family members living
together as a joint family”, means the members living
jointly as a family. In such an interpretation, even a girl
child/children who is/are cared for as foster children also
have a right to live in a shared household and are
conferred with the right under sub-section (1) of Section
17 of the DV Act. When such a girl child or woman
becomes an aggrieved person, the protection of sub-
section (2) of Section 17 comes into play.”
(emphasis added)
28.1 Thus, there is no doubt that, notwithstanding the penal
provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the
proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are
predominantly of a civil nature.
The power of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC
and Section 528 of the BNSS to quash proceedings under the
D.V Act,2005.
29. Under the scheme of the DV Act, 2005, the reliefs which are
provided in Sections 18 to 23 can be granted on an application
made by an aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other
person on behalf of the aggrieved person under Sub-section (1) of
Section 12. Thus, when the question of quashing proceedings
under the DV Act, 2005 pending before the learned Magistrate
arises, it is for quashing of an application under Section 12(1) of
the DV Act. We are examining the issue of jurisdiction of the High
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 25 of 33
Court under Section 482 of the CrPC or Section 528 of the BNSS
in the context of quashing the proceedings initiated on an
application made under Section 12(1). We have already held that
an application under Sub-section (1) of Section 12 is completely
different from a complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC (Section
223 of the BNSS).
30. Now, we turn to Section 482 of CrPC, which reads thus:
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any order under this
Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”30.1 The word ‘Court’ referred to in Section 482 is obviously a
Criminal Court within the meaning of Section 6 of CrPC which
includes a Court of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan
Magistrate.
31. There are two parts of Section 482. Both parts save the
inherent powers of the High Court. The first part is applicable
where the power is exercised to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under ‘this Code’. When a
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 26 of 33
notice is issued on an application under Section 12(1), the learnedMagistrate does not pass any order under the CrPC. When orders
granting any of the reliefs under Sections 18 to 23 are passed, the
orders of the learned Magistrate are not under the CrPC.
Therefore, the first part of Section 482 cannot apply to
proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005.
32. The second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power of
the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, in a given
case where a learned Magistrate is dealing with an application
under Section 12(1), the High Court can exercise the power under
the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Hence, the High Court
can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash
proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders
passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.
33. Now, the question is what is the scope of interference under
Section 482 with the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005. We
must make a distinction between proceedings initiated on the
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 27 of 33
basis of an application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005,
which are predominantly of a civil nature and the proceedings
before the Criminal Court for prosecuting a person for any offence.
Setting criminal law in motion has very serious consequences
affecting the liberty of a human being, as the person against whom
criminal law is set in motion can be arrested and sentenced to
undergo imprisonment.
34. We have already referred to the objects and reasons of the
DV Act, 2005, which are reproduced in the decision of this Court
in the case of Kunapareddy alias Nookal
a Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr4.
The basic object of the DV Act, 2005, is to protect women from
being victims of domestic violence and also to prevent the
occurrence of domestic violence in society. It seeks to protect the
right of women to reside in their matrimonial home or shared
household. Therefore, there is a provision for passing a Residence
Order under Section 19. Section 18 provides for granting
Protection Orders, which are essentially to prevent the
commission of acts of domestic violence against women. The
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 28 of 33
orders which can be passed under Section 20 are with the object
of compensating a woman for loss caused due to domestic
violence. The custody orders regarding children are also
essentially to prevent domestic violence. Even Section 22 provides
for passing compensation orders for the injuries, including mental
torture and emotional distress, caused by acts of domestic
violence. If a complaint is entertained under Section 12(1), the
erring respondent cannot be punished as is understood in
criminal law. He can be subjected to various orders as provided in
Sections 18 to 23. A respondent in the application can be
prosecuted only if he commits a breach of a protection order or an
interim protection order. Therefore, the consequences of
entertaining an application under Section 12(1) are not as drastic
as the consequences of setting criminal law in motion. No doubt,
orders that can be passed under the DV Act, 2005, can also be
very drastic, but in proceedings under Section 12(1), a respondent
cannot be sentenced to suffer imprisonment or a fine as in a
criminal trial.
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 29 of 33
35. When it comes to exercise of power under Section 482 of the
CrPC in relation to application under Section 12(1), the High
Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005 is a
welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women
who suffer from domestic violence and for preventing acts of
domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section
12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect.
Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross
illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High
Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with
proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under
Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while
dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV
Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be
defeated.
36. We must also note here that against an order passed by a
learned Magistrate, there is an appeal provided under Section 29
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 30 of 33
to the Court of Session. In contrast, generally, there is no remedy
of appeal available against an order taking cognisance of an
offence or an order issuing process. This is another reason why
the High Court should exercise caution when exercising its
inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings under Section 12 of
the D.V. Act, 2005.
37. There are decisions of the High Courts taking a view that the
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC is not available to
quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) of DV
Act, 2005. The decisions are primarily based on the premise that
proceedings under Section 12(1) are predominantly of a civil
nature. The said view is not correct for the reasons set out earlier.
38. Before we part with this Judgment, we must mention here
that one of us (Abhay S. Oka, J) is a party to a Judgment dated
27nd October, 2016 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition
2473 of 2016 in which the view taken is that remedy under
Section 482 of the CrPC is not available for quashing the
proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act,2005. This view
was found to be incorrect by a full Bench of the same High Court.
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 31 of 33
As judges, we are duty-bound to correct our mistakes in properly
constituted proceedings. Even for Judges, the learning process
always continues.
39. To conclude, the view taken in the impugned order of the
High Court that a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC for
challenging the proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of the
DV Act, 2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view. We hold
that High Courts can exercise power under Section 482 of CrPC
(Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings emanating
from the application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005,
pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate. However,
considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts
should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an
application under Section 12(1). Normally, interference under
Section 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or
injustice.
40. Accordingly, we quash the order dated 9th May, 2024, passed
by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Miscellaneous
Criminal Case Nos. 52308 of 2022 and 3363 of 2023 and restore
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 32 of 33
the said petitions to the file of the High Court. The restored
petitions shall be heard afresh and disposed of by the High Court
in the light of what we have held in this Judgment.
41. The appeals are allowed accordingly.
..……………………J.
(Abhay S. Oka)
..……………………J.
(Ujjal Bhuyan)
New Delhi;
May 19, 2025.
Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 33 of 33
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