Chattisgarh High Court
Sheetal Singh Gond vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 1 August, 2025
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
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2025:CGHC:38210
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 157 of 2015
The State Of Chhattisgarh Through- District Magistrate- Balrampur -
Ramanujganj, Civil District- Sarguja Ambikapur Chhattisgarh
--- Appellant
versus
1 - Sheetal Singh Gond S/o Harisingh Gond, Aged About 24 Years R/o
Patana, P. S. - Ramanujnagar, District - Surajpur, Chhattisgarh
2 - Amar Singh S/o Shrifal, Aged About 28 Years R/o Navaparakala, P. S. -
Premnagar, District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Shrimati Budhiyaro Bai W/o Amar Singh Gond, Aged About 25 Years R/o
Navaparakala, P. S. - Premnagar, District- Surajpur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
CRA No. 445 of 2015
Sheetal Singh Gond S/o Hari Singh Gond Aged About 24 Years R/o Village
Ramanujnagar, PS Ramanujnagar, Civil And Rev. Distt. Surajpur
Chhattisgarh.
— Appellant
Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, P.S. Ramanujnagar,
District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.
— Respondent
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CRA No. 530 of 2015
Amar Singh Gond S/o Shriphal Aged About 28 Years R/o Nawaparakala,
Police Station Premnagar, Civil And Rev. Distt. Surajpur, District Surajpur
Chhattisgarh.
—Appellant
Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Of Police
Station Ramanujnagar, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent
For Appellant in CRA: Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, Mr. Ashwani Singh and
No.445/15 Ms. Mamta Gendle, Advocates.
For Appellant in : Mr. Anil Gulati, Advocate
CRA No.530/15
For State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Addl. Advocate General.
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J
Judgment On Board
01-08-2025
Since the aforesaid appeals arise out of the judgment dated 30.3.2015
passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Surajpur in ST No.41/2013, they
are being disposed of by this common judgment. By the impugned judgment,
accused Smt. Budhiyaro Bai was acquitted of all the charges whereas
accused/appellants Sheetal Singh Gond and Amar Singh Gond were
convicted under Sections 363, 366 of IPC and accused/appellant Amar Singh
was also convicted under Section 342 of IPC and sentenced as under:
Conviction Sentence Under Section 363 of IPC. SI for three years and fine of Rs.100/-, in default thereof to suffer additional imprisonment for seven days. 3 Under Section 366 of IPC. SI for three years and fine of Rs.100/-, in default thereof to suffer additional imprisonment for seven days. Under Section 342 of IPC. SI for one month and fine of Rs.100/-, in default thereof to suffer additional imprisonment for seven days.
All the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
02. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the prosecutrix (PW-1) lodged
FIR to the effect that accused Sheetal Singh Gond loves her very much and
he used to stalk her. On the date of incident i.e. 2.8.2013 at around 9 pm
when she went out of her house to attend the call of nature, the accused
Sheetal reached there, made a proposal for marriage and asked for eloping
with him. Thereafter, he forcibly took her into Sendri forest where he had
physical relation with her. Thereafter, he called his brother accused Amar
Singh through phone, who took both of them on his motorcycle to his house
at Village-Navaparakala where they stayed for two days. When her family
members came to the house of the accused persons in search of her, the
accused persons told them that she was not at their home. The accused
persons confined her in the house. Based on this report, offence under
Sections 363, 366 and 376 of IPC was registered.
03. During investigation, spot map Ex.P/2 was prepared, confessional
statement of accused Amar Singh Ex.P/4 was recorded which led to recovery
of the motorcycle vide Ex.P/5. The prosecutrix was got medically examined.
Statements of the witnesses were recorded and after completion of usual
investigation, charge sheet under Sections 363, 366, 376, 368 of IPC and
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Section 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short
“the Act of 2012”) was filed against the accused persons. Learned trial Court
framed charges under Sections 363, 366, 376 of IPC and Section 4 of the
Act of 2012 against accused Sheetal Singh whereas accused Amar Singh
and Budhiyaro were charged under Sections 363, 366 and 342 of IPC. The
accused persons abjured their guilt and prayed for trial.
04. In order to substantiate its case the prosecution examined 07
witnesses. Statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of
CrPC wherein they denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing
against them in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false
implication. However, no evidence was adduced in their defence.
05. After hearing counsel for the respective parties and appreciation of oral
and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court while acquitting
accused Budhiyaro of all the charges, convicted and sentenced the
appellants Sheetal Singh Gond and Amar Singh Gond as mentioned above.
Hence these appeals.
06. Learned counsel for the appellant Sheetal Singh Gond submits that the
impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on
record. Learned trial Court utterly failed to appreciate the fact that there is
unexplained delay in lodging of FIR. No reliable oral and documentary
evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove age of the prosecutrix.
The admission register of the school wherein date of birth of the prosecutrix
is recorded is not a reliable piece of evidence for want of examination of the
author who made this entry. Even otherwise, there are contradiction and
omission in the statements of the witnesses which make the whole
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prosecution case as against the appellant doubtful. Therefore, the impugned
judgment as against this appellant being illegal is liable to be set aside.
07. Learned counsel for appellant Amar Singh Gond submits that findings
of guilty recorded by learned trial court against appellant Amar Singh Gond
are perverse particularly in view of major contradiction and omission in the
statements of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses. Except the
fact that this appellant on being called by his cousin-accused Sheetal Singh
Gond went to the spot to pick both of them on his motorcycle and brought
them to his house, there is no other role played by him in the alleged offence.
PW-1 prosecutrix deposed that accused Sheetal did not disclose anything to
this appellant and acquitted accused Budhiyaro Bai. He also submits that
age of the prosecutrix has not been proved by the prosecution in accordance
with law that she was minor on the date of incident. Being so, no offence is
made out against the appellant Amar Singh Gond and he deserves to be
acquitted of all the charges.
08. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposing the contention of
the appellants submits that the prosecutrix and other witnesses categorically
stated about the act of the appellants and acquitted accused Budhiyaro but
the learned trial Court did not properly appreciate the oral and documentary
evidence and wrongly acquitted accused Budhiyaro of all the charges and
accused/appellant Sheetal Singh Gond of the charges u/s 376 of IPC and 4
of the Act of 2012. Further, looking to gravity of the offence, the sentence
awarded to the convicts being disproportionate deserves to be enhanced
suitably. Hence this acquittal appeal by the State.
09. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
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10. It is clear from the record of learned trial Court that learned trial Court
framed charges under Sections 363, 366, 376 of IPC and Section 4 of the
Act of 2012 against accused Sheetal Singh Gond whereas accused Amar
Singh Gond and Budhiyaro were charged under Sections 363, 366 and 342
of IPC. After appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, learned trial
Court while acquitting accused Budhiyaro of all the charges and
accused/appellant Sheetal Singh Gond of the charges u/s 376 of IPC and
Section 4 of the Act of 2012, convicted and sentenced both the appellants as
mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment.
11. PW-1 prosecutrix states that when she went out of her house for
attending the call of nature, accused/appellant Sheetal Singh Gond reached
there, he told her that he loves her very much, asked for eloping with him
and then forcibly took her towards a forest where he called his brother
accused/appellant Amar Singh and then Amar Singh took both of them on his
motorcycle to Village-Navapara. In cross-examination she admits that their
village is dense and that both of them went on foot. She admits that the
accused Sheetal Singh did not took her away by beating and that there are
many villages on the way. In para 14 she admits that they used to go near
the house of the accused for planting. In para 15 she also admits that
accused Amar Singh and Budhiyaro did nothing to her. She also admits that
Navapara where she stayed is a dense locality and she did not disclose
about the incident to anyone there.
12. PW-2 father of the prosecutrix states that he was informed by the
prosecutrix that accused Sheetal Singh took her away and committed rape
on her. PW-3 mother of the prosecutrix has not supported the prosecution
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case. PW-4 Anant Kumar and PW-5 Panki Sai state that during the course of
search, the prosecutrix was found in the house of accused Amar Singh.
13. Learned trial Court upon appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence found that no offence of rape is made out against the accused
Sheetal Singh Gond. Looking to the medical report Ex.P/6 of the prosecutrix,
her evidence, the FSL report which does not support the prosecution case,
the fact that no semen was found on the vaginal slide of the prosecutrix and
PW-6 Dr. Rashmi Kumar did not notice any internal or external injury on the
body of the prosecutrix, this Court is of the opinion that learned trial Court
has not committed any illegality in acquitting the accused Sheetal Singh
Gond of the charge u/s 376 of IPC and Section 4 of the Act of 2012.
14. So far as acquittal of accused Budhiyaro is concerned, the Hon’ble
Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of
2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held
in para 36 as under:-
36. Our criminal jurisprudence is
essentially based on the promise that no
innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All
the safeguards and the jurisprudential
values of criminal law, are intended to
prevent any failure of justice. The
principles which come into play while
deciding an appeal from acquittal could be
summarized as:-
"(i) Appreciation of
evidence is the core
element of a criminal
trial and such
appreciation must be
comprehensive--
inclusive of all evidence,
oral and documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective
appreciation of evidence
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may result in a
miscarriage of justice
and is in itself a ground
of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after
appreciation of evidence,
finds that two views are
possible, the one in
favour of the accused
shall ordinarily be
followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial
Court is a legally
plausible view, mere
possibility of a contrary
view shall not justify the
reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court
is inclined to reverse the
acquittal in appeal on a
re-appreciation of
evidence, it must
specifically address all
the reasons given by the
Trial Court for acquittal
and must cover all the
facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal
from acquittal to
conviction, the appellate
Court must demonstrate
an illegality, perversity or
error of law or fact in the
decision of the Trial
Court."
15. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgment, considering the evidence of
the prosecutrix and other witnesses, it is seen that the prosecution has
utterly failed to make out a case against accused Budhiyaro and as such, her
acquittal recorded by learned trial Court needs no interference by this Court.
16. A close scrutiny of the evidence, the conduct of the prosecutrix during
the incident and subsequent thereto makes it clear that she was a
consenting party to the act of the accused/appellants. In such a situation,
9age of the prosecutrix becomes crucial for determining the culpability of the
accused/appellants. In order to prove her age, the prosecution produced
admission (Dakhil-Kharij) register of the school and examined the principal
namely PW-7 Dharamsai Lakda. This witness states as per Dakhil-Kharij
register (Ex.P./7), date of birth of the prosecutrix is 25 th June, 1996. However,
in cross-examination he states that he has no knowledge as to at whose
instance the said date of birth was recorded. He also admits that he has no
knowledge whether the prosecutrix is older than the age recorded.
17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Alamelu and another Vs.
State, represented by Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC 385 observed in
paras 40 & 48 of its judgment as under:
“40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the
girl’s date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according
to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16
years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e.,
31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a
Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster.
Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of
the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a
document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age
of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the
age was recorded.
48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of
the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by
applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings.
In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations
made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State
of U.P.4 held as follows:-
“The age of a person as recorded in the school register or
otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for
10obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for
contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a
separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose
of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being
represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is
filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not
appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on
his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the
purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having
regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will
have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be
applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or
rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix
although might have consented with the accused, if on the
basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the
school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused
would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of
the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be
convicted.”
18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Manak Chand alias Mani vs.
State of Haryana, 2023 SCC Online SC 1397 has reiterated the law laid
down by it in the matter of Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit, 1988
(Supl.) SCC 604 and observed that the date of birth in the register of the
school would not have any evidentiary value without the testimony of the
person making the entry or the person who gave the date of birth. It was
further reiterated that if the date of birth is disclosed by the parents, it would
have some evidentiary value but in absence the same cannot be relied upon.
For sake of brevity para No. 14 & 15 of the judgment are reproduced
hereunder:-
“14 This Court in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit (1988)
Supp SCC 604 had observed that the date of birth in the register of
11a school would not have any evidentiary value without the
testimony of the person making the entry or the person who gave
the date of birth.
“14…. The date of birth mentioned in the scholar’s register
has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the
entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. The entry
contained in the admission form or in the scholar’s register
must be shown to be made on the basis of information given
by the parents or a person having special knowledge about
the date of birth of the person concerned. If the entry in the
scholar’s register regarding date of birth is made on the basis
of information given by parents, the entry would have
evidentiary value but if it is given by a stranger or by someone
else who had no special means of knowledge of the date of
birth such an entry will have no evidentiary value.”
15. In our opinion, the proof submitted by the prosecution with
regard to the age of the prosecutrix in the form of the school
register was not sufficient to arrive at a finding that the prosecutrix
was less than sixteen years of age, especially when there were
contradictory evidences before the Trial Court as to the age of the
prosecutrix. It was neither safe nor fair to convict the accused,
particularly when the age of the prosecutrix was such a crucial
factor in the case.”
19. In the case in hand, though in the Dakhil-Kharij register (Ex.P/7) the
date of birth of the prosecutrix is recorded as 25 th June, 1996 but PW-7
Principal of the school in cross-examination has admitted that he has no
knowledge as to who got this date of birth recorded in the register and that
he does not know whether she is older than the age recorded in the register.
Even no ossification test was conducted by the prosecution in this case.
Thus, in light of aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, looking to
the nature and quality of evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that
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there is no such clinching and legally admissible evidence brought on record
by the prosecution to prove the fact that the prosecutrix was minor on the
date of incident.
20. In the matter of State of H.P. Vs. Suresh Kumar @ Chhotu reported
in 2009 AIR SCW 295, the accused was convicted under Sections 363, 366
& 376 of IPC and the High Court having found the prosecutrix to be a
consenting party and that the prosecution failed to prove that she was minor
on the date of incident, acquitted the accused of all the charges. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in para 9 of its judgment observed as under:
“9. We find that the High Court was justified in its conclusions about
the prosecutrix having accompanied the accused on her own and
being a consenting party to the sexual acts. As rightly contended by
learned counsel for the State, if the age of the prosecutrix was below
16 years, the consent would be of no consequence. But the High
Court’s findings as regards the age of the prosecutrix cannot be said to
be without any basis. The High Court has analysed the oral evidence
and the documentary evidence to come to a conclusion that the date
of birth of the prosecutrix as claimed by the prosecution has not been
established. That being so, we find no merit in this appeal which is
accordingly dismissed.”
21. In the present case also, learned trial Court acquitted accused Sheetal
Singh Gond of the charges under Section 376 of IPC and Section 4 of the
Act of 2012 but convicted him under Sections 363 & 366 of IPC. Thus,
having regard to the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the
fact that the prosecutrix accompanied the accused Sheetal Singh of her own
free will and was a consenting party; the prosecution has utterly failed to
prove that she was minor on the date of incident, this Court is of the opinion
13
that the learned trial Court was not justified in holding the accused/appellants
guilty under Sections 363, 366 & 342 of IPC.
22. On the basis of aforesaid discussions,
ACQA No.157/2015 filed by the State being devoid of any substance is
hereby dismissed.
CRA No.445/2015 and 530/2015 filed by the accused/appellants are
allowed. They are acquitted of the charges under Sections 363, 366 &
342 of IPC. The impugned judgment stands modified to the above
extent.
The appellants are reported to be on bail. However, keeping in view
the provisions of Section 481 of BNSS, 2023 the appellants are also directed
to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- each with one surety in
the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a
period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of
special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the
aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be sent
back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary
action.
Sd/
(Rajani Dubey)
Digitally signed
Judge
MOHD by MOHD
AKHTAR KHAN
AKHTAR Date:
2025.08.04
KHAN 14:21:52
+0530Khan