Karnataka High Court
Shivakumar vs The State Of Karnataka on 16 January, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.9385 OF 2024
(482(CR.PC) / 528(BNSS))
BETWEEN:
1. SHIVAKUMAR
S/O. HANAMATHA CHAVAN
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
RESIDING AT YAMPANDA
THANDA, GURUMITKAL,
YADAGIRI, KARNATAKA 585 214.
2. SHARANAGOWDA (MLA)
S/O. NAGANNAGOUDA KANDAKUR
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NEAR THE NEW BUS STATION,
YADAGIRI, KARNATAKA 585 214.
3. MARTHANDAPPA
S/O. SHAKEERAPPA HAYYALLADORA,
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BANDALLI, YADAGIRI,
KARNATAKA 585 214.
VISHAL
NINGAPPA 4. MALLAREDDY
PATTIHAL
Digitally signed by
S/O. DEVENDRAREDDY POLICE PATIL
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
VISHAL NINGAPPA
PATTIHAL
Location: High Court of
Karnataka Dharwad Bench
Date: 2025.01.22 10:57:20
+0530
RESIDING AT BADDEPALLI,
GURUMITKAL,
YADAGIRI, KARNATAKA 585 214.
5. CHANDRAKANTH
S/O. BHOJARAJA
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
RESIDING AT YARAGOLA,
YADAGIRI,
KARNATAKA 585 214.
6. ARUNAKUMARA
S/O. AMBARISH HONAGUNTI
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
RESIDING AT CHITTAPURA, KALBURGI,
KARNATAKA 585 211.
7. SUDARSHANA S/O. VINOD PADENOOR
AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS,
RESIDING AT YARAGOLA, YADAGIRI,
KARNATAKA 563 129.
8. MARKANDAPPA
S/O. MALLAPPA MANEGARA
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS,
RESIDING AT YARAGOLA, YADAGIRI,
KARNATAKA 563 129.
9. SHARANAPPA
S/O. BASAVARAJA GOWDA
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS,
RESIDING AT GURUMITKAL, YADAGIRI,
KARNATAKA 585 214.
10. BHIMARAJA S/O. BHIMASHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BALACHEDA, GURUMITKAL,
YADAGIRI, KARNATAKA 585 214.
11. DEVENDRAPPA S/O. SHANTAPPA
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
RESIDING AT GADDESUGOORU,
VADAGERA, YADAGIRI,
KARNATAKA 585 214.
12. BHIMASHANKARA S/O. BHIMARAYA
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
YARAGOLA, YADAGIRI,
KARNATAKA 563 129.
13. VINOD NAYAKA
S/O. SHANKARA RATHOD
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
RESIDING AT YAMPADA
THANDA YADAGIRI,
KARNATAKA 563 129.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SMT. URMILA PULLAT, ADVOCATE)
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY YADGIRI TOWN POLICE,
R/BY. THE SPP,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
BENGALURU 560001.
2. SRI. HANANMANTA
S/O YALLAPPA ITAGI
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/AT GANDHI NAAGAR,
YADAGIR,
KARNATAKA 585 214.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI JAGADISH B.N., SPL.P.P FOR R1;
NOTICE TO R2 IS SERVED)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.P.C (U/S 528 BNSS)
PRAYING TO, CALL FOR RECORDS IN CC NO.649/2024 OF THE
RESPONDENT PS, PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE 42ND ADDL. CHIEF
JUDICIAL METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU (XLII ACJM,
BENGALURU). QUASH THE CHARGESHEET AND ENTIRE
PROCEEDINGS IN C.C.NO.649/2024, PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE
42ND ADDITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE (XLII ACJM)
BENGALURU FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S. 143, 341, 120B R/W 149 OF
IPC., IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS
DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
ORAL ORDER
Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri Sandesh J. Chouta
appearing for the petitioner.
2. Learned Senior Counsel taking this Court through
the documents appended to the petition would seek to
demonstrate that the offences alleged are not made out even
to its remoteness. He would further contend that the issue in
the lis is answered by the judgment rendered by this Court in
Crl.P.No.4067/2023.
3. Learned HCGP would not dispute the position of law
as is laid down by this Court. Therefore, the submission is in
union.
4. This Court in Crl.P.No.4067/2023 has held as
follows:
“3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
would submit that the issue in the lis stands covered by two
orders passed by, one by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
in
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024Crl.P.No.3916/2018 disposed on 17.02.2020 and one by this
Court in Crl.P.No.7575/2022 disposed on 22.08.2022,
wherein held as follows:
In Crl.P.No.3916/2018 disposed on 17.02.2020 has held
as follows:
” This petition is filed by petitioners/accused Nos.1 to
48 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the charge
sheet in C.C. No.23259/2017 pending on the file of
VIII Additional CMM, Bengalulru for the offence
punishable under Section 143 read with Section 149
of IPC.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for petitioners
and learned High Court Government Pleader for
respondent – State.
3. Though this case is listed for admission, with the
consent of learned counsel appearing for both the
parties, the same is taken up for final disposal
4. The gist of the complaint is that on 23.05.2017 at
about 11.30 a.m., received a credible information
that a group of people gathered on Queen’s Road
shouting slogans against the Government.
Immediately, he went to the spot and found that 50
young men assembled illegally and disturbed the
public and vehicles without prior permission from the
station. On enquiry he found that they are the
members of Campus Front of India Karnataka and
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
protesting against interference religious and personal
freedoms by imposing dress code in ‘AIIMS Exam’
which is against the personal and religious rights of
our Constitution. Immediately they were disbursed
and a case has been registered and after
investigation, the charge sheet has been filed.
5. It is the submission of the learned counsel for
petitioners that though there is no substantial
material as against petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48,
the respondent have investigated the case and have
filed the charge sheet against petitioners/accused
Nos.1 to 48. It is his further submission that in order
to file a charge. sheet under Section 143 of IPC, the
unlawful assembly must satisfy the ingredients as
contemplated under Section 141 of IPC but none of
the ingredients are satisfied in this case. It is his
further submission that mere presence in an unlawful
assembly, cannot render a person liable unless there
was a common object, they were actuated by the
common object and that object is one of those set
out under Section 141 of IPC. It is his further
submission that if the common object of an unlawful
assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot
be convicted either under Section 143 of IPC or under
Section 149 of IPC. It is his further submission that
the prosecution has to prove the overtacts as against
the persons who have been alleged as a member of
unlawful assembly. In order to substantiate his said
contention, he has relied upon the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CHARAN SINGH
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
reported in (2004) 4 SCC 205. It is his further
submission that as per the Licensing and Controlling
of Assemblies and Public Processions (Bangalore City)
Order 2009, the permission is required in Bangalore
City if the congregation of more than 250 persons
assembling at one place with an intention to conduct
the meeting, protest, to hear a public speech
including political, social, religious and cultural
meetings to which the public have got free access.
The said condition specially says that no permission
or license is required in Bangalore City if the
congregation of more than 250 persons assembling at
one place with an intention of conducting meeting to
protest. It is the specific submission that
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 have given the letter
dated 20.05.2017 seeking permission but no such
permission is granted by the Commissioner of Police.,
under such circumstance, the said assembly cannot
be held as an unlawful assembly and the provisions of
Sections 141, 143, 147, 149, 188 of IPC are not
attracted. On these grounds, he prayed to allow the
petition and to quash the proceedings.
6. Per contra, learned High Court Government
Pleader vehemently argued and submitted that as per
the Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies and Public
Processions (Bangalore City) order, 2009 the
congregation of more than 250 persons is required
but as per Section 141 of IPC, an assembly of five or
more persons is considered to be an unlawful
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
assembly and if they have assembled with a common
object, then under such circumstance, accused
persons can be prosecuted for the alleged offences. It
is his further submission that the contents of the
complaint and other materials clearly indicate that
they were intending to proceed to Raj Bhavan in that
light, they have obstructed the public traffic, public
movement and thereby, they have violated the
provisions of Section 141 of IPC and other provisions
of law. It is his further submission that there are
independent eye-witnesses and they have also
categorically stated with regard to the overt-acts of
each of the accused persons and there is ample
materials to connect the accused persons to the
alleged crime. On these ground, he prayed to dismiss
the petition.
7. I have carefully and cautiously gone through the
submissions made by the learned counsel appearing
for both the parties and perused the records.
8. On perusal of records, it is the case of the
prosecution that the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48
have assembled and were protesting against
interference and dress code imposed by AIIMS exam
and also have not obtained any permission from the
concerned Authorities. But as could be seen from the
Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies and Public
Processions (Bangalore City) Order, 2009 assembly
means a congregation of more than 250 persons
assembling at one place with an intention of
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
conducting meeting or protest, to hear a public
speech including political, social, religious and cultural
meetings to which the public have got free access,
license is required only when more than 250 persons
are there. Admittedly in the instant case, the
contents of the complaint and other materials
indicates that only 50 persons have assembled. In
that light, a license said to have been is not
necessary as per the Order of 2009. The only
question which remains for consideration of this Court
is that whether the assembly of petitioners/accused
Nos.1 to 48 had constituted an unlawful assembly as
per Section 141 of IPC? In order to attract the said
provision, the assembly must satisfy five ingredients
which have been stated therein but on close reading
of the contents of the complaint, charge sheet
material and other materials, it indicates that none of
the ingredients are present as contemplated under
Section 141 of IPC.
9. Be that as it may. If 50 persons have assembled at a
particular place, then under such circumstance, it cannot be
held as an unlawful assembly. Mere presence of a person in an
unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there
was a common object and he was actuated by that common
object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141 of
IPC. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of CHARAN SINGH (Quoted supra) at
paragraph No.13, it has been observed as under:
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024“13. Coming to the others who were armed with
double-barrelled guns and country-made pistols, the
question is regarding applicability of Section 149 IPC.
Section 149 IPC has its foundation on constructive
liability which is the sine qua non for its operation.
The emphasis is on the common object and not on
common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful
assembly cannot render a person liable unless there
was a common object and he was actuated by that
common object and that object is one of those set
out in Section 141. Where common object of an
unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons
cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149. The
crucial question to determine is whether the assembly
consisted of five or more persons and whether the
said persons entertained one or more of the common
objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid
down as a general proposition of law that unless an
overt act is proved against a person, who is alleged
to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be
said that he is a member of an assembly. The only
thing required is that he should have understood that
the assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit
any of the acts which fall within the purview of
Section 141. The word “object” means the purpose or
design and, in order to make it “common”, it must be
shared by all. In other words, the object should be
common to the persons, who compose the assembly,
that is to say, they should all be aware of it and
concur in it. A common object may be formed by
express agreement after mutual consultation, but
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
that is by no means necessary. It may be formed at
any stage by all or a few members of the assembly
and the other members may just join and adopt it.
Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It
may be modified or altered or abandoned at any
stage. The expression “in prosecution of common
object” as appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly
construed as equivalent to “in order to attain the
common object”. It must be immediately connected
with the common object by virtue of the nature of the
object. There must be community of object and the
object may exist only up to a particular stage, and
not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly may
have community of object up to a certain point
beyond which they may differ in their objects and the
knowledge, possessed by each member of what is
likely to be committed in prosecution of their common
object may vary not only according to the information
at his command, but also according to the extent to
which he shares the community of object, and as a
consequence of this the effect of Section 149 IPC may
be different on different members of the same
assembly.”
10. On close perusal of the charge sheet material, it
indicates that none of the ingredients specify in Section 141 of
IPC are present so as to attract the provisions of Sections 141,
143, 149, 188 of IPC. When that being the case, then under
such circumstances, the proceedings initiated as against
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 appears to be not in
accordance with law and the same is liable to be quashed.
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
11. Accordingly, petition is allowed and the proceedings
initiated in C.C. No.23259/2017 pending on the file of VIII
Additional CMM, Bengaluru for the offence punishable under
Section 143 read with Section 149 of IPC is hereby quashed.
I.A. No.1/2018 does not survive for consideration.
Accordingly, it is disposed off”
In Crl.P.No.7575/2022 disposed on 22.08.2022 has
held as follows:
“The petitioners are before this Court calling in
question the proceedings in C.C.No.2052/2014
registered for offences punishable under Sections
143, 144, 145, 353 read with Section 149 of the IPC.
2. Heard the learned counsel, Sri. Mohammed Tahir,
appearing for the petitioners, Smt. K.P. Yashodha,
learned HCGP appearing for the respondents and
have perused the material on record.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
submits that the issue in the petition is akin to what
is decided in Crl.P.No.3916/2018 disposed on
17.02.2020, wherein this Court has examined
identical facts and offences alleged against the
petitioners therein. While so examining, this Court
has held as follows:
“4. The gist of the complaint is that on
23.05.2017 at about 11.30 a.m., received a
credible information that a group of people
gathered on Queen’s Road shouting slogans
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024against the Government. Immediately, he
went to the spot and found that 50 young
men assembled illegally and disturbed the
public and vehicles without prior permission
from the station. On enquiry he found that
they are the members of Campus Front of
India Karnataka and protesting against
interference religious and personal freedoms
by imposing dress code in ‘AIIMS Exam’
which is against the personal and religious
rights of our Constitution. Immediately they
were disbursed and a case has been
registered and after investigation, the charge
sheet has been filed.
5. It is the submission of the
learned counsel for petitioners that though
there is no substantial material as against
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48, the
respondent have investigated the case and
have filed the charge sheet against
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48. It is his
further submission that in order to file a
charge sheet under Section 143 of IPC, the
unlawful assembly must satisfy the
ingredients as contemplated under Section
141 of IPC but none of the ingredients are
satisfied in this case. It is his further
submission that mere presence in an unlawful
assembly, cannot render a person liable
unless there was a common object, they were
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024actuated by the common object and that
object is one of those set out under Section
141 of IPC. It is his further submission that if
the common object of an unlawful assembly is
not proved, the accused persons cannot be
convicted either under Section 143 of IPC or
under Section 149 of IPC. It is his further
submission that the prosecution has to prove
the overt-acts as against the persons who
have been alleged as a member of unlawful
assembly. In order to substantiate his said
contention, he has relied upon the decision of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
CHARAN SINGH AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF
UTTAR PRADESH reported in (2004) 4 SCC
205. It is his further submission that as per
the Licensing and Controlling of Assemblies
and Public Processions (Bangalore City) Order
2009, the permission is required in Bangalore
City if the congregation of more than 250
persons assembling at one place with an
intention to conduct the meeting, protest, to
hear a public speech including political, social,
religious and cultural meetings to which the
public have got free access. The said
condition specially says that no permission or
license is required in Bangalore City if the
congregation of more than 250 persons
assembling at one place with an intention of
conducting meeting to protest. It is the
specific submission that petitioners/accused
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024Nos.1 to 48 have given the letter dated
20.05.2017 seeking permission but no such
permission is granted by the Commissioner of
Police., under such circumstance, the said
assembly cannot be held as an unlawful
assembly and the provisions of Sections 141,
143, 147, 149, 188 of IPC are not attracted.
On these grounds, he prayed to allow the
petition and to quash the proceedings.
6. Per contra, learned High Court
Government Pleader vehemently argued and
submitted that as per the Licensing and
Controlling of Assemblies and Public
Processions (Bangalore City) order, 2009 the
congregation of more than 250 persons is
required but as per Section 141 of IPC, an
assembly of five or more persons is
considered to be an unlawful assembly and if
they have assembled with a common object,
then under such circumstance, accused
persons can be prosecuted for the alleged
offences. It is his further submission that the
contents of the complaint and other materials
clearly indicate that they were intending to
proceed to Raj Bhavan in that light, they have
obstructed the public traffic, public movement
and thereby, they have violated the
provisions of Section 141 of IPC and other
provisions of law. It is his further submission
that there are independent eye-witnesses and
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024they have also categorically stated with
regard to the overt-acts of each of the
accused persons and there is ample materials
to connect the accused persons to the alleged
crime. On these ground, he prayed to dismiss
the petition.
7. I have carefully and cautiously
gone through the submissions made by the
learned counsel appearing for both the parties
and perused the records.
8. On perusal of records, it is the case
of the prosecution that the
petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48 have
assembled and were protesting against
interference and dress code imposed by
AIIMS exam and also have not obtained any
permission from the concerned Authorities.
But as could be seen from the Licensing and
Controlling of Assemblies and Public
Processions (Bangalore City) Order, 2009
assembly means a congregation of more than
250 persons assembling at one place with an
intention of conducting meeting or protest, to
hear a public speech including political, social,
religious and cultural meetings to which the
public have got free access, license is
required only when more than 250 persons
are there. Admittedly in the instant case, the
contents of the complaint and other materials
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024indicates that only 50 persons have
assembled. In that light, a license said to
have been is not necessary as per the Order
of 2009. The only question which remains for
consideration of this Court is that whether the
assembly of petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48
had constituted an unlawful assembly as per
Section 141 of IPC? In order to attract the
said provision, the assembly must satisfy five
ingredients which have been stated therein
but on close reading of the contents of the
complaint, charge sheet material and other
materials, it indicates that none of the
ingredients are present as contemplated
under Section 141 of IPC.
9. Be that as it may. If 50 persons
have assembled at a particular place, then
under such circumstance, it cannot be held as
an unlawful assembly. Mere presence of a
person in an unlawful assembly cannot render
a person liable unless there was a common
object and he was actuated by that common
object and that object is one of those set out
in Section 141 of IPC. This proposition of law
has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of CHARAN SINGH (Quoted supra)
at paragraph No.13, it has been observed as
under:
– 18 –
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024“13. Coming to the others who were
armed with double-barrelled guns and
country-made pistols, the question is
regarding applicability of Section 149 IPC.
Section 149 IPC has its foundation on
constructive liability which is the sine qua non
for its operation. The emphasis is on the
common object and not on common intention.
Mere presence in an unlawful assembly
cannot render a person liable unless there
was a common object and he was actuated by
that common object and that object is one of
those set out in Section 141. Where common
object of an unlawful assembly is not proved,
the accused persons cannot be convicted with
the help of Section 149. The crucial question
to determine is whether the assembly
consisted of five or more persons and
whether the said persons entertained one or
more of the common objects, as specified in
Section 141. It cannot be laid down as a
general proposition of law that unless an
overt act is proved against a person, who is
alleged to be a member of an unlawful
assembly, it cannot be said that he is a
member of an assembly. The only thing
required is that he should have understood
that the assembly was unlawful and was likely
to commit any of the acts which fall within the
purview of Section 141. The word “object”
means the purpose or design and, in order to
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
make it “common”, it must be shared by all.
In other words, the object should be common
to the persons, who compose the assembly,
that is to say, they should all be aware of it
and concur in it. A common object may be
formed by express agreement after mutual
consultation, but that is by no means
necessary. It may be formed at any stage by
all or a few members of the assembly and the
other members may just join and adopt it.
Once formed, it need not continue to be the
same. It may be modified or altered or
abandoned at any stage. The expression “in
prosecution of common object” as appearing
in Section 149 has to be strictly construed as
equivalent to “in order to attain the common
object”. It must be immediately connected
with the common object by virtue of the
nature of the object. There must be
community of object and the object may exist
only up to a particular stage, and not
thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly
may have community of object up to a certain
point beyond which they may differ in their
objects and the knowledge, possessed by
each member of what is likely to be
committed in prosecution of their common
object may vary not only according to the
information at his command, but also
according to the extent to which he shares
the community of object, and as a
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
consequence of this the effect of Section 149
IPC may be different on different members of
the same assembly.”
10. On close perusal of the charge
sheet material, it indicates that none of the
ingredients specify in Section 141 of IPC are
present so as to attract the provisions of
Sections 141, 143, 149, 188 of IPC. When
that being the case, then under such
circumstances, the proceedings initiated as
against petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 48
appears to be not in accordance with law and
the same is liable to be quashed
11. Accordingly, petition is allowed
and the proceedings initiated in C.C.
No.23259/2017 pending on the file of VIII
Additional CMM, Bengalulru for the offence
punishable under Section 143 read with
Section 149 of IPC is hereby quashed.”
The aforesaid order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court would cover the case at hand on all its fours. That
apart, no untoward incident has occurred in the protest. There
are no independent witnesses who would speak about the
incident as alleged against the petitioners, which has
happened in a broad day light, apart from police officials, who
are examined as witnesses.
4. Therefore, in the light of the order passed by a Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court supra, the following:
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
ORDER
i. Criminal Petition is allowed.
ii. Proceedings pending in C.C.No.2052/2014 on the
file of the II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC,
Mysuru, stands quashed qua the petitioners.”
4. In the light of the orders passed by this Court and
the Co-ordinate Bench (supra) and for the reasons
aforementioned, the following:
ORDER
(i) The Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) The proceedings in C.C.No.10277/2022 pending on
the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dn) & JMFC
Court, Hoskote, Bangalore Rural District stands
quashed.”
5. In another order passed by this Court wherein
this Court has held as follows:
“8. The complaint then becomes a crime in crime
No.222/2022 for the offences punishable under
Sections 341, 504 and 506 of IPC. Since the
allegations are for the aforesaid offences, it is
germane to notice whether the complaint meets the
necessary ingredients of those offence or otherwise,
Section 341 reads as follows:
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CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.- Whoever
wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or
with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with
both.
9. Section 341 has its ingredients in Section
339 of IPC. Section 339 of IPC reads as follows:
339. Wrongful restraint.-Whoever voluntarily obstructs
any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in
any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is
said wrongfully to restrain that person.
10. Section 339 of IPC has its ingredients of
wrongful restraint for an act to become an offence
under Section 341 of IPC, mandates that the victim
should be restrained from a movement in a manner
that he would not be able to move towards any side.
The complaint does not narrate any such
circumstances, the complaint is only hurling of
certain abuse with regard to reason why the
complainant approaches the petitioner for registering
the complaint and beyond that there is nothing
narrated about any fact that would become
ingredients of any wrongful restraint.
– 23 –
NC: 2025:KHC:1749
CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
11. The Apex Court in the case of Keki
Hormusji Gharda & Ors vs Mehervan Rustom
Irani & Anr reported in (2009) 6 SCC 475
interpreting section 339 has held as follows:
12. ‘Wrongful restraint’ has been defined
under Section 339 of the IPC in the following words:
“339. Wrongful restraint – Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from
proceeding in any direction in which that person has a
right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that
person.
Exception.- The obstruction of a private way over
land or water which a person in good-faith believes
himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an
offence within the meaning of this Section.”
The essential ingredients of the
aforementioned provision are:
(1) Accused obstructs voluntarily;
(2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in any
direction;
(3) Such victim has every right to proceed in that
direction.
– 24 –
NC: 2025:KHC:1749
CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
13. Section 341 of the IPC provides that :
341. Punishment for wrongful restraint-Whoever
wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees, or with both.
14. The word `voluntary’ is significant. It
connotes that obstruction should be direct. The
obstructions must be a restriction on the normal
movement of a person. It should be a physical one.
They should have common intention to cause
obstruction.
12. The said judgment of the Apex Court, this
court is followed by this Court in the case of Kota
Rohit Karanth V/s State of Karnataka By Police
Sub-Inspector, Sanjayanagar Police Station,
Bengaluru and another reported in 2023(2)
Kar.L.J 372 and in W.P.No.1254/2023, dated
11.7.2023, wherein this Court has held
11. The only offence that remains is Section 341
of the IPC. For an offence to become punishable under
Section 341 of the IPC, the ingredients as obtaining
under Section 339 of the IPC is necessary to be present.
Section 339 of the IPC reads as follows:
– 25 –
NC: 2025:KHC:1749
CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024“339. Wrongful restraint – Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from
proceeding in any direction in which that person has a
right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that
person.
Exception.–The obstruction of a private way over
land or water which a person in good faith believes
himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an
offence within the meaning of this section.”
In terms of Section 339 of the IPC (supra) for a
wrongful restraint to be proved, the foundation should be
that the person against whom such wrongful restraint is
made should not be permitted to move around in any
direction. That is not the issue in the case at hand. The
complaint narrates that when he wanted to step into the
office of the accused he was stopped and not let in. This
is not wrongful restraint as obtaining in Section 339 of
the IPC for it to become an offence. The Apex Court in
the case of KEKI HORMUSJI GHARDA V. MEHERVAN
RUSTOM IRANI1 has delineated as to what would
amount to wrongful restraint under Section 341 of the
IPC. The Apex Court holds as follows:
“12. “Wrongful restraint” has been defined under
Section 339 IPC in the following words:
“339. Wrongful restraint.–Whoever voluntarily
obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from
proceeding in any direction in which that person has a1
(2009)6 SCC 475
– 26 –
NC: 2025:KHC:1749
CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that
person.
Exception.–The obstruction of a private way over
land or water which a person in good faith believes
himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an
offence within the meaning of this section.”
The essential ingredients of the aforementioned
provision are:
(1) Accused obstructs voluntarily;
(2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in any
direction;
(3) Such victim has every right to proceed in that
direction.
13. Section 341 IPC provides that:
“341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.–Whoever
wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees, or with both.”
14. The word “voluntary” is significant. It connotes
that obstruction should be direct. The obstructions must
be a restriction on the normal movement of a person. It
should be a physical one. They should have common
intention to cause obstruction.”
12. In the light of the judgments of the Apex Court
quoted (supra) and also in view of none of the facts
meeting the ingredients that are necessary to drive home
the offences as alleged, permitting further proceedings
– 27 –
NC: 2025:KHC:1749
CRL.P No. 9385 of 2024
against the petitioners would amount to abuse of the
process of law and result in miscarriage of justice.
13. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand or the
complaint is considered on the bedrock of the
principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid
judgment, as followed by this court supra, the
complaint so registered for the offences as aforequoted
would be rendered unsustainable. The unsustainability
of it would lead to its obliteration.”
6. In that light, issue standing answered by the
aforequoted orders, I deem it appropriate to obliterate the
crime against the petitioners.
7. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii) The proceedings in C.C. No.649/2024 pending
on the file of 42nd Addl. Chief Judicial
Magistrate, (XLII ACJM, Bengaluru, stand
quashed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
NAA/VP
LIST NO.: 19 SL NO.: 31
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