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Bombay High Court
Shri. Nitin Suresh Kadam And Ors vs Shri. Vitthal Thaku Jadgale And Ors on 5 May, 2025
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2025:BHC-AS:20305
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AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.8428 OF 2019
1. Vitthal Thaku Jagdale,
Age Adult, Occupation: Business,
R/at: Bobkhel, Talulka Haveli,
District Pune
ATUL 2. Dodake Dhodade Properties
GANESH
KULKARNI through partner,
Digitally signed by
ATUL GANESH
Shrirang Dnyanoba Dhobade,
KULKARNI
Date: 2025.05.05
17:56:51 +0530
Age 49 years, Occupation Business,
R/at: Bobkhel, Taluka Haveli,
District Pune 411 031 ... Petitioners
V/s.
1. Nitin Suresh Kadam,
Age Adult, Occu.: Business/Agriculture,
R/at Kadam Niwas, Opposite Vishal
Theatre & Hotel Roxy, Pimpri 411 018
2. Sanjay Shashikant Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Agriculture
3. Vivek Shashikant Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Agriculture
4. Ulhas Shashikant Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Agriculture,
Nos.2 to 4, R/at Kadam Niwas,
300, Juna Bazar, Gadi Addaa,
Khadki, Pune 411 030
5. Aruna Mohanrao Dilkar,
Age Adult, Occupation Housewife,
R/at: 15/4/77/88/81/2, 2nd Floor,
Osamashi, Hyderabad, 500 012
Andhra Pradesh
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6. Anita Vishnupandit Khele,
Age Adult, Occupation Household,
R/at: Janaki Bungalow, Shivdatta
Colony, N8 C Sector Cidco,
Aurangabad 431 003
7. Asha Ratan Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation: Household
8. Ganesh Ratan Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Business,
9. Mangesh Ratan Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Business,
Nos.7 to 9, R/at: 206/1, 1st Floor,
Raj Plastic Building, Opposite
Vishal Theatre, Pimpri
10. Varsha Mangesh Ponarkar,
Age Adult, Occupation Household,
R/at: Subhadra Bungalow, Bhavani
Nagar, Near Raghvendra Swami Math,
Hubli, Karnataka 580 023
11. Arti Nitesh Bhise,
Age Adult, Occupation Household,
R/at: Flat No.25, 4th Floor,
Bhakti Complex, Kharalwadi,
Pimpri, Pune 411 018
12. Shalin Suresh Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Household,
13. Sachin Suresh Kadam,
Age Adult, Occu.: Business/Agriculture,
Nos.12 & 13 R/at Kadam Niwas,
Opposite Vishal Theatre & Roxy Hotel,
Pimpri - 411 018
14. The State of Maharashtra,
through Principal Secretary,
Revenue and Foresh Department,
Mantralaya, Mumbai
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15. Sub-Divisional Officer,
Haveli, Pune.
16. Tahsildar and Agricultural Tribunal,
Haveli, Pune
Nos.14 to 16, notice to be served on the
Government Pleader, Appellate Side,
Room No.4, P.W.D. Building,
High Court, Bombay. ... Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.8490 OF 2019
1. Vitthal Thaku Jagdale,
Age Adult, Occupation: Business,
R/at: Bobkhel, Talulka Haveli,
District Pune
2. Dodake Dhodade Properties
through partner,
Shrirang Dnyanoba Dhobade,
Age 49 years, Occupation Business,
R/at: Bobkhel, Taluka Haveli,
District Pune 411 031 ... Petitioners
V/s.
1. Sanjay Shashikant Kadam,
Age Adult, Occu.: Business/Agriculture.
2. Vivek Shashikant Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Agriculture
3. Ulhas Shashikant Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Agriculture,
Nos.1 to 3, R/at Kadam Niwas,
300, Juna Bazar, Gadi Addaa,
Khadki, Pune 411 030
4. Aruna Mohanrao Dilkar,
Age Adult, Occupation Housewife,
R/at: 15/4/77/88/81/2, 2nd Floor,
Osamashi, Hyderabad, 500 012
Andhra Pradesh
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5. Anita Vishnupandit Khele,
Age Adult, Occupation Household,
R/at: Janaki Bungalow, Shivdatta
Colony, N8 C Sector Cidco,
Aurangabad 431 003
6. Asha Ratan Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation: Household
7. Ganesh Ratan Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Business,
8. Mangesh Ratan Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Business,
Nos.6 to 8, R/at: 206/1, 1st Floor,
Raj Plastic Building, Opposite
Vishal Theatre, Pimpri
9. Varsha Mangesh Ponarkar,
Age Adult, Occupation Household,
R/at: Subhadra Bungalow, Bhavani
Nagar, Near Raghvendra Swami Math,
Hubli, Karnataka 580 023
10. Arti Nitesh Bhise,
Age Adult, Occupation Household,
R/at: Flat No.25, 4th Floor,
Bhakti Complex, Kharalwadi,
Pimpri, Pune 411 018
11. Shalin Suresh Kadam,
Age Adult, Occupation Household,
12. Sachin Suresh Kadam,
Age Adult, Occu.: Business/Agriculture,
Nos.12 & 13 R/at Kadam Niwas,
Opposite Vishal Theatre & Roxy Hotel,
Pimpri - 411 018
13. The State of Maharashtra,
through Principal Secretary,
Revenue and Foresh Department,
Mantralaya, Mumbai
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14. Sub-Divisional Officer,
Haveli, Pune.
15. Tahsildar and Agricultural Tribunal,
Haveli, Pune
Nos.13 to 15, notice to be served on the
Government Pleader, Appellate Side,
Room No.4, P.W.D. Building,
High Court, Bombay. ... Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST.) NO.92775 OF 2020
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.8428 OF 2019
Nitin Suresh Kadam & Ors. ... Applicants
In the matter between
Vitthal Thaku Jagdale & Anr. ... Petitioners
V/s.
Nitin Suresh Kadam & Ors ... Respondents
Mr. Prasad Dhakephalkar, Senior Advocate (through
VC) i/by Mr. Jaydeeo Deo for the petitioner.
Mr. Abhishek Kulkarni with Mr. Sagar Wakale for
respondent No.1 in WP/8428/2019.
Mr. P.R. Katneshwarkar, Senior Advocate with Mr.Sagar
Kursija, Ms. Kushi Verma, i/by Mr. Vikrant Suryawanshi
for respondent No.1 in WP/8490/2019.
Mrs. V.S. Nimbalkar, AGP for respondent Nos.14 to 16-
State.
Mr. Rajesh More (through V.C.) for the Applicants in IA,
for respondent Nos.12 & 13 in WP/8428/2019 & for
respondent Nos.11 and 12 in WP/8490/2019.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : APRIL 8, 2024
PRONOUNCED ON : MAY 5, 2025
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JUDGMENT:
1. These petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution
impugns the order dated 21st February 1975 passed by the
concerned tenancy authority (“Mamlatdar”) purportedly under
Section 32R and 32P of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948 (“the Tenancy Act“). By that order, the petitioner –
a purchaser of agricultural land – was evicted on the ground of not
personally cultivating the land, and the land was directed to be
resumed/disposed of. The petitioners have challenged the legality
and propriety of the common judgment and order dated 17th July
2019 passed by the learned Member, Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal, Pune, in Revision Application Nos. 4 of 2017 and 7 of
2017, whereby the Tribunal allowed the said revision applications
preferred by respondent Nos.1 and 2 to 13, and thereby set aside
the judgment and order dated 23rd October 2017 passed by the
Sub-Divisional Officer, Pune.
2. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition are rooted in
a long-standing tenancy and ownership dispute in respect of
agricultural land bearing Survey No.152/1 admeasuring 3
Hectares and 2 Ares, situated at village Bakul, Taluka Haveli,
District Pune. The land in question originally belonged to the
predecessor-in-title of respondent Nos.1 to 13.
3. The father of petitioner No.1 was a tenant in possession of
the said land as on the tillers’ day, i.e. 1st April 1957. In an enquiry
held under Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural
Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Tenancy Act“), the
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Agricultural Land Tribunal, Haveli, by order dated 22nd June
1964, declared the father of petitioner No.1 as the deemed
purchaser of the said land.
4. Pursuant to the said order, the purchase price of the land was
determined at Rs.3,960/-. The father of petitioner No.1 deposited
the entire purchase price along with interest totalling Rs.4,816.63
within the prescribed time. Upon such compliance, the Agricultural
Land Tribunal, by order dated 29th July 1972, issued a certificate
under Section 32M of the Tenancy Act, thereby confirming the
father of petitioner No.1 as the lawful purchaser of the land.
5. According to the petitioners, it was only in the year 2008,
upon obtaining the 7/12 extract of the said land, that petitioner
No.1 realised that the name of his father did not appear in the
revenue records. Upon further enquiry, the petitioners learnt that
proceedings under Section 32P of the Tenancy Act had been
initiated against the father of petitioner No.1 and that an order
under Section 32P had been passed to resume the land.
6. It is the case of the petitioners that the father of petitioner
No.1, being an illiterate person and aged about 82 years in 1975,
was not aware of the legal implications of such proceedings. They
contend that the said proceedings were conducted behind his back
and were vitiated by fraud. Two eviction orders dated 21st
February 1975 and 29th April 1975 were passed against the
petitioners’ father.
7. Upon coming to know of the above proceedings and the
resultant orders, petitioner No.1 preferred Tenancy Appeal No.17
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of 2009 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pune, along with an
application for condonation of delay. The said appeal was allowed
by the Sub-Divisional Officer vide order dated 1st October 2010.
8. Respondent Nos.1, 12 and 13 challenged the said order
before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal by filing Revision
Application No.138 of 2010. By order dated 12th November 2012,
the Tribunal allowed the said revision solely on the ground that
the Sub-Divisional Officer had not decided the application for
condonation of delay before deciding the appeal on merits.
Consequently, the Tribunal remitted the matter back.
9. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners approached this Court by
filing Writ Petition No.50 of 2013. This Court, by judgment and
order dated 9th January 2013, allowed the writ petition and
remanded the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer to consider the
application for condonation of delay on its own merits.
10. The Sub-Divisional Officer, upon hearing the parties, allowed
the application for condonation of delay by order dated 19th July
2013. During the pendency of appeal, respondent Nos.2 to 11 filed
an application seeking intervention, claiming that after the orders
dated 21st February 1975 and 29th April 1975 were passed, the
land was returned to the Kadam family (predecessor-in-title of
respondents) under Section 32B of the Tenancy Act, and that an
amount of Rs.3,960/- was deposited by the joint family of Rajaram
Kadam towards repurchase.
11. The application for intervention was allowed. The Sub-
Divisional Officer reheard the matter and by a detailed judgment
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and order dated 23rd October 2017 allowed the appeal filed by the
petitioners, setting aside the earlier orders of eviction.
12. Aggrieved by the said decision, respondent No.1 preferred
Revision Application No.4 of 2017 and respondent Nos.2 to 11
preferred Revision Application No.7 of 2017 before the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal, after hearing both
parties, allowed the said revision applications by a common
judgment and order dated 17th July 2019, which is impugned in
the present writ petition.
13. Shri Dhakephalkar, the learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of the petitioners, has raised serious contentions
questioning the legality of the order passed under Section 32R the
Tenancy Act. He submitted that on a plain and purposeful reading
of Section 32P of the Tenancy Act, it is evident that the said
provision becomes applicable only when the deemed purchaser
fails to personally cultivate the land and instead inducts a third
party in possession of the suit land. The learned Senior Counsel
urged that even assuming that the father of petitioner No.1 had
left the land fallow for a period, such conduct does not amount to
failure of personal cultivation, unless there is clear and cogent
evidence to show that possession was parted with or a third party
was inducted for cultivation. He submitted that if the provision is
construed to mean that mere non-cultivation, even without
handing over possession, would entail resumption, then the word
“personally” occurring in the expression “fails to cultivate the land
personally” would be rendered redundant and otiose. Such an
interpretation, according to him, would defeat the legislative
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intent and the beneficial object of the Tenancy Act, which was
designed to protect and confer security of tenure upon tillers of the
soil.
14. It was further submitted that the entire proceedings under
Section 32P of the Act were vitiated on the ground of want of
effective notice and understanding of the nature of proceedings by
the illiterate and aged father of petitioner No.1, who was around
82 years of age at the relevant time. In this context, it was
contended that the so-called statement attributed to the father of
petitioner No.1 viz., that he had kept the land fallow, appears to be
a solitary line recorded on the same date on which the eviction
order itself came to be passed. There is no contemporaneous
record to demonstrate any voluntary relinquishment of rights or
acknowledgment of default on the part of the tenant. No
panchanama or possession receipt has been drawn to indicate that
possession of the land was ever resumed or taken back from the
petitioner’s father pursuant to the said order. In absence of any
such evidence, it is submitted that the order dated 21st February
1975 is a mere paper order, passed perfunctorily to dispossess an
illiterate tenant of his statutorily vested rights.
15. In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Advocate
placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Amrut Bhikaji Kale vs. Kashinath Janardhan Trade , (1983)
3 SCC 437, wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 11 has taken
judicial notice of the fact that many tenants, due to their illiteracy
and socio-economic backwardness, often fail to comprehend legal
proceedings initiated against them. The Supreme Court observed
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that a major agrarian reform, such as the grant of ownership rights
to tenants under the Tenancy Act, cannot be permitted to be
defeated by devious tactics or mechanical and uninformed
decisions rendered by lower-level revenue officers. The Court held
that such procedural lapses, coupled with lack of legal awareness,
can frustrate the very object of welfare legislation, and hence
orders passed in such circumstances warrant close judicial scrutiny.
16. It was further contended that the issue of delay in filing the
appeal in the year 2009 does not survive for consideration in the
present petition, as the application for condonation of delay has
already been allowed by the Sub-Divisional Officer vide order
dated 19th July 2013. That order has not been challenged by the
respondents at any stage, and has attained finality in law. Hence,
the issue of delay cannot be reopened indirectly in these
proceedings.
17. In view of the above submissions, the learned Senior
Advocate vehemently urged that the judgment and order dated
17th July 2019 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal
suffers from a patent error of law and is liable to be quashed and
set aside. He submitted that the Tribunal has failed to consider the
substantive rights acquired by the petitioners’ predecessor under
Section 32G read with Section 32M of the Tenancy Act, and has
mechanically relied upon a procedurally flawed and substantively
unjust order passed in the year 1975.
18. Per contra, Shri Katneshwarkar, learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents, has opposed
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the writ petition on multiple grounds. At the outset, he submitted
that the delay of more than 33 years in filing the appeal by the
petitioners has not been explained with sufficient or convincing
reasons, and therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to any
discretionary relief under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
It was urged that the inordinate delay is fatal and strikes at the
root of the maintainability of the proceedings initiated by the
petitioners. The learned counsel submitted that the allegations
regarding the impugned order dated 21st February 1975 having
been obtained by fraud are vague, lacking in particulars, and
devoid of substance. He pointed out that the record itself bears
testimony to the fact that the said order was read over and
explained to the father of petitioner No.1 in Marathi. Not only was
he present during the proceedings, but he was also informed of his
rights, including the remedy of appeal. Despite this, the original
tenant chose not to prefer any appeal or legal challenge, which
indicates that he accepted the said order voluntarily.
19. It was further contended that the father of petitioner No.1
had himself made a voluntary statement before the competent
authority, to the effect that the land in question was kept fallow for
the preceding four years, and the reason assigned for such non-
cultivation was that he had obtained a loan from the bank and
could not cultivate the land. This admission, according to the
learned counsel, amounts to a clear acknowledgment of default in
compliance with the condition of personal cultivation and justifies
the invocation of the provisions under Section 32P of the Tenancy
Act. He submitted that this statement is binding not only on the
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original tenant but also on his legal heirs, the petitioners herein.
20. The learned advocate further argued that the order passed in
the year 1975 has attained finality. No challenge was raised by the
affected party at the relevant time. In such circumstances,
reopening settled rights after a lapse of more than three decades
on technical grounds ought not to be permitted. He submitted that
the presumption of regularity of official acts attaches to the
proceedings held under the Tenancy Act and, absent any clinching
material to the contrary, the belated and unsubstantiated
allegations raised now by the petitioners do not merit judicial
interference.
21. The learned counsel sought to distinguish the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Amrut Bhikaji Kale (Supra),
relied upon by the petitioners. He submitted that the said
judgment was rendered in the context of proceedings under
Section 32F of the Tenancy Act, which deals with failure to tender
purchase price within the stipulated time. In that case, the
Supreme Court permitted challenge in collateral proceedings on
the ground that the order was a nullity. However, the facts of the
present case are entirely distinguishable, as here the father of
petitioner No.1 was admittedly given an opportunity to file an
appeal but did not avail the same. Therefore, the ratio of the said
judgment, according to the learned counsel, has no application to
the facts at hand.
22. He further submitted that the statement made by the tenant
that the land was fallow for the past four years and that the
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revenue entries showing cultivation were incorrect clearly
demonstrated that the tenant had abandoned personal cultivation.
The tenant also admitted that he had obtained a loan and had not
taken prior permission of the Collector, which also supports the
case of the respondents that there was a breach of statutory
condition under the Tenancy Act. In such circumstances, the
competent authority was fully justified in passing the order for
resumption of land.
23. The learned counsel concluded by submitting that no case
for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is made out.
The order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal is well-
reasoned, consistent with the record, and does not suffer from any
jurisdictional error or perversity warranting interference. He,
therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition with costs.
24. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having
perused the material on record, the following issue arises for
consideration:
“Whether mere failure of the tenant to cultivate the land
personally, in absence of proof of abandonment or unlawful
transfer of possession, would justify resumption of land
under Section 32R of the Tenancy Act?”
25. In order to answer this issue, it is necessary to appreciate the
object and scheme of the Tenancy Act, which is a social welfare
legislation intended to protect the interests of tillers of the soil.
Section 32 read with Section 32G confers ownership rights upon
tenants from 1st April 1957 (Tillers’ Day), subject to certain
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conditions. Once such ownership is vested, it is a statutory right,
and any divestment thereof must be in accordance with express
statutory provisions.
26. Section 32P of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
Act is titled “Power of Tribunal to resume and dispose of land not
purchased by tenant”. In simple terms, this section gives power to
the Tribunal to take back the land and give it to someone else if
the tenant’s purchase of land under Section 32 does not succeed.
This can happen in two main situations –
(a) where the deemed purchase by the tenant fails under earlier
provisions of the Act, such as when the tenant is found ineligible,
or fails to pay the purchase price in time, or voluntarily gives up
the purchase; and
(b) where the tenant does not exercise his right to purchase in
time, for example under Section 32F, which applies when the
landlord was a minor or disabled, and the tenant had to act within
one year after such disability ended.
27. In such situations, after a formal inquiry, the Tribunal can
cancel the tenant’s rights and take steps to give the land to
someone else. Section 32P(2) explains how this is to be done –
first, by ending the tenancy and removing the tenant, and then by
selling or allotting the land to persons from a priority list. This list
includes cooperative societies, landless labourers, and others who
need land for cultivation. In some cases, the same tenant may be
given first priority again if his default was not deliberate or due to
fraud. Thus, Section 32P ensures that agricultural land is used
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properly and not wasted when the tenant’s right to purchase fails.
28. Section 32R, which forms part of the statutory scheme,
enables the landlord or the Collector to initiate proceedings for
resumption only if it is found that the tenant has failed to cultivate
the land personally. Section 32R is a separate provision added to
strengthen the policy that only those who cultivate land personally
should hold its ownership. The section clearly says that if a tenant,
after buying the land, stops cultivating it personally, then unless
the Collector excuses him for good reason, he can be removed and
the land shall be dealt with under Section 84C. This means that
the tenant-turned-owner must continue cultivating the land
himself. If he fails to do so and cannot give a valid reason, he can
be evicted, and the land will be redistributed just like in the case of
failed purchase. Section 84C allows the Mamlatdar to remove
persons in unauthorized possession and take steps to give such
land to others. Therefore, Section 32R imposes a continuing
condition on the tenant, to personally cultivate the land even after
the purchase, failing which his right can be taken away. However,
such power must be exercised cautiously and sparingly,
considering the serious consequence of extinguishment of vested
ownership rights.
29. Thus, the power under Section 32R must be interpreted in
consonance with the object of agrarian reforms, and any lapse in
cultivation must be of such gravity and duration that it amounts to
irreversible abandonment of cultivation and possession by the
tenant. Temporary inability due to economic hardship, illness, old
age, or other reasonable grounds cannot be treated as sufficient to
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extinguish ownership. It is also settled law that when a right is
statutorily vested in a person under a beneficial legislation, it
cannot be taken away on mere technicalities. The provisions of the
Tenancy Act must be construed liberally in favour of the tenant,
and strict compliance with the preconditions of forfeiture must be
insisted upon. In light of the above, this Court is of the considered
view that Section 32R contemplates only such failure to cultivate
which amounts to complete relinquishment of ownership and
possession, and not every lapse or omission. The interpretation
must uphold the legislative mandate to protect the tiller’s rights,
and not render it vulnerable to procedural shortfalls.
30. The relationship between Sections 32P and 32R can be
understood in this way, Section 32P applies when the tenant’s
purchase of land does not go through or is cancelled (for example,
for failing to pay the purchase price or not exercising the right in
time). Section 32R applies when the tenant has already bought the
land but later stops cultivating it personally. In both cases, the
result is the same, the land is taken back by the State and given to
others. In the present case, the 1975 order referred to Section 32R
as the reason but passed the order under Section 32P, which shows
that both provisions work together. This Court holds that Section
32R is not a standalone penal section. It works along with Section
32P. When the Collector finds that the buyer has failed to
personally cultivate the land without any just cause, Tribunal may
use Section 32R to hold the tenant liable, and then use Section
32P(2) or Section 84C to redistribute the land. In law, such failure
to cultivate is treated as making the earlier purchase ineffective.
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So, even though the purchase had happened earlier, the later
breach of conditions makes it invalid in the eyes of law.
31. Based on the above, the Court holds that Sections 32P and
32R together give power to the Tribunal to take back the land from
a tenant-purchaser who is not cultivating it himself. However, this
power cannot be used arbitrarily. It must be used only when the
purchase fails either from the beginning or later due to violation of
conditions like personal cultivation. Section 32R shows the law’s
intention that land given to a cultivator must be used for
cultivation. But the law also gives protection, if the tenant has a
valid reason for not cultivating (such as illness or natural
calamity), the Collector has the power to excuse such failure.
Hence, eviction is not automatic. The Tribunal must first hold a
proper inquiry under Section 32P(1) and give the tenant a chance
to explain. Only if no sufficient reason is shown, eviction can be
ordered and the land can be given to someone else as per Section
32P(2) or 84C.
32. In summary, the law requires a careful approach in such
cases. Before resuming land, the authority must prove three
things-
(a) that the tenant has in fact failed to cultivate the land
personally,
(b) that there is no valid reason for such failure, and
(c) that proper legal procedure was followed including giving
notice, holding hearing, and conducting inquiry.
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With this legal understanding, I now examine whether in the
present case, the facts really justified using Sections 32P and 32R,
and whether the tenant’s non-cultivation was enough to resume
the land.
Does Non-Cultivation Without Parting Possession Justify
Resumption?
33. In the present case, the basic factual situation is that the
tenant had not cultivated the land in question for a certain period.
The documents show that for four years before the year 1975, the
land was lying uncultivated. The reason, as seen from the record,
was the tenant’s old age and weak health. It is also a fact that the
tenant did not give the land on rent to anyone else (sub-letting),
nor did he leave the land and go away. He continued to remain in
actual possession of the land till the eviction order was carried out.
The land remained fallow (uncultivated), but it was not in
someone else’s hands. The issue before this Court is whether such
a situation can be considered as a failure to “personally cultivate
the land” as stated under Section 32R of the Tenancy Act.
34. It is a settled principle in agrarian jurisprudence that the
Tenancy Ac is a beneficial legislation, enacted with the objective of
conferring ownership rights upon actual tillers of the land and
eradicating absentee landlordism. Amongst the various provisions
introduced to achieve this purpose, Section 32 and the scheme
relating to deemed purchasers play a pivotal role. Under the
statutory scheme, a tenant who fulfills the conditions prescribed
under Section 32 is deemed to have purchased the land on the
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Tillers’ Day, that is, 1st April 1957, and becomes the statutory
owner, subject to the procedure under Sections 32G to 32P. The
ownership so vested is a product of statutory compulsion arising
from social welfare and land reform policies adopted by the State.
In such a context, the right conferred upon the tenant to become
owner of the land is not contractual or discretionary, but statutory
and compulsorily vested, unless divested in accordance with
express and strictly construed provisions of the Act.
35. At this stage, it is necessary to emphasise the special
importance of Section 32R of the Act. This provision is exceptional
and unique within the entire scheme of the Act. It is the only
section which permits taking back the ownership rights that have
already been legally given to a tenant-purchaser by operation of
law. This section is not just a procedural tool; rather, it is a
substantive exception to the general rule and purpose of agrarian
reform under Section 32, which ensures that the tenant who
actually cultivates the land eventually becomes its rightful owner.
36. The real purpose of Section 32R is not to undo the reform,
but to control its misuse, and ensure that only those who continue
to cultivate the land personally enjoy the benefit of ownership.
Hence, whenever authorities or landlords rely on Section 32R, they
must act with serious legal responsibility and caution, keeping in
mind the constitutional values behind land reform.
37. To take away such ownership, the failure to cultivate the
land must be of a serious kind. It must not be a small lapse, or
something caused by genuine difficulties like illness, old age, or
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poverty. It must be clearly shown that the tenant consciously and
voluntarily stopped cultivating the land, and that such non-
cultivation was for a long period and done with the intention to
give up the land permanently. Only then can such a harsh step of
cancelling ownership be justified. The Legislature, while framing
Section 32R, did not intend it to be a punishment. It is meant to
regulate the benefit of ownership and ensure that people who
misuse the Act without genuinely cultivating the land do not
continue to enjoy the rights granted under the law. This provision
helps maintain the core purpose of land reform, which is to give
land to those who actually till it. It is not meant to allow landlords
to take back land just because the tenant missed one or two crop
seasons.
38. Therefore, whenever Section 32R is used, the law requires a
proper and detailed inquiry. The tenant must be given a fair
chance to explain why he could not cultivate the land, and the
decision must be made not by focusing only on small technical
faults, but by looking at the matter from the larger perspective of
social justice and fairness in agriculture.
39. The Supreme Court in the case of K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1, has clearly explained that
even after the Forty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, the
right to property, though no longer a fundamental right, still
remains a protected constitutional right under Article 300A. The
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court clarified that a person
can be deprived of his property only by a law which is just, fair,
reasonable and proportionate to the object it wants to achieve. The
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Court further explained that any such action must follow fair
procedure, must be proportionate to the situation, and should
serve a genuine public interest. These are basic and essential
conditions which must be satisfied before anyone’s property rights
can be taken away.
40. When this legal principle is applied to the Tenancy Act, and
particularly to Section 32R, it becomes clear that the law allows
the State or landlord to take back land from the tenant-purchaser
only in limited and exceptional situations. The Tenancy Act was
brought into force as part of India’s land reform movement, with
the aim of giving ownership to those who actually cultivate the
land. The Act was not meant just to end landlordism, but also to
achieve social and economic justice for farmers. This law reflects a
larger public interest, which is not about keeping land with rich
landowners, but about ensuring that land is distributed in a fair
way to those who work on it, as promised in Articles 38 and 39(b)
of the Constitution.
41. Therefore, Section 32R, which allows the land to be resumed
from a deemed purchaser if he fails to cultivate it, should not be
read in a way that gives the landlord an easy way to get the land
back. It should not become a tool to cancel the rights of the tenant
over small or technical issues. The real purpose behind this section
is to ensure that the land continues to be cultivated, not to punish
the tenant. The law must be used to regulate, not to undo the
rights already given to the tenant-purchaser under the land reform
scheme.
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42. The Court must also be careful not to allow misuse of this
provision. If small gaps or temporary issues in cultivation are
treated as grounds for taking the land back, it would go against
the very purpose for which the Tenancy Act was made. As clearly
held by the Supreme Court in K.T. Plantation (supra), just because
a law exists, does not mean it can be used in any manner. Even if
the law allows property to be taken back, the way in which it is
done, the reasons behind it, and the process followed must all be
fair, lawful, and honest. If the tenant’s failure to cultivate is
temporary, unintentional, or something that can be corrected,
there is no real public interest in taking away his land.
43. If Section 32R is interpreted in such a way that the landlord
can use it to claim back land for minor issues like missing one crop
cycle or being absent from the land for a short period it would
destroy the very foundation of land reform laws. A law that was
made to protect farmers would then start working against them.
Such an interpretation must be strictly avoided. This section
should be used only in cases where the tenant’s failure to cultivate
shows a clear and permanent intention to give up the land, and
this should be proven through a fair and detailed process.
44. If the law is interpreted in any other way, it would defeat
both the moral values and constitutional purpose of the Tenancy
Act. The Court has a duty to ensure that land reform laws are not
misused by those who wish to reverse the progress made in
protecting farmers’ rights. Provisions like Section 32R, which are
exceptions to the rule of giving ownership to tenants, must be
interpreted in a limited and careful manner, so that the larger
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public interest in ensuring land justice is preserved.
45. When we read Section 32R(1) carefully and in context, it
becomes clear that before this power is exercised, there must be
proof that the tenant-purchaser failed to cultivate the land
personally. But even this is not enough by itself. To take away his
ownership, such failure must fall within the meaning and purpose
of the Act. Mere proof of non-cultivation is not sufficient. The
authorities must look at the full background and ask whether the
tenant has completely abandoned the land or misused the legal
benefits given to him. The Act does not support a mechanical or
routine cancellation of ownership. What is required is a well-
reasoned and lawful decision that respects both the tenant’s rights
and the purpose of the tenancy law.
46. Section 32R uses the words “fails to cultivate the land
personally”. The simple meaning of “fail” in this setting is not
doing something that one is supposed to do. The law requires the
purchaser to do cultivation by his own effort or under his
supervision. The question arises, if a person leaves his land fallow
(uncultivated), does that mean he has failed to personally cultivate
it? If we look at the words strictly, then yes, if the land is not being
tilled at all, it is not being cultivated, whether personally or
otherwise. So, any period of uncultivation may technically amount
to non-cultivation. However, the law, especially one that relates to
social and economic welfare, is not to be read in a dry or
mechanical manner without looking at its background. In farming,
sometimes the land is kept fallow for natural reasons like giving
time for the soil to recover, for changing crops, or due to genuine
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personal problems. The Act does not say how long such failure
must continue before action can be taken.
47. The structure and intention of Section 32R suggest that only
a serious or meaningful failure to cultivate would amount to a
breach. The law does not intend to punish every small lapse. The
purpose of taking back land from a purchaser under Section 32R is
to ensure that land is not wasted or misused, and that it remains
with real cultivators. This is meant for cases where the tenant
completely gives up cultivating like when he moves away from the
land, allows it to waste, or lets someone else cultivate it in
violation of the rule of personal cultivation. In such cases, the goal
of the “tiller’s day” that is, giving land to those who actually till it,
is defeated.
48. In conclusion, the failure to cultivate the land under Section
32R must not be viewed in isolation, but must be assessed in the
backdrop of the totality of circumstances, including the conduct of
the tenant, his ability, age, health, economic condition, and any
lawful impediments. Only when the cumulative evidence indicates
a complete and deliberate withdrawal from cultivation, can the
drastic consequence of forfeiture be invoked. Any other
interpretation would render the remedial and reformative object of
the Tenancy Act nugatory and open doors for abuse of process by
landlords, defeating the very spirit of the legislation.
49. But in the present case, the situation is not like that. The
tenant did not give the land to any third person for cultivation, so
he did not violate Section 27 of the Act which prohibits sub-letting.
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He also did not use the land for any non-farming purpose like
construction, so Section 43 (which bans use of agricultural land for
non-agricultural purposes without permission) is not attracted.
The land was left uncultivated, likely with the hope that some
family member would cultivate it, or that he himself would recover
and resume farming. There is no material to show that the tenant
had any intention to permanently stop farming or misuse the land.
His failure appears to be due to personal incapacity, not deliberate
abandonment.
50. This Court is of the opinion that if a tenant-purchaser does
not cultivate the land personally and has no valid legal reason,
then it amounts to a breach of Section 32R of the Tenancy Act.
However, whether such breach should lead to eviction or not
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The
requirement of personal cultivation under the Act is strict, but it is
not without exception. The law itself provides a safeguard – the
Collector may condone the failure if there is “sufficient reason”.
Therefore, while not cultivating the land is a serious issue, the
decision to evict must be taken after considering the reason for
such failure.
51. The learned Advocate for the petitioner argued that since the
tenant had never given up possession of the land to any third
party, he should not be evicted. It is true that continuing
possession by the tenant is an important factor, as it shows that he
did not sublet or abandon the land. But mere possession is not
enough. The objective of the Tenancy Act is not just to protect
possession, but to ensure active cultivation. So, even if no sub-
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letting took place, the tenant is still expected to cultivate the land.
The absence of a third party may save him from the charge of sub-
letting under Section 27, but it does not automatically excuse non-
cultivation under Section 32R.
52. On the other hand, the argument of the respondent that any
instance of non-cultivation should directly result in eviction is also
not acceptable. If such a strict view is adopted, then even if the
land is kept fallow for one season due to genuine reasons like
illness or poor rainfall, the tenant would face eviction unless the
Collector condones the lapse. This would make the law extremely
harsh and would discourage genuine farmers from facing any risk
or difficulty. It is unlikely that the legislature ever intended to evict
a farmer merely because he could not cultivate during a difficult
year. That is precisely why the legislature included a clause
allowing the Collector to condone such failures for “sufficient
reasons”. This ensures that eviction does not happen in cases of
genuine hardship or temporary inability.
53. From the wording of the order, it seems that the ALT treated
any failure to cultivate as enough to evict the tenant. This
approach appears to be legally incorrect. If the legislature had
intended that any failure to cultivate must lead to eviction without
any exception, it would not have included the clause “unless the
Collector condones such failure for sufficient reasons” in Section
32R. In fact, Explanation I to Section 2(6) of the Act states that
even if a person is physically unable, he would still be considered
to be personally cultivating the land if he arranges for it to be
cultivated by hired labour or servants. This shows that the law is
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sensitive to the problems of old or disabled tenants. In the present
case, although the tenant did not make alternative arrangements
for cultivation, it was due to lack of knowledge or financial
capacity. His case cannot be said to be completely hopeless. The
ALT, by evicting him straightaway, deprived him of any chance to
arrange cultivation through family or helpers.
54. Therefore, this Court finds that in the special facts of this
case, simply because the land was left fallow, it was not a strong
enough reason to take away the land from the tenant permanently.
At the very least, the authority was expected to inquire into the
cause of non-cultivation and whether the tenant could resume
cultivation if given help or some time. The Act, in fact, provides
that if land is resumed, the evicted tenant can even be given first
preference to get the land back under Section 32P(2), which
shows that the law does not treat eviction as a punishment but as a
last resort. Although this provision may apply more often to cases
where purchase fails due to technicalities, it shows the spirit of the
law – to avoid eviction unless absolutely necessary.
55. While arriving at this conclusion, this Court does not in any
way dilute the force of Section 32R. It is clear that if a tenant-
purchaser deliberately abandons cultivation and has no valid
justification, then eviction is certainly legal and proper. But where
the failure is due to genuine hardship, such as illness or old age,
and not due to a wilful violation of law, then the authority must
act with fairness and apply its mind to the proportionality of the
action. As observed by the Supreme Court in Amrit Bhikaji Kale,
laws enacted for agrarian reform cannot be allowed to fail because
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of mechanical or overly rigid interpretations.
56. Applying the above legal principles, this Court holds that the
tenant’s non-cultivation of the suit land, in a situation where he
did not misuse it or hand over possession to another, and the fact
that it was due to old age, should not have been treated as a
ground for eviction without exploring other options. It is true that
non-cultivation brought the case within the scope of Section 32R,
but that by itself was not enough to justify eviction in the present
facts. The authority failed to take into account the mitigating
factors. Therefore, although the ground of non-cultivation was
factually made out, the decision to evict the tenant was not legally
sustainable, because relevant factors were ignored.
57. Having said so, the Court must now also examine whether
the procedure followed in passing the eviction order was fair and
in accordance with the principles of natural justice – because even
if the ground was legally valid, the order may still be set aside if
passed in breach of fair procedure.
Procedural Fairness and Natural Justice in the 1975 Proceedings:
58. It is a basic rule of law that even in cases where the law
provides for a quick inquiry, especially in matters where serious
consequences like taking away someone’s land are involved, the
affected person must be given a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Tenancy Act, although it creates simple and informal forums
like Mamlatdars and Tribunals, does not do away with the
principles of natural justice. In fact, Section 32P(1) of the Act
clearly mentions that a “formal inquiry” must be held before
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passing any order to resume the land. A formal inquiry means that
the concerned person should be informed of the reasons or
allegations, should be allowed to give his explanation, and should
have an opportunity to produce evidence or statements in his
support.
59. From the record of the year 1975, only two documents are
available – the tenant’s statement and the final order. From this,
the following can be understood: the tenant was present before the
authority, which suggests that he was informed to appear. He gave
a statement admitting that he had not cultivated the land because
he was unable to do so due to loans. Immediately after this, the
order was passed, cancelling his rights. There is nothing to show
that the matter was postponed or that the tenant was given a
chance to bring proof or give more explanation. There is also no
sign that he was informed about the legal impact of his admission
or that he could ask for time or legal help.
60. I must now decide whether this process followed the
principles of natural justice. Considering that the tenant was an
old and uneducated farmer with no legal aid, the officer had a
greater duty to act carefully and fairly. The law itself recognizes
that such persons are vulnerable. The Supreme Court in Amrit
Bhikaji Kale has clearly held that poor tenants may unknowingly
make statements that go against their legal rights because of lack
of legal knowledge. In that case, the Court stated that the goal of
agrarian reforms must not be defeated by such uninformed
admissions.
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61. In this case, although there was no private landlord
influencing the tenant, the problem of lack of understanding still
existed. The tenant was standing alone before a legal authority,
without knowing the law properly. The officer should have
explained to him that not cultivating the land could result in losing
it. The officer should have asked whether the tenant had any
reason for not cultivating or whether he intended to resume it
later, and told him that if he had a good reason, the law allowed
the Collector to excuse him. Ideally, the officer should have also
advised the tenant to take legal help, seeing the seriousness of the
matter. But from the available record, none of this appears to have
been done. The entire process seems to have been completed in
just one sitting.
62. Moreover, even if the tenant’s statement is treated as a
voluntary surrender of rights, then the safeguards under Section
15 of the Tenancy Act should have been applied in a similar way.
Section 15 requires the Mamlatdar to ensure that such surrender is
genuinely voluntary and in the interest of the tenant. So, when an
old tenant says he cannot cultivate and doesn’t object, the
authority must confirm that he is not saying this out of ignorance
or confusion. There is no sign that any such verification was done
in 1975. Taking a statement from a person who doesn’t understand
the consequences and treating it as surrender is against the
protective nature of tenancy law.
63. The respondents argued that the tenant never objected or
asked for time, and so it should be taken that he agreed to the
order. But this argument misses the main point, if a person does
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not know his rights, then his silence or failure to object cannot be
treated as consent. The Supreme Court in Kale has clearly said that
a tenant’s statement giving up possession should not be taken
seriously if it was made in ignorance of legal rights. In the present
case also, the tenant probably did not know that even if he was
personally unable to cultivate, he could still retain the land by
making alternate arrangements or by seeking time or help.
64. Another important point is the speed with which the order
was passed, the statement and the order were done almost
immediately, which shows there was no real consideration of the
facts. Following the principles of natural justice does not just mean
ticking off a few formalities. It includes a duty to take a fair and
balanced decision. The order in this case simply mentions that the
land was not cultivated, and therefore action was taken. This
shows that the decision might have been taken in advance, without
a real hearing.
65. This Court finds that the proceedings of 1975 were not
conducted in a fair manner and violated the principles of natural
justice. The tenant’s age, lack of education, and absence of legal
help were important aspects that were ignored. The inquiry
appears to have been done only for formality’s sake and did not
ensure that the tenant’s legal rights were explained to him or that
he was given a real chance to put forth his case. Therefore, I hold
that the way in which the tenant’s eviction was ordered does not
meet the standard of a “formal inquiry” under Section 32P(1) and
fails the test of fairness in law. On this ground alone, the 1975
order deserves to be set aside. However, since there are additional
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points which also support this conclusion, I will proceed to
consider those as well.
The Tenant’s Statement: Admissibility and Legal Effect:
66. The most important document in the record of the year 1975
is the tenant’s own statement. In that statement, he admitted that
the land was lying uncultivated and that due to his old age, he was
unable to cultivate it. Although he did not directly say that he had
no objection to the land being taken away, the authorities seem to
have interpreted his words in that way. At this stage, it is necessary
to consider the legal nature of this statement. Was it merely an
admission of fact? Or was it a waiver of rights? Or a consent to
pass an order against him? Even if it is treated as any of these, the
question remains whether it is legally binding. In law, an
admission about a fact such as “I have not cultivated the land for
some years” is relevant and may be treated as final if not
withdrawn. In this case, the non-cultivation of land was anyway
visible and true. Hence, the tenant’s statement only helped the
authority avoid the task of proving that the land was uncultivated.
However, the real concern arises when I look at whether the
statement should be treated as an acceptance of legal
consequences. The tenant never clearly said that he wished to
surrender the land. Despite this, both the authority and the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (MRT) treated the statement as
though the tenant had willingly given up his rights.
67. It is a well-settled principle that no one can be stopped from
claiming a legal right given by law merely because of a statement
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made in the past. There can be no estoppel against a statute. If a
law has given a person a right particularly a right created in public
interest then that right cannot be taken away just because the
person says he doesn’t want it. The Bombay Tenancy Act gave
ownership rights to tenants to achieve the goal of land reform. If a
tenant says “I don’t want the land” or “I can’t cultivate it,” that
may give the authorities a reason to take some action, but it does
not take away the right unless the procedure and conditions under
the law are satisfied. In Amrit Bhikaji Kale, even when the tenant
had clearly agreed to hand over possession, the Supreme Court
held that such a statement alone was not enough to take away the
tenant’s rights under the Act. The Apex Court did not treat the
tenant’s statement as legally significant and restored the tenant’s
rights. This judgment is an important reminder that such
statements must be examined with great care and cannot be
treated as final unless they are made freely and with full
understanding.
68. One may ask whether the tenant’s statement was given
voluntarily. On the face of it, there was no physical force used. But
real voluntariness means making an informed and conscious
choice. If someone says something because they believe they have
no other option, or they do not know their legal rights, such a
statement cannot be called voluntary. It is more like giving in to
authority. Looking at the record, the tenant’s statement seems
more like an expression of helplessness .
69. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, in its 2019 decision,
appears to have placed great reliance on the tenant’s statement.
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With respect, this approach does not appear to be legally sound. In
proceedings of a quasi-judicial nature, especially when they
involve ordinary farmers or laypersons, their statements must be
understood in context. Here, the tenant was an old farmer stating
a simple fact about his condition. It was not a legal submission or a
negotiated compromise. It is important to note that the
Agricultural Lands Tribunal (ALT) did not rely solely on this
statement to pass its order. The statement only supported the
factual finding that the land was not being cultivated. Therefore,
the role of the statement was limited to providing evidence of non-
cultivation. If it is being considered as a consent to eviction, I am
of the view that it was not an informed consent and hence cannot
be treated as binding. In the interest of justice, the petitioner
cannot be penalised merely because the tenant acted with
apparent honesty.
70. It is true that admissions made by parties during court
proceedings can be binding. But such admissions are generally
made by parties who are represented by legal counsel or who
make clear concessions. In this case, the so-called admission was
made by an unrepresented person who was simply stating his
difficulty. To treat it as a legal admission would be unfair.
71. The Supreme Court in Amrit Bhikaji Kale has also warned
that such statements may be the result of undue influence or
difficult circumstances. The Court strongly held that legal rights
cannot be lost in such a manner. The present case also requires the
same caution.
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72. Therefore, though the tenant’s 1975 statement is admissible
to prove that he was not cultivating the land, it cannot by itself
take away his legal rights or justify his eviction. It was not a clear
or unconditional surrender of the land. Even if one were to treat it
as a surrender, it was not a conscious or informed act. In the eyes
of law, such a statement cannot override the statutory protections
provided to the tenant. This Court holds that the reliance placed
on the tenant’s statement for eviction was legally incorrect. The
statement should have either been disregarded for deciding the
tenant’s ultimate rights or, at the very least, should not have
replaced the legal inquiry required under the Act — including
consideration of whether the delay in cultivation should be
excused. In short, the statement cannot cure or validate the
otherwise defective eviction order.
Finality of the 1975 Order and Effect of Delay (Laches):
73. The next issue to be considered is the question of delay. It is
true that the order passed in the year 1975 is being challenged
after several decades, and such long delay normally raises the
issue of laches (unexplained delay), which courts generally do not
encourage, as it affects settled legal positions and makes it difficult
to trace evidence. However, this is not an ordinary civil dispute
between two private parties where strict limitation laws apply. This
case involves the implementation of a welfare statute and the
rights of a person belonging to a weaker section of society. It is
important to note that in the year 2013, the petitioner had filed for
condonation of delay, and the Appellate Authority allowed the
delay to be condoned. That order condoning the delay has not
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been challenged by the respondents and, therefore, has attained
finality. As a result, under the scheme of the relevant statute, the
petitioner’s challenge to the 1975 order cannot be rejected merely
on the ground of delay or limitation.
74. Moreover, considering the nature of the rights involved in
this matter and the apparent illegality in the original order, this is
a case where the general principle that quasi-judicial orders attain
finality must give way to the higher principle of doing substantive
justice. Mere passage of time does not have the effect of validating
an order which was otherwise illegal in its origin. Hence, this
Court is inclined to decide the matter based on its merits, rather
than dismissing it only because of the delay.
Applicability of Precedents – Amrut Bhikaji Kale and Others:
75. The facts of this case cannot be fully understood without
referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Amrut Bhikaji Kale
(Supra), decided in 1983. In that case, the tenant Janardhan had
become a deemed purchaser on 1st April 1957. However, due to
confusion (such as a mistaken belief that the landlord was a
minor), the process of purchase was not completed. Later, the
landlord filed an eviction case on the ground of default in payment
of rent. In those proceedings, Janardhan stated that he was old,
could not cultivate, and had no objection to giving up possession.
On this basis, the authority passed an eviction order, and the
landlord took back the land. Years later, Janardhan’s son
challenged this, and the Supreme Court held that Janardhan had
already become owner on 1st April 1957, and that all further
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proceedings, including his statement and the eviction order, were
legally invalid. The Court made it clear that the so-called
“surrender” in 1967 had no legal effect because the law had
already conferred ownership on him, and he had likely acted
without knowing his rights or under pressure. The Court also
referred to the legal principle that a person cannot be allowed to
give up the protection given under a beneficial law. The tenant’s
ownership was restored, and the Court rejected the objections of
delay and finality.
76. The present case has many similarities with the Kale case:
here also we have an old tenant, a statement about inability to
cultivate, a summary eviction, a long delay, and legal action by the
legal heirs to reclaim the land. However, some differences were
noted by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (MRT) in its 2019
decision, which the respondents have also highlighted. In Kale, the
eviction was under Sections 14 and 29 of the Act based on rent
default. But these provisions were not applicable after 1957
because the tenancy had already ended with the deemed purchase.
Therefore, the authority in that case had no jurisdiction at all. In
contrast, in the present case, the eviction was under Sections 32P
and 32R of the Tenancy Act, which are applicable after 1957.
Hence, if the conditions under those sections were satisfied, the
authority had legal power. In Kale, the landlord had allegedly
misled the tenant by falsely claiming to be a minor to delay the
tenant’s purchase and manipulated the process. In this case, there
is no such misrepresentation by a private party; the action was
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willing to pay the purchase price. In the present case, the price was
paid and certificate under Section 32 M was issued. Hence present
case stands on the better footing.
77. Even with these differences, the key principle from Kale
applies here as well: Agrarian reform laws meant to benefit
farmers cannot be defeated by technicalities or improper
processes. The tenant’s statutory rights cannot be lost just because
he made a statement without proper legal understanding. The
Supreme Court in Kale clearly held that once the legal conditions
for deemed purchase are fulfilled, the tenant’s ownership is
protected except in a few limited situations. Any action to take
back land from the tenant must be strictly as per the law;
otherwise, it is void. Therefore, this is a case of a statutory owner
being dispossessed by an illegal process, which is exactly what the
Supreme Court disapproved of in Kale.
78. The Supreme Court’s observations in Kale about the tenant’s
statement are directly relevant here and need to be recalled again:
“We are not unaware… legally protected interest. A measure of
agrarian reform cannot be permitted to be defeated by such
devious means…” In the present case, even if the State’s action is
not called devious, the outcome was that a beneficial scheme
meant to give land to the tiller was undermined because the tenant
was unaware of his rights, and the authority acted in undue haste.
The spirit of the Kale judgment clearly applies.
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79. In Anna Bhau Magdum v. Babasaheb Anandrao Desai ,
(1995) 5 SCC 243, the Supreme Court had distinguished Kale. In
Anna Bhau, the tenant had failed to take necessary steps to
exercise his purchase rights, especially because the landlord was a
minor on Tiller’s Day. The tenant argued that a minor procedural
lapse should not deprive him of the land. But the Supreme Court
did not agree. It held that Kale was different because in Kale, the
tenant had already become owner since the landlord had no legal
disability. But in Anna Bhau, the landlord’s minority postponed the
sale, and the tenant had a duty to give notice under Section
32F(1A), which he failed to do. Hence, the right of ownership
never arose. This difference is legally sound: Kale was about
enforcing a vested right, while Anna Bhau was about not granting
a right because the required conditions were not fulfilled.
80. Applying the legal position discussed above, the question
arises whether the tenant had acquired ownership rights in the
present case. The answer is yes. On 1st April 1957, the tenant
became a deemed purchaser under the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act because he was issued a certificate under
Section 32M. Therefore, just like in the case of Amrut Bhikaji Kale,
ownership rights had vested in the tenant. The core issue in this
case is whether those vested rights were lawfully taken away in the
year 1975. This is different from the case of Anna Bhau, where the
right had not vested at all due to a statutory requirement not being
fulfilled. Therefore, the judgment in Anna Bhau does not weaken
the petitioner’s case; in fact, by contrast, it strengthens the
principle that once a right vests in a tenant, it cannot be taken
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away unless the law clearly permits it. Though Section 32R of the
Act allows cancellation of ownership for failure to cultivate
personally, such cancellation must be strictly in accordance with
prescribed legal procedure and conditions, which, as discussed
earlier, were not followed in this case. Hence, the result in this
matter is aligned with the conclusion reached in Kale.
81. No other judgment directly covering these facts has been
cited before this Court. However, it is a well-accepted principle in
tenancy law that the relevant statutes are meant to protect tenants.
Therefore, in case of any doubt or when procedural rules are
involved, such provisions must be interpreted in a manner
favourable to the tenant so that the object of the law — land
reforms and security of tenure — is not defeated.
82. In summary of legal precedents, the judgment in Amrut
Bhikaji Kale is highly relevant and persuasive in the present case. I
find no reason to take a different view from the one taken by the
Supreme Court on similar facts. The Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal’s (MRT) decision to disregard the law laid down in Kale
appears to be unjustified. The judgment in Kale reminds us that
tenants must not be deprived of their rights due to technicalities or
unintentional statements made without proper legal
understanding.
83. On careful reading, I find that the MRT committed an error
of law. It failed to appreciate that the proceedings of 1975 were
conducted in breach of principles of natural justice and did not
properly consider that the tenant was not legally represented. The
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MRT assumed that the mere presence of the tenant and his
statement in 1975 made the proceedings valid. However, it did not
consider whether the hearing was fair in substance. The MRT also
applied the requirement of “personal cultivation” in an overly strict
manner. It treated the fact of non-cultivation as a ground sufficient
in itself to cancel ownership, without considering whether the
lapse could be condoned. It thus failed to apply the binding
principles laid down by the Supreme Court. This is a serious legal
error. Further, the MRT gave undue importance to the delay in
challenging the 1975 order, even though the delay had already
been condoned. Some of its remarks indirectly revived the issue of
delay, which is not permissible once condonation is granted. The
Tribunal should have only examined the case on its merits.
84. On merits, the MRT accepted that the tenant’s statement in
1975 was voluntary. For reasons already explained, I am unable to
agree with this conclusion. The MRT did not examine whether the
tenant truly understood his legal rights. It assumed, without proof,
that the tenant had intended to surrender the land. In the facts of
the case, no reasonable tribunal properly instructed in law would
have drawn such a conclusion. If such an order were to be upheld,
it would set a dangerous precedent — that even an uneducated or
ill-informed tenant’s brief statement could lead to loss of valuable
land rights without any legal safeguard. This would be contrary to
the pro-tenant approach adopted consistently in tenancy law in
Maharashtra.
85. Therefore, I hold that the decision of the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal dated 17th July 2019 is legally incorrect and
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cannot be sustained. The MRT failed to properly exercise its
jurisdiction, overlooked clear legal errors, and misapplied the
settled position of law. Hence, this Court is justified in exercising
its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India to interfere with the said order.
86. In conclusion, this Court finds that the eviction order passed
against the tenant (the petitioner’s predecessor) on 21st February
1975 was unlawful and cannot be upheld. The order was based on
a wrong interpretation of Sections 32P and 32R of the Act. The so-
called voluntary statement of the tenant ought not to have been
used to take away his ownership. The long delay in filing the
petition has already been explained, condoned, and the
condonation has become final. Therefore, it cannot now be used to
deny relief.
87. The Supreme Court’s judgment in Amrut Bhikaji Kale (1983)
directly applies to the present case. The tenant’s ownership on
Tillers’ Day was a vested right that could not be taken away based
on procedural lapses or statements made without proper
understanding. The decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal
passed in 2019, which upheld the eviction, is legally flawed and
deserves to be quashed and set aside.
88. Accordingly, both the petitions are allowed. The impugned
judgment and order dated 17th July 2019 passed by the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application Nos.4 of
2017 and 7 of 2017, respectively is hereby set aside.
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89. In result, both the petitions are allowed in the above terms.
Rule is made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
90. In view of disposal of writ petitions, all pending interlocutory
application(s) stand disposed of.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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