Shri. Protarsius Bula vs State Of Meghalaya on 8 August, 2025

August 9, 2025

Meghalaya High Court

Shri. Protarsius Bula vs State Of Meghalaya on 8 August, 2025

1. Judgment and Order dated 27.02.2024 passed in Sessions Case
No. 20 of 2016 by the learned District and Sessions Judge, West Khasi
Hills District, Nongstoin by which the appellants herein stood convicted
for an offence under section 302 and section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) and were made to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with
respective fine of ₹ 5000/-, in default thereof, to further undergo simple
imprisonment of one month vide sentencing order dated 05.03.2024 is
under challenge herein in this appeal filed by all the convicts in the case.

2. The background details of the case is that on 04.10.2011, Shri
Ismer Sangriang and Shri Binsen Synshiang lodged an FIR with the
Officer Incharge, Riangdo Out Post, West Khasi Hills District informing
him that on 02.10.2011, eight persons, whose names were noted in the
said FIR had assaulted Nicholas Sangriang out of personal reasons,
whereupon he was taken to Sonapahar CHC and from there he was
referred to Civil Hospital Shillong, but he succumbed to his injuries on
04.10.2011 at about 12.30 pm.

3. On receipt of the said FIR, a criminal case was registered as
Nongstoin P.S. Case No. 127(10) of 2011 under section 302/34 IPC and
investigation was duly initiated. The Investigating Officer, on
completion of the investigation has then filed the charge sheet dated
09.05.2012 with a finding that the deceased victim Nicholas Sangriang
who was the Headman and Chairman, VEC Porshken Village was
persuaded to attend a meeting convened by some villagers of Porshken
Village, who are workers under the NREGS Scheme of 100 days’ work

3
2025:MLHC:710-DB

at the compound of Shri Binsen Synshiang, Secretary, VEC. The
meeting was to discuss the allegations made against the deceased victim
that he has misappropriated the labour cost of the workers by disbursing
only a part of such amount to them. In course of such meeting, there
arose a heated altercation between the parties and in the process, some
of those present, assaulted and beat up the deceased victim rendering
him unconscious until the villagers of Mawsmai Village intervened. He
was then shifted to Civil Hospital, Shillong where he succumbed to his
injuries on 04.10.2011 at about 12.30 pm. The IO has then opined that a
prima facie case under section 302/34 IPC is made out against those
arrested in the case and they are made to stand trial before the competent
court of jurisdiction for the same.

4. In course of trial, the learned Sessions Judge, West Khasi Hills
District, Nongstoin has examined 8 prosecution witnesses and has
caused 4 documents to be exhibited as well as 3 material exhibits
produced before the court and after the recording of the evidence of the
witnesses etc., the accused persons therein were made to give their
statement or reply in terms of the provision of section 313 Cr.P.C. and
thereafter, on no witnesses being examined on the part of the said
accused persons, the learned Trial Court heard the argument of both
sides and has then passed the judgment and order dated 27.02.2024
finding the accused persons guilty of the offences charged and has
accordingly, convicted them by imposing a sentence of life
imprisonment together with fine of ₹ 5000/- each. Hence this appeal.

2025:MLHC:710-DB

5. We have heard the argument of Mr. H.R. Nath, learned counsel
for the appellants who has started his submission by detailing the facts
of the case as was depicted hereinabove.

6. The first limb of the argument of the learned counsel is that the
inquest being considered as preliminary investigation does not reflect
the actual cause of death of the victim as to the manner and the weapon
or instruments employed for such injuries to be inflicted. The same not
being in conformity with the provision of section 174 Cr.P.C, such
inquest report cannot be considered as proved by the prosecution. Also
the fact that the said inquest was conducted at the morgue of the Civil
Hospital, Shillong by one S.I. P. Nongrum who was on duty at the Police
Assistance Booth within the Civil Hospital, that too without the presence
of any of the police officers from the concerned police station or any
Magistrate, except three witnesses, that the said S.I. P. Nongrum was not
even cited as a witness in the case to prove such inquest report has also
rendered such evidence unreliable, further submits the learned counsel.

7. Continuing on this point, the learned counsel has submitted that
the prosecution witnesses has deposed in court that the injured victim
was first taken to Sonapahar CHC at about 7:00 pm on 02.10.2011 where
he could not be treated and therefore, he was referred to Shillong Civil
Hospital and was admitted on the same night where he succumbed to his
injuries on 04.10.2011. This too, could not be proved by valid
documents such as the admission or discharge slip or even the death
certificate which were never produced in evidence. This goes to show
that there is doubt if the victim was ever taken to Sonapahar CHC or
even to the Civil Hospital, Shillong.

2025:MLHC:710-DB

8. The veracity of the FIR was also doubted by the appellants
wherein it was pointed out that the written FIR was dated 04.10.2011,
GD Entry was made on 05.10.2011 and the same was registered on
07.10.2011 as it was noted that the FIR was received on that date at 2:00
pm. The delay in filing the said FIR was not explained nor was the
Officer who has registered the FIR ever examined in Court, submits the
learned counsel.

9. As to the seizure of the weapons used for committing the
offence, the learned counsel has submitted that the Investigating Officer
(IO) in his deposition as PW-8 has stated that on being directed, he has
taken up the investigation of the case on 06.10.2011 and the complainant
Shri Binsen Synshiang (PW-2) has produced and handed over one
bamboo stick, one wooden stick and one shirt reportedly belonging to
the deceased victim, which articles were seized in the presence of seizure
witnesses.

10. However, it is the submission of the learned counsel that
although in evidence, PW-2 has deposed that the police had visited the
place of occurrence and had seized some materials in his presence, the
same being one wooden log and one wooden stick as well as one black
shirt with stripe, on such items being exhibited in court as Material
Exhibit-I, II and III respectively, he accordingly identified the same.
The IO has also identified the wooden stick and wooden bamboo, but as
for the shirt, he said that it was a navy blue and white stripe shirt,
therefore there is discrepancy in the evidence of PW-2 and PW-8 in this
regard.

2025:MLHC:710-DB

11. Further, the learned counsel has submitted that even the second
seizure witness who was examined as PW-3, in his deposition has stated
that he did not see when the police seized the Material Exhibits I, II and
III. The said material exhibits were also not shown to the other
prosecution witnesses who are said to be eye witnesses to the incident.
Also the fact that there was no FSL report to determine any blood stains
etc. in the seized materials as admittedly, the IO has deposed that the
same were not sent for forensic examination as many of the witnesses
have touched or removed them, the same would only prove that the
prosecution has not been able to link the seized materials with the
appellants as the cause of the commission of the alleged offence.

12. Coming to the Post Mortem Report, exhibited as Exhibit-4, the
learned counsel has submitted that from the evidence of PW-4, the
Doctor who has conducted the post mortem, he has deposed that the
cause of death was due to shock and internal haemorrhage caused by
head injuries inflicted upon by a blunt object, but the seized material in
this regard were never shown to this witness to prove the cause of such
injuries. Furthermore, the doctor has also given his opinion that the death
of the victim might have occurred within 24 hours from the date of post
mortem examination, However, this does not prove as to when and
where the victim died as the body was found in the morgue of the Civil
Hospital Shillong, submits the learned counsel.

13. On the evidentiary value of the evidence of the witnesses
produced by the prosecution, the learned counsel has submitted that PW-
1 is the maternal uncle of the deceased and he was informed of the

7
2025:MLHC:710-DB

incident by PW-2. He has however admitted that he is not an eye-witness
to the incident and he did not say anything as regard the seized materials.

14. On the evidence of PW-2 who was the Secretary of the VEC at
that time and who was also alleged to have misappropriated the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), the learned counsel
has submitted that this witness has handed over the seized materials to
the IO from his custody which he kept in his house for four days and as
such his evidence in this regard is not trustworthy.

15. As to the evidence of PW-3, the learned counsel has contended
that this witness is not an eye-witness to the incident. PW-4 who is the
wife of PW-2 also did not say anything about the seized materials.
Nothing is required to be said about the evidence of PW-5 who is the
doctor who had conducted the post-mortem.

16. On PW-6, it is submitted that he is the brother-in-law of the
victim and in his cross examination he has stated that he has mentioned
the name of all the accused persons as they are job card holders and
further that he has come to depose before the court to help the victim.
Even the wife of the victim who was examined as PW-7, in her
deposition has admitted that it was the Secretary (PW-2) who has
mentioned the names of the accused persons as those persons who have
assaulted her husband, as such, her evidence is also hearsay evidence
and cannot be relied upon.

17. Another line of argument canvassed by the learned counsel for
the appellant is on the applicability of the ingredients of Section 34 IPC
when it is submitted that for the application of Section 34 to the case in

8
2025:MLHC:710-DB

hand as far as the appellants/accused persons are concerned common
intention to commit the act has to be brought out by evidence. The
prosecution has not been able to bring on record that there was a prior
meeting of minds and common intention among the appellants for
commission of the said offence, as such, they cannot be held guilty of
the alleged offence jointly and severally. In this regard, the case of Balu
@ Bal Subramaniam & Anr. v. State (U.T. Pondicherry), (2016) 15 SCC
471, para 17 has been relied upon by the learned counsel wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that for conviction of an offence read
with Section 34 IPC it is necessary that there should be finding as to the
common intention of the participants.

18. In view of the discrepancies and failure of the prosecution to link
the death of the alleged victim with the appellants, the impugned
judgment and sentence is liable to be set aside and the appellants be set
at liberty submits the learned counsel.

19. Per contra, Mr. K. Khan, learned P.P while defending the order
of conviction and the sentence passed thereto has submitted that on the
FIR being registered as a police case and the IO after investigation has
filed the charge sheet on 09.05.2012, finding a well-established prima
facie case against the accused persons therein, out of all the accused
persons including the appellants herein, two accused persons namely
Balantin Synshiang had expired on 29.01.2018 and Justin Chirang had
expired on 13.09.2018 as such, the case against them stands abated.

20. It is also submitted that to prove the charges framed against the
appellants/accused persons, the prosecution has relied on the deposition
of eight prosecution witnesses and four material exhibits as well as four

9
2025:MLHC:710-DB

documents which includes the FIR, Inquest Report, Seizure List and
Post Mortem Report. Of the prosecution witnesses, PW-1, PW-2, PW-4
and PW-6 are eye-witnesses to the incident and the material exhibits
have also been proved before the court by PW-2 and PW-8. Such
evidence tendered by the prosecution witnesses have remained unshaken
and could not be contradicted or disproved, the admissible evidence of
the prosecution being true and duly corroborated, the same stood proven
beyond reasonable doubt, for which the learned Trial Court is justified
in passing the impugned order of conviction and sentence.

21. The learned P.P has submitted that the prosecution’s case rests
on the strength of the evidence of the eye-witnesses who have in effect,
proved the fact that the victim was assaulted by the appellants herein
leading to his sustaining severe injuries and on being referred to the Civil
Hospital, he succumbed to his injuries therein.

22. It is also the submission of the learned P.P that the evidence of
PW-2 in particular has answered all the relevant questions as to the place
of occurrence, the motive of the assault, the actual act of assault and the
result of the said assault leading to the death of the victim, all being
perpetrated by the appellants herein.

23. Taking this Court to the evidence of PW-2, the learned P.P has
submitted that in his deposition, this witness has stated that in the month
of October, 2011 he was holding the post of Secretary, VEC while the
victim was the Chairman. “…On the day of the incident it was a Sunday
the job card holders which included all the accused persons along with
three others called for a meeting at my compound without the knowledge
of the chairman (victim) and the secretary in connection with the

10
2025:MLHC:710-DB

NREGS schemes of the job card holders to the effect that they have not
received the said money as the chairman had misappropriate.”. A-3,
Shri. Justin Chiran forced the Chairman (victim) to attend the said
meeting even though it was a Sunday to which he has to comply and
accordingly attended the meeting at the compound of the house of this
witness. In course of the meeting, the accused persons (appellants)
manhandled and assaulted the Chairman and in the melee, they got one
stick and bamboo and hit him on the head whereupon he fell down on
the ground. This witness tried to help the victim but the accused persons
also tried to assault him and he escaped and ran away to Mawsmai
Village.

24. The learned P.P has then submitted that thereafter PW-2
informed Shri. Ismer Sangriang (PW-1) about the incident and along
with some villagers of Mawsmai Village they proceeded to the place of
occurrence where the victim was still found lying on the ground. On the
advice of the Sirdar of Nonglang the victim was taken to Riangdo CHC
where they were informed that he could not be treated there and
therefore they had to take him to Civil Hospital, Shillong for treatment
but on 04.10.2011 he succumbed to his injuries at the said hospital,
whereupon the inquest and the post mortem was also conducted at the
said hospital.

25. This witness has further stated that it was he and PW-1 (Shri.
Ismer Sangriang) who had gone to the Riangdo Police Outpost to file
the complaint following which, the police visited the place of occurrence
and seized the weapons used for the murder from his (PW-2) possession.

2025:MLHC:710-DB

26. The learned P.P has again submitted that the evidence of PW-2
was further strengthened and corroborated by the deposition of PW-6
who has also witnessed the entire incident where the accused persons
were seen to have assaulted the deceased victim with a wooden and
bamboo log.

27. PW-4, Smti. Justina Sangriang is the wife of PW-2 and she too,
has deposed that on the day of the incident at about 6:30 pm she was in
the kitchen when she heard a lot of people shouting and screaming and
when she came out of the kitchen, she witnessed the victim being beaten
up by the accused persons whom she had identified by their respective
names. She had tried to rescue the victim but she was also assaulted on
the head. This witness has also stated that her husband PW-2 fled from
the scene to Mawsmai Village and later came back with some villagers
where they saw the victim lying on the ground. The weapon of assault
which includes the bamboo and wooden log were also at the place of
occurrence.

28. To confirm the fact that the victim died as a result of the assault
perpetrated by the accused persons/appellants, the learned P.P has
referred to the evidence of PW-5 who is the doctor who had conducted
the post mortem examination. In his evidence this witness has given a
detailed description of the injuries present in the body of the deceased
and has also stated that “Detailed description of injuries are (L) dead
body belong to a male adult person in rigor mortis. He sustained injuries
on the head caused by blunt object. The injuries are ante mortem in
nature.

2025:MLHC:710-DB

In my opinion, the cause of death was due to shock and internal
hemorrhage caused head injury.”

29. As to the production of the seized weapon used for the assault
on the victim, the learned P.P has submitted that PW-2 in his evidence
has stated that “The police visited the P.O and they seized some articles
in front of me. The seized articles are produce in Court today from the
Court’s Malkhana….” “…Mat- Ext-I is one wooden log, Mat- Ext-II
one bamboo log and Mat- Ext-III one black shirt with stripe belonging
to the victim…”. He further stated that he has appended his signature on
the seizure list which was exhibited as Exhibit-P-3. This piece of
evidence was corroborated by the IO who has deposed as PW-8 when
he said that “…the complainant Shri Binsen Shynshiang produced and
handed over one bamboo stick, one wooden stick and one shirt which
was reportedly belong to the deceased late Nikholas Sangriang which
was accordingly seized by me in the presence of available witnesses…”.

“On being shown to me the materials exhibits seized as per exhibit-P-3
I confirmed that Mat-Ext-I is one wooden log/stick, Mat-Ext-II is one
bamboo log/stick an Mat-Ext-III is the torn navy blue and white stripe
shirt which has come off from the body of the deceased…”

30. The learned P.P has submitted that though one of the seizure
witness PW-3 has stated in court that “I did not see when the police
seized the Mat-Ext-I, Mat-Ext-II and Mat-Ext-III.”, it is however a
settled position of law that if seizure material has been proved by the IO,
minor irregularity, if any, by seizure witness will not disprove the case
of prosecution as fatal. The case of Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan,
(1978) 4 SCC 435, para 9 has been referred to in this regard.

2025:MLHC:710-DB

31. The next line of argument advanced by the learned P.P is on the
issue of motive when it was submitted that as far as the motive for the
murder of the deceased victim is concerned the prosecution through the
evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-6 and PW-8 have clearly
proved the motive of the accused persons/appellants to kill the deceased.
Even otherwise, assuming but not admitting the absence of motive in
murder cases, it is a settled position of law that motive is irrelevant
where there is direct evidence and eye-witnesses to connect to the
accused persons with the commission of murder, submits the learned
P.P. The case of Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal, (2010)
12 SCC 91, para 24 was relied upon to prove this point.

32. Upon hearing such submission, it is to be mentioned herein that
this is a case where the punishment for an offence under Section 302
IPC entails a sentence of life imprisonment, where, concerning a citizen
of this country, who is entitled to certain rights, particularly fundamental
rights, for example the right to life and liberty, the same has to be
minutely examined to ensure that it has been rendered in accordance
with law, applying the principle of criminal jurisprudence judiciously.

33. The facts and circumstances of this case has been brought out in
the preceding paragraphs hereinabove and would be referred to only if
necessary. Suffice it to say that the case of the prosecution is that an
assault has taken place involving a particular individual, the same being
perpetrated by the accused persons/appellants herein. The outcome of
such an assault was the ultimate demise of the victim. On the police
being informed by way of an FIR, after investigation it was found fit to
book the appellants under the relevant provision of law. Thereafter, on

14
2025:MLHC:710-DB

conclusion of the trial it was established and proved that the appellants
are guilty of the offence alleged and due to the severity of the said
offence wherein murder is involved, the appellants were found liable for
punishment under section 302 IPC and also jointly liable for such act,
thereby, attracting the provision of section 34 IPC.

34. On perusal of the relevant records, the memo of appeal including
the impugned judgment and sentence what is significant is that the
factum of the occurrence of the incident involving the appellants herein
and the deceased victim, Nicholas Sangriang at the PO, which is the
compound of the house of PW-2 has not been denied by the appellants
in evidence. There is no plea of alibi raised and established in this case.

35. It is also on record that initially, there are 8 accused persons who
are brought to trial in this case, however, in the midst thereof, two of the
accused persons, Justin Chirang and Balantin Synshiang had expired on
13.09.2013 and 29.01.2018 respectively, thereby necessitating an order
of abatement of the case as against such accused persons.

36. From the deposition of PW-2, it is understood that on the day of
the incident being a Sunday, the job card holders which included the
appellants herein along with three others had called for a meeting at his
compound, the purpose of the said meeting was to demand an
explanation from the Chairman/deceased victim as regard the allegation
of misappropriation of the money due and entitled to the job card holders
under the NREGS scheme.

37. Apparently, the deceased victim was forced to attend the meeting
by one of the accused persons, Justin Chirang (since deceased). Again,

15
2025:MLHC:710-DB

in the midst of the meeting, there arose heated discussions and
deliberations which eventually resulted in a fist fight between the
deceased victim and those who are opposing him. In course of the
fighting, the deceased victim was hit on the head by one wooden stick
and bamboo stick as a consequence of which he fell to the ground
severely injured. It was PW-1 and PW-2 along with all the appellants
who then took the victim to Riangdo CHC.

38. This vital piece of evidence, that is, that the deceased victim was
seriously injured as a result of such assault and that he was taken to the
Riangdo CHC by PW-1, PW-2 and others including the accused
persons/appellants has not been able to be contradicted or refuted in the
cross examination of PW-2. Further, as has been pointed out by the
learned P.P, the evidence of PW-6, Shri. Stephan Langsah is also
material inasmuch as this witness in his deposition has clearly deposed
that “…It is during that time the crowd has tried to pacify both of them
and Justin Chirang was following from behind and then he hit the
headman Nikholas Sangriang on the head with a bamboo stick and the
headman then collapse on the floor and then Protarsius Bula attack the
headman with a wooden stick. I can identify accused Protarsius Bula by
name and face he is present in the court dock today (witness pointed to
accused Protarsius Bula) while Justin Chirang has already exprired…”

“…The people who were involved in assaulting Nikholas Sangriang are
Justin Chirang, Protarsius Bula, Belantin Shynshiang, Rebe Dkhar,
Tarsis Sangriang, Genes Sangriang, Loris Rongmah and Jerimaia
Miangiong.”. This evidence has not been shaken, when this witness in
his cross examination has reiterated “…It is not a fact that I did not
witness the persons who hit the victim…”

2025:MLHC:710-DB

39. Without going further, only on the basis of such evidence
indicated above, the case of the prosecution is deemed to be well
founded as to the complicity of the accused persons/appellants in the
case and their actual involvement in the assault of the deceased victim.

40. On the objection of the learned counsel for the appellants as to
the fact that there was no proper inquest conducted at the place of death,
it may be mentioned that faulty or even absence of the inquest report
will not be fatal to the prosecution’s case if there are other reliable
evidence to be considered by the court.

41. The factum of death of the victim having been established, let us
now discuss the manner in which such death has occurred. PW-2 and
PW-4 saw the deceased victim being beaten up by the accused persons,
more particularly when PW-4 has even named all of the appellants
herein as the perpetrators of such assault. PW-6 has also deposed that he
saw accused Justin Chirang hit the victim on the head with a bamboo
stick, while the accused Protarsius Bula hit him with a wooden stick.
When confronted in the cross-examination, both PW-4 and PW-6 has
stated that it is not a fact that they did not witness the victim being
assaulted by the accused persons. The testimonies of the above eye-
witnesses are found to be consistent and believable, the degree of
probability is very high in this instance, more so when such evidence has
not been able to dislodge in cross-examination. Therefore, this Court
would hold that the deceased victim was actually assaulted by the
appellants herein at the said place of occurrence, that is, the compound
of the house of PW-2.

2025:MLHC:710-DB

42. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the
prosecution’s version of the chain of events which took place after the
victim was assaulted is not well founded, has also fallen flat in the face
of evidence in that regard which has been proven that he was first taken
to Riangdo CHC as has been stated by PW-2 in his evidence when he
said “…then he advice us to take the victim to Riangdo CHC and all the
accused persons along with us took the victim to the said hospital.” PW-
3, Shri Dinist Dkhar in his deposition has also said “…and thereafter we
along with all the accused persons took the victim to Riangdo CHC.” In
fact, all the accused persons/appellants Rebinus Dkhar, Tarsis
Sangriang, Loris Rongmah, Protarsius Bula, Jeremaia Miangiong and
Gines @ Genesh Sangriang in their respective statement under section
313 Cr.P.C. when confronted about this fact, has replied in the
affirmative. This, therefore, has established the fact that the victim was
injured as a result of such assault and that he was immediately taken to
Riangdo CHC.

43. Thereafter, he was taken to Civil Hospital Shillong for better
treatment. This was confirmed from the evidence of PW-1 who has
stated that “…He was then admitted to Civil Hospital Shillong where he
succumbed to his injuries after two days of the incident i.e on
04.10.2011…”. PW-2 has also corroborated this statement when he has
also stated “…We then took the victim to Civil Hospital, Shillong where
he succumbed to his injuries on 04-10-2011.” PW-6 has further
strengthened this assertion when he too has stated that “Thereafter the
villagers from Mawsmai arrived and carried the victim to Riangdo
hospital and later to Civil Hospital Shillong…” This evidence was also
not refuted by the defence in the cross-examination of the

18
2025:MLHC:710-DB

abovementioned witnesses and as such, the same being unrebutted, it
has passed the scrutiny of law. It can then be said that the victim was
first taken to Riangdo CHC and later to Civil Hospital Shillong where
he succumbed to his injuries on 04.10.2011.

44. The post mortem was conducted at the Civil Hospital Shillong
by PW-5, Dr R.W. Lyngwa and in his evidence, he has given a detailed
account of how the said post mortem was conducted and the findings
thereto, mention is required to be made of the findings as regard the
examination of the ‘Cranium and Spinal Canal’ which reads as follows:

“2. CRANIUM AND SPINAL CANAL:-

1. Scalp, skull, vertebrae- Depressed wound with laceration
over the frontal region on the right side of the scalp, 9 cm above
the right eyebrow size 1.5 cm x 0.5 cm. On opening the scalp
massive hematoma over the right frontal region extending to the
right parietal and right temporal region. Contusion over the
temporal is muscle on the right side. Fracture of the frontal bone,
right side, extending from the right frontal temporal suture is 4
cm long going left ward then going back at an angle and proceed
2 cm posteriorly. On opening of the skull bone, heamatoma over
the right frontal parictal region extending to the right temporal
region. On opening of the dura meter heamatoma on the left
frontal-temporal region in the left side.

Membrane – NAD.

Brain and spinal cord – NAD”

The opinion of the Doctor is that the victim sustained injuries on
the head caused by blunt object. The injuries are ante mortem in nature.
This evidence has also not been able to be disproved by the defence in
the cross-examination and as such, the same is also found reliable to be
accepted by this Court as to how the deceased victim met his death.

2025:MLHC:710-DB

45. Now coming to the issue of motive and intention and also
whether there was a common intention on the part of the accused
persons/appellants herein to commit the murder of the deceased victim,
it may be proper to first understand the meaning and connotation of the
two words, “Motive” and “Intention”.

46. In simple language, motive is said to refer to a desire that
prompts a person to perform a certain act. Intention, on the other hand,
refers to the immediate purpose behind such act, the conscious objective
to bring about a specific result. Motive and intention are interlinked
inasmuch as it has been said that motive serves as a clue to the intention.
For example, in a murder case, the intention to murder someone can be
motivated by the fact that there is strong resentment between the parties,
or that because of jealousy and a desire for revenge, the perpetrator
intents to kill or cause serious bodily injuries to the victim.

47. The Latin phrase “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” refers
to the commission of an act with a guilty mind thus making such act an
act of crime. “It means that for an action to be considered a crime, there
must accompany it a criminal intent or state of mind (mens rea).

48. However, in all this, though motive is an important link to prove
the guilt of an accused, it loses its importance in the face of available
direct evidence of eyewitnesses by which such evidence has
conclusively proved the guilt of the accused.

49. Coming again to the case in hand, let us revisit the scene of the
incident. One of the accused person forcibly compelled the deceased
victim to take part in a meeting convened at the compound of the house

20
2025:MLHC:710-DB

of PW-2, who was the Secretary of the VEC at that time, apparently to
discuss about his alleged misappropriation of the NREGS fund meant
for the accused persons and other villagers who have taken part in the
100 days’ work. In the midst of such a heated atmosphere, there was
exchange of words which eventually led to a fight between the deceased
victim and the accused persons. In course of such fight, one of the
accused persons took up a bamboo stick and hit the deceased victim on
the head, while yet another accused person then hit him with a wooden
stick, resulting in the deceased victim to sustain severe injuries on his
person, whereupon he was taken to the hospital and later succumbed to
his injuries after two days or so.

50. What can be concluded from this is that the accused persons had
assaulted the victim in course of the fight. There is no evidence to show
that they have brought along with them the bamboo stick or the wooden
stick, it must have been lying within the compound for them to find them
easily at the time when there was fierce fighting. As such, it cannot be
said that there was any premeditation to commit murder, though it can
be infer that the accused persons are aware that such act of assault can
lead to infliction of severe injuries or even death.

51. Again, there is nothing in evidence to show that several blows
were hit by the accused persons using the bamboo stick and wooden
stick, they have not acted in a cruel manner or taken undue advantage as
such. In fact, that the accused person have accompanied those who have
taken the victim to Riangdo CHC would prove this point as far as
intention is concerned.

2025:MLHC:710-DB

52. Section 34 IPC speaks of acts done by several persons in
furtherance of common intention stating that when a criminal act is done
by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each
of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done
by him alone.

53. From the evidence on record, the fact that during the fighting,
not only the two accused person who has delivered the blow by hitting
the victim with the bamboo stick and wooden stick was involved, the
other co-accused had also joined in the fight and has equally assaulted
the victim. Herein is found the element of shared or common intention
in plain sight. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no common
intention of the part of the accused persons to commit the crime or
offence of assault upon the victim, though it cannot be proved that the
same was for commission of murder.

54. The next question to be answered is the level or extent of
culpability of the accused persons for commission of the act of assault.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chunni Bai v. State of
Chhattisgarh reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 955, at para 17 has
observed as follows:

“17. Once homicide is proved being committed by the appellant,
the next consideration will be whether such homicide was
“culpable homicide” within the meaning of Section 299 IPC. If
it is found to be “culpable homicide”, further consideration will
be whether it is “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”

which is punishable under Section 304 IPC or “murder” as
defined under Section 300 IPC, punishable under Section 302
IPC, under which the appellant has been convicted and punished
by the Trial Court which was upheld by the High Court.”

2025:MLHC:710-DB

55. At para 18 and 19 of the Chunni case(supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court went on to observe as under:

“18. The difference between “murder” and “culpable homicide
not amounting to murder” has been succinctly explained by this
Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC
382 in the following words:

“12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, “culpable homicide”

is genus and “murder” its specie. All “murder” is “culpable
homicide” but not vice-versa. Speaking generally,
“culpable homicide” sans “special characteristics of
murder”, is “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”.
For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the
gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically
recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is,
what may be called, “culpable homicide of the first degree”.
This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is
defined in Section 300 as “murder”. The second may be
termed as “culpable homicide of the second degree”. This
is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there
is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is the
lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment
provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments
provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this
degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.”

19. The difference was further elucidated in Rampal Singh v.
State of U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289 in the following words:

“18. This Court in Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of U.P.,
[(2007) 14 SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915] noticed that
academic distinction between “murder” and “culpable
homicide not amounting to murder” had vividly been
brought out by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu
Punnayya, [(1976) 4 SCC 382 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 659] where
it was observed as under : (Vineet Kumar case, [(2007) 14
SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915], SCC pp. 665-66, para

16)
“16. …that the safest way of approach to the
interpretation and application of Sections 299 and 300

23
2025:MLHC:710-DB

IPC is to keep in focus the key words used in various
clauses of the said sections. Minutely comparing each
of the clauses of Sections 299 and 300 IPC and
drawing support from the decisions of this Court in
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, [AIR 1958 SC 465 :

1958 Cri LJ 818] and Rajwant Singh v. State of
Kerala, [AIR 1966 SC 1874 : 1966 Cri LJ 1509],
speaking for the Court, R.S. Sarkaria, J. neatly brought
out the points of distinction between the two offences,
which have been time and again reiterated. Having
done so, the Court said that wherever the court is
confronted with the question whether the offence is
‘murder’ or ‘culpable homicide not amounting to
murder’, on the facts of a case, it [would] be
convenient for it to approach the problem in three
stages. The question to be considered at the first stage
would be, whether the accused has done an act by
doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof
of such causal connection between the act of the
accused and the death, leads to the second stage for
considering whether that act of the accused amounts
to ‘culpable homicide’ as defined in Section 299. …If
the answer to this question is in the negative the
offence would be ‘culpable homicide not amounting
to murder’, punishable under the First or the Second
Part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on
whether the second or the third clause of Section 299
is applicable. If this question is found in the positive,
but the case comes within any of the Exceptions
enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be
‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’,
punishable under the First Part of Section 304 IPC. It
was, however, clarified that these were only broad
guidelines to facilitate the task of the court and not
cast-iron imperative.”

56. We will now examine the case of the appellants as to whether
such case would fall within Exception 4 to section 300 IPC which
provides as follows:

2025:MLHC:710-DB

“Exception 4.-Culpable homicide is not murder if it is
committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of
passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having
taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.”

57. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ankush Shivaji
Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 6 SCC 770, a case of which
facts and circumstances are almost similar to the case in hand, has this
to say at para 11.1, 11.2., 11.3 and 13 thereof:

“11.1 Firstly, because even according to the prosecution version,
there was no premeditation in the commission of the crime.
There is not even a suggestion that the appellant had any enmity
or motive to commit any offence against the deceased, leave
alone a serious offence like murder. The prosecution case, as
seen earlier, is that the deceased and his wife were guarding their
jaggery crop in their field at around 10 p.m. when their dog
started barking at the appellant and his two companions who
were walking along a mud path by the side of the field nearby. It
was the barking of the dog that provoked the appellant to beat
the dog with the rod that he was carrying apparently to protect
himself against being harmed by any stray dog or animal. The
deceased took objection to the beating of the dog without in the
least anticipating that the same would escalate into a serious
incident in the heat of the moment. The exchange of hot words
in the quarrel over the barking of the dog led to a sudden fight
which in turn culminated in the deceased being hit with the rod
unfortunately on a vital part like the head.

11.2. Secondly, because the weapon used was not lethal nor was
the deceased given a second blow once he had collapsed to the
ground. The prosecution case is that no sooner the deceased fell
to the ground on account of the blow on the head, the appellant
and his companions took to their heels-a circumstance that
shows that the appellant had not acted in an unusual or cruel
manner in the prevailing situation so as to deprive him of the
benefit of Exception 4.

11.3. Thirdly, because during the exchange of hot words between
the deceased and the appellant all that was said by the appellant

25
2025:MLHC:710-DB

was that if the deceased did not keep quiet even he would be
beaten like a dog. The use of these words also clearly shows that
the intention of the appellant and his companions was at best to
belabour him and not to kill him as such. The cumulative effect
of all these circumstances, in our opinion, should entitle the
appellant to the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC.

13. In Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217],
this Court held that if on a sudden quarrel a person in the heat of
the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes
injuries out of which only one proves fatal, he would be entitled
to the benefit of the Exception provided he has not acted cruelly.
This Court held that the number of wounds caused during the
occurrence in such a situation was not the decisive factor. What
was important was that the occurrence had taken place on
account of a sudden and unpremeditated fight and the offender
must have acted in a fit of anger. Dealing with the provision of
Exception 4 to Section 300 this Court observed: (SCC p. 220,
para 7)
“7. …To invoke this exception four requirements must be
satisfied, namely, (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no
premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and

(iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted
in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor
is it relevant who offered the provocation or started the
assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence
is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the
occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and
the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the
offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted
in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in
the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy
and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be
entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not
acted cruelly.”

58. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we find
that the same fits the description of Exception 4 to section 300 IPC.

2025:MLHC:710-DB

59. As such, as to the case of the appellants herein, although, we find
that this is a fit case for sustaining the finding of guilt by the learned
Trial Court, however, we also find it fit to convert the conviction of the
appellants from punishment under section 302 IPC to Part II of section
304 IPC and for them to individually undergo sentence of rigorous
imprisonment for a period of 5(five) years.

60. The sentence undergone by the appellants, upon calculation, will
then be carried out to its complete execution. The imposition of fine of
₹ 5000/- each, in default thereof to undergo simple imprisonment of one
month is maintained.

61. This appeal is accordingly disposed of as stipulated hereinabove
with the impugned judgment and sentence modified as such.

62. Let copy of this order be forwarded to the Superintendent of
District Prisons and Correctional Home, Shillong for information
and necessary action.

63. Appeal disposed of.

64. Send back the Trial Court’s case record.

                                (B. Bhattacharjee)                              (W. Diengdoh)
                                      Judge                                         Judge




Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
TIPRILYNTI KHARKONGOR
Date: 2025.08.08 16:00:52 IST                                27

Source link

Neeraj And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of … on 5 August, 2025

Smt. Nitansha Gupta vs Shri Vikas Prasad Gupta on 7 August, 2025

Deepak @ Deepu vs State on 7 August, 2025

Pratap Chandra@Chand & Ors vs The State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr on 21 July, 2025

Bhola Mahto @ Bhola Prasad Mahto vs The State Of Jharkhand … … Opposite … on 7 August, 2025

Neeraj And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of … on 5 August, 2025

Smt. Nitansha Gupta vs Shri Vikas Prasad Gupta on 7 August, 2025

Deepak @ Deepu vs State on 7 August, 2025

Pratap Chandra@Chand & Ors vs The State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr on 21 July, 2025

Bhola Mahto @ Bhola Prasad Mahto vs The State Of Jharkhand … … Opposite … on 7 August, 2025

Shri. Protarsius Bula vs State Of Meghalaya on 8 August, 2025

Meghalaya High Court

Shri. Protarsius Bula vs State Of Meghalaya on 8 August, 2025

Author: W. Diengdoh

Bench: W. Diengdoh

LEAVE A REPLY Cancel reply

About us

Company

Top Stories

Now Is the Time to Think About Your Small-Business Success

Program Will Lend $10M to Detroit Minority Businesses

Kansas City Has a Massive Array of Big National Companies

Subscribe