Madhya Pradesh High Court
Shrimati Aditi Chakraverty vs Teevan Prasad Prajapati on 3 July, 2025
Author: Dinesh Kumar Paliwal
Bench: Atul Sreedharan, Dinesh Kumar Paliwal
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F.A. No.1523/2023
I N T H E H I G H C O U RT O F M A D H YA P R A D E S H
AT J A B A L P U R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ATUL SREEDHARAN
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DINESH KUMAR PALIWAL
ON THE 03rd OF JULY 2025
FIRST APPEAL NO.1523 OF 2023
Smt. Adity Chakraverty
Versus
Teevan Prasad Prajapati
..........................................................................................
Appearance:
Shri Ram Sahay Chakravarty - Advocate for the appellant
Shri Ankit Saxena and Shri Nishant Agrawal - Advocates for the
respondent.
..........................................................................................
JUDGMENT
Per: Hon’ble Shri Justice Dinesh Kumar Paliwal
This appeal under Section 28 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
(hereinafter referred to as “HMA”) has been filed by the appellant
challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 01.05.2023 passed
by the First District Judge, Kotma, Anuppur (M.P.) in RCSHM
No.87/2022 (Smt. Aditi Chakravarty Vs. Teevan Prasad Prajapati)
whereby a decree of dissolution of marriage of the appellant with the
respondent under Section 13-B(2) of HMA has been passed.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
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F.A. No.1523/2023
2. In short, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that
the marriage between the appellant and respondent was solemnized on
13.02.2019 according to Hindu rites and customs. They lived together as
husband and wife and the marriage was consummated. The son Adhyan
Prajapati was born on 20.01.2022. It is contended that when the
appellant was carrying the pregnancy, respondent/husband deserted her
and since 28.04.2021 she is living separately. On account of harassment,
torture and humiliation by the respondent, appellant became mentally
unsound and started to take treatment from Neuro Psychiatrist Dr.
Sanjay Mishra since 03.10.2022. She was unable to understand her good
and bad. It is further contended that on 24.11.2022 respondent beat her
and apologized for his behaviour and asked her to go along with him to
the Court to clear all the differences and also assured her to give Rs.5
Lac and took her to the Court. It is further contended that in Kotma
Court he took the signature of the appellant on the joint application
under Section 13-B(2) of HMA and presented the same before the Court
without the consent of the appellant, on 01.05.2023 consent decree was
passed. Appellant was suffering from mental illness and consent decree
has been obtained by playing fraud with her by the respondent. It is also
contended that the first motion took place on 25.11.2022 and statements
were recorded and second time statement was recorded on 26.04.2023
and judgment was passed on 01.05.2023 as such judgment has been
passed before expiration of the 6 months, therefore, the decree passed on
the basis of the consent requires to be set-aside.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned
decree of divorce was obtained by the respondent through fraudulent
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
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F.A. No.1523/2023
means when appellant was of unsound mind. In support of her
contention she has filed two medical prescriptions issued by Dr. Sanjay
Mishra, consultant Neuro Psychiatrist, Goyal Market, Sirmour Square,
Rewa (M.P.).
4. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the
consent decree has been passed before expiry of 6 months, therefore, for
the aforesaid reasons impugned decree of divorce by mutual consent
under Section 13-B(2) of HMA be set-aside.
5. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent by
placing reliance on the provisions of Section 96(3) of Code of Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 has submitted that an appeal against the consent
decree is not maintainable, because as per the aforesaid provisions no
appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of
parties.
6. It is further contended that the joint application was filed by
the both the parties and their statements were recorded on 25.11.2022 on
the date when the joint application was presented and matter was listed
on 26.04.2023 almost after five months. On 26.04.2023 again statements
of the appellant and respondent were recorded and when despite both
counseling they refused to live together and sought divorce through
mutual consent. The trial Court having no option, has passed the consent
decree. It is further submitted that the factum of mental illness was
never taken before the trial Court and same has been raised for the very
first time before the appellate Court, therefore, same cannot be
considered by the appellate Court as trial Court has no occasion to
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
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F.A. No.1523/2023
consider the same, therefore, learned counsel prays for dismissal of the
case.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
8. The following questions arise for our consideration:-
“Whether an appeal under Section 28 of HMA is competent
against a consent decree in the face of provision of Section 96 (3) of
CPC ?”
9. Section 96 of CPC provides for appeal from original decree.
Section 96 (3) of CPC is read as under:-
“96 (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court
with the consent of parties.”
10. Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC provides as under:-
“3. Compromise of suit- Where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted
wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or
compromise (in writing and signed by the parties) or
where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect
of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the
suit the Court shall order such agreement,
compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall
pass a decree in accordance therewith (so far as it
relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the
subject mater of the agreement, compromise or
satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the
suit].
3-A. Bar to suit.- No suit shall lie to set aside
a decree on the ground that the compromise on
which the decree is based was not lawful]”
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
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F.A. No.1523/2023
11. On perusal of the aforesaid, it is apparent that position under
Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC is not anyway different from that under
Section 13-B(2) of HMA. Once the Court is satisfied that the
compromise arrived at is lawful and has passed the decree, no appeal
shall lie under Section 96(3) of CPC. It is clear that no appeal lie against
a consent decree. A decree for divorce by mutual consent by District
Judge shall stand on the same footing as the concerned decree of Civil
Court in the Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC.
12. In Anshu Malhotra Vs. Mukesh Malhotra, 2020 SCC
Online Del 3255 a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had the
occasion to consider the maintainability of an appeal against a decree of
divorce granted by mutual consent under Section 13-B(2) of HMA and it
held as under:-
“22. As would immediately become obvious, the
law with respect to consent decree is, that though appeal is
not maintainable there against but the remedy for an
eventuality of consent having been obtained forcefully or
fraudulently or having been obtained by misrepresentation
is, by applying to the same court. We do not find any
reason why the said principle of law of general application
should not follow qua decree of divorce by mutual
consent when the grounds of appeal are on the basis of
facts, which were not before the court which passed the
consent decree. It is only the court which passed the
consent decree which is capable of going into the said
facts and if finds any prima facie merit therein, make
inquiry by recording evidence with respect thereto and to
thereafter take a final decision. Against such an order, an
appeal may lie. We however do not deem it necessary to
give a final opinion in this regard. However when the
facts on which setting aside of a decree for divorce by
mutual consent are pleaded in the appeal for the first time,Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
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F.A. No.1523/2023it is not in the domain of the appellate court to enter into
the inquiry into the said facts and if the same is done,
would also deprive the parties of an important right of
appeal, by converting the appellate court into a fact
finding court.”
13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Manisha Anand Vs.
Nilesh Anand, SLP (C ) No.4530/2025, by its order dated 24.02.2025
reiterated that:-
“2. The Family Court on 17.08.2023 has passed a
decree by consent for mutual divorce. The petitioner-wife
had preferred an appeal before the High Court which was
dismissed as not maintainable.
3. The submission of learned senior counsel for the
petitioner is that the consent decree was obtained by fraud
and therefore, the same is liable to be recalled.
4. If that be so, the proper remedy available to the
petitioner is to approach the Family Court itself for recall
of the consent decree rather than filing an appeal.”
14. We have perused the impugned judgment dated 01.05.2023
passed by the learned First District Judge, Kotma, District Anuppur
(M.P.). It reflect that the learned Court duly recorded the joint statement
of both parties after confirming their identity, verified their willingness
to part ways, noted the settlement of all claims including alimony and
custody and found that the statutory conditions under Section 13-B(2) of
HMA were satisfied.
15. The appellant was admittedly present in the Court at both
the stages, that is, the first and second motion. Appellant joint statement
recorded on both the occasion categorically records that the decision to
seek divorce was voluntary and not under any threat, coercion or
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
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F.A. No.1523/2023
inducement. The relevant portion of the statement of the parties
recorded by the learned District Judge on 25.11.2022 and 26.04.2023
reads as under:-
“25-11-2022
uke %& vfnrh pØorzhZ
01 vukosnd esjk ifr gS ge tUe ls fgUnw gS ,oa fgUnw jhfr jhokt ls
‘kkflr gksrs gSA esjk fookg fnukd 13-02-2019 dks fgUnw jhfrfjokt ls xzke cS<+ku
ftyk flxjkSyh eç esa gqvk FkkA ge nksuksa ds ,d larku vn~;Ur çtkifr dk tUe
fnukad 20-01-2022 dks gqvk gSA tks esjs laj{k.k esa gSA vukosnd Vhou ,oa esa
nkEiR; thou dk fuokZg xzke ip[kqjk Fkkuk rglhy dksrek esa fd;s gSA gekjs chp
xgjk erHksn mRiUu gks tkus ds dkj.k eSa ,oa esjk ifr Vhou çlkn çtkifr
vkilh lgefr ls fookg foPNsn dh fMØh çkIr djuk pkgrs gS iq= vn~;Ur
çtkifr dks esa vius laj{k.k esa j[kuk pkgrh gw¡ A Hkfo”; esa vius Lo;a vFkok iq=
ds fy;s Hkj.k iks”k.k dh ekax ugha d:axh D;ksafd eSa Lo;a f’kf{kdk dk dk;Z djrh
gw¡ ,oa Lo;a o iq= dk Hkj.k iks”k.k djus l{ke gw¡
ge nksuks vkil esa fookg foPNsn gsrq -<+ gSA rFkk Hkfo”; esa gekjs ,d
lkFk jgus dh dksbZ laHkokuk ugha gSA blfy;s ge yksx ikjLifjd lgefr ls
fookg foPNsn djuk pkgrs gSA25-11-2022
uke %& Vhou izlkn
01 ;kfpdkdrkZ esjh iRuh gSA ge tUe ls fgUnw gS ,oa fgUnw jhfr jhokt
ls ‘kkflr gksrs gSaA esjk fookg ;kfpdkdrkZ ls fnukad 13-02-2019 dks fgUnw
jhfrfjokt ls xzke cS<+ku ftyk flaxjkSyh e-ç esa gqvk FkkA ge nksuksa ds ,d larku
vn~;Ur çtkifr dk tUe fnukad 20-01-2022 dks gqvk gSA tks esjh iRuh ds
lj{k.k esa gSA ;kfpdkdrkZ ,oa esa nkEiR; thou dk fuokZg xzke ip[kqjk Fkkuk
rglhy dksrek esa fd;s gSA ge yksxksa ds chp esa xgjk erHksn mRiUu gks tkus ds
dkj.k esa vkSj esjh iRuh vfnrh pdorhZ vkilh lgefr ls fookg foPNsn dh fMØhSignature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
8
F.A. No.1523/2023çkIr djuk pkgrs gS iq= vn~;Ur çtkifr ge nksuks dh lgefr ls esjh iRuh ds
laj{k.k esa jgsxkA
ge nksuksa vkil esa fookg foPNsn gsrq -<+ gSA rFkk Hkfo”; esa gekjs ,d
lkFk jgus dh dksbZ laHkokuk ugha gSA blfy;s ge yksx ikjLifjd lgefr ls
fookg foPNsn djuk pkgrs gSA26-04-2023
uke %& Vhou izlkn iztkifr
dFku vukosnd %&
01 ;kfpdkdrkZ esjh iRuh gS- ftlls esjk fookg 13-02-2019 dks xzke cS<+u
ftyk flaxjkSyh eåçå ls laiUu gqvk FkkA fookg ds i’pkr~ ge nksuksa ds e/;
vkilh erHksn gks x;s FksA eSa vius iRuh ls o”kZ 2021 ls i`Fkd jg jgk gw¡A esjk
vius iRuh ls vkilh oSpkfjd erHksn gS ftlds dkj.k ge yksxksa ds chp çse
LFkkfir ugha gS vkSj fookn bruk gks x;k gS fd Hkfo”; esa ge ,d lkFk ugha jg
ldrs gSA02 eSaus vius iRuh ds fo#) fookg foPNsn dh ;kfpdk vkilh lgefr ls
çLrqr fd;k gSA nksuksa i{kksa dks U;k;ky; }kjk le>kbZl nh xbZ Fkh vkSj ge yksx
vkilh lgefr ls vyx&vyx gksuk pkgrs gSA gekjs lalxZ ls ,d iq= larku
vn;Ur çtkifr mez 01 o”kZ gS tks orZeku esa esjh iRuh ds laj{k.k gS ftlesa eq>s
dksbZ vkifÙk ugha gSA vc gekjs e/; dksbZ fookn ugha gSA ge yksx vkilh lgefr
ls fookg foPNsn djkuk pkgrs gSaA gekjs }kjk lfEefyr :i ls fookg foPNsn dk
vkosnu çLrqr fd;k x;k gS ftls eSaus i<+] le>dj vius gLrk{kj fd;k gwaA03 fookg foPNsn dk vkosnu i= çLrqr djus ds ckn U;k;ky; }kjk ges
le>kbZl Hkh nh xbZ gS fdarq gekjs chp lkFk jgus dh dksbZ lgefr ugha cuh gSA
ge nksuksa vkil esa fookg foPNsn gsrq -<+ gS rFkk Hkfo’; esa gekjs ,d lkFk jgus
dh dksbZ lHkkouk ugha gS blfy, ge yksx ikjLifjd lgefr ls fookg foPNsn
djuk pkgrs gSaA26-04-2023
uke %& vkfnrh pØorhZSignature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
9
F.A. No.1523/2023dFku ;kfpdkdrkZ %&
xSj;kfpdkdrkZ esjk ifr gS- ftlls esjk fookg 13-02-19 dks xzke cS<+u]
ftyk flaxjkSyh eåçå ls laiUu gqvk FkkA fookg ds i’pkr~ ge nksuksa ds e/;
vkilh erHksn gks x;s FksA eSa vius ifr ls o”kZ 2021 ls i`Fkd jg jgh gwaA esjk
vius ifr ls vkilh oSpkfjd erHksn gS ftlds dkj.k ge yksxksa ds chp çse
LFkkfir ugha gS vkSj fookn bruk gks x;k gS fd Hkfo’; esa ge ,d lkFk ugha jg
ldrs gSaA
02 eSaus vius ifr ds fo:) fookg foPNsn dh ;kfpdk vkilh lgefr ls
çLrqr fd;s gSA nksuksa i{kksa dks U;k;ky; }kjk le>kbZl nh xbZ Fkh vkSj ge yksx
vkilh lgefr ls vyx&vyx gksuk pkgrs gSA esjs }kjk Hkfo”; esa [kpkZ vkSj gtkZ
dk nkok fdlh Hkh U;k;ky; esa çLrqr ugha fd;k tk;sxkA gekjs lalxZ ls ,d iq=
larku vn~;Ur çtkifr mez 01 o”kZ gS- tks orZeku esa esjs laj{k.k esa gS ftlesa esjs
ifr dk dksbZ vkifÙk ugha gSA vc gekjs e/; dksbZ fookn ugha gSA ge yksx vkilh
lgefr ls fookg foPNsn djkuk pkgrs gSA gekjs }kjk lfEefyr :i ls fookg
foPNsn dk vkosnu çLrqr fd;k x;k gS ftls eSaus i<+] le>dj vius gLrk{kj dh
gwaA03- fookg foPNsn dk vkosnu i= çLrqr djus ds ckn U;k;ky; }kjk gesa
le>kbZl Hkh nh xbZ gS fdrq gekjs chp lkFk jgus dh dksbZ lgefr ugha cuh gSA
ge nksuksa vkil esa fookg foPNsn gsrq -<+ gS rFkk Hkfo”; esa gekjs ,d lkFk jgus
dh dksbZ lHkkouk ugha gS blfy, ge yksx ikjLifjd lgefr ls fookg foPNsn
djuk pkgrs gSaA”
16. Based on the above joint statement of the parties, the
learned District Judge passed the impugned judgment, recorded that
both the parties are living separately for more than a year and they are
not ready to live with each other and are ready for dissolution of the
marriage. The minor son is living with the appellant/petitioner and both
the parties have clearly stated that they are not interested to live together
and there is no scope for the same. It is also recorded that they cannot be
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
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F.A. No.1523/2023
compelled to live against their will because same will cause mental
trauma for both the parties.
Thus, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case,
allowed the application under Section 13-B(2) of HMA and ordered to
dissolve the marriage dated 13.02.2019 from the decree dated
01.05.2023.
17. It is worth mentioning that the appellant is a government
teacher and is posted in Central School, Shahdol. She is a well educated
woman and mother of one child. It is difficult to accept the contention of
the appellant that she was mentally ill and had gone for Court
proceedings and made statements under mental illness. She never move
any application for review of the decree before trial Court and never
filed document, which has been filed first time before this Court to state
that she was having mental problem and consent decree has been
obtained by playing fraud.
18. Thus the allegation that she had filed joint application for
consent decree and had given statement both the time under the mental
illness appears to be an after thought and documents issued by Dr.
Sanjay Mishra also appears to have been got prepared after passing the
decree. It is noteworthy that aforesaid grounds were not available before
the trial Court at the stage of the application under Section 13-B(2) of
HMA. In joint application filed by the parties, it is clearly stated that
they are residing separately before one year of the presentation of the
application. They have decided to dissolve their marriage by filing a
divorce petition through mutual consent and containing the terms and
conditions with respect to alimony, guardianship visitation rights etc.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
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F.A. No.1523/2023
19. Hon’ble Apex Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat Vs. Rajinder
Singh (2006) 5 SCC 566 held as under:-
“17. The position that emerges from the
amended provisions of Order 23, can be summed up thus:
(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent
decree having regard to the specific bar contained in section
96(3) CPC.
(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of
the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a
compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) Rule 1
Order 43.
(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting
aside a compromise decree on the ground that the
compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in
Rule 3A.
(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is
valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which
passed the consent decree, by an order on an application
under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23.
Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a
consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach
the court which recorded the compromise and made a
decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no
compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the
compromise will itself consider and decide the question as
to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so
because a consent decree, is nothing but contract between
parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court.
The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the
validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is
made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent
compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she
filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on
21.8.2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise
in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other
defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons best
known to herself, the second defendant within a few days
thereafter (that is on 27.8.2001), filed an appeal and chose
not to pursue the application filed before the court which
passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by second
defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the
express bar contained in section 96 (3) of the Code.”
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
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F.A. No.1523/2023
20. In Rama Narang Vs. Ramesh Narang (2006) 11 SCC 114
Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the a compromise decree is as much a
decree as a decree passed on adjudication. It is not merely an agreement
between the parties. In passing the decree by consent the Court adds its
mandate to the consent. A consent decree is composed of both a
command and a contract. A consent decree is a contract with the
imprimatur of the Court. ‘Imprimatur’ means ‘authorized’ or ‘approved’.
In other words by passing a decree in terms of a consent order the Court
authorizes and approves the course of action consented to. Moreover,
the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC requires the Court to pass
a decree in accordance with the consent terms only when it is proved to
the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in
part by any lawful agreement.
21. In view of the above, it is obvious that the law with respect
to consent decree is, that appeal is not maintainable, there against what
the remedy for it eventuality of consent having been obtained forcefully
or fraudulently or having been obtained by misrepresentation is, by
applying to the same Court.
22. As far the submission of not completing the period of 6
months after first motion is concerned i.e immaterial as no objection in
this regard was ever raised before trial Court at any point of time. Even
otherwise parties can pray for waive by the same. It also cannot be
overlooked that on both the motions parties have given their statements
making it clear that there is no possibility of living together.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM
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F.A. No.1523/2023
23. Therefore, we do not find any reason why the said principle
of law of general application should not follow qua decree of divorce by
mutual consent when the grounds of appeal are on the basis of facts,
which were not before the Court, who passed the consent decree. The
facts of mental illness were not brought into notice of the trial Court and
documents also appears to have been got prepared after passing of the
decree for mutual consent and same has been pleaded for the first time.
It is not in the domain of the appellate Court to enter into the inquiry
into the fact, and if the same is done, would also deprive the party of the
important right of appeal, by converting the appellate court into a fact
finding court.
24. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the
present appeal is not maintainable and even otherwise, there is no error
or infirmity in the impugned judgment and decree dated 01.05.2023
passed by the learned First District Judge, Kotma, District Anuppur
(M.P.)
Accordingly, the present appeal being of devoid of merits is
hereby dismissed.
(ATUL SHREEDHARAN) (DINESH KUMAR PALIWAL)
JUDGE JUDGE
Vin**
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: VINOD SHARMA
Signing time: 7/25/2025
6:12:43 PM