Himachal Pradesh High Court
Silmo Devi vs State Of H.P on 22 August, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 276 of 2010
Reserved on: 30.07.2025
.
Decided on: 22.08.2025
Silmo Devi
........Appellant
Versus
State of H.P.
Coram
r to .....Respondent
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Appellant: Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, Senior
Advocate, with Mr. Tek Chand,
Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. Jitender K. Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the
judgment of conviction dated 31.07.2010 and order of
sentence dated 04.08.2010, passed by Learned Sessions
Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Trial Court) vide
1
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes
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which the appellant (accused) before the learned Trial
Court was convicted and sentenced as under:-
Sr. Offence Sentence Imposed
.
No.
1. 498-A To undergo simple imprisonment for a period
IPC of three years, pay fine of ₹12,500/- and indefault of the payment of fine, to further
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of
six months.
2. 306 IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for a period
of three years, pay fine of ₹12,500/- and in
default of the payment of fine, to further
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of
six months.
Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered
to run concurrently.
(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial
Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the
present appeal are that the police presented a challan
against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A
and 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted
that the informant, Sudershan Singh (PW1), had three
daughters and one son. Meenu Kumari (since deceased)
was the eldest. She was married to Bhuvneshwar Singh on
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01.05.2005 as per Hindu Rites and Customs. One daughter
was born to her. No dowry was demanded at the time of
the marriage. However, the informant provided the gold
.
ornaments as per his capacity. Meenu told the informant
that her mother-in-law, Silmo Devi (present petitioner),
started taunting her that she had not brought anything at
the time of her marriage. The informant counselled
Meenu and told her that he would settle the matter. He
purchased a bed box, a Godrej almirah & bedding and
dropped all these articles in the matrimonial home of
Meenu. Silmo Devi told Meenu that instead of providing
the articles, the expenses of the delivery of the child
should have been provided. Meenu called her parental
home on 05.05.2007. The call was picked up by Poonam
(PW3). Meenu said that Silmo Devi was harassing and
taunting her by saying that she was good for nothing.
Charan Lal called the informant on 07.05.2007 at about
1:30 P.M. and informed him that Meenu had committed
suicide by hanging herself. The matter was reported to the
police. An entry No.35 (Ex. PW8/A) was recorded. ASI
Kamal Deep (PW10) went to the hospital for verification.
Sudershan(PW1) made a statement (Ex.PW1/A), which was
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sent to the police station where F.I.R. (Ex.PW9/A) was
registered. The photographs of the dead body (Ex.
PW10/A1 to Ex. PW10/A5) whose negatives are Ex.
.
PW10/A6 to Ex. PW10/A10 were taken. Kamal Deep (PW10)
conducted the inquest and prepared the report (Ex.
PW7/B). He filed an application (Ex.PW7/A) for
conducting the post-mortem examination of the dead
body. Dr. Jaidesh Rana (PW7) conducted the post-mortem
examination of the dead body and found that the cause of
death was asphyxia. He preserved the viscera and handed
them over to the police official accompanying the dead
body. He issued the report (Ex. PW7/C). ASI Kamal Deep
went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW10/B).
The photographs of the spot (Ex.PW10/A11 to
Ex.PW10/A14) whose negatives are Ex.PW10/A15 to
Ex.PW10/A18 were taken. The telephone receipt
(Ex.PW1/B) was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/C). The viscera
and other belongings were sent to SFSL, Junga. Reports
(Exs. PX & PY) were issued stating that “dupatta” could
easily bear the weight of an average female body, and no
poison was detected in the viscera. The final report was
issued by Dr. Jaidesh Rana (PW7). Statements of
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remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version,
and after completion of the investigation, the challan was
prepared and presented before the learned Judicial
.
Magistrate, First Class-I, Palampur, who committed it to
the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala for
trial.
3. Learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at
Dharamshala (learned Trial Court) charged the accused
with the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC, to which she pleaded
not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses to
prove its case. Sudershan Singh (PW1) is the informant
and father of the deceased. Manjeet Kaur (PW2) is the
mother, Poonam (PW3) is the sister, and Smt. Udhma Devi
(PW4) was the grandmother of the deceased. Smt. Veena
Kumari (PW5) was looking after the public call office,
from where the deceased made a call to her home. Dr.
Anjana Tuli (PW6) examined the deceased and declared
her dead. Dr. Jaidesh Rana (PW7) conducted the post-
mortem examination. HHC Jaswant Singh (PW8) proved
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entry in the daily diary. Inspector Meghnath (PW9) signed
the F.I.R. and filed the charge-sheet before the Court. ASI
Kamal Deep (PW10) conducted the investigation.
.
5. The accused, in her statement recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its
entirety. She claimed that the deceased used to run away
from her matrimonial home without any reason. Her
parents were called, who asked the deceased why she was
running away from home. The mother of the deceased
advised her to live properly. The accused remained ill due
to a mental problem. She was getting treatment for her
mental disease. She never demanded any dowry and bore
the expenses of the delivery of the child. Statements of Dr.
R.S. Dhatwalia (DW1), Dr. A.K. Maini (DW2), S.K. Sharma
(DW3) and Chander Prabha (DW4) were recorded in
defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the relationship
between the parties was not disputed. The testimonies of
prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. It was
duly proved that the accused used to taunt the deceased.
Her father purchased household articles and left them in
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the matrimonial home of the deceased. The constant
taunting of the deceased by the accused would constitute
mental cruelty. The death had taken place within 07
.
years, and the presumption under Section 113A of the
Indian Evidence Act would apply. The deceased would
have confided to her relatives, and the non-examination
of an independent witness did not make the prosecution’s
case doubtful. The defence evidence did not prove that the
accused was incapable of knowing the nature of the act
and that whatever she was doing was wrongful or
contrary to law. Therefore, the defence evidence would
not help the accused. Consequently, the accused was
convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the
present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court
overlooked the settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence. The evidence was misappreciated. No
witness deposed that the accused had harassed the
deceased and created such circumstances that the
deceased was left with no other option except to commit
suicide. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act did not
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apply to the present case, and the learned Trial Court erred
in relying upon it. The accused is suffering from a chronic
disease of schizophrenia, and this fact was duly proved on
.
record. Her mental condition was such that she could not
make any demand for dowry. Therefore, it was prayed that
the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
8.
I have heard Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, learned
Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Tek Chand, learned
counsel for the appellant/accused and Mr. Jitender K.
Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the
respondent-State.
9. Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, learned Senior Advocate
for the appellant, submitted that the learned Trial Court
erred in appreciating the evidence placed on record. The
statements made by the prosecution witnesses regarding
the cruelty were highly vague. There was no evidence that
the accused had created such circumstances that the
deceased was left with no other option except to commit
suicide. It was duly proved on record that the accused was
suffering from schizophrenia. Therefore, she was unable
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to harass the deceased. The learned Trial Court failed to
properly appreciate the evidence on record. Therefore, he
prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the
.
judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
10. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted
that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the
deceased would have confided to her relatives, and non-
examination of the independent witnesses was not
material. The evidence on record proved that the accused
had demanded dowry and taunted the deceased. The
accused created such circumstances that the deceased was
left with no other option except to commit suicide. The
death had taken place within 07 years of marriage, and it
was proved by the prosecution that the deceased was
subjected to harassment by the accused. Therefore, the
presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence
Act was rightly applied. He prayed that the present appeal
be dismissed.
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11. I have given considerable thought to the
submissions made at the bar and have gone through the
records carefully.
.
12. Sudershan Singh (PW1) stated in his
examination-in-chief that no dowry was demanded at the
time of marriage. Meenu was kept properly for 5-6
months. She did not make any complaint. The accused
started saying after 05-06 months of marriage that
Meenu had not brought any dowry. Meenu narrated this
incident to her parents. Sudershan purchased one steel
almirah, one double bed and bedding, etc and left all the
articles in the house of the accused at Palampur. He
received a call on the same day from Meenu that her
parents-in-law were saying that the expenses of the
delivery of the child should have been borne by the
informant instead of providing the articles. Meenu gave
birth to a daughter on 19.07.2007. The parents-in-law of
Meenu left for their house and never returned. They said
that Meenu should have given birth to a son. He brought
Meenu to his home. His son-in-law visited his home, but
parents-in-law of Meenu did not visit her. Meenu told
him telephonically that she was being tortured by the
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accused, however, her husband was keeping her properly.
She made a call to Poonam on 05.05.2007 and told her that
she was being harassed by her parents-in-law. Meenu told
.
that she would come to the function of Shivji and would
narrate the incident. The informant received a telephonic
call from the husband of the accused that Meenu had
consumed poison, and she was admitted to the hospital.
Subsequently, the informant found that Meenu had died
due to hanging.
13. The statement of the informant is highly
vague. He made general allegations that Meenu was being
harassed in her matrimonial home because she had not
brought any dowry. The details of the dowry demanded by
the parents-in-law of the deceased were not given.
14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184: (2010) 1 SCC
(Cri) 286: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the Court has to
see that particulars of the offences committed by every
accused and the role played by the accused in committing
the offence are required to be given in the complaint
made to the police. It was observed: –
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“9. To lodge a proper complaint, the mere mention
of the sections and the language of those sections
is not the be-all and end-all of the matter. What is
required to be brought to the notice of the court is
the particulars of the offence committed by each.
and every accused and the role played by each and
every accused in committing that offence.
10. When we see the complaint, the complaint is
sadly vague. It does not show as to which accused
has committed what offence, and what is the exact
role played by these appellants is in the
commission of the offence. There could be said
that something is against Rajesh, as the allegations
are made against him more precisely, but he is no
more and has already expired. Under such
circumstances, it would be an abuse of the process
of law to allow the prosecution to continue against
the aged parents of Rajesh, the present appellants
herein, on the basis of a vague and general
complaint which is silent about the precise acts of
the appellants.” (Emphasis supplied)
15. Similarly, it was held in Abhishek v. State of
M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083: 2023 INSC 779 that the
tendency of false implication by way of general omnibus
allegations, if left unchecked, would result in the misuse
of the process of law. It was observed:
“13. Instances of a husband’s family members
filing a petition to quash criminal proceedings
launched against them by his wife in the midst of
matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity nor of
recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this
score. We may now take note of some decisions of
particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan
Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar [(2022) 6 SCC
599], this Court had occasion to deal with a similar::: Downloaded on – 23/08/2025 02:28:30 :::CIS
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( 2025:HHC:28511 )situation where the High Court had refused to
quash an FIR registered for various offences,
including Section 498A IPC. Noting that the
foremost issue that required determination was
whether allegations made against the in-laws.
were general omnibus allegations which would be
liable to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier
decisions wherein concern was expressed over the
misuse of Section 498A IPC and the increasedtendency to implicate relatives of the husband in
matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that
false implications by way of general omnibus
allegations made in the course of matrimonialdisputes, if left unchecked, would result in misuse
of the process of law . On the facts of that case, it
was found that no specific allegations were made
against the in-laws by the wife, and it was heldthat allowing their prosecution in the absence of
clear allegations against the in-laws would result
in an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted
that a criminal trial, leading to an eventualacquittal, would inflict severe scars upon the
accused, and such an exercise ought to be
discouraged.
14. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7
SCC 667], this Court noted that the tendency toimplicate the husband and all his immediate
relations is also not uncommon in complaints filed
under Section 498A IPC. It was observed that theCourts have to be extremely careful and cautious in
dealing with these complaints and must take
pragmatic realities into consideration while
dealing with matrimonial cases, such as
allegations of harassment by the husband’s close
relations, who were living in different cities and
never visited or rarely visited the place where the
complainant resided, would add an entirely
different complexion and such allegations would
have to be scrutinised with great care and
circumspection.
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15. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [(2009) 10
SCC 184], this Court observed that the mere
mention of statutory provisions and the language
thereof for lodging a complaint is not the ‘be all
and end all’ of the matter, as what is required to be.
brought to the notice of the Court is the particulars
of the offence committed by each and every
accused and the role played by each and every
accused in the commission of that offence. Theseobservations were made in the context of a
matrimonial dispute involving Section 498A IPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana,
16.
2024 SCC OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a
person to face criminal allegations without any specific
instance of criminal misconduct amounts to an abuse of
the process of the Court. It was observed:
“18. The plain reading of the FIR and the
chargesheet papers indicates that the allegationslevelled by the First Informant are quite vague,
general and sweeping, specifying no instances ofcriminal conduct. It is also pertinent to note that in
the FIR, no specific date or time of the alleged
offence/offences has been disclosed. Even thepolice thought it fit to drop the proceedings
against the other members of the Appellants’
family. Thus, we are of the view that the FIR lodged
by Respondent No. 2 was nothing but a
counterblast to the divorce petition & also the
domestic violence case.
25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on
some general and sweeping allegations without
bringing on record any specific instances of
criminal conduct, it is nothing but an abuse of the
process of the court. The court owes a duty to::: Downloaded on – 23/08/2025 02:28:30 :::CIS
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( 2025:HHC:28511 )subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to
thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie,
whether there is any grain of truth in the
allegations or whether they are made only with the
sole object of involving certain individuals in a.
criminal charge, more particularly when a
prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute .”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. It was further held that in matrimonial
disputes, the parents, including the close relatives, make
a mountain out of a molehill, and every matrimonial
conduct amounting to nuisance does not constitute
cruelty. It was observed: –
“32. Many times, the parents, including the close
relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a
molehill. Instead of salvaging the situation andmaking every possible endeavour to save the
marriage, their action, either due to ignorance or
on account of sheer hatred towards the husbandand his family members, brings about the
destruction of the marriage over trivial issues. Thefirst thing that comes to mind for the wife, her
parents and her relatives is the Police as if the
Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner does thematter reach the Police than even if there are fair
chances of reconciliation between the spouses,
they would get destroyed. The foundation of a
sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and
respecting one another. Tolerance of each other’s
faults, to a certain bearable extent, has to be
inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles and
trifling differences are mundane matters and
should not be exaggerated and blown out of
proportion to destroy what is said to have been
made in heaven. The Court must appreciate that all
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( 2025:HHC:28511 )in determining what constitutes cruelty in each
particular case, always keeping in view the
physical and mental conditions of the parties, their
character and social status. A very technical and
hyper-sensitive approach would prove to be.
disastrous for the very institution of marriage. In
matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers are the
children. The spouses fight with such venom in
their hearts that they do not think even for asecond that if the marriage would come to an end,
then what would be the effect on their children?
Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the
upbringing of the children is concerned. The onlyreason why we are saying so is that, instead of
handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation
of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing
but hatred for each other. There may be cases ofgenuine ill-treatment and harassment by the
husband and his family members towards the wife.
The degree of such ill-treatment or harassment
may vary. However, the Police machinery shouldbe resorted to as a measure of last resort and that
too in a very genuine case of cruelty and
harassment. The Police machinery cannot be
utilised for the purpose of holding the husband toransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at
the instigation of her parents, relatives or friends.
In all cases where the wife complains of
harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A ofthe IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is
complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of
the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct which may
cause annoyance to the other may not amount to
cruelty. Mere trivial irritations and quarrels
between spouses, which happen in day-to-day
married life, may also not amount to cruelty”
18. Similarly, it was held in Mamidi Anil Kumar
Reddy v. State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127: 2024 (2)
SCR 252 that the phenomenon of false implication by a
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general omnibus allegation in the case of a matrimonial
dispute is not unknown to the Court. It was observed: –
“14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there
.
is significant merit in the submissions of the
Learned Counsel for the Appellants. A bare perusal
of the complaint, statement of witnesses and the
charge sheet shows that the allegations against theAppellants are wholly general and omnibus in
nature; even if they are taken in their entirety, they
do not prima facie make out a case against the
Appellants. The material on record neitherdiscloses any particulars of the offences alleged
nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned
to any of the Appellants in the commission of theoffences.
15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of
general omnibus allegations in the course of
matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court.
In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar(2022) 6 SCC 599, this Court dealt with a similar
case wherein the allegations made by the
complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s. 498Aand others were vague and general, lacking any
specific role and particulars. The court proceededto quash the FIR against the accused persons and
noted that such a situation, if left unchecked,
would result in the abuse of the process of law.
xxxx
17. Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra),
we find that the High Court, in this case, has failed
to exercise due care and has mechanically
permitted the criminal proceedings to continue
despite specifically finding that the allegations are
general and omnibus in nature. The Appellants
herein approached the High Court on inter
alia grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated
on vexatious grounds and even highlighted the
commencement of divorce proceedings by
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Respondent No. 2. In these peculiar circumstances,
the High Court had a duty to consider the
allegations with great care and circumspection so
as to protect against the danger of unjust
prosecution.”
.
19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of
Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2621, that general and
vague allegations of cruelty made against the husband and
his relatives are not sufficient to constitute cruelty. It was
observed: – r
“10.1 The tendency to make general, vague, and
omnibus allegations is noticed by this Court in
many decisions. In Usha Chakraborty v. State of
W.B. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90 , this court observed
that:
“16… the respondent alleged commission of
offences under Sections 323, 384, 406, 423,467, 468, 420 and 120B, IPC against the
appellants. A bare perusal of the saidallegation and the ingredients to attract
them, as adverted to hereinbefore, would
reveal that the allegations are vague andthey do not carry the essential ingredients to
constitute the alleged offences…. The
ingredients to attract the alleged offence
referred to hereinbefore and the nature of
the allegations contained in the application
filed by the respondent would undoubtedly
make it clear that the respondent had failed
to make specific allegations against the
appellants herein in respect of the aforesaid
offences. The factual position thus would
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( 2025:HHC:28511 )of criminal proceedings are nothing but the
aforesaid incident, and further that the
dispute involved is essentially of a civil
nature. The appellants and the respondents
have given a cloak of a criminal offence in.
the issue…”
10.2 Similarly, dealing with allegations lacking in
particulars and details, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti
(2009) 10 SCC 184, this court observed that:
“7. …what strikes us is that there are no
particulars given as to the date on which the
ornaments were handed over, as to the exactnumber of ornaments or their description
and as to the date when the ornaments were
asked back and were refused. Even the
weight of the ornaments is not mentioned in
r the complaint, and it is a general and vaguecomplaint that the ornaments were
sometimes given in the custody of the
appellants, and they were not returned. What
strikes us more is that even in Para 10 of thecomplaint, where the complainant says that
she asked for her clothes and ornaments,
which were given to the accused, and theyrefused to give these back, the date is
significantly absent.”
xxxx
12. The complaint also refers to a small incident
where the complainant’s brother accompanied her
to the matrimonial house when appellants no. 1
and 3 are alleged to have refused to take her back,
but on persuasion by her brother, she was allowed
to stay. There is also a vague allegation that, when
the complainant gave birth to a second child,
appellants 1 and 2 came and “quarrelled” with the
complainant, her brother, and her parents and
threatened them. This Court had occasion to
examine the phenomenon of general and omnibus
allegations in the cases of matrimonial disputes.
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In Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v. State of A.P. 2024
SCC OnLine SC 127, this Court observed that:
“14. …A bare perusal of the complaint,
statement of witnesses and the charge sheet
shows that the allegations against the.
Appellants are wholly general and omnibus
in nature; even if they are taken in their
entirety, they do not prima facie make out acase against the Appellants. The material on
record neither discloses any particulars of
the offences alleged nor discloses the
specific role/allegations assigned to any ofthe Appellants in the commission of the
offences.
15. The phenomenon of false implication by
way of general omnibus allegations in the
r course of matrimonial disputes is notunknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar
alias Sonam v. State of Bihar, this Court dealt
with a similar case wherein the allegations
made by the complainant-wife against herin-laws u/s. 498A and others were vague and
general, lacking any specific role and
particulars. The court proceeded to quashthe FIR against the accused persons and
noted that such a situation, if left unchecked,would result in the abuse of the process of
law.”
xxxx
13.1 In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (2022) 6
SCC 599, this Court noticed the injustice that may
be caused when parties are forced to go through
the tribulations of a trial based on general and
omnibus allegations. The relevant portion of the
observation is as under:
“11. …in recent times, matrimonial litigation
in the country has also increased
significantly, and there is greater
disaffection and friction surrounding the::: Downloaded on – 23/08/2025 02:28:30 :::CIS
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( 2025:HHC:28511 )institution of marriage now more than ever.
This has resulted in an increased tendency to
employ provisions such as Section 498-
A IPC as instruments to settle personal
scores against the husband and his relatives.
.
18. … upon a perusal of the contents of the
FIR dated 1-4-2019, it is revealed that
general allegations are levelled against theappellants. The complainant alleged that “all
accused harassed her mentally and
threatened her with terminating her
pregnancy”. Furthermore, no specific anddistinct allegations have been made against
either of the appellants herein, i.e. none of
the appellants has been attributed any
specific role in furtherance of the generalallegations made against them. This simply
leads to a situation wherein one fails to
ascertain the role played by each accused in
furtherance of the offence. The allegations
are, therefore, general and omnibus and can,at best, be said to have been made out on
account of small skirmishes… However, as
far as the appellants are concerned, theallegations made against them, being
general and omnibus, do not warrantprosecution.
21. …it would be unjust if the appellants are
forced to go through the tribulations of a
trial, i.e. general and omnibus allegations
cannot manifest in a situation where the
relatives of the complainant’s husband are
forced to undergo a trial. It has been
highlighted by this Court in varied instances
that a criminal trial leading to an eventual
acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the
accused, and such an exercise must,
therefore, be discouraged.”
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22
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20. This position was reiterated in Dara Lakshmi
Narayana v. State of Telangana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3682, wherein it was observed:
.
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the
allegations made by respondent No. 2 are vague
and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellantNo. 1 harassed her and that appellant Nos. 2 to 6
instigated him to do so, respondent No. 2 has not
provided any specific details or described any
particular instance of harassment. She has also notmentioned the time, date, place, or manner in
which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore,
the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.
21.
A similar view was taken in Geddam Jhansi v.
State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263, wherein it
was observed:
“31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter
with penal consequences involving coercivemeasures, which can be permitted only when the
specific act(s) which constitute offencespunishable under the Penal Code or any other
penal statute are alleged or attributed to the
accused and a prima facie case is made out. Itapplies with equal force when criminal laws are
invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising
domestic disputes without specific allegations and
credible materials to support the same may have
disastrous consequences for the institution of
family, which is built on the premise of love,
affection, cordiality and mutual trust. The
institution of family constitutes the core of human
society. Domestic relationships, such as those
between family members, are guided by deeply
ingrained social values and cultural expectations.
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These relationships are often viewed as sacred,
demanding a higher level of respect, commitment,
and emotional investment compared to other
social or professional associations. For the
aforesaid reason, the preservation of family.
relationships has always been emphasised. Thus,
when family relationships are sought to be brought
within the ambit of criminal proceedings,
rupturing the family bond, courts should becircumspect and judicious and should allow
invocation of the criminal process only when there
are specific allegations with supporting materials
which clearly constitute criminal offences.
32. We have to keep in mind that in the context of
matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as
such in the complaints filed alleging harassmentor domestic violence, there may be a tendency to
implicate other members of the family who do not
come to the rescue of the complainant or remain
mute spectators to any alleged incident of
harassment, which in our view cannot by itselfconstitute a criminal act without there being
specific acts attributed to them. Further, when
tempers run high and relationships turn bitter,there is also a propensity to exaggerate the
allegations, which does not necessarily mean thatsuch domestic disputes should be given the colour
of criminality.
33. It goes without saying that genuine cases of
cruelty and violence in the domestic sphere, which
do happen, ought to be handled with utmost
sensitivity. Domestic violence typically happens
within the four walls of the house and not in the
public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed
by the public at large, except perhaps by the
immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible
evidence by the victim of domestic violence may
not be easily forthcoming and producing direct
evidence may be hard and arduous, which does not
necessarily mean that domestic violence does not::: Downloaded on – 23/08/2025 02:28:30 :::CIS
24
( 2025:HHC:28511 )occur. In fact, to deal with this pernicious
phenomenon, stringent statutes like the
Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have
been enacted with a very expansive meaning and
scope of what amounts to domestic violence. Since.
violence perpetrated within the domestic sphere by
close relatives is now criminalised, entailing
serious consequences on the perpetrators, the
courts have to be careful while dealing with suchcases by examining whether there are specific
allegations with instances against the perpetrators
and not generalised allegations. The purpose and
mandate of the law to protect the victims ofdomestic violence is of paramount importance,
and as such, a balance has to be struck by ensuring
that while perpetrators are brought to book, all the
family members or relatives are notindiscriminately brought within the criminal net in
a sweeping manner.
34. For a matrimonial relationship which is
founded on the basis of cordiality and trust to turnsour to an extent to make a partner hurl
allegations of domestic violence and harassment
against the other partner, would normally nothappen at the spur of the moment, and such an
acrimonious relationship would develop only inthe course of time. Accordingly, such a situation
would be the culmination of a series of acts which
turn, otherwise, an amicable relationship into afractured one. Thus, in such cases involving
allegations of domestic violence or harassment,
there would normally be a series of offending acts,
which would be required to be spelt out by the
complainant against the perpetrators in specific
terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminal
proceedings sought to be initiated against them.
Thus, mere general allegations of harassment
without pointing out the specifics against such
perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in
respect of the present appellants.
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35. We are, thus, of the view that in criminal
cases relating to domestic violence, the
complaints and charges should be specific, as
far as possible, as against each and every
member of the family who is accused of such.
offences and sought to be prosecuted, as
otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the
stringent criminal process by indiscriminatelydragging all the members of the family. There
may be situations where some of the family
members or relatives may turn a blind eye to
the violence or harassment perpetrated on thevictim and may not extend any helping hand to
the victim, which does not necessarily mean
that they are also perpetrators of domesticviolence unless the circumstances clearly
indicate their involvement and instigation.
Hence, implicating all such relatives without
making specific allegations and attributing
offending acts to them and proceeding againstthem without prima facie evidence that they
were complicit and had actively collaborated
with the perpetrators of domestic violencewould amount to abuse of the process of law.”
22. Therefore, the allegations made by the
informant are insufficient to constitute the cruelty.
23. The informant specifically stated in his
statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C (Ex. PW1/A)
that the accused Silmo Devi started taunting the deceased.
However, he changed his version in the Court to say that
parents-in-law of Meenu harassed her. He specifically
stated that he received a telephonic call from his daughter,
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26
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who said that her parents-in-law were saying that the
expenses of the delivery of Meenu should have been
provided. He again stated that the parents-in-law of
.
Meenu left for their home and never returned. Therefore,
it is apparent that the informant has changed the initial
version projected in the F.I.R. that Meenu was being
harassed by the accused, Silmo Devi, to that the deceased
was being harassed by her parents-in-law in the Court.
24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in State of M.P. v. Dhirendra Kumar, (1997) 1 SCC 93: 1997
SCC (Cri) 54 that when the prosecution projects a different
case during the Trial, its case becomes suspect. It was
observed:
“11. It was very emphatically contended by Shri
Gambhir that as in the first information report
(FIR), there is no mention of the dying
declaration, we should discard the evidence ofPW 1 and PW 2 regarding the dying declaration,
because of what has been pointed out by this
Court in Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of
M.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 815: 1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR
1975 SC 1026] We do not, however, agree with
Shri Gambhir, for the reason that what was
observed in Ram Kumar case [(1975) 3 SCC 815:
1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR 1975 SC 1026] after
noting the broad facts, was that material
omission in the FIR would cast doubt on the::: Downloaded on – 23/08/2025 02:28:30 :::CIS
27
( 2025:HHC:28511 )veracity of the prosecution case, despite the
general law being that statements made in the
FIR can be used to corroborate or contradict its
maker. This view owes its origin to the
thinking that if there be a material departure.
in the prosecution case as unfolded in the FIR,
which would be so if material facts not
mentioned in the FIR are deposed to byprosecution witnesses in the court, the same
would cause a dent to the edifice on which the
prosecution case is built, as the substratum of
the prosecution case then gets altered.
The prosecution cannot project two entirely
different versions of a case. This is entirely
different from thinking that some omission in
r the FIR would require disbelieving thewitnesses who depose about the fact not
mentioned in the FIR. Evidence of witnesses
has to be tested for its strength or weakness.
While doing so, if the fact deposed be amaterial part of the prosecution case, about
which, however, no mention was made in the
FIR, the same would be borne in mind whiledeciding about the credibility of the evidence
given by the witness in question.”
25. Therefore, the prosecution’s case would
become suspect due to a shift in the informant’s
testimony.
26. Manjeet Kaur (PW2) stated that the accused
and her husband started treating Meenu with cruelty.
Meenu said that she was forced to sleep on the floor by the
accused. One almirah, one bed box and complete bedding
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were provided to Meenu. However, Meenu said that the
accused and her husband were saying that the expenses
for the delivery of Meenu should have been provided by
.
Meenu’s parents.
27. This witness has also made a general
statement without any particulars of harassment and
details of dowry. She stated that Meenu was being asked to
sleep on the floor, which was not mentioned by the
informant. She also included the husband of the accused as
the person who had harassed the deceased. This is
contrary to the initial version projected in the F.I.R.
(Ex.PW9/A) that only the accused was harassing the
deceased. Therefore, the version of Manjeet Kaur (PW2)
being contrary to the prosecution case, cannot be relied
upon.
28. Poonam (PW3) stated that the accused started
taunting Meenu for not providing any dowry. She
demanded dowry. Meenu was being told to bring dowry
from her parents. Dowry articles were provided to the
accused. She received a call on 05.05.2007, and Meenu told
her that her parents-in-law were torturing her. She
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29
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narrated the call details to her parents. Meenu committed
suicide subsequently.
29. The statement of this witness also does not
.
mention the details of the demand, and time and the place
of the demand. She also stated that the demands were
made by the accused and her husband, whereas it was
specifically stated in the F.I.R. (Ex. PW9/A) that the
demand was made by the accused Silmo Devi. Therefore,
her testimony does not establish the cruelty to the
deceased.
30. Udhma Devi (PW4) stated that the accused and
her husband ill-treated Meenu. Meenu told about the ill-
treatment. Almirah, bed box and bedding were provided to
the accused, however, the accused did not treat Meenu
properly. The deceased made a call, which was attended by
Poonam. Meenu told that she was being ill-treated by the
accused.
31. The statement of this witness also does not
contain any details of harassment or cruelty. She has also
made a general statement regarding the harassment
without providing particulars of the date, time and place.
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30
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The informant stated in his complaint (Ex. PW1/A) that
the accused started taunting the deceased six months after
her marriage.
.
32. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Kamal & others vs. State of Gujarat & anr. 2025 INSC
504, that when the allegations of the harassment were
limited to taunts without the details, the same are not
sufficient to infer the cruelty. It was observed:-
“11. What is important, for the purposes of
deciding this case, is that in the FIR, there is no
specific allegation of demand of dowry by the
accused. Further, the allegation of harassment of
the complainant at the instance of the parents-
in-law is limited to extending taunts andcustody-related issues of minor children.
However, there is no disclosure about the nature
of those taunts. Admittedly, the secondrespondent was married to the first appellant in
the year 2005, and for the last several years, sincebefore lodging the FIR, the complainant had been
working and staying in rented accommodations atdifferent places. Besides that, the FIR was lodged
on 20.07.2019, just three days after service of
summons of the divorce proceedings initiated by
the first appellant. In these circumstances, we will
have to consider whether the impugned
proceedings are vexatious and mala fide,
particularly in the context of a matrimonial
dispute where time and again, Courts have been
cautioned to be circumspect to obviate malicious
prosecution of family members of the main
accused.
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31
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12. Even if we assume that there are some
allegations of assault and of physical and mental
torture of the complainant, they are against the
husband. As against the parents-in-law, the
allegations are only of extending taunts and of not.
parting with the money for managing household
expenses. Specific details in respect of those
taunts have not been disclosed. Moreover, a few
taunts here and there are a part of everyday life,which, for the happiness of the family, are usually
ignored. Interestingly, as per her own allegations
in the FIR, the complainant admits that when she
reported those issues to her parents and uncle,she was counselled to be patient. In the
circumstances, in our considered view, no case to
proceed against the parents-in-law, namely, the
second and third appellant, is made out.”
33. In the present case, the prosecution’s case
against the accused is confined to the taunts. There was
no other evidence showing the harassment of the
deceased, and the learned Trial Court erred in holding that
the evidence was sufficient to fulfil the ingredients of
cruelty.
34. Dr. R.S. Dhatwalia (DW1) stated that Silmo Devi
was examined by him on 18.6.1988, and she was
diagnosed to be suffering from chronic schizophrenia. He
treated the patient till 2001. The patient suffered from
hallucinations and delusions.
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32
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35. Dr. A.K. Maini (DW2) stated that he examined
Silmo Devi and treated her. He provided a certificate of
treatment. Silmo Devi was suffering from schizophrenia,
.
which could not be cured. S.K.Sharma (DW3) proved the
OPD slip issued in the name of Silmo Devi. Chander
Prabha (DW4) proved the OPD register.
36. Dr. R.S. Dhatwalia stated in his cross-
examination that he could not identify the lady who was
examined by him. However, that is not material because
the prescription slips produced by the accused were issued
in her name, which shows that she was being treated by
the doctors.
37. Learned Trial Court held that the ingredients
of Section 84 of IPC were not satisfied because it was not
proved that the accused was not aware of the nature of the
act or that whatever she was doing was morally wrong.
Indeed, evidence on record does not fulfil the requirement
of Section 84 of the IPC. However, the evidence proved
that the accused is suffering from schizophrenia, which
cannot be cured. As per the statement of Dr. A.K. Maini, a
patient of schizophrenia loses contact with reality.
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33
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Similarly, Dr. R.S. Dhatwalia stated that the patient will
have disorganisation of functions of the mind, will
hallucinate and have delusions. This evidence showed
.
that the accused is not in a fit state of mind, and the
prosecution’s version that she harassed the deceased to
compel her to commit suicide is not acceptable. When the
accused is suffering from schizophrenia, she would not be
in a position to form a rational opinion about the acts
being done by her, and would not have the necessary
mens rea. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Abhinav Mohan Delkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 1725, that the accused must have the
necessary mens rea before he can be held guilty of
abetment of suicide. It was observed:
“22. What comes out essentially from the various
decisions herein before cited is that, even if there isallegation of constant harassment, continued over
a long period; to bring in the ingredients of Section
306 read with Section 107, still there has to be a
proximate prior act to clearly find that the suicide
was the direct consequence of such continuous ha-
rassment, the last proximate incident having fi-
nally driven the subject to the extreme act of tak-
ing one’s life. Figuratively, ‘the straw that broke
the camel’s back’; that final event, in a series, that
occasioned a larger, sudden impact resulting in the
unpredictable act of suicide. What drove the victim
to that extreme act, often depends on individual::: Downloaded on – 23/08/2025 02:28:30 :::CIS
34
( 2025:HHC:28511 )predilections; but whether it is goaded, definitively
and demonstrably, by a particular act of another, is
the test to find mens rea. Merely because the vic-
tim was continuously harassed and at one point, he
or she succumbed to the extreme act of taking his.
life cannot by itself result in finding a positive in-
stigation constituting abetment. Mens rea cannot
be gleaned merely by what goes on in the mind of
the victim.
23. The victim may have felt that there was no al-
ternative or option but to take his life, because of
what another person did or said, which cannot lead
to a finding of mens rea and resultant abetment onthat other person. What constitutes mens rea is the
intention and purpose of the alleged perpetrator as
discernible from the conscious acts or words andthe attendant circumstances, which in all proba-
bility could lead to such an end. The real intentionof the accused and whether he intended by his ac-
tion to at least possibly drive the victim to suicide,
is the sure test. Did the thought of goading the vic-
tim to suicide occur in the mind of the accused, or
whether it can be inferred from the facts and cir-
cumstances arising in the case, as the true testof mens rea would depend on the facts of each case.
The social status, the community setting, the rela-
tionship between the parties and other myriad fac-
tors would distinguish one case from another.
However harsh or severe the harassment, unlessthere is a conscious deliberate intention, mens
rea, to drive another person to suicidal death, there
cannot be a finding of abetment under Section
306.”
38. Learned Trial Court held that a death had taken
place within seven years of the marriage, and the
presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence
Act applied to the present case. This finding cannot be
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35
( 2025:HHC:28511 )
sustained. In the present case, the evidence regarding the
cruelty is not satisfactory, and no reliance can be placed
upon Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid
.
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naresh Kumar
versus the State of Haryana (2024) 3 SCC 573 that the
presumption under Section 113 A of the Indian Evidence
Act will only apply when there is proof of the cruelty. It
was observed: –
“29. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act requires
proof : (1) that her husband or relatives subjected
her to cruelty and (2) that the married woman
committed suicide within a period of seven years
from the date of her marriage.
30. Although it is not necessary for us to refer to
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which raises a
presumption as to dowry death, yet, to indicate the
fine distinction between the two presumptions, weare referring to Section 113-B. In Section 113-A, the
legislature has used the word “may”, whereas inSection 113-B, the word used is “shall”.
31. In this appeal, we are concerned with Section
113-A of the Evidence Act. The mere fact that the
deceased committed suicide within a period of
seven years of her marriage, the presumption
under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, would not
automatically apply. The legislative mandate is
that where a woman commits suicide within seven
years of her marriage, and it is shown that her
husband or any relative of her husband had
subjected her to cruelty, the presumption under
Section 113-A of the Evidence Act may be raised,
having regard to all other circumstances of the
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36
( 2025:HHC:28511 )
case, that such suicide had been abetted by her
husband or by such relative of her husband.
32. What is important to note is that the term “the
court may presume, having regard to all other
circumstances of the case that such suicide had
.
been abetted by her husband” would indicate that
the presumption is discretionary, unlike the
presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence
Act, which is mandatory. Therefore, before the
presumption under Section 113-A is raised, the
prosecution must show evidence of cruelty or
incessant harassment in that regard.
33. The court should be extremely careful in
assessing evidence under Section 113-A for finding
out if cruelty was meted out. If it transpires that a
victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to
ordinary petulance, discord and differences in
domestic life quite common to the society to which
the victim belonged and such petulance, discord
and differences were not expected to induce a
similarly circumstanced individual in a given
society to commit suicide, the conscience of the
court would not be satisfied for holding that the
accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide
was guilty.
34. Section 113-A has been interpreted by this
Court in Lakhjit Singh v. State of Punjab [Lakhjit
Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 173:
1994 SCC (Cri) 235], Pawan Kumar v. State of
Haryana [Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1998)
3 SCC 309: 1998 SCC (Cri) 740] and Shanti v. State
of Haryana [Shanti v. State of Haryana, (1991) 1
SCC 371: 1991 SCC (Cri) 191].
35. This Court has held that from the mere fact of
suicide within seven years of marriage, one should
not jump to the conclusion of abetment unless
cruelty was proved. The court has the discretion to
raise or not to raise the presumption because of the
words “may presume”. It must take into account
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37
( 2025:HHC:28511 )
all the circumstances of the case, which is an
additional safeguard.
36. In the absence of any cogent evidence of
harassment or cruelty, an accused cannot be held
guilty of the offence under Section 306 IPC by
.
raising a presumption under Section 113-A.”
39. A similar view was taken in Abhinav Mohan
Delkar (supra) wherein it was observed:
25. In this context, useful reference can be made to
Sections 113A & 113B of the Indian Evidence Act,1872, providing statutory presumptions in aid of
Sections 498A & 304B, respectively, of the IPC.
When a woman dies by suicide within seven years
of her marriage, if it is shown that she was
subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relative ,
there arises a presumption that the husband or
such relative abetted the suicide, in which event
the penalty under Section 306 is attracted. The
presumption under Section 113A was statutorily
employed by the Parliament, realising the menace
and in an attempt to prevent domestic violence
unleashed on women in the patriarchal society, by
deterrence. This exercise would not have been
necessary if Section 107 did provide for finding
abetment without conscious instigation
constituting mens rea. This Court held in Mangat
Ram v. State of Haryana (2014) 12 SCC 595 that the
provision only enabled the court to presume on the
abetment, having due regard to all other
circumstances of the case and drawing such
presumption is purely within the discretion of the
Court.
40. In the present case, the evidence regarding the
cruelty is not satisfactory, and no reliance can be placed
upon Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act.
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38
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41. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Naresh Kumar versus the State of Haryana (2024) 3 SCC
573 that the prosecution is required to prove that the
.
accused had created such circumstances that the deceased
was left with no other option but to commit suicide. It was
observed:
“17. This Court in Geo Varghese v. State of
Rajasthan [Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan,
(2021) 19 SCC 144], considering the provisions of
Section 306 IPC along with the definition of
abetment under Section 107 IPC, observed as
runder: (SCC pp. 149-50, paras 14-16)“14. Section 306IPC makes abetment of
suicide a criminal offence and prescribes
punishment for the same. …
15. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the
word “instigate” is to bring about or initiate,
incite someone to do something. This Courtin Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh
[Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh,(2001) 9 SCC 618: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088] , has
defined the word “instigate” as under : (SCC
p. 629, para 20)’20. Instigation is to goad, urge
forward, provoke, incite or encourage
to do “an act”.’
16. The scope and ambit of Section 107 IPC
and its correlation with Section 306 IPC have
been discussed repeatedly by this Court. In
S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan [S.S.
Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12
SCC 190: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 465] , it was
observed as under: (SCC p. 197, para 25)::: Downloaded on – 23/08/2025 02:28:30 :::CIS
39
( 2025:HHC:28511 )’25. Abetment involves a mental
process of instigating a person or
intentionally aiding a person in doing
a thing. Without a positive act on the
part of the accused to instigate or aid.
in committing suicide, a conviction
cannot be sustained. The intention of
the legislature and the ratio of the
cases decided by the Supreme Court
are clear that to convict a person under
Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear
mens rea to commit the offence. It also
requires an active act or direct act
which led the deceased to commit
suicide, seeing no option, and that act
must have been intended to push the
deceased into such a position that he
committed suicide.”
18. This Court in M. Arjunan v. State [M.
Arjunan v. State, (2019) 3 SCC 315: (2019) 2 SCC
(Cri) 219], while explaining the necessary
ingredients of Section 306 IPC in detail, observed
as under: (SCC p. 317, para 7)
“7. The essential ingredients of the offence
under Section 306 IPC are (i) the abetment
and (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or
instigate or abet the deceased to commit
suicide. The act of the accused, however,
insulting the deceased by using abusive
language, will not, by itself, constitute the
abetment of suicide. There should be
evidence capable of suggesting that the
accused intended by such an act to instigate
the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the
ingredients of instigation/abetment to
commit suicide are satisfied, the accused
cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC.”
19. This Court in Ude Singh v. State of
Haryana [Ude Singh v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17
SCC 301: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 306 ], held that to
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40
( 2025:HHC:28511 )
convict an accused under Section 306IPC, the state
of mind to commit a particular crime must be
visible with regard to determining the culpability.
It was observed as under: (SCC pp. 321-22, para 16)
“16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide,
.
there must be proof of direct or indirect acts
(s) of incitement to the commission of
suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the
question of the cause of suicide, particularly
in the context of an offence of abetment of
suicide, remains a vexed one involving
multifaceted and complex attributes of
human behaviour and responses/reactions.
In the case of an accusation of abetment of
suicide, the court would be looking for
cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of
r incitement to the commission of suicide. In
the case of suicide, a mere allegation of
harassment of the deceased by another
person would not suffice unless there be
such action on the part of the accused which
compels the person to commit suicide, and
such an offending action ought to be
proximate to the time of occurrence.
Whether a person has abetted the
commission of suicide by another or not
could only be gathered from the facts and
circumstances of each case.
16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a
person has abetted the commission of
suicide by another, the consideration would
be if the accused is guilty of the act of
instigation of the act of suicide. As explained
and reiterated by this Court in the decisions
above referred, instigation means to goad,
urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage
to do an act. If the persons who committed
suicide had been hypersensitive and the
action of the accused is otherwise not
ordinarily expected to induce a similarly
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circumstanced person to commit suicide, it
may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of
abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand,
if the accused, by his acts and by his
continuous course of conduct, creates a
.
situation which leads the deceased to
perceive no other option except to commit
suicide, the case may fall within the four
corners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused
plays an active role in tarnishing the self-
esteem and self-respect of the victim, which
eventually draws the victim to commit
suicide, the accused may be held guilty of
abetment of suicide. The question of mens
rea on the part of the accused in such cases
would be examined with reference to the
actual acts and deeds of the accused and if
the acts and deeds are only of such nature
where the accused intended nothing more
than harassment or snap show of anger, a
particular case may fall short of the offence
of abetment of suicide. However, if the
accused kept on irritating or annoying the
deceased by words or deeds until the
deceased reacted or was provoked, a
particular case may be that of abetment of
suicide. Such being the matter of delicate
analysis of human behaviour, each case is
required to be examined on its own facts
while taking note of all the surrounding
factors having bearing on the actions and
psyche of the accused and the deceased.”
20. This Court in Mariano Anto Bruno v. State
[Mariano Anto Bruno v. State, (2023) 15 SCC 560:
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387 ], after referring to the
above-referred decisions rendered in the context
of culpability under Section 306 IPC, observed as
under: (SCC para 45)
“45. … It is also to be borne in mind that in
cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there::: Downloaded on – 23/08/2025 02:28:30 :::CIS
42
( 2025:HHC:28511 )must be proof of direct or indirect acts of
incitement to the commission of suicide.
Merely on the allegation of harassment
without there being any positive action
proximate to the time of occurrence on the
.
part of the accused which led or compelled
the person to commit suicide, a conviction in
terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.”
21. This Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State of
Punjab [Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020)
10 SCC 200: (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 417] , observed that
whenever a person instigates or intentionally aids
by any act or illegal omission, the doing of a thing,
a person can be said to have abetted in doing that
thing. To prove the offence of abetment, as
specified under Section 107IPC, the state of mind
to commit a particular crime must be visible to
determine the culpability.
22. This Court in Kashibai v. State of Karnataka
[Kashibai v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 15 SCC 751:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 575], observed that to bring
the case within the purview of “abetment” under
Section 107IPC, there has to be an evidence with
regard to the instigation, conspiracy or intentionalaid on the part of the accused and for the purpose
proving the charge under Section 306IPC, alsothere has to be an evidence with regard to the
positive act on the part of the accused to instigateor aid to drive a person to commit suicide.
23. Had there been any clinching evidence of
incessant harassment on account of which the wife
was left with no other option but to put an end to
her life, it could have been said that the accused
intended the consequences of his act, namely,
suicide. A person intends a consequence when he
(1) foresees that it will happen if the given series of
acts or omissions continues and (2) desires it to
happen. The most serious level of culpability,
justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is
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achieved when both these components are actually
present in the accused’s mind (a “subjective” test).
24. For intention in English law, Section 8 of the
Criminal Justice Act, 1967, provides the frame in
which the mens rea is assessed. It states:
.
“A court or jury, in determining whether a person
has committed an offence,
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he
intended or foresaw a result of his actions by
reason only of its being a natural and
probable consequence of those actions, but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or
foresee that result by reference to all the
evidence, drawing such inferences from the
evidence as appear proper in the
r circumstances.”
Under Section 8(b), therefore, the jury is allowed
wide latitude in applying a hybrid test to impute
intent or foresight on the basis of all the evidence.
25. It is now well settled that in order to convict a
person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a
clear mens rea to commit the offence. Mere
harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused
guilty of abetting the commission of suicide. It also
requires an active act or direct act which led the
deceased to commit suicide. The ingredient of
mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly
present but has to be visible and conspicuous.
42. This position was reiterated in Patel Babubhai
Manohardas and others vs State of Gujarat 2025 INSC 322,
wherein it was observed:
15. Attempt to commit suicide is an offence in In-
dia. Section 309 IPC says that whoever attempts to
commit suicide and does any act towards such an
act shall be punished with simple imprisonment
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for a term which may extend to one year or with a
fine or with both. However, once suicide is carried
out, the offence is complete. Considering the na-
ture of the offence, such a person would be beyond
the reach of the law. Therefore, the question of pe-
.
nalising him would not arise, but whoever abets
the commission of such suicide would be penalised
under Section 306 IPC. The punishment prescribed
under Section 306 IPC is imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to 10
years, and shall also be liable to a fine. What Sec-
tion 306 IPC says is that if any person commits
suicide, then whoever abets the commission of
such suicide shall be punished as above.
16. Therefore, the crucial word in Section 306 IPC
is ‘abets’. ‘Abetment’ is defined in Section 107 of
the IPC. As per Section 107 IPC, a person would be
abetting the doing of a thing if he instigates any
person to do that thing, if he encourages one or
more person or persons in any conspiracy for do-
ing that thing or if he intentionally aids by any act
or illegal omission in doing that thing. There are
two explanations for Section 107. As per Explana-
tion 1, even if a person, by way of wilful misrepre-
sentation or concealment of a material fact which
he is otherwise bound to disclose, voluntarily
causes or procures or attempts to cause or procure
a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of
that thing. Explanation 2 clarifies that whoever
does anything in order to facilitate the commission
of an act, either prior to or at the time of the com-
mission of the act, is said to aid in the doing of that
act.
17. Section 114 IPC is an explanation or clarification
of Section 107 IPC. What Section 114 IPC says is that
whenever any person is absent but was present
when the act or offence for which he would be
punishable in consequence of the abetment is
committed, he shall be deemed to have committed
such an act or offence and would be liable to be
punished as an abettor.
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18. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh
(2001) 9 SCC 618, this Court held that to ‘instigate’
means to goad, urge, provoke, incite or encourage
to do ‘an act’. To satisfy the requirement of ‘insti-
gation’, it is not necessary that actual words must
.
be used to that effect or that the words or act
should necessarily and specifically be suggestive of
the consequence. Where the accused, by his act or
omission or by his continued course of conduct,
creates a situation that the deceased is left with no
other option except to commit suicide, then ‘insti-
gation’ may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of
anger or emotion without intending the conse-
quences to actually follow cannot be said to be ‘in-
stigation’
19. Elaborating further, this Court in Chitresh Ku-
mar Chopra versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
(2009) 16 SCC 605 observed that to constitute ‘in-
stigation’, a person who instigates another has to
provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an
act by the other by ‘goading’ or ‘urging forward’.
This Court summed up the constituents of ‘abet-
ment’ as under:
(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying
the deceased by words, deeds or wilfulomission or conduct which may even be a
wilful silence until the deceased reacted or
pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds,
words or wilful omission or conduct to makethe deceased move forward more quickly in a
forward direction; and
(ii) that the accused had the intention to
provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to
commit suicide while acting in the manner
noted above. Undoubtedly, the presence of
mens rea is the necessary concomitant of
instigation.
20. Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu versus State of West
Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707 is a case where this Court
held that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide,
there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of
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46
( 2025:HHC:28511 )
incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on
the allegation of harassment without there being
any positive action proximate to the time of
occurrence on the part of the accused which led or
compelled the deceased to commit suicide,
.
conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not
be sustainable. A similar view has been expressed
by this Court in the case of Ude Singh versus State
of Haryana (2019) 17 SCC 301
21. After considering the provisions of Sections 306
and 107 of IPC, this Court in Rajesh versus State of
Haryana (2020) 15 SCC 359 held that conviction
under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the
allegation of harassment without there being any
positive action proximate to the time of occurrence
on the part of the accused which led or compelled
the person to commit suicide.
22. Abetment to commit suicide involves a mental
process of instigating a person or intentionally
aiding a person in the doing of a thing. Without a
positive proximate act on the part of the accused to
instigate or aid in committing suicide, a conviction
cannot be sustained. Besides, in order to convict a
person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a
clear mens rea to commit the offence.
23. This Court in Amudha versus State 2024 INSC
244 held that there has to be an act of incitement
on the part of the accused proximate to the date on
which the deceased committed suicide. The act at-
tributed should not only be proximate to the time
of suicide but should also be of such a nature that
the deceased was left with no alternative but to
take the drastic step of committing suicide.
24. Again, in the case of Kamaruddin Dastagir
Sanadi versus State of Karnataka (2024) SCC
Online SC 3541, this Court observed that discord
and differences in domestic life are quite common
in society. The commission of suicide largely
depends upon the mental state of the victim. Until
and unless some guilty intention on the part of the
accused is established, it is ordinarily not possible
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to convict the accused for an offence under Section
306 IPC.
25. Prakash versus State of Maharashtra. 2024
INSC 1020 is a case where this Court, after
analysing various decisions on the point, summed
.
up the legal position in the following manner:
14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of the
IPC has been interpreted, time and again,
and its principles are well established. Toattract the offence of abetment to suicide, it
is important to establish proof of direct or
indirect acts of instigation or incitement of
suicide by the accused, which must be inclose proximity to the commission of suicide
by the deceased. Such instigation or
incitement should reveal a clear mens rea to
abet the commission of suicide and shouldput the victim in such a position that he/she
would have no other option but to commit
suicide.
25.1. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court referred
to its earlier decision in Sanju @ Sanjay SinghSengar versus State of M.P. (2002) 5 SCC 371 and
held that in a given case, even a time gap of 48
hours between using of abusive language by theaccused and the commission of suicide would not
amount to a proximate act.”
43. In the present case, the evidence on record is
insufficient to conclude that the accused had created such
circumstances that the deceased was left with no other
option but to commit suicide.
44. Learned Trial Court was swayed by the fact
that the witness consistently deposed about the
harassment. He did not have the advantage of judgments
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( 2025:HHC:28511 )of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, noticed above, requiring
that the allegations of cruelty in a matrimonial home have
to be proved specifically by mentioning date, time and
.
place, which ingredients are not satisfied in the present
case. Hence, the judgment and order passed by the
learned Court cannot be sustained.
45. In view of the above, the present appeal is
allowed and the accused is acquitted of the charged
offences. The fine amount be refunded after the expiry of
the period of limitation in case no appeal is preferred, and
in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
46. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the appellant/accused is
directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/-
with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of
the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six
months with a stipulation that in an event of a Special
Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on
grant of the leave, the appellant/accused on receipt of
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notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court.
47. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also
.
the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
48. A copy of the judgment, along with records of
the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.
22 August, 2025.
(yogesh)
to (Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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