Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Sm. Aroti Paul And Another vs The State Of West Bengal And Others on 27 August, 2025
Author: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
Bench: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
2025:CHC-AS:1654-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
The Hon'ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon'ble Justice Uday Kumar
WPLRT No. 146 of 2015
Sm. Aroti Paul and Another
Vs.
The State of West Bengal and others
For the petitioners : Mr. Supratim Dhar, Ld. Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Jagabandhu Roy,
Mr. Balailal Sahoo ... Advocates
For the State : Mr. Lalit Mohan Mahata, Ld. AGP,
Mr. Rudranil De ... Advocates
Heard on : 12.08.2025 & 20.08.2025
Reserved on : 20.08.2025
Judgment on : 27.08.2025
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1.
The writ petitioners had challenged an order dated July 13, 2015 passed
by the First Bench of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy
Tribunal in O.A. 306 of 2015 (LRTT), whereby the petitioners’ application
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for a direction on the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer (BL & LRO),
Goghat – II at Kamarpukur, District – Hooghly, regarding permission to
give a fresh option to surrender 84 decimals of land in Mouza – Idalbati
in plot no. 1704 in exchange of vested lands being 56 decimals in plot
no. 6843 and 28 decimals in plot no. 6932, has been turned down.
2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners argues that
initially a determination was made by the concerned BL & LRO on
September 3, 1985 in respect of the land of the predecessor-in-interest of
the petitioner to be vested with the State under the West Bengal Land
Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1955 Act”). However,
one of the married daughters of the original raiyat was excluded from the
family of the raiyat for the purpose of calculation of the ceiling limit, in
derogation of Section 14K(c) of the 1955 Act. Whereas the date of vesting
was February 15, 1971, which was to be taken as the cut-off date under
Chapter – II B of the 1955 Act for the purpose of calculation of the ceiling
limit, the said daughter was married in the year 1977 and, as such, was
erroneously excluded from the calculation.
3. Learned senior counsel next argues that there was no independent
enquiry under Section 14N of the 1955 Act, read with Rule 14B of the
West Bengal Land Reforms Rules, 1965 (for short, “the 1965 Rules”), for
the purpose of calculating as to what portion of the vested land was
irrigable and what was not. The composite adjudication under Section
14T(3) of the 1955 Act, without a prior independent adjudication under
Section 14N, it is argued, deprived the petitioners’ predecessor from
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preferring a challenge under Section 14-O against such adjudication.
Since separate appeals are provided for in the statute, under Section 54
against an order under Section 14T (3) and under Section 14-O against
orders under Section 14N of the 1955 Act, it is argued that non-
adjudication under Section 14N vitiated the determination.
4. Thus, the said adjudication ought to have been reopened and a fresh
option of retention permitted to be given by the petitioners.
5. It is further argued that the original raiyat died on June 17, 1990,
whereas the vesting proceeding was pending even thereafter. Learned
senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners contends that the
original order of vesting was challenged by way of a writ petition, which
was subsequently transferred to the Tribunal but was later on dismissed
for default. During the pendency of the writ petition, there was a stay
order operating, due to which the vesting proceeding was stalled. It is
submitted that upon transfer to the Tribunal, by operation of law, the
stay order expired after the period stipulated under the West Bengal
Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunals Act, 1997 (in brief, “the 1997 Act”).
It is argued that a vesting proceeding is not concluded till possession is
taken under Section 14SS of the 1955 Act. The continuance of the
vesting proceeding after the demise of the raiyat was vitiated in law and
a nullity, being in the name of a dead person.
6. It is next contended by the petitioners that the dismissal for default of
the writ petition challenging the vesting, subsequently transferred to the
Tribunal, could not operate as res judicata.
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7. Learned senior counsel cites Reazuddin Ahmed – versus – State of West
Bengal & Ors., reported at 1982 (1) CLJ 434, and Haidar Ali Mondal v.
State of West Bengal and Ors., reported at 88 C.W.N. 536, in support of
the contention that there has to be an adjudication under Section 14K(d)
of the 1955 Act prior to passing a vesting order to find out what portion
of the land is comprised of irrigated area. In absence of the same, the
vesting itself is vitiated.
8. Learned senior counsel cites Gokul Chandra Pal – versus – State of West
Bengal & Ors., reported at (1988) 2 CHN 41, in order to support the
contention that the relevant date for a determination under Section
14T(3) of the 1955 Act is the date on which Chapter – II B came into
force. Thus, the date of consideration ought to have been taken to be the
date of vesting and, as such, the exclusion of the daughter of the original
raiyat, who was married after the date of vesting, was bad in law.
9. Learned senior counsel cites Surya Dev Rai – versus – Ram Chander Rai
and others, reported at (2003) 6 SCC 675, to argue the scope of Article
226/Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the interference
thereunder.
10. It is contended that before coming to a conclusion finally as regards
vesting, an opportunity ought to have been given to the raiyat to amend
the appropriate form, for which proposition learned senior counsel cites
Krittibus Bhattacharya and Others – versus – State of West Bengal and
Others, reported at (1983-84) 88 CWN 485.
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11. Learned senior counsel lastly cites Satyadhyan Ghosal and others –
versus – Deorajin Debi (Smt) and Another, reported at AIR 1960 SC 941,
to explain the concept of res judicata. A dismissal for default, and not on
merits, it is argued, cannot operate as res judicata. However, it is
contended that the learned Tribunal proceeded on the premise that since
the previous Tribunal application of the writ petitioners’ predecessor was
dismissed for default, the adjudication could not be reopened, which is
erroneous and contrary to the settled position of law, according to the
petitioners.
12. Learned Additional Government Pleader (AGP) controverts the above
submissions and argues that upon an adjudication under Section 14T(3)
being done (in the present case, on September 3, 1985) the vesting is
concluded. The demise of the original raiyat in 1990, subsequent
thereto, does not vitiate such vesting retrospectively.
13. Mere, non-taking of possession under Section 14SS does not keep the
vesting process open, it is submitted.
14. Learned AGP argues that an exhaustive exercise of giving several
opportunities of hearing to the raiyat was undertaken by the BL & LRO.
Innumerable hearing dates were fixed, but the original raiyat avoided the
same and ultimately, upon giving adequate hearing to the raiyat, the
determination under Section 14T (3) was done.
15. Learned AGP further contends that vesting happens by operation of law
and is not dependent on possession being taken and, as such, stood
concluded in the present case on the date of vesting itself.
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16. Since the previous Tribunal application of the writ petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest was dismissed for default, the said chapter, it is
argued, cannot be reopened.
17. Learned AGP relies on Bharat Singh and others – versus – State of
Haryana and others, reported at AIR 1988 SC 2181, for the proposition
that both facts and evidence are to be pleaded in a writ petition, unlike a
suit. In the present case, no evidence of the allegations made is found
from the writ petition or its annexures and, as such, the present writ
petition ought to be dismissed.
18. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Upon consideration of the above
contentions, this Court arrives at the following FINDINGS:
(i) Non-consideration of Section 14K and Section 14N of the
1955 Act
19. The admitted fact of the case, as evident from the annexures to the writ
petition as well, is that by an order dated September 3, 1985, the
concerned Revenue Officer adjudicated the portion of the land of the
original raiyat, the predecessor-in-interest of the writ petitioners, which
was to be vested and the portion thereof which was to be retained. The
original raiyat was given hearing before doing so. It is reflected in the
order itself that a determination under Section 14K (c) of the 1955 Act
was done prior to coming to the findings in the said order. The specific
adjudication of irrigated and non-irrigated areas was undertaken while
doing so, which is also evident from the said order itself. Thus, it cannot
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be said that no opportunity of hearing was given to the raiyat or that
there was no adjudication under Section 14N or Section 14K prior to
passing the order under Section 14T(3).
20. Relying on the principles laid down in Bharat Singh (supra)1, it may very
well be said that unlike a suit, where evidence need not be pleaded, a
writ petition is a self-sufficient proceeding, where both pleadings and the
evidence are required to be averred and annexed. We do not find
anything on record to substantiate the allegations of the writ petitioners
that their predecessor, the original raiyat, was not given adequate
opportunity of hearing. Rather, the contrary is evident from the order-
sheet of the said proceeding, annexed to the writ petition itself.
(ii) Effect of demise of original raiyat in the year 1990
21. The next question which arises is whether the demise of the original
raiyat on June 17, 1990 vitiated the vesting. The vesting order was
passed on September 3, 1985. Thus, under Section 14S of the 1955 Act,
the vesting stood complete on the said date, upon an adjudication being
made compositely under Section 14T(3) as well as Section 14K(c) and
Section 14K(d), read with Section 14N, of the 1955 Act. The very
language of Section 14SS of the said Act makes it abundantly clear that
the vesting occurs much prior to the possession being taken. Sub-
section (1) of Section 14SS begins with the expression “Upon vesting of
any land in the State under any of the provisions of this Act, …”. Thus,
1. Bharat Singh and others – versus – State of Haryana and others, reported at AIR 1988 SC 2181
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the vesting precedes the possession. Hence, it cannot be argued that
unless possession is taken, the process of vesting is not complete. The
entire scheme of the 1955 Act indicates that the vesting is complete on
an adjudication under Section 14T(3), by operation of Section 14S of the
said Act.
22. Hence, the subsequent demise of the original raiyat in the year 1990
does not vitiate the vesting in any manner.
(iii) Effect of previous challenge
23. The order of vesting was specifically challenged by the original raiyat by
way of a writ petition, which was subsequently transferred by operation
of the 1997 Act to the Tribunal. Upon the said application being
dismissed for default by the Tribunal for non-appearance of the original
raiyat, the proceeding came to an end.
24. The principle laid down in Satyadhyan Ghosal (supra)2 is indisputable, to
the effect that unless there is an adjudication on merits, the principle of
res judicata does not come into play. However, although it cannot be
said that the challenge to the vesting order is barred by res judicata, the
dismissal for default of the Tribunal application debars the writ
petitioners from challenging the self-same vesting order, since they claim
thorough the original raiyat, by operation of the principle of Order IX
Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. Satyadhyan Ghosal and others -versus – Deorajin Debi (Smt) and Another, reported at AIR 1960 SC 941
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25. It is well-settled that where there is no specific provision or rules
governing writ petitions in a particular field, the principles of the Code of
Civil Procedure apply to writ petitions or applications akin to it.
26. Even otherwise, no challenge has been preferred to the vesting orders
subsequently. Thus, the question of res judicata on such count is
academic.
CONCLUSIONS
27. Till date, the vesting order dated September 3, 1985 has not been
challenged either by the original raiyat or by the writ petitioners
subsequent to the dismissal of the previous dismissal of the previous
challenge to the same for default. Hence, the vesting has attained
finality and cannot now be reopened on either the ground of non-
compliance of Section 14N, read with Section 14K(d), or Section 14K(c) of
the 1955 Act.
28. Accordingly, not only does the previous dismissal of the Tribunal
application stand in the way of a further challenge to the vesting order,
in fact, no further challenge has been preferred at all. Thus, the vesting
order has attained finality and cannot now be reopened on any ground
whatsoever.
29. Although Section 14T (3A) of the 1955 Act permits the Revenue Officer to
reopen a final determination under Section 14T (3) on the parameters
laid down in sub-Section (3A), such an option is not available to the
raiyat.
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30. In view of the above observations, Reazuddin Ahmed (supra)3 and Haidar
Ali Mondal (supra)4 are not germane in the present case, since we have
already held that the issue of vesting cannot be reopened.
31. Even otherwise, the order of vesting itself reflects clearly that the
Revenue Officer fully considered the provisions of Section 14K(c) and
Section 14N, read with Section 14K(d), of the 1955 Act while passing the
order dated September 3, 1985.
32. Insofar as Krittibus Bhattacharya (supra)5 is concerned, the said case
arose from a civil suit. The learned Single Judge of this Court dwelt on
the scope of amending Form-B under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition
Rules, 1954 and dealt with the scope of adducing evidence in a suit. We
do not find any manner of application of the proposition laid down
therein in the present case.
33. Surya Dev Rai (supra)6 merely lays down the general scope of interference
under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India and do not have any
direct bearing upon the present consideration.
34. In view of the above discussions, we do not find any illegality or
irregularity in the impugned order of the Tribunal.
35. Accordingly, WPLRT No. 146 of 2015 is dismissed on contest, thereby
affirming the judgment dated July 13, 2015 passed by the First Bench,
3. Reazuddin Ahmed – versus – State of West Bengal & Ors., reported at 1982 (1) CLJ 434
4. Haidar Ali Mondal v. State of West Bengal and Ors., reported at 88 C.W.N. 536
5. Krittibus Bhattacharya and Others – versus – State of West Bengal and Others, reported at
(1983-84) 88 CWN 485
6. Surya Dev Rai – versus – Ram Chander Rai and others, reported at (2003) 6 SCC 675
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West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal in O.A. 306 of 2015
(LRTT).
36. There will be no order as to costs.
37. Urgent certified server copies, if applied for, be issued to the parties upon
compliance of due formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Uday Kumar, J.)
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