Karnataka High Court
Smt. Gangamma vs State Of Karnataka on 21 July, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 15.07.2025
Pronounced on : 21.07.2025 R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF JULY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.6626 OF 2025 (LA - RES)
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. GANGAMMA
W/O LATE HANUMANTHA BHOVI
@ HANUMANTHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
R/O NO. 2/1, 1ST CROSS,
DODDABASTHI MAIN ROAD,
BHUVANESHWARI NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 056.
2. SRI SRINIVAS,
S/O LATE HANUMANTHA BHOVI @
HANUMANTHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
R/O NO. 2/1, 1ST CROSS,
DODDABASTHI MAIN ROAD,
BHUVANESHWARI NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 056.
3. SMT. MUNIYAMMA,
W/O LATE BASAVARAJU,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
R/O NO. 31, 1ST CROSS, 1ST STAGE,
2
BHUVANESHWARI NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 056.
4. SRI MANJU B.,
S/O LATE BASAVARAJU
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
R/O NO.31, 1ST CROSS, 1ST STAGE,
BHUVANESHWARI NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 056.
5. SMT. LAKSHMI,
D/O LATE BASAVARAJU
W/O VENKATESH BHOVI,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
R/O M. MANIAYAMBAL VILLAGE,
MARALWADI HOBLI, KANAKPURA TALUK,
RAMANAGARA - 562 121.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI K.N.PHANINDRA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI BHARATH KUMAR V., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY,
REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
HAVING OFFICE AT V.V. TOWERS,
6TH FLOOR, AMBEDKARVEEDHI,
BENGALURU - 560 001.
3. M/S GAVIPURAM EXTENSION HOUSE BUILDING
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD.,
3
REGISTERED UNDER
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT 1959
HAVING OFFICE AT NO. 50, 3RD CROSS,
GAVIPURAM EXTENSION,
BENGALURU - 560 019.
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT.
4. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,
KENGERI GATE SUB-DIVISION,
HAVING OFFICE AT
GNANABHARATHI POLICE STATION,
NAGARBHAVI,
BENGALURU - 560 072.
5. INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
GNANABHARATHI POLICE STATION,
NAGARBHAVI,
BENGALURU - 560 072.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI SPOORTHY HEGDE N., HCGP FOR R-1, 2, 4 AND 5;
SRI D.R.RAVISHANKAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
SRI K.ANANDA, ADVOCATE FOR C/R-3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECTION
DECLARING THAT THE LAND MEASURING 2 ACRES AND 20
GUNTAS RESPECTIVELY GRANTED TO THE PREDECESSORS IN
INTEREST OF THE PETITIONERS, i.e., LATE VENKATA BHOVI @
DASAPPA AND LATE HANUMANTHA BHOVI RESPECTIVELY HAVE
BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE ACQUISITION PROCESS INITIATED
VIDE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION DATED 31.07.1986 AND
BEARING NO. LAQ(1)(SR).7.86-87 ISSUED UNDER SECTION 4(1)
OF THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 VIDE ANNEXURE-B AND
FINAL NOTIFICATION DATED 22.01.1987 BEARING NO RD.128 AQB
84, ISSUED UNDER SECTION 6(1) OF THE LAND ACQUISITION
ACT, 1894, VIDE ANNEXURE-C FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMATION
4
OF LAYOUT CALLED 'GAVIPURAM EXTENSION HBCS LAYOUT' VIDE
NOTIFICATION DATED 03.09.1993 BEARING NO. RD 39 AQB 94
ISSUED UNDER SECTION 48(1) OF THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT
1894 VIDE ANEXURE-A.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 15.07.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioners are before this Court seeking the following
prayer:
(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or
direction declaring that the land measuring 2 acres and
20 guntas respectively granted to the predecessors in
interest of the petitioners i.e., late Venkata Bhovi @
Dasappa and late Hanumantha Bhovi respectively have
been withdrawn from the acquisition process initiated vide
preliminary notification dated 31-07-1986 and bearing
No.LAQ (1)(SR).7.86-87 issued under Section 4(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, vide Annexure-B and final
notification dated 22-01-1987 bearing No.RD 128 AQB 84
issued under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, vide Anenxure-C for the purpose of formation of
layout called 'Gavipuram Extension HBCS Layout' vide
notification dated 03-09-1993 bearing No.RD 39 AQB 94
issued under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, vide Annexure-A."
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2. Heard Sri K.N. Phanindra, learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioners, Sri Spoorthy Hegde N, learned High Court
Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1, 2, 4 and 5 and
Sri D.R. Ravishankar, learned senior counsel appearing for
respondent No.3.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -
The petitioners are said to be the legal representatives of late
Venkata Bhovi and Hanumantha Bhovi who are said to have been
granted 2 acres and 20 guntas of land in Sy.No.26 of
Nagadevanahalli Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk in
terms of an official memorandum dated 09-01-1979. The said land
was said to be under unauthorized occupation and cultivation of the
aforesaid two persons. Recognizing unauthorized occupation, they
come to be granted by the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore
District in the aforesaid official memorandum and consequently the
names of late Venkata Bhovi and late Hanumantha Bhovi were
mutated into the revenue records in respect of Schedule A & B
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properties. It is claimed, all the revenue entries stood in the name
of those two persons.
4. On 31-07-1986 a preliminary notification is issued under
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act' for short)
seeking to acquire the property in question along with other
properties in the said vicinity for formation of a residential layout on
a plan prepared by the 3rd respondent/Gavipuram Extension House
Building Co-operative Society Limited ('the Society' for short). After
issuance of the preliminary notification, a final notification comes to
be issued on 22-01-1987. After issuance of the final notification,
the 2nd respondent passes an award under Section 11(2) of the Act
fixing the amount of compensation at ₹65,000/- per acre and
₹15,000/- per acre for solatium and interest in terms of the award
so notified on 06-06-1987. Subsequent to the notification of award,
the Divisional Commissioner, Bangalore Division, deposits the
amount of the award on 09-10-1987. After all the aforesaid events,
it appears that Venkata Bhovi dies.
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5. The legal heirs of Venkata Bhovi began submission of
representations to drop the property in question from the process of
acquisition. The representation dated 12-11-1992 is appended to
the petition. Subsequent communications between the Government
and the legal heirs of the original grantees galore. It is the
averment in the petition that a report was sought for from the
hands of the Special Deputy Commissioner and a recommendation
was made on 23-04-1993 to drop the lands of the petitioners from
acquisition and a draft notification under Section 48(1) of the Act
was communicated. It is on the strength of this communication, the
entire fulcrum of the present petition is based. The pleading travel
from 1993 to 24-01-2025 when they approached the 2nd
respondent for a no objection certificate, wherein the fact of
promulgation of a particular notification by the 1st respondent dated
03-09-1993 was projected and on that ground the lands are said to
be deleted from acquisition process. Non-consideration of those
grounds that are projected in the representations leads the
petitioners to this Court, seeking the aforesaid prayer of issuance of
a writ in the nature of mandamus, declaring that the subject lands
8
are deemed to be withdrawn from preliminary notification dated
31-07-1986.
6. The learned senior counsel Sri K.N. Phanindra appearing
for the petitioners would vehemently contend that this Court would
secure the records and go into the issue of the lands being dropped
from acquisition. The lands would be the properties of the
petitioners. Therefore, the petition is filed only on the promise that
the notification dated 03-09-1993, which is appended to the
petition, would enure to the benefit of the petitioners. He would
further contend that if the lands had been dropped pursuant to a
notification, the acquisition process will have to be quashed insofar
as the present lands are concerned.
7. Per contra, the learned senior counsel Sri D.R. Ravishankar
appearing for respondent No.3, beneficiary of the acquisition would
vehemently contend that the petition has to be dismissed with
exemplary costs, as it is on the face it an abuse of the process of
law. The family members of original grantees are before this Court
for the seventh time. At every stage, the claim of these petitioners
9
challenging the acquisition has been dismissed, not only by the
learned single Judges but even by the Division Bench. Those
dismissals have become final. Now on a new plea of a notification
of 1993 which at all times was available to be urged in all previous
six petitions that stood dismissed is given up and now they are
wanting it to be projected that the acquisition process should be
quashed on the score that the lands are dropped from acquisition.
The possession of the lands including the lands of the petitioners
are taken in the year 1987 itself. Therefore, he would submit that
without going into the merit of the matter as to whether the
notification was in existence or otherwise, the petition should be
dismissed with a caution that they should not approach this Court
on the same cause of action over again.
8. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner would join issue in
clarifying that this ground was never urged in the earlier petitions.
They have come to know of the notification only recently and,
therefore, they have now urged this ground in the subject petition.
It is a right to property and, therefore, on the ground that six
10
petitions have been dismissed, the subject petition cannot be
thrown out. They are entitled to relief without their seeking,
notwithstanding the challenge to the acquisition process after close
to 40 years of the notification and even 36 years after taking of
possession of the property. He would seek the prayer be granted.
9. The learned High Court Government Pleader would, on
verification of the records, submit that there is a communication
found in the records which was not gazetted. If it is not gazetted
Section 48(1) of the Act would not become applicable and would
admit that all proceedings of acquisition got over in the year 1987
itself. He would further contend if the entire acquisition process was
over in 1987, the passing of an order under Section 48(1) would
not arise. He would seek dismissal of the petition.
10. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned senior counsel, as also the learned
High Court Government Pleader and have perused the material on
record.
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11. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record or are the
averments in the petition or the statement of objections. The
predecessors of the petitioners, one late Venkata Bhovi, and
Hanumantha Bhovi were granted lands in the year 1979. The 3rd
respondent is a co-operative society registered under the Karnataka
Co-operative Societies Act, 1959. Respondent No.3 in order to meet
the needs of its members had approached Government of
Karnataka to acquire lands at Nagadevanahalli village, Kengeri
Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk to form a layout of sites thereon and
to allot them to its members. In furtherance of the said request,
Government of Karnataka issues a preliminary notification on
31-07-1986 under Section 4(1) of the Act. This comes to be
published in the Official Gazette on 14-08-1986 whereby 16 acres
and 6 guntas of land was sought to be acquired including the
granted lands of the petitioners.
12. Pursuant to issuance of preliminary notification, a final
notification comes to be issued on 22-01-1987 for formation of the
layout of the Society. An award is passed on 06-06-1987 under
Section 11(2) of the Act and the 3rd respondent deposited the
12
compensation amount as awarded by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer and notified the kathedars of the said compensation amount.
The kathedars then i.e., the predecessors of the petitioners
received the compensation amount in respect of their lands.
Pursuant to the entire acquisition process coming to an end, the
Special Land Acquisition Officer takes possession of entire 16 acres
6 guntas of land on 09-11-1987. The original grantees late Venkata
Bhovi and Hanumantha Bhovi voluntarily handed over possession of
lands to the 2nd respondent on 09-11-1987. The documents of
voluntarily handing over possession are appended to the petition.
These facts are not in dispute.
FIRST ROUND OF LITIGATION:
13. After the Special Land Acquisition Officer taking
possession of land on 09-11-1987, there was some delay in
handing over lands to the 3rd respondent. On the said score begins
the saga of litigation by the original grantees, the predecessors or
ancestors of the petitioners. The first of the writ petition was filed
13
in Writ Petition No.29888 of 1994. The prayer in the said writ
petition is as follows:
"Prayer
Wherefore, the petitioner most respectfully prays that this
Hon'ble Court be pleased to:
a). Issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other
appropriate order, direction or writ.
thereby directing the second respondent
to deliver the possession of the
schedule land, and
b) grant such other relief or reliefs as deemed
just, to the petitioner, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, In the interest of
justice and equity.
Interim Prayer
Pending final disposal of the above writ petition, the
petitioner prays that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct the
second respondent to hand over the possession of the schedule
land, in the petitioner Society, in the Interest of justice and
equity.
Schedule
All that part and parcel of 16 acres 16 guntas of land
situated in survey No.26 of Nagadevanahalli Kengeri Hobli,
Bangalore South Taluka, which have been acquired under
LA-.SR.7/87-88."
(Emphasis added)
The said writ petition comes to be dismissed by an order of the
learned single Judge on 05-12-1994. The order reads as follows:
14
"The Petitioners are House Building Co-operative
Societies. For their benefit, the State Government
initiated acquisition proceedings under the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The acquisition
proceedings have been completed by passing of the
award and taking possession of the lands from the
owners/persons interested in the lands. It appears, the
Government has also received the whole of the amount
from the respective Co-operative Societies towards the
compensation amount payable to the owners of the
land/persons interested,
2. The grievances of the petitioners are despite the fact
that the Government has taken possession of the lands, the
same have not been delivered to the respective Societies
without assigning any reason.
3. Smt. Bharathi Nagesh, learned High Court Government
Pleader was not is a position to give any valid reason except
stating that it is a "policy decision of the Government" not to
hand over possession of the lands acquired for the Societies
without first collecting certain data in respect of the Societies in
question. In this regard, the learned High Court Government
pleader submitted that the State Cabinet has to take decision in
these matters.
4. When the acquisition proceedings have been
completed for the benefit of the respective Societies and
its members and amounts have been received from them,
it is difficult to understand the hesitation on the part of
the Government to hand over possession. When there are
no legal obstacles for handing over possession of the
lands, the respondents cannot avoid their commitment by
merely making a general statement that since handing
over possession of the lands is a "policy decisions of the
Government and the Cabinet has to take a decision in that
regard, possession of the lands have not been given to
the respective Societies. If the authorities think that
Cabinet decision is necessary, such decision cannot be
withheld for an indefinite period.
5. In this view of the matter, I issue the following
directions:-
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(i) In W.P.No.11349/93, a direction is
issued to the 1st and 2nd respondents to
deliver possession of the lands in
question to the petitioner-Society on or
before 31-1-1995;
(ii) In W.P.No.29888/94, a direction is
issued to respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to
deliver possession of the lands in
question to the petitioner-Society on or
before 31-1-1995; and
(iii) In W.P.No.31968/94, a direction is issued to
the respondents to deliver possession of the
lands in question to the petitioner-Society on
or before 31-1-1995.
6. Though, I am convinced that the filing of these
petitions by the Societies became necessary because of
the inordinate delay on the part of the Authorities in
handing over possession without valid reasons, I desist
from imposing heavy costs on the assurance of the
learned High Court Government Pleader that the
Authorities would abide by the directions given above
within the time stipulated. Writ Petitions allowed."
(Emphasis supplied)
The learned single Judge directed the Authorities to take possession
of the property and desisted from imposing heavy costs on the
assurance of the Government Pleader that the Authorities would
abide by the direction of handing over possession. Immediately,
thereafter, possession was handed over to the 3rd respondent and
the 3rd respondent is said to be in possession of the said lands from
16
the said date. The documents of handing over possession are
appended to the statement of objections. All nuances for formation
of the layout takes place at the hands of the 3rd respondent.
SECOND ROUND OF LITIGATION:
14. Thereafter, second petition is filed in Writ Petition
No.3470 of 1997 challenging the preliminary notification and the
final notification afore-narrated, now by the wife and children of the
first original grantee Venkatabovi. The prayer in the said writ
petition is as follows:
"i. ISSUE a writ of certiorari or any other writ, or order
quashing the acquisition notifications No. LAC (1)
SR.07/86-87 dated 31.03.86 and as per 'ANNEXURE
K' and notification No.RD.128.A0B.84 dated.
22.01.87 as per ANNEXURE 'L' in so far as it relates
to the property bearing sy.no.26, khatha No.155,
measuring 2 acres situated at Nagadevanahalli
village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk
Bangalore district surrounded by
East by : Entrance and Muniyappa's property
West by: Hanumaiah's property
North by: Lingappa's property.
South by: Chinnappa's property,
ii. ISSUE a writ of certiorari or any other writ or order,
quashing the award passed by the third respondent
dated.06.06.07 in No.SLAC/HBCS/17/64-85 vide
17
ANNEXURE 'M' in so far as it relates to the petition
lands.
iii. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ, order or
direction, directing the respondents not to disturb the
petitioners' possession of the land in any way;
iv. PASS such other order or direction as deems fit under the
facts and circumstances of the case including an order of
costs of this application in the interest of justice and
equity."
(Emphasis added)
This writ petition comes to be dismissed again by an order dated
11-03-1997 by the very same learned single Judge who had
dismissed the first writ petition. This becomes the second
dismissal. Observations in the said order assume certain
significance. They read as follows:
".... .... ....
2. Under Preliminary Notification, dated 31-3-1986,
gazette copy of which is marked as Annexure-K, certain
lands were notified for acquisition, including two acres in
Sy.No.26 situated at Nagadevanahalli village, Kengeri
Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore. The proposed
acquisition was for the benefit of the 4th respondent-
House Building Co-operative Society. The final
notification is dated 22-1-1987, gazette copy of which is
marked as Annexure-L. Copy of the award, dated 6-
6-1987, is marked as Annexure-M. From a perusal of the
award, it is obvious that the husband of the 1st petitioner
and father of petitioner Nos.3 to 5 had participated in the
award proceedings and had claimed compensation of Rs.
80,000/- per acre. Accordingly, the award has been
passed.
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3. Since it is a consent award, question of assailing the
validity of the notification does not arise. Besides as noticed
above, the final notification is of the year 1987. The petition is
liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches also.
4. Sri K.L. Manjunath, learned Counsel for the 4th
respondent-Society with reference to the statement of
objections filed by the Society submitted that the 1st
petitioner, as a matter of fact had filed original suit
bearing No.O.S. 379/93 on the file of the II Munsiff,
Bangalore, seeking an injunction order against the 4th
respondent-Society. Ultimately, the said suit was
dismissed on 4-10-1993. This material fact has been
suppressed by the petitioners in the petition. The petition
also fails on the ground of suppressing material facts.
5. In the result, this petition is dismissed."
(Emphasis supplied)
The learned single Judge observes that since it is a consent award,
question of assailing the validity of the notification does not arise.
Besides, as noticed above, the final notification is of the year 1987.
The petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay as well.
On all the said grounds comes the dismissal second in line.
THIRD ROUND OF LITIGATION:
15. The petitioners therein had also filed a civil suit in
O.S.No.379 of 1993 seeking injunction against the Society which
also had been dismissed on 04-10-1993 and this has been
19
suppressed by the petitioners. Rejection is third in line, as the civil
suit had also been dismissed.
FOURTH ROUND OF LITIGATION:
16. A third writ petition comes to be filed by the son of late
Venkata Bhovi in Writ Petition No.36917-22 of 2003 seeking the
very same prayer. The prayer reads as follows:
"PRAYER
Wherefore, the petitioners pray that this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to
(a) Issue a writ of certiorari any other appropriate writ,
order or direction quashing the notifications in No.
LAQ (1) SR 7/8687 dated 31.7.1986 and final
notifications No. RD 128 AQB 84 dated 22.1.1987
issued by the second respondent produced at
Annexures A and B and the award under section 11
(2) of the Land Acquisition Act in case No. SLAQ
HBCS 17/1984-85 produced at Annexure C and
endorsement dated 10.01.2003 No. LAQ HBCS
17/84-85 produced at Annexure E issued by the
second respondent.
(b) Pass an order directing respondent No.3 not to interfere
with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
property.
(c) Grant such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to
grant in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the
interest of justice and equity."
(Emphasis added)
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This also comes to be dismissed by a learned single Judge on
25-08-2003. The order reads as follows:
"All these petitioners claim to be the owners of
different portions of the land situate at Nagadevanahalli,
Kengeri hobli, Bangalore. These lands were notified for
acquisition by the Land Acquisition Officer for the benefit
of 3rd respondent by a Preliminary Notification dated
31.7.1986, followed by a Final Notification dated
22.1.1987. Subsequently, award has been passed. The
petitioners were also awarded by compensation which
has been received by them. After happening of all these
events and after a lapse of 16 years, they have
approached this court questioning the acquisition
proceedings on many grounds.
2. In my view, it is unnecessary to go into the
merits of the case, in as much as these petitions are
liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches.
The petitioners having filed these petitions after lapse of
16 years from the date of Final Notification and also after
having received the compensation, cannot be permitted
to challenge the very notification.
Therefore, the writ petitions are rejected."
(Emphasis supplied)
It is dismissed on the ground of delay of 16 years in filing the
petition challenging the acquisition. There as well, the earlier
proceedings were not divulged. Thus, comes the fourth petition
dismissed.
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FIFTH ROUND OF LITIGATION:
17. A second suit is filed before the civil Court in
O.S.No.17534 of 2004 and connected cases. The plaint comes to be
rejected as not maintainable. The said order has become final.
Thus, ends the fifth attempt to litigation.
SIXTH ROUND OF LITIGATION:
18. The sixth litigation and the fourth writ petition is preferred
in Writ Petition No.9496 of 2007 by the family members viz.,
children of Venkata Bhovi. This comes to be dismissed by a detailed
order capturing all the earlier facts. The learned Judge observes as
follows:
".... .... ....
4. In the light of the above, from a perusal of the
record, it is evident that the land in Survey No. 26 of
Nagadevanahalli had been notified for acquisition in
favour of the Bangalore City Gavipuram Extension HBCS
Ltd., with the issuance of a notification under Section 4
(1) of the LA Act, duly published in the Official Gazette on
14.8.1986. A final declaration under Section 6 (1) of the
LA Act was also duly published in the official gazette on
5.3.1987. An award was passed determining the
compensation payable in respect of the land, dated
6.6.1987. The same has been duly approved on
14.9.1987, and a notice in terms of Section 12(2) had
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been issued to the land owners. The possession of the
land has been taken on 9.1.1987 and handed over to the
Society and a notification under Section 16(2) has been
duly published in the Gazette on 26.1.1987. It is also on
record that the compensation amount in respect of the
lands acquired has been paid to the land owners, who in
turn have consented to the acquisition.
Insofar as the acquisition proceedings initiated by the
BDA in respect of the very extent of land and its subsequent
withdrawal would not have any effect on the validity of the
aforesaid acquisition proceedings, on the face of it.
In the above circumstances, assuming that all or
any one of the contentions raised in the writ petition was
available to the petitioners to challenge the above
acquisition proceedings - the primary question of the
belated challenge would have to be addressed. The
explanation offered by the petitioners is laconic and
vague. A Division Bench of this court while taking into
consideration the entire case law on the issue has expressed
thus:-
"40. In the instant case, the Division Bench of
this Court as well as the Apex Court have upheld the
acquisition which were filed by various land owners and
the said orders would bind the petitioners herein.
Therefore the petitioner's contention that there has been
fraud in the acquisition proceedings and the earlier
round of litigation did not take into consideration the
said aspects and therefore, the present litigation has to
be considered on merits cannot be accepted. The
petitioners have nowhere stated as to when they
became aware of any fraud in the acquisition and as to
why they remained silent for over two decades before
assailing the acquisition proceedings at this point of
time. On the other hand, it is noted that the Division
Bench of this Court has also taken in to consideration
the original records and has given its findings upholding
the acquisition. Therefore, the plea of fraud cannot be a
sheet-anchor for the petitioners herein at this point of
time, to approach this Court to assail the acquisition. In
fact, it is only a semblance of a plea to once again seek
a review of the legality of the acquisition proceeding.
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41. In the absence of there being any
explanation for approaching the Court at this point of
time would only lead to an inference that silence and
inaction of the petitioners for over two decades has
resulted in petitioners' acquiescence to the acquisition
and thereby they have lost their right to challenge the
same.
42. We are therefore, of the view that the
learned Single Judge in W.P.No.9412/2007 was not right
in holding that there was no delay in assailing the
acquisition proceedings and thereby, considering the
writ petition on merits."
In the light of the above, this petition is dismissed
on the sole ground of delay and laches without entering
upon the other doubtful grounds raised in the petition."
(Emphasis supplied)
It was dismissed on the sole ground of delay and laches, without
entering upon doubtful grounds raised in the petition.
SEVENTH ROUND OF LITIGATION:
19. The aforesaid order passed was challenged before the
Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 8556 of 2012. This comes to be
dismissed on 09-11-2022. The Division Bench considering the entire
spectrum of law holds as follows:
".... .... ....
11. In the backdrop of aforesaid legal principles, we
may advert to the facts of the case on hand. In the instant case,
preliminary notification was issued on 31.07.1986, whereas
declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act was issued on
22.01.1987. An award was passed on 19.10.1987 and the
24
possession of the schedule land was taken on 09.11.1987.
Section 16(2) of the Act, which has been inserted by Karnataka
Act No.17/1961 with effect from 24.08.1961 reads as under:
16. Power to take possession.
(1)xxxx
(2)The fact of such taking possession may be
notified by the Deputy Commissioner in the Official
Gazette, and such notification shall be evidence of such
fact.
12. Thus, it is evident that if a notification under
Section 16(2) of the Act is issued, it raises a presumption
that the possession of the land has been taken. In the
instant case notification under Section 16(2) of the Act
was published in gazette on 16.01.1995. The writ
petition was filed nearly after a period of 20 years from
the passing of the award on or about 18.06.2007. On
account of efflux of time, all the steps taken for
acquisition of the land had become final and the
challenge to the land acquisition proceeding suffered
from delay and laches. We have perused the averments
made in the petition. No explanation has been offered for
approaching this court after an inordinate delay of 20
years. Thus, the challenge to the land acquisition
proceeding was barred by delay and laches.
13. So far as the submission made by learned
counsel for the appellants that the acquisition of land was
malafide is concerned, suffice it to say that there is no
pleading in the writ petition in this behalf. In the absence
of any pleading regarding plea of malafides, we are not
inclined to examine the same. Even assuming that the
land acquisition proceeding initiated under the Act were
void, the same ought to have been challenged within a
reasonable time. The decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court
in VYALIKAVAL HOUSE BUILDING COOPERATIVE SOCIETY
supra has no application to the facts of the case as in the
said case Hon'ble Supreme Court found the acquisition to
be malafide. In the instant case, the appellants in the
writ petition has not assailed the land acquisition
25
proceeding on the ground of malafides. Similarly, Hon'ble
Supreme Court in TUKARAM KANA JOSHI supra has held
that where circumstances justify the conduct of a party in
approaching the court belatedly, an illegality, which is
manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of
laches. In the instant case, no explanation has been
offered by the appellants for approaching the court
belatedly after two decades. Therefore, the aforesaid
decision does not apply to the fact situation of this case.
14. We cannot lose sight of the fact that at this
point of time, no relief can be granted to the appellants
as the land ceases to be an agricultural land and has been
utilized for the purposes of formation of a residential
layout. Third party interest have been created, which is
evident from the list of sites allotted to the members of
the Society during the pendency of the writ petition.
For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any merit
in this appeal. The same fails and is hereby dismissed."
(Emphasis supplied)
After dismissal by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No.9496
of 2007, another writ petition comes to be filed in Writ Petition
No.37818 of 2016. This is, before the Division Bench could confirm
the order of the learned single Judge. This is the eighth round of
litigation.
26
EIGHTH ROUND OF LITIGATION:
20. The prayer in Writ Petition No.37818 of 2016 is as
follows:
"a) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ to
declare that the acquisition initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, by virtue of the Preliminary
Notification dated 31-07-1986 and followed by the Final
Notification dated 23-01-1987 and gazetted on 05-03-
1987 as per Annexure-C and C1 is superseded or
abandoned by virtue of issuance of the preliminary
notification under Section 17(1) of the Bangalore
Development Authority Act, 1976 dated 19-01-1989 and
final notification dated 19-01-1994 as per Annexure-J and
K bearing No. HUD 483 MNX 91, in so far as the
petitioners' lands are concerned;
b) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ to
declare that the issuance of the notification under Section
48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act dated 16-05-2001
bearing No. HUD 376 MNJ 2000 Gazetted on 22-05-2001
as per Annexure-S does not revive the notification issued
under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in
favour of the 6th respondent which is referred to as
Annexure-C and C1 keeping in view of the principles laid
down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Soorajmull
Nagarmull reported in (2015) 10 Supreme Court
Cases 270 (para-8);
c) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ to
declare that the acquisition of the petitioners' lands is
deemed to have been lapsed in view of applying Section
24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Re-habilitation and Re-
settlement Act, 2013, in so far as the lands of the
petitioners are concerned;
d) Or, in the alternative, declare by issuing any appropriate
writ including the writ of certiorari that the acquisition
notification issued under Section 6(1) of the Land
27
Acquisition Act, 1894 in favour of the 6th respondent
society is void in view of non-compliance of the
requirements under Section 3(f)(iv) of the Land
Acquisition Act keeping in view of the law declared by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of H.M.T. House
Building Co-operative Society -vs- Syed Khader and
others, reported in 1995 (2) SCC 677, as well as in
case of Bangalore city cooperative house society Ltd.
v/s state of Karnataka and others reported on
(2012) 3 SCC 727."
The very same grounds are urged including the ground of
notification under Section 48(1) of the Act.
21. During the pendency of the said petition, the subject
petition is filed on 04-03-2025 and the said petition of 2016 is
withdrawn. Again, seeking the very same prayer that had been
sought for eight times right from 1993 to 2016, the subject petition
is preferred. Therefore, the subject petition becomes the ninth
round of litigation.
22. All these facts are borne out in the statement of
objections along with the documents appended to it. The petition is
preferred in the year 2025 i.e., the subject petition, without a
whisper about eight litigations on the same subject matter coming
28
to end against the petitioners. Who are the petitioners; they are
legal representatives of late Hanumantha Bhovi and Venkata Bhovi.
These were the very petitioners in few of the earlier petitions. In
the least, it was expected of a scrupulous litigant, to divulge all the
earlier litigations and then seek the prayer that is now sought. Eight
rounds of suffering of orders against them and those orders having
become final are conveniently suppressed in the subject petition, on
a specious plea that in 1993, about 32 years ago, there was a
notification dropping the lands from acquisition.
23. The first of the petitions was filed in 1994. The
information about Section 48(1) notification was always available to
the petitioners. During eight rounds of litigation, this ground is not
taken and on a new plea, the entire acquisition process is
challenged all over again, notwithstanding the challenge being
rejected not once but eight times. Therefore, the petitioners are
guilty of suppression of material facts and have approached this
Court with soiled hands. This becomes a case to caution every
litigant that if they want the relief before this Court, they ought not
29
to approach the doors of this Court with unclean hands, suppressing
material facts.
24. Deprecating such actions of unscrupulous litigants
approaching the constitutional Courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the Apex Court in the case of PRESTIGE
LIGHTS LIMITED v. SBI1 has held as follows:
".... .... ....
35. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is
not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary
power, therefore, a writ court will indeed bear in mind
the conduct of the party who is invoking such
jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or
suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of
misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action
without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been
evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous
litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving
it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in
disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the
material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are
distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become
impossible."
(Emphasis supplied)
1
(2007) 8 SCC 449
30
24.1. The said judgment is reiterated by the Apex Court in
the case of DALIP SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH2
wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
"1. For many centuries Indian society cherished
two basic values of life i.e. "satya" (truth) and "ahimsa"
(non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma
Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their
daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-
delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-
Independence era and the people used to feel proud to
tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences.
However, post-Independence period has seen drastic
changes in our value system. The materialism has
overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal
gain has become so intense that those involved in
litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,
misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court
proceedings.
2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has
cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have
any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to
falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals.
In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of
litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new
rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who
attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches
the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not
entitled to any relief, interim or final.
3. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] this
Court adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave
granted to the appellant by making the following observations:
(AIR p. 1558)
2
(2010) 2 SCC 114
31
"It is of utmost importance that in making material
statements and setting forth grounds in applications for
special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution,
care must be taken not to make any statements which are
inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with
applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes
statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the
petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray
the confidence of the Court by making statements which are
untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal
the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements
made by the appellant in his application for special leave
are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is
entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained
special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of
what he characterises as misrepresentations of facts
contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme
Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case
special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked."
4. In Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC 575 :
1983 SCC (Cri) 872 : AIR 1983 SC 1015] the Court held that a
party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its
favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case.
5. In G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of
Karnataka [(1991) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1991 SC 1726] the Court
denied relief to the appellant who had concealed the fact that
the award was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer within
the time specified in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act
because of the stay order passed by the High Court. While
dismissing the special leave petition, the Court observed: (SCC
p. 263, para 2)
"2. ... Curiously enough, there is no reference in the
special leave petitions to any of the stay orders and we
came to know about these orders only when the
respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed
their counter-affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders
have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non-
disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of
material facts. On this ground alone, the special leave
petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law
that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is
discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for
32
such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts.
If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his
application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss
the special leave petitions."
6. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1
SCC 1 : JT (1993) 6 SC 331] the Court held that where a
preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an important
document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be
thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
7. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI [(2007) 8 SCC 449] it
was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law,
but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High
Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-
bound to place all the facts before the Court without any
reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted
facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully
justified in refusing to entertain a petition filed under Article 226
of the Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of
Scrutton, L.J. in R. v. Kensington Income Tax
Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486 (CA)] , and observed:
(Prestige Lights Ltd. case [(2007) 8 SCC 449] , SCC p. 462,
para 35)
In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the
conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the
applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant
materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, then
the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the
matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public
interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the
process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ
jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct
facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are
suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ
courts would become impossible.
8. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. [(2007) 4 SCC
221 : AIR 2007 SC 1546] the Court held that Article 136 does
not confer a right of appeal on any party. It confers discretion
on this Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In
33
other words, the Constitution has not made the Supreme Court
a regular court of appeal or a court of error. This Court only
intervenes where justice, equity and good conscience require
such intervention.
9. In Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India [(2008) 2 SCC
326] the Court held that while exercising discretionary and
equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, the
facts and circumstances of the case should be seen in
their entirety to find out if there is miscarriage of justice.
If the appellant has not come forward with clean hands,
has not candidly disclosed all the facts that he is aware of
and he intends to delay the proceedings, then the Court
will non-suit him on the ground of contumacious conduct.
10. In K.D. Sharma v. SAIL [(2008) 12 SCC 481] the
Court held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it
is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ court must
come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the
Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an
appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant
and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the
Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without
considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was
reiterated in G. Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel [(2009) 3
SCC 141] ."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court observes that in the last 40 years then, and now 55
years, a new creed of litigants have cropped up. Those who belong
to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly
resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals.
In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants,
34
the Courts have to deal them with iron hands and deny relief, be it
interim or final.
24.2. The Apex Court, later, in the case of K. JAYARAM v.
BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY3 in identical
circumstances has held as follows:
".... .... ....
10. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction exercised
by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it
is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ
court must come with clean hands and put forward all
facts before the court without concealing or suppressing
anything. A litigant is bound to state all facts which are
relevant to the litigation. If he withholds some vital or
relevant material in order to gain advantage over the
other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud with
the court as well as with the opposite parties which
cannot be countenanced.
11. This Court in Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI [Prestige
Lights Ltd. v. SBI, (2007) 8 SCC 449] has held that a
prerogative remedy is not available as a matter of course. In
exercising extraordinary power, a writ court would indeed bear
in mind the conduct of the party which is invoking such
jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or
suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of
misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action without
adjudicating the matter. It was held thus : (SCC p. 461, para
33)
"33. It is thus clear that though the appellant
Company had approached the High Court under Article 226
3
(2022) 12 SCC 815
35
of the Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the facts to
the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionary and
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Over and above, a court of law is also a court
of equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a
party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts
before the Court without any reservation. If there is
suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or
twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the writ
court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it
without entering into merits of the matter."
12. In Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare
Sanstha v. State of U.P. [Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog
Welfare Sanstha v. State of U.P., (2008) 1 SCC 560 : (2008) 1
SCC (Civ) 359] , this Court has reiterated that the writ
remedy is an equitable one and a person approaching a
superior court must come with a pair of clean hands.
Such person should not suppress any material fact but
also should not take recourse to legal proceedings over
and over again which amounts to abuse of the process of
law.
13. In K.D. Sharma v. SAIL [K.D. Sharma v. SAIL, (2008)
12 SCC 481] , it was held thus : (SCC pp. 492-93, paras 34-39)
"34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary.
Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing
substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that
the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with
clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court
without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an
appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of
relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of
misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the
threshold without considering the merits of the claim.
35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated
by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington
Income Tax Commissioners [R. v. Kensington Income Tax
Commissioners, (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT
136 (KB & CA)] in the following words : (KB p. 514)
36
'... it has been for many years the rule of the
court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to
maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to
obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make
a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts--it
says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he
can help it--the court is supposed to know the law. But
it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant
must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by
which the court enforces that obligation is that if it
finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly
stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it
has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.'
36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course.
While exercising extraordinary power a writ court would
certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes
the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false
statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to
mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that
ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the
case by stating, 'We will not listen to your application
because of what you have done.' The rule has been evolved
in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants
from abusing the process of court by deceiving it.
37. In Kensington Income Tax
Commissioners [R. v. Kensington Income Tax
Commissioners, (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT
136 (KB & CA)] , Viscount Reading, C.J. observed : (KB pp.
495-96)
'... Where an ex parte application has been
made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if
the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in
support of the application was not candid and did not
fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as
to mislead the Court as to the true facts, the Court
ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse
of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the
examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in
the Court, but one which should only be used in cases
which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it
has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a
careful examination will be made of the facts as they
are and as they have been stated in the applicant's
affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be
urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads
37
the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result
of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt
that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to
hear anything further from the applicant in a
proceeding which has only been set in motion by
means of a misleading affidavit.'
38. The above principles have been accepted in our
legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes
the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32
or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is
supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose
all material facts without any reservation even if they are
against him. He cannot be allowed to play "hide and seek"
or to "pick and choose" the facts he likes to disclose and to
suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other
facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in
disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material
facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of
writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The
petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the
relief sought without any qualification. This is because "the
court knows law but not facts".
39. If the primary object as highlighted
in Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [R. v. Kensington
Income Tax Commissioners, (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257
: 116 LT 136 (KB & CA)] is kept in mind, an applicant who
does not come with candid facts and "clean breast" cannot
hold a writ of the court with "soiled hands". Suppression or
concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a
jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or mis-representation,
which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction.
If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly
and truly but states them in a distorted manner and
misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to
protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to
discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with
the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not
reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing
in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt
with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the
court."
(emphasis in original)
14. It is necessary for us to state here that in order
to check multiplicity of proceedings pertaining to the
38
same subject-matter and more importantly to stop the
menace of soliciting inconsistent orders through different
judicial forums by suppressing material facts either by
remaining silent or by making misleading statements in
the pleadings in order to escape the liability of making a
false statement, we are of the view that the parties have
to disclose the details of all legal proceedings and
litigations either past or present concerning any part of
the subject-matter of dispute which is within their
knowledge. In case, according to the parties to the
dispute, no legal proceedings or court litigations were or
are pending, they have to mandatorily state so in their
pleadings in order to resolve the dispute between the
parties in accordance with law."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. On a harmonious synthesis of the elucidation by the
Apex Court, a singular and compelling truth crystallizes, that
any litigant who dares to sully the sanctity of judicial
proceedings through deceit, misrepresentation or fraud,
commits on egregious affront to the majesty of justice itself.
Such conduct constitutes a direct assault on the very edifice
of judicial integrity. The Courts must respond not with mere
disapproval, but resolute censure. Justice, if it is to remain
untainted, demands that those who attempt to pervert its
course, must be met not only with stern repudiation, but
with consequences potent enough to serve as a salutary
warning to others. Therefore, the writ petition does not
39
merely merit dismissal; it calls for rejection with exemplary
costs, so that justice does not become a playground for the
unscrupulous.
26. Now let me turn my attention to the petitioners' latest
endeavour - hitherto unprojected ground, namely, a purported
notification of the year 1993. This belated revelation is
tendered as if it were an epiphany, on such score, the
petitioners seek to undo decades of judicial deliberation.
But, much water has flown beneath the bridge since that
year, as the petitioners, or their kin, have embarked upon
odyssey through eight rounds of litigation swinging between
candour and concealment. What I witness is, not the pursuit
of justice, but a game of judicial hide and seek, where one of
the family members of the grantee seeks invocation of the
writ jurisdiction, while the other member, hides. Later, the
other member seeks, and the former hides. Such cynical use
of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, must be arrested in its tracks.
40
27. The ground is that there is a notification of 1993. It is a
notification of 1993. In eight rounds of litigation this notification
was never projected. Today to contend that there was a
notification of 1993 and therefore, the acquisition process should be
quashed is a submission that is noted only to be rejected, as it runs
contrary to the principles of constructive res judicata, which is a
specie of the genes res judicated. It is also to be rejected on the
Henderson principle. Both these principles need not detain this
Court for long or delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court in the
case of CELIR LLP v. SUMATI PRASAD BAFNA4, has held as
follows:-
".... .... ....
b. The 'Henderson' Principle as a corollary of Constructive
Res-Judicata.
135. The 'Henderson Principle' is a foundational
doctrine in common law that addresses the issue of
multiplicity in litigation. It embodies the broader concept
of procedural fairness, abuse of process and judicial
efficiency by mandating that all claims and issues that
could and ought to have been raised in a previous
litigation should not be relitigated in subsequent
proceedings. The extended form of res-judicata more
popularly known as 'Constructive Res Judicata' contained
in Section 11, Explanation VII of the CPC originates from
this principle.
4
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727
41
136. In Henderson v. Henderson, [1843] 3 Hare
999, the English Court of Chancery speaking through Sir
James Wigram, V.C. held that where a given matter
becomes the subject of litigation and the adjudication of
a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties so litigating
are required to bring forward their whole case. Once the
litigation has been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction, the same parties will not be permitted to
reopen the lis in respect of issues which might have been
brought forward as part of the subject in contest but
were not, irrespective of whether the same was due to
any form of negligence, inadvertence, accident or
omission. It was further held, that principle of res
judicata applies not only to points upon which the Court
was called upon by the parties to adjudicate and
pronounce a judgment but to every possible or probable
point or issue that properly belonged to the subject of
litigation and the parties ought to have brought forward
at the time. The relevant observations read as under:--
"In trying this question I believe I state the rule of
the Court correctly when I say that, where a given matter
becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by,
a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the
parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case,
and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the
same parties to open the same subject of litigation in
respect of matter which might have been brought forward
as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought
forward, only because they have, from negligence,
inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case.
The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not
only to points upon which the Court was actually required
by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a
judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the
subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising
reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the
time. [...]"
(Emphasis supplied)
.... .... ...
139. Even in a common law action it was said by
Blackburn, J.:"I incline to think that the doctrine of res
42
judicata applies to all matters which existed at the time
of giving of the judgment, and which the party had an
opportunity of bringing before the Court." [See
: Newington v. Levy, [L.R.] 6 C.P. 180 (J)].
140. The fundamental policy of the law is that there
must be finality to litigation. Multiplicity of litigation
benefits not the litigants whose rights have been
determined, but those who seek to delay the enforcement
of those rights and prevent them from reaching the
rightful beneficiaries of the adjudication. The Henderson
Principle, in the same manner as the principles
underlying res judicata, is intended to ensure that
grounds of attack or defence in litigation must be taken
in one of the same proceeding. A party which avoids
doing so does it at its own peril. In deciding as to
whether a matter might have been urged in the earlier
proceedings, the court must ask itself as to whether it
could have been urged. In deciding whether the matter
ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the
court will have due regard to the ambit of the earlier
proceedings and the nexus which the matter bears to the
nature of the controversy. In holding that a matter ought
to have been taken as a ground of attack or defence in
the earlier proceedings, the court is indicating that the
matter is of such a nature and character and bears such a
connection with the controversy in the earlier case that
the failure to raise it in that proceeding would debar the
party from agitating it in the future. The doctrine itself is
based on public policy flowing from the age-old legal
maxim interest reipublicaeut sit finislitium which means
that in the interest of the State there should be an end to
litigation and no party ought to be vexed twice in a
litigation for one and the same cause.
141. The Henderson Principle was approvingly referred to
and applied by this Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab
Hussain, (1977) 2 SCC 806 as the underlying principle for res-
judicata and constructive res-judicata for assuring finality to
litigation. The relevant observations read as under:--
"3. The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam is a
rule of evidence. As has been stated
43
in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council [[1939] 2 K.B.
426 at p. 437], it may be said to be "the broader rule of
evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of
action". This doctrine is based on two theories : (i) the
finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final
termination of disputes in the general interest of the
community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest
of the individual that he should be protected from
multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a
public but also a private purpose by obstructing the
reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated
upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment
for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for
otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to
conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity
of actions and bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an
action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to
recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment
must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the
judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the
judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the
same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of
res judicata.
4. But it may be that the same set of facts may give
rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a
person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of
action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent
litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation.
Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an
abuse of its process and Somervell, L.J., has answered it as
follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [[1947] All ER 255 at p.
257]:"I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it
would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose
is not confined to the issues which the court is actually
asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are
so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so
clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of
the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be
started in respect of them.
This is therefore another and an equally necessary
and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in
raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the
general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is
why this other rule has some times been referred to as
44
constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or
amplification of the general principle."
(Emphasis supplied)
142. This Court in Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer,
Ratlam, AIR 1965 SC 1150, held that if the underlying rule of
constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it
would be open to the party to take one proceeding after another
and urge new grounds every time, and would be inconsistent
with considerations of public policy. The relevant observations
read as under:--
"8. [...] the rule of constructive res judicata which is
pleaded against him in the present appeal is in a sense a
somewhat technical or artificial rule prescribed by the Code
of Civil Procedure. This rule postulates that if a plea could
have been taken by a party in a proceeding between him
and his opponent, he would not be permitted to take that
plea against the same party in a subsequent proceeding
which is based on the same cause of action; but basically,
even this view is founded on the same considerations of
public policy, because if the doctrine of constructive res
judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open
to the party to take one proceeding after another and urge
new grounds every time; and that plainly is inconsistent
with considerations of public policy [...]"
(Emphasis supplied)
143. In Shankara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. M.
Prabhakar, (2011) 5 SCC 607, this Court held that the ground of
non-compliance of statutory provision which was very much
available to the parties to raise but did not raise it as one of the
grounds, cannot be raised later on and would be hit by the
principles analogous to constructive res judicata. The relevant
observations read as under:--
"89. In the present case, it is admitted fact that
when the contesting respondents filed WP No. 1051 of
1966, the ground of non-compliance with statutory
provision was very much available to them, but for the
reasons best known to them, they did not raise it as one of
the grounds while challenging the Notification dated 11-12-
1952 issued under the Evacuee Property Act. In the
subsequent writ petition filed in the year 1990, initially, they
had not questioned the legality of the notification, but
45
raised it by filing an application, which is no doubt true,
allowed by the High Court. In our view, the High Court was
not justified in permitting the petitioners therein to raise
that ground and answer the same since the same is hit by
the principles analogous to constructive res judicata."
(Emphasis supplied)
144. From the above exposition of law, it is clear
that the 'Henderson Principle' is a core component of the
broader doctrine of abuse of process, aimed at enthusing
in the parties a sense of sanctity towards judicial
adjudications and determinations. It ensures that
litigants are not subjected to repetitive and vexatious
legal challenges. At its core, the principle stipulates that
all claims and issues that could and should have been
raised in an earlier proceeding are barred from being
raised in subsequent litigation, except in exceptional
circumstances. This rule not only supports the finality of
judgments but also underscores the ideals of judicial
propriety and fairness.
145. There are, four situations where in second
proceedings between the same parties doctrine res
judicata as a corollary of the principle of abuse of process
may be invoked : (i) cause of action estoppel, where the
entirety of a decided cause of action is sought to be
relitigated; (ii) issue estoppel or, "decided issue
estoppel," where an issue is sought to be relitigated
which has been raised and decided as a fundamental step
in arriving at the earlier judicial decision; (iii) extended
or constructive res judicata i.e., "unraised issue
estoppel," where an issue is sought to be litigated which
could, and should, have been raised in a previous action
but was not raised; (iv) a further extension of the
aforesaid to points not raised in relation to an issue in the
earlier decision, as opposed to issues not raised in
relation to the decision itself.
146. As part of the broader rule against abuse of
process, the Henderson principle is rooted in the idea of
preventing the judicial process from being exploited in
any manner that tends to undermine its integrity. This
46
idea of preventing abuse of judicial process is not
confined to specific procedure rules, but rather aligned to
a broader purport of giving quietus to litigation and
finality to judicial decisions. The essence of this rule is
that litigation must be conducted in good faith, and
parties should not engage in procedural tactics that
fragment disputes, prolong litigation, or undermine the
outcomes of such litigation. It is not a rigid rule but
rather a flexible principle to prevent oppressive, unfair,
or detrimental litigation.
147. We are conscious of the fact, that ordinarily this
principle has been applied to instances where a particular plea
or ground was not raised at any stage of the proceedings, but
were later sought to be raised. However, it must be borne in
mind that construing this rule in a hyper-technical manner or
through any strait-jacket formula will amount to taking a
reductive view of this broad and comprehensive principle.
148. Although in the present case, the Borrower had
raised the issue of the validity of the measures taken by the
Bank under the SARFAESI Act and the legality of the 9th auction
conducted it in the earlier stages albeit in a different proceeding,
yet its conduct of having conveniently abandoned the same in a
different proceeding elected by it for the same cause of action
and then later reagitating it in the pretence that the two
proceedings were distinct, is nothing but a textbook case of
abuse of process of law.
149. Piecemeal litigation where issues are
deliberately fragmented across separate proceedings to
gain an unfair advantage is in itself a facet of abuse of
process of law and would also fall foul of this principle.
Merely because one proceeding initiated by a party differs
in some aspects from another proceeding or happens to
be before a different forum, will not make the subsequent
proceeding distinct in nature from the former, if the
underlying subject matter or the seminal issues involved
remains substantially similar to each other or connected
to the earlier subject matter by a certain degree, then
such proceeding would tantamount to 'relitigating' and
the Henderson Principle would be applicable.
47
150. Parties cannot be allowed to exploit
procedural loopholes and different foras to revisit the
same matters they had deliberately chosen not to pursue
earlier. Thus, where a party deliberately withholds
certain claims or issues in one proceeding with the
intention to raise them in a subsequent litigation
disguised as a distinct or separate remedy or proceeding
from the initial one, such subsequent litigation will also
fall foul of this principle.
151. Similarly, where a plea or issue was raised in
earlier proceedings but later abandoned it is deemed
waived and cannot be relitigated in subsequent. Allowing
such pleas to be resurrected in later cases would not only
undermine the finality of judgments but also incentivize
strategic behaviour, where parties could withdraw claims
in one case with the intention of reintroducing them later.
proceedings. Abandonment signifies acquiescence,
barring its reconsideration in subsequent litigation. This
ensures that judicial processes are not misused for
tactical advantage and that litigants are held accountable
for their procedural choices. Parties must litigate
diligently and in good faith, presenting their entire case
at the earliest opportunity.
152. The Henderson principle operates on the broader
contours of judicial propriety and fairness, ensuring that the
judicial system remains an instrument of justice rather than a
platform for procedural manipulation. Judicial propriety
demands that courts maintain the finality and integrity of their
decisions, preventing repeated challenges to settled matters.
Once a matter has been adjudicated, it should not be revisited
unless exceptional circumstances warrant such reconsideration.
Repeated litigation of the same issue not only wastes judicial
resources but also subjects the opposing party to unnecessary
expense and harassment. judicial processes are not merely
technical mechanisms but are rooted in principles of equity and
justice.
153. Both logic and principle support the approach
that the judicial determination of an entire cause of
action is in fact the determination of every issue which is
fundamental to establishing the entire cause of action.
48
Thus, the assertion that the determination is only on one
of the issues is flawed as it is nothing but an indirect way
of asserting that the whole judgment is flawed and
thereby relitigating the entire cause of action once more.
The effect of a judicial determination on an entire cause
of action is as if the court had made declarations on each
issue fundamental to the ultimate decision."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court has expounded the aforesaid doctrines of
constructive res judicata and the Henderson principle with
luminous clarity, which would unmistakably mean, that no
litigant may withhold a plea and preserve it for further
battle. The law frowns upon fragmented litigation and
strategic silence. The reason is to prevent abuse of judicial
process and give quietus to litigation and finality to judicial
decision.
27.1. Long before the judgment of the Apex Court quoted
hereinabove, a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of
FORWARD CONSTRUCTION CO., v. PRABHAT MANDAL5, has
held as follows:
5
(1986) 1 SCC 100
49
".... .... ....
20. So far as the first reason is concerned, the High
Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the
earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one
of the grounds taken in the present petition was
conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition.
Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC provides that any
matter which might and ought to have been made ground
of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed
to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue
in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not
only as to the actual matter determined but as to every
other matter which the parties might and ought to have
litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or
essentially connected with the subject-matter of the
litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate
purview of the original action both in respect of the
matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying
Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an
opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be
the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted
and decided. It is true that where a matter has been
constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually
heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard
and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no
force."
(Emphasis supplied)
27.2. Later again, the Apex Court in the case of
M.NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA6, has held as
follows:
".... .... ....
6
(2011) 3 SCC 408
50
2. From the perusal of the judgment of the learned Single
Judge it appears that the appellant claims to be the owner of
the land bearing Survey No. 76/1 and Survey No. 76/2 of
ThotadaGuddadahalli Village, Bangalore North Taluk. The
appellant alleged that these two plots of land were outside the
purview of the Framework Agreement (FWA) and notification
issued under Sections 28(1) and 28(4) of the Karnataka
Industrial Areas Development Act (the KIAD Act). While
dismissing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge held that
the acquisition proceedings in question were challenged by the
writ petitioner, the appellant herein, in a previous Writ Petition
No. 46078 of 2003 which was initially accepted and the
acquisition proceedings were quashed. Then on appeal, the
Division Bench (in Writ Appeals Nos. 713 and 2210 of 2004)
reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Thereafter,
the Division Bench order was upheld by this Court and this
Court approved the acquisition proceedings. Therefore, the writ
petition, out of which this present appeal arises, purports to be
an attempt to litigate once again, inter alia, on the ground that
the aforesaid blocks of land were outside the purview of the
FWA dated 3-4-1997.
3. The learned Judges of the Division Bench held that the
second round of litigation is misconceived inasmuch as the
acquisition proceedings were upheld right up to this Court. The
Division Bench in the impugned judgment noted the aforesaid
facts which were also noted by the learned Single Judge. Apart
from that the Division Bench also noted that another batch of
public interest litigation in WP No. 45334 of 2004 and connected
matters were also disposed of by this Court directing the State
of Karnataka and all its instrumentalities including the Housing
Board to forthwith execute the project as conceived originally
and upheld by this Court and it was also directed that the FWA
be implemented. The Division Bench, however, noted that on
behalf of the appellant an additional ground has been raised
that the acquisition stood vitiated since no award was passed as
contemplated under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act
(hereinafter "the said Act").
... ... ...
7. Challenging the aforesaid judgment, the present
appellant filed a special leave petition before this Court, which,
on grant of leave, was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 3878 of
51
2005. The grounds which were substantially raised by the
present appellant in the previous appeal (No. 3878 of 2005)
have been raised again in this appeal. The alleged grounds in
the present appeal about acquisition of land beyond the
requirement of the FWA were raised by the present appellant in
the previous Appeal No. 3878 of 2005 also.
... ... ...
16. It is nobody's case that the appellant did not know
the contents of the FWA. From this it follows that it was open to
the appellant to question, in the previous proceeding filed by it,
that his land which was acquired was not included in the FWA.
No reasonable explanation was offered by the appellant to
indicate why he had not raised this issue. Therefore, in our
judgment, such an issue cannot be raised in this proceeding in
view of the doctrine of constructive res judicata.
... ... ...
20. This Court in AIMO case [(2006) 4 SCC 683]
explained in clear terms that principle behind the doctrine of res
judicata is to prevent an abuse of the process of court. In
explaining the said principle the Bench in AIMO case [(2006) 4
SCC 683] relied on the following formulation of Somervell, L.J.
in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA)] (All ER p.
257 H): (AIMO case [(2006) 4 SCC 683] , SCC p. 700, para 39)
"39. ... 'I think that on the authorities to which I will
refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this
purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is
actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts
which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the
litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would
be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new
proceeding to be started in respect of them.' "
(emphasis supplied in AIMO case [(2006) 4 SCC 683] )
The Bench in AIMO case [(2006) 4 SCC 683] also noted that the
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Greenhalgh [(1947) 2 All ER
255 (CA)] was approved by this Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab
Hussain [(1977) 2 SCC 806 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 362] , SCC at p.
809, para 4.
52
21. Following all these principles a Constitution Bench of
this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State
of Maharashtra [(1990) 2 SCC 715 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 339 :
(1990) 13 ATC 348] laid down the following principle: (SCC p.
741, para 35)
"35. ... an adjudication is conclusive and final not
only as to the actual matter determined but as to every
other matter which the parties might and ought to have
litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially
connected with subject-matter of the litigation and every
matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original
action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence.
Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying
Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure
was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ
case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata."
22. In view of such authoritative pronouncement of
the Constitution Bench of this Court, there can be no
doubt that the principles of constructive res judicata, as
explained in Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC, are also
applicable to writ petitions."
(Emphasis supplied)
28. In the light of the foregoing, the petition, replete
with suppression, bereft of bonafides, must meet its
dismissal, not dismissal simpliciter, but with exemplary cost.
If the petition is now entertained on any score, it would
amount to putting a premium on litigative persistence of the
petitioners and rewarding abuse of the process and tacit
fraud played on this Court, as this forms the ninth petition
on the same cause of action, seeking the very same prayer,
53
differently worded, after the dismissal of eight rounds of
litigation, all of which are suppressed in the subject petition.
29. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
Writ Petition is dismissed with exemplary costs of
₹10,00,000/- (Ten lakhs) to the paid by the petitioners to the
Karnataka State Legal Services Authority within a period of 4 weeks
from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
bkp
CT:MJ
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