Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt.Munni Devi (Deleted) Smt Kusumlata … vs Ramvati Devi (Dead) Through Lrs 1. … on 21 July, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:16182
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F.A.No. 162/2001
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 21st OF JULY, 2025
FIRST APPEAL No. 162 of 2001
SMT.MUNNI DEVI (DELETED) SMT KUSUMLATA DUBEY AND OTHERS
Versus
RAMVATI DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS 1. RAMSWAROOP DIXIT
(DELETED) AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri N.K. Gupta - Senior Advocate with Shri Saket Sharma - Advocaste
for appellants.
Shri P.C. Chandil - Advocate for respondents.
ORDER
This First Appeal under Section 96 of CPC has been filed against the
judgment and decree dated 07.02.2001 passed by III Additional District Gwalior in
Regular Civil Suit No.3A/1989 by which suit filed by appellant/plaintiff for specific
performance of contract as well as for permanent injunction has been rejected.
2. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal, in short, are that
plaintiff filed suit pleading inter alia that house No.328/2 which was ultimately
renumbered as House No.801 is situated in Ward No.38, Bakshi Ki Goth, Lashkar,
Gwalior. The husband of plaintiff namely Ramnath Dubey is the brother of
Signature Not Verified
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F.A.No. 162/2001
defendant.
3. It is the case of plaintiff that one part of house in dispute was purchased by
Ramnath Dubey by a registered sale deed dated 25.02.1963 and another part of
building was purchased by another registered sale deed dated 14.05.1963 and since
then husband of plaintiff/brother of defendant namely Ramnath Dubey became the
owner and in possession of the property in dispute. It is the case of plaintiffs that
husband of plaintiff/brother of defendant was not in possession of the entire
consideration amount, therefore, he took Rs.2,500/- from defendant and got both the
sale deeds executed in the name of defendant. It was agreed upon between the parties
that after the amount is refunded by Ramnath Dubey, defendant would execute the
sale deed either in favour of Ramnath Dubey or in the name of wife of Ramnath
Dubey/plaintiff.
4. On 09.08.1975, Ramnath Dubey returned the entire consideration amount of
Rs.2,500/- alongwith interest and accordingly, the defendant was required to execute
a sale deed either in favour of Ramnath Dubey or in favour of plaintiff. On account
of two or three official holidays and the defendant was required to go to the house of
her children, therefore, on 09.08.1975 defendant issued a receipt of Rs.2,500/- and
also executed an agreement to sell mentioning therein that whenever she would get
time, she would execute the sale deed in respect of both the parts of the houses.
Accordingly, original sale deeds of both the part of houses were also handed over to
husband of plaintiff namely Ramnath Dubey. It was further contended in the plaint
that on multiple occassions her husband had requested the defendant to execute the
sale deed but she was all the time avoiding to execute the sale deed. Ultimately,
Ramnath Dubey husband of plaintiff expired in the month of February, 1980. As per
agreement to sell dated 09.08.1975, defendant was under obligation to execute the
sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, but in spite of multiple reminders by the plaintiff,
defendant always avoided the execution of sale deed and was assuring that since
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F.A.No. 162/2001
plaintiff is in possession of the property in dispute and as per the agreement to sell,
she is the owner, therefore, whenever she will get time, she would execute the sale
deed. Thereafter, in the month of October, 1985 another agreement to sell was
executed by defendant in favour of plaintiff. According to which defendant had
agreed to execute the sale deed within a period of one year from the date of
agreement to sell (Ex.P/4). It is pleaded by plaintiffs that on 01.01.1986 an
application was also filed by defendant before Competent Authority under Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act seeking permission to sell the property but in
spite of that defendant did not execute the sale deed after obtaining permission from
the competent authority. Accordingly, once again on 30.11.1988, plaintiff requested
the defendant to execute the sale deed, but defendant refused to do the same. Thus, it
was pleaded that thereafter, the plaintiff realized that the intention of the defendant
has become dishonest and now she wants to alienate the property to somebody else.
Accordingly, on 02.12.1988 a public notice was also published in the newspaper
informing the general public not to purchase the property. On 08.12.1980 defendant
published the denial in the newspaper. Thereafter, plaintiff by a registered letter dated
04.01.1989, sent a notice through her Advocate to execute the sale dead within a
period of 3 days from the date of receipt of notice. On 06.01.1989, the defendant
came to the plaintiff and insisted that she should withdraw her notice dated
04.01.1989 and also tried to dispossess the plaintiff, but she could not succeed.
Accordingly, a report was also lodged in Police Station Janakganj on 06.01.1989. It
was alleged that another notice dated 11.01.1989 was sent by plaintiff, but defendant
did not execute sale deed and on the contrary, she tried to forcibly take possession of
the property in dispute. However, that said attempt was foiled by plaintiff. Thus it
was alleged by plaintiff that in spite of the service of notice, the defendant is not
executing the sale date, but on the contrary, she is challengin the title and possession
of the plaintiff and is trying to disspossess the plaintiff and accordingly, it was
Signature Not Verified
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F.A.No. 162/2001
pleaded that plaintiffs is entitled for specific performance of contract dated
09.08.1975 and 09.10.1985.
5. Defendant filed her written statement and denied the plaint averments. It was
admitted that husband of plaintiff was the brother of defendant. However, it was
claimed that plaintiff would not get any advantage of the said relationship. It was
pleaded that defendant had purchased the property in dispute by two registered sale
deed dated 25.02.1963 and 14.05.1963 out of her own Stridhan and by virtue of said
sale deeds, she became the owner and in possession of the property in dispute. The
story developed by plaintiff was denied claiming that it is an after thought. It was
denied that defendant had ever executed an agreement to sell dated 09.08.1975,
thereby assuring the husband of plaintiff that she would execute the sale deed as and
when she gets time. Defendant also admitted that Ramnath Dubey had expired in the
month of February, 1980. The defendant also denied the execution of another
agreement to sale dated 09.10.1985. Thus, in nutshell it is sufficient to mention here
that defendant specifically denied that she had entered into any agreement to sell on
09.08.1975 or 09.10.1985.
6. The Trial Court after framing issues and recording evidence dismissed the suit
filed by plaintiff.
7. This Court by order dated 03.07.2025 framed an additional issue with regard
to the limitation.
8. Order dated 03.07.2025 reads as under:-
“During the course of arguments, it was found that the case of
plaintiff is that the defendant had executed an agreement on
09/08/1975 mentioning therein that she would execute the sale-deed
as and when she gets time.
The plaintiff has also relied upon another agreement Ex.P-4 in
which it was mentioned that sale-deed would be executed within a
period of one year from the date of agreement Ex.P-4, which was
executed on 09/10/1985. Ex.P-4 is based on an agreement Ex.P-1,
which was executed on 09/08/1975. In agreement Ex.P-1, the timeSignature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
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F.A.No. 162/2001
was not the essence of contract.
Now, the only question for consideration is as to whether the suit
should be filed within a reasonable period, in case where time was
not the essence of contract, or the plaintiff can issue a notice as per
his own convenience even after lapse of considerably long time?
Unfortunately, the issue regarding limitation was not framed by the
Trial Court. However, under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is the
duty of the Court to find out as to whether litigation is within a
period of limitation or not?
Accordingly, the following additional issue is framed:-
“Whether, the suit filed by plaintiff was barred by time or not?”
Counsel for parties pray for and are granted time to address on this
issue as well as on merits of the case.
List on 09/07/2025.on 09/07/2025.”
9. Since the issue with regard to the fact as to whether suit filed by plaintiff was
within a period of limitation was not framed by Trial Court and in the light of
Section 3 of Limitation Act, it is the duty of the Court to find out as to whether
proceedings / suit is within the period of limitation or not, therefore, following
additional issue was framed.
“Whether the suit filed by plaintiff was barred by time or not?”
10. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by Court below, it is submitted
by counsel for appellant that on 09.10.1985, defendant had executed another
agreement to sell. According to this agreement to sell, sale deed was to be executed
within a period of one year. Therefore, it is submitted that last date for execution of
sale deed as per agreement to sell dated 09.10.1985 was 08.10.1986. It is submitted
that civil suit was filed on 16.01.1989. Accordingly, it was submitted by counsel for
appellant that suit was within a period of limitation.
11. Per contra, it is submitted by counsel for respondent that according to the
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plaintiff herself, first agreement to sell was executed on 09.08.1975 whereas second
agreement to sell which is based on first agreement to sell was executed on
09.10.1985 i.e. after ten years of execution of first agreement to sell. In the
meanwhile, Ramnath had also expired in the month of February, 1980. It is
submitted that when time is not the essence of contract, then suit has to be filed
within a period of limitation. Even otherwise, it is submitted by counsel for
respondent that plaintiff herself had pleaded in her plaint that on multiple occassions,
her husband Ramnath Dubey had requested the defendant to execute the sale deed,
but she always avoided to do the same. It is further submitted that even the plaintiff
had pleaded in her plaint that after the death of Ramnath Dubey she also tried to
persuad the plaintiff to execute the sale deed, but she always avoided to do the same.
Thus, it is submitted that where the time is not the essence of contract, then denial
for the first time would become the crucial date for period of limitation to run. It is
submitted that conduct of defendant in avoiding the execution of sale deed has to be
construed that she has refused to execute the sale deed. Therefore, it is submitted that
not only the suit was not filed within a reasonable period from 09.08.1975 but even
otherwise defendant had refused to execute the sale deed even during the lifetime of
Ramnath Dubey and since the suit was not filed within a period of three years from
the date of denial for the first time, therefore, suit is barred by time.
12. Heard the learned counsel for appellant.
13. Before considering the submissions made by counsel for parties, this Court
would like to mention that so far as submissions with regard to the other issues
decided by Trial Court are concerned, the same shall be considered only after
considering as to whether the suit filed by plaintiff was within a period of limitation
or not?
14. The Supreme Court in the case of Chand Rani (SMT) (Dead) by LRS. Vs.
Kamal Rani (SMT) (DEAD) by LRS reported in (1993) 1 SCC 519 has held as
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F.A.No. 162/2001
under:-
“25. From an analysis of the above case-law it is clear that in the
case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to
time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the
essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be
performed in a reasonable time if the condition are:
1. From the express terms of the contract;
2. from the nature of the property; and
3. from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object
of making the contract.”
15. The Supreme Court in the case of Azhar Sultana Vs. B. Rajamani and
others reported in (2009) 17 SCC 27 has held that the suit must be filed within a
reasonable time. In a certaining reasonable time, conduct of parties would also
assume significance. It has also been held that when the suit was filed belatedly, then
plaintiff has failed to prove continuous willingness and readiness to perform her part
of the contract and is not entitled for grant of specific relief.
16. The Supreme Court in the case of Urvashi Aggarwal and another Vs.
Kushagra Ansal and others reoprted in (2020) 17 SCC 774 has held that plaintiffs
had not performed their part of agreement within a reasonable period and silence
maintained by plaintiffs for about 12 years amounted to abandonment of agreement.
17. The Supreme Court in the case of K.S. Vidyanadam and others Vs.
Vairavan reported in AIR 1997 SC 1751 has held as under:-
“9. Article 54 of the Limitation Act prescribes three years as
the period within which a suit for specific performance can
be filed. The period of three years is to be calculated from the
date specified in the agreement for performance or in the
absence of any such stipulation, within three years from the
date the performance was refused.
10. It has been consistently held by the courts in India,
following certain early English decisions, that in the case of
agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not
of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to
that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by theSignature Not Verified
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F.A.No. 162/2001
Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two
circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for
specific performance of the agreement (which does not
provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract)
should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of
limitation notwithstanding the time limits stipulated in the
agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the
other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits
prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no
significance or value and that they mean nothing. Would it be
reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence
of the contract, the time-limit(s) specified in the agreement
have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity? It
would also mean denying the discretion vested in the court by
both Sections 10 and 20. As held by a Constitution Bench of
this court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, [1993] 1 S.C.C. 519,
“it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property
there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the
contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract, the
court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time
if the conditions are (evident)?: (1) From the express terms of
the contract; (2) from the nature of the property; and (3) from
the surrounding circumstances, for example, the object of
making the contract”. In other words, the court should look at
all the relevant circumstances including the time-limit(s)
specified in the agreement and determine whether its
discretion to grant specific performance should be exercised.
Now in the case of urban properties in India, it is well-known
that their prices have been going up sharply over the last few
decades – particularly after 1973*. In this case, the suit
property is the house property situated in Madurai, which is
one of the major cities of Tamil Nadu. The suit agreement was
in December 1978 and the six months’ period specified
therein for completing the sale expired with 15th of June,
1979. The suit notice was issued by the plaintiff only on
11.7.1981, i.e., more than two years after the expiry of six
months’ period. The question is what was the plaintiff doing
in this interval of more than two years? The plaintiff says that
he has been calling upon Defendants 1 to 3 to get the tenant
vacated and execute the sale deed and that the defendants
were postponing the same representing that the tenant is not
vacating the building. The defendants have denied this story.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 8/5/2025
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F.A.No. 162/2001
According to them, the plaintiff never moved in the matter
and never called upon them to execute the sale deed. The
Trial Court has accepted the defendants’ story whereas the
High Court has accepted the plaintiffs story. Let us first
consider whose story is more probable and acceptable. For
this purpose, we may first turn to the terms of the agreement.
In the agreement of sale, there is no reference to the existence
of any tenant in the building. What it says is that within the
period of six months, the plaintiff should purchase the stamp
papers and pay the balance consideration whereupon the
defendants will execute the sale deed and that prior to the
registration of the sale deed, the defendants shall vacate and
deliver possession of the suit house to the plaintiff. There is
not a single letter or notice from the plaintiff to the
defendants calling upon them to get the tenant vacated and
get the sale deed executed until he issued the suit notice on
11.7.1981. It is not the plaintiffs case that within six months,
he purchased the stamp papers and offered to pay the balance
consideration. Defendants’ case is that the tenant is their own
relation, that he is ready to vacate at any point of time and
that the very fact that the plaintiff has in his suit notice
offered to purchase the house with the tenant itself shows that
the story put forward by him is false. The tenant has been
examined by the defendant as DW-2. He stated that soon after
the agreement, he was searching for a house but could not
secure one. Meanwhile [i.e., on the expiry of six months from
the date of agreement], he stated, the defendants told him that
since the plaintiff has abandoned the agreement, he need not
vacate. It is equally an admitted fact that between December
15, 1978 and July 11, 1981, the plaintiff has purchased two
other properties. The defendants’ consistent refrain has been
that the prices of house properties in Madurai have been
rising fast, that within the said interval of 2½ years, the
prices went up by three times and that only because of the
said circumstance has the plaintiff [who had earlier
abandoned any idea of going forward with the purchase of
the suit property] turned round and demanded specific
performance. Having regard to the above circumstances and
the oral evidence of the parties, we are inclined to accept the
case put forward by Defendants 1 to 3. We reject the story put
forward by the plaintiff that during the said period of 2½
years, he has been repeatedly asking the defendants to get theSignature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 8/5/2025
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1618210
F.A.No. 162/2001
tenant vacated and execute the sale deed and that they were
asking for time on the ground that tenant was not vacating.
The above finding means that from 15.12.1978 till 11.7.1981,
i.e., for a period of more than 2½ years, the plaintiff was
sitting quiet without taking any steps to perform his part of
the contract under the agreement though the agreement
specified a period of six months within which he was expected
to purchase stamp papers, tender the balance amount and
call upon the defendants to execute the sale deed and deliver
possession of the property. We are inclined to accept the
defendant’s case that the values of the house property in
Madurai town was rising fast and this must have induced the
plaintiff to wake up after 2½ years and demand specific
performance.”
18. Thus, it is clear that in case of an immovable property, generally the time is
never considered to be the essence of contract, but even when the time was not made
an essence of contract, still suit for specific performance of contract has to be filed
within a reasonable time.
19. If the facts and circumstances of the case are considered, then it is clear that
for the first time an agreement to sell was executed in the year 1975. Thereafter there
was a complete silence for five years because Ramnath who is the brother of
defendant and husband of the plaintiff expired in the month of February, 1980.
Thereafter once again there was a complete silence on the part of the plaintiff till
09.10.1985 when second agreement to sell was executed which was primarily based
on the first agreement dated 09.08.1975. Agreement dated 09.10.1985 reads as
under:-
“इकर रन म
मनकक स 0 र मवत दव पतन श र मसवरप द क त कनव स ग म पर क ल
क ण क ह।
यह कक वन कम क 32812 स#त ब क ग&ठ, लशकर क एक ग
क& कदन क 25-02-63 क& श मकत र ध ब ई धम,पतन क-वदय ल अर&र न मर
न म स 3,000/- (त न ह र रपय कवल) रपय म/ कवकय रक स01 ककय थ
तथ उकत वन क द5 सर ग क कवकयपत क रक स01 कदन क 14-5-63Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 8/5/2025
6:15:57 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:1618211
F.A.No. 162/2001
श मकत र ध ब ई धम,पतन क-वदय ल अर&र न 500/- रपय ( प च स रपय
कवल) म/ मर न म स क थ । यह द&न& बयन म& क रक स81य मर न म स मर
ई र मन थ द9 ब न & रपय म9झस उध र कलय थ उसक रपय अद यग क
इतम न न क कलय क थ । यह तय हआ थ कक उध र रपय मय बय क अद
करन पर म/ द&न& कहसस& क बयन म/ अपन ई र मन थ द9 ब अथव उनक पतन
म9नन दव क न म कर द5 ग ।इस सबध म/ इकर रन म 9-8-75 म?न/ र मन थ द9 ब
क हक म/ कलख थ कक च5कक उपर&कत मक न, कय करत समय मर ई क
प स कय करन क कलय प5र रपय नह थ । इसकलय मर स द& ह र प च स
रपय आठ आन सकड बय क दर पर उध र कलय थ । और उकत वन क
द&न& बयन म/ मर रपय& क अद यग क इतम न न क कलए मर न म स रक स01
कर कदय थ। क स समय 2500/- रपय (द& ह र प च स रपय कवल) मय
बय अद कर कदय वग म/ मक न क द&न& कहसस क वयन म& क रक स01
र मन थ अपन ई और यकद च हग त& उनक पतन क न म स रक स01 कर द5 ग ।
म9झ र मन थ द9 व न 2,500/- रपय (द& ह र प च स रपय कवल) मय बय
कदन क 9-8-75 क& अद कर कदय व म9झ द&न& कहसस& क वयन म& क रक स01
र मन थ द9 ब क हक म/ करन थ ककनत9 नह कर प ई इस सबध म/ म?न
इकर रन म 9-8-75 र मन थ द9 ब क& कलख कदय थ ककनत9 मC र मन थ द9 व क
हक म/ रक स01 नह कर प ई व र मन थ द9 व मर ई क फरवर 1980 म/
दह नत ह& गय । र मन थ द9 व क मEतय9 क उपर नत उकत वन क वयन म& क
रक स01 उनक पतन म9नन दव क हक म/ नह कर प ई। अत: उस कवषय म/
इकर रन म लखवद करत ह।
अत: आ स एक स ल क अनदर म9त कबक व यद उपर&कत वन क
द&न& ग& क बयन म& क रक स01 म9नन दव पतन र मन थ द9 व कनव स ब क
ग&ठ, लशकर गव कलयर मधयपद- क हक म/ कर द5 ग न करन पर ररय
नय य लय म9नन दव क& उपर&कत वन क द&न& ग& क वयन म रक स01 अपन
हक म/ कर न क अकधक र ह&ग । उध र कलय हआ प5र रपय मय बय प5व, म/
कदन क 9-8-75 क& अद ह& च9क ह? । कलह यह इकर रन म सवचM स
सचत वसथ म/ लखवद कर कदय कक सनद रह व वखत ररत क म आव ।”
20. Agreement dated 09.10.1985 (Ex.P/4) is not an independent agreement to sell.
Had it been a case that the defendant has executed a fresh agreement to sell on
09.10.1985 without making reference to the earlier agreement to sell dated
09.08.1975, then this Court may have ignored the effect of non-filing of suit for
specific performance of contract in response to the agreement dated 09.08.1975.
21. This Court has already reproduced the agreement dated 09.10.1985 (Ex.P/4),
from which it is clear that it was based on ealier agreement dated 09.08.1975.
Therefore, the question for calculating the period of limitation would arise from
Signature Not Verified
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Signing time: 8/5/2025
6:15:57 PM
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initial agreement dated 09.08.1975 (Ex.P/1). From the plain reading of this
agreement, it is clear that time was not the essence. Therefore, suit should have been
filed within a reasonable period. It is the case of plaintiff herself that Ramnath Dubey
had made request to the defendant on multiple occassions to execute the sale deed,
but it was always avoided by defendant.
22. Now the question for consideration is as to whether attempt on the part of
defendant to avoid the execution of sale deed can be treated as refusal to execute the
sale deed or not?
23. This Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Singh Vs. Gulab Jain and
another decided 21.03.2023 in Second Appeal No.2932/2022 has held as under:-
“42. Therefore, the question of consideration is that
whether the act of vendor in avoiding the execution of sale
deed can be treated as refusal to execute the sale deed or
not?
43. To avoid means “to evade” or “to make it void” or “to
annul or to avoid efficacy of anything”.
24. Thus, it is clear that when the defendant had avoided execution of sale deed in
compliance of agreement dated 09.08.1975 (Ex.P/1), then it has to be presumed that
she had refused to execute the sale deed. The period of limitation has started to run
from the day when the refusal was made by defendant for the first time. Even
otherwise, if it is presumed that because of relationship between the parties, plaintiff
or her husband never treated the conduct of defendant in avoiding the exeuction of
sale deed as refusal, still suit should have been filed within a reasonable period.
Admittedly, nothing was done either by husband of plaintiff or by plaintiff till
09.10.1985 (Ex.P/4) when the second agreement to sell was executed. Furthermore,
plaintiff again took approximately four years to file a suit because the suit was filed
in the month of January, 1989. Thus, it is clear that suit for specific performance of
contract was filed after 14 years of execution of initial agreement to sell i.e.
09.08.1975 (Ex.P/1).
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 8/5/2025
6:15:57 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:16182
13
F.A.No. 162/2001
25. By no stretch of imagination, silence maintained by plaintiff or her husband
for a period of 10 years can said to be a reasonable period for not filing the suit for
specific performance of contract. Since second agreement to sell i.e. 09.10.1985
(Ex.P/4) is based on the first agreement to sell i.e. 09.08.1975 (Ex.P/1), therefore,
period of limitation cannot be counted from the date of execution of second
agreement to sell dated 09.10.1985 (Ex.P/4) but the period of limitation has to be
counted from the date of execution of first agreement to sell i.e. 09.08.1975 (Ex.P/1).
26. Since the plaintiff has failed to file a suit for specific performance of contract
within a reasonable period from the date of execution of first agreement to sell dated
09.08.1975 (Ex.P/1), therefore, this Court is of considered opinion that the suit filed
by plaintiff was hopelessely barred by time which also indicates that neither plaintiff
nor her husband were ready and willing to perform their part of contract.
27. Accordingly, this Court is of considered opinion that since the suit filed
plaintiff is hopelessely barred by limitation, therefore, no relief can be granted to the
plaintiff.
28. Accordingly, judgment and decree dated 07.02.2001 passed by III Additional
District Gwalior in Regular Civil Suit No.3A/1989 is hereby affirmed though on
different ground. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
Rashid
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 8/5/2025
6:15:57 PM