Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Smt Mutyala Seetha Mahalakshmi 2 Others vs Akula Srinivas 2 Others on 1 August, 2025
APHC010233262013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
FRIDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 301 OF 2013
BETWEEN:
1. Smt Mutyala Seetha Mahalakshmi, W/o. Suryanarayana, Occ:
Housewife, R/o. Yerrampallem Village Gandepalli Mandal, Peddapuram
JCJ Court Limits.
2. Mutyala Suryanarayana, S/o. Sathiraju, R/o. Yerrampallem Village
Gandepalli Mandal, Peddapuram JCJ Court Limits.
3. Smt Parimi Satyadevi, W/o. Ravikumar, Housewife, R/o. Vetlapalem
Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits.
...Appit/Petitioners
AND
1. Akula Srinivas, S/o. Bhadram, Driver of Elcher Van AP 5 Y 7141 R/o.
D.No. 11-132 G Medapadu (V) Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits.
2. Jana Srinu, S/o. Venkatarao, Owner of Elcher Van AP 5 Y 7141 R/o.
D.No. 11-132 G Medapadu (V) Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits.
3. M/s Bajaj Allianz Insurance Co Ltd Vijayawada, Rep. by its Divisional
Manager, Vijayawada VZA JCJ Limits.
...Respondents/Respondents
Appeal filed under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1973,
aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated; 21-11-2012 in M.V. O.P. No.
149 of 2011 on file of the Motor Accidents Cum Tribunal VIII Additional
District Court, East Godavari District.
Appeal coming on for hearing and upon perusing the Memorandum of
Appeal, the Judgment and Decree of the lower Court and the material
evidence on record and upon hearing the arguments of Sri. T.G.S. Srivatsava,
Advocate for the Appellant and Sri N.Siva Reddy for the Respondent No.2 and
for the Appellant and Sri Naresh Byrapaneni for the Respondent No.3.
This Court doth order and decree as follows:
1. That the MACMA.NO.301 of 2013 be and is hereby Allowed in part.
2. That the Judgment and Decree dated 21/11/2012 passed by the MACT
dismissing the M.V.O.P.NO. 149 of 2011 be and is hereby set-aside.
3. That the M.V.O.P.No.149 of 2011 be and is hereby allowed.
4. That the claimants be and hereby are entitled for a compensation of
Rs.4,87,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date
of petition till deposit or realization.
5. That Rs.2,50,000/- be and hereby is apportioned to the share of
claimant No. 1/the mother of the deceased with proportionate interest
and total costs.
6. That Rs.1,50,000/- be and hereby is apportioned to the share of claimant No.2
the father of the deceased with proportionate interest.
7. That Rs.87,000/- be and hereby is apportioned to the share of claimant
no.3/ the sister of the deceased with proportionate interest.
8. That all the claimants be and hereby are entitled to withdraw the
amount at once on deposit.
9. That the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 be and are hereby jointly and
severally liable. But Respondent No.3 is liable in view of the Insurance
Policy.
10. That the time for deposit is two months.
11. That there be no order as to costs in this appeal.
Sd/- G HELA NAIDU
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
//TRUE COPY//
^ O'
' SECTION OFFICER
To.
1. The Chairman, Motor Accidents Cum Tribunal VIII Additional District
Court, East Godavari District.
2. Two C.D Copies.
Ssl
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HIGH COURT
DATED:01/08/2025
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DECREE
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1Q AUG 2m g*i
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WIA.CMA. NO. 301 OF 2013 ^ Current aeciion ^ ^
PARTLY ALLOWING THE WIA.CMA. WITHOUT
COSTS
APHC010233262013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
FRIDAY, THE FIRST DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 301 OF 2013
Appeal filed under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1973,
aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated: 21-11-2012 in M.V. O.P. No.
149 of 2011 on file of the Motor Accidents Cum Tribunal VIII Additional
District Court, East Godavari District.
BETWEEN:
1. Smt. Mutyala Seetha Mahalakshmi, W/o. Suryanarayana, Occ;
Housewife, R/o. Yerrampallem Village Gandepalli Mandal
Peddapuram JCJ Court Limits.
2. Mutyala Suryanarayana, S/o. Sathiraju, R/o. Yerrampallem Village
Gandepalli Mandal, Peddapuram JCJ Court Limits.
3. Smt. Parimi Satyadevi, W/o. Ravikumar, Housewife, R/o. Vetiapalem
Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits.
...Appit/Petitioners
AND
1. Akula Srinivas, S/o. Bhadram, Driver of Elcher Van AP 5 Y 7141 R/o.
D.No. 11-132 G Medapadu (V) Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits.
2. Jana Srinu, S/o. Venkatarao, Owner of Elcher Van AP 5 Y 7141 R/o.
D.No. 11-132 G Medapadu (V) Samalkota (M), Kakinada JCJ Limits.
r
A
. M/s Bajaj Allianz Insurance Co Ltd Vijayawada, Rep. by its Divisional
Manager, Vijayawada VZA JCJ Limits.
% :
>•'
...Respondents/Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioners:- SRI. T.G.S. SRIVATSAVA
Counsel for the Respondent No.2 SRI N. SIVA REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent No.3 SRI. NARESH BYRAPANENI
The Court made the following Order:
1
APHC010233262013
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3520]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY,THE FIRST DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 301/2013
Between:
1.SMT MUTYALA SEETHA MAHALAKSHMI & 2 OTHERS, W/0.
SURYANARAYANA, OCC; HOUSEWIFE, R/0. YERRAMPALLEM
VILLAGE GANDEPALLI MANDAL, PEDDAPURAM JCJ COURT LIMITS.
2. MUTYALA SURYANARAYANA,, S/0. SATHIRAJU, R/0.
YERRAMPALLEM VILLAGE GANDEPALLI MANDAL, PEDDAPURAM
JCJ COURT LIMITS.
3.SMT PARIMI SATYADEVI W/0. RAVIKUMAR, HOUSEWIFE, R/0.
VETLAPALEM SAMALKOTA (M), KAKINADA JCJ LIMITS.
...APPELLANT(S)
AND
1.AKULA SRINIVAS 2 OTHERS, S/0. BHADRAM, DRIVER OF ELCHER
VAN AP 5 Y 7141 R/0. D.NO. 11-132 G MEDAPADU (V) SAMALKOTA
(M), KAKINADA JCJ LIMITS.
2.JANA SRINU, S/0. VENKATARAO, OWNER OF ELCHER VAN AP 5 Y
7141 R/0. D.NO. 11-132 G MEDAPADU (V) SAMALKOTA (M),
KAKINADA JCJ LIMITS.
3.M/S BAJAJ ALLIANZ INSURANCE CO LTD VIJAYAWADA, REP. BY ITS
DIVISIONAL MANAGER, VIJAYAWADA VZA JCJ LIMITS.
E' '
2
...RESPONDENT(S):
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1.TG S SRIVATSAVA
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1.N SIVA REDDY
2..
3.NARESH BYRAPANENI
The Court made the following:
fca
3
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA
M.A.C.M.A.No.301 of 2013
JUDGMENT:
1. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of their claim petition, claimants in
M.V.O.P.No.149 of 2011 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-
III Additional District Judge, Kakinada (for short ‘the MACT’) filed the present
appeal
2. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein were the driver and owner of the Elcher
Van bearing No.AP 5 Y 7141 (hereinafter referred to as “the offending vehicle”)
involved in the accident and Respondent No.3 is the Insurance Company with
which the offending vehicle was insured.
3. For the sake of convenience, parties will be hereinafter referred to as the
claimants and the respondents, with reference to their status before the learned
MACT.
Case of the Claimants:
4(i). One Mutyala Venkata Satya Ravi Kumar(hereinafter referred to as “the
deceased”) is the son of Claimant Nos.1 and 2 and the brother of Claimant No.3.
4(ii). On 13.06.2009, at about 07:30 p.m., the deceased, while proceeding to
Samalkota from Vetapalem on his Hero Honda Passion Pius motorcycle and
when he was near Hussainpuram Village, respondent No.1 / driver of the
4offending vehicle reversed the
same in a rash and negligent manner to main road
from Ceramic shop to main road and dashed the motorcycle on which the
deceased was travelling. As a result, the accident occurred. The deceased was
shifted to Government General Hospital. Kakinada and from there to Safe
Emergency Hospital, Kakinada, but while undergoing treatment, he succumbed
to injuries on 15.06.2009.
4(iii). The accident occurred due to rash and
negligent driving of the offending
vehicle by respondent No.1. A case in Crime No. 144 of 2009 was registered
against respondent No.1 in Samalkota Police Station initially for the offenses
under Section 338 IPC and subsequently, it was altered to Section 304-A IPC.
The deceased was hale and healthy, aged about 25 years, earnings Rs. 11,000/-
per month and working as Marketing Manager-cum-Team Leader. The claimants
lost valuable financial support and every hope, including love and affection of the
deceased. Hence, claimants
are entitled for just and reasonable compensation.
4(iv). The offending vehicle was owned by Respondent No.2 insured with
Respondent No.3.
Hence all the respondents are liable to pay the
compensation.
Case of the Respondents:
5.
Respondent Nos.1 and 2, the driver
and the owner of the offending
vehicle, remained ex parte. Respondent No.3 alone contested the case.
w-
1
5
Case of Respondent No.3-lnsurance Company:
6(i). The claimants shall prove the pleaded accident, negligence of the driver of
the offending vehicle, ownership of respondent No.2 over the offending vehicle
and insuring the same with the Respondent No.3 is true. But, the compliance ofthe conditions of the policy shall be proved.
6(ii). The deceased himself was responsible for the accident by driving
motorcycle at high speed.
6(iii). The driver of the offending vehicle did not possess a valid driving license,
hence there is breach of conditions of policy. There are other violations.
6(iv). The claimants shall prove the age, occupation and income of the deceased
and their dependency on the deceased. In any event, the quantum ofcompensation claimed is excessive and the petition is liable to be dismissed
against the Insurance Company.
7. On the strength of pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial by
the learned MACT;
(i) Whether the accident occurred out of the use of Van bearing No.AP 05
Y 7141 and due to the rash and negligent driving of the said vehicle by the
1st respondent?
(ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation? If so, to what
amount and from which of the respondents?
(iii) To what relief?
f
6
8. Evidence before the learned MACT:
Description Remarks
Oral evidence P.W.1: Mutyala Seetha 1st petitioner /
Mahalakshmi
Mother of deceased
P.W.2: Reddy Abbulu Eye witness to the
accident.
Documentary Ex.AI; Attested Photostat copy of
evidence F.I.R. in Cr.No.144 of 2009 of
S.H.O., Samalkot P.S. for the
offence under Section 338 I.P.C
On behalf of the
Ex.A2: Attested Photostat copy of
altered F.I.R. in Cr.No.144 of petitioner(s).
2009 of S.H.O., Samalkot Police
Station for the offence under
Section 304-A I.P.C.
Ex.A3:Attested photostat copy of
postmortem report
Ex.A4; Attested photostat copy of
charge sheet
Ex.A5:Attested photostat copy of
scene observation report
Ex.A6: Attested Photostat copy of
M.V.I. report
EX.A7: Salary certificate of
deceased issued by Proprietor,
Dhwani Communications,
Kakinada.
Ex.A8: Attested photostat copy of
inquest report
Ex.BI: Copy of Insurance Policy On behalf of the
for the Eicher van bearing No.AP respondents.
05 Y 7141, which is valid from
19.07.2008 to 18.07.2009.
\
\
V ‘
7
Findings of the learned MACT:
9(i). P.W.1 is not an eye witness to the accident. P.W.2 is an eye witness. In
chief examination, he has stated that negligence of the driver of the offending
vehicle is the cause for the accident. In cross-examination, he has admitted that
when the offending vehicle was being reversed, the motor cycle hit and dashed
the offending vehicle and there was no fault on the part of the driver of the
offending vehicle. Therefore, there is negligence on the part of the motorcyclists /
deceased himself.
9(ii). Since the eye witness admitted the negligence of deceased, the charge
sheet cannot be basis, even investigation officer is not examined. Therefore, the
issue relating to negligence is answered against the claimants.
9(iii). The deceased was working as a Marketing Manager-cum-Team Leader
and earning Rs.11,000/-. Ex.A7 does not show when the deceased was
appointed. Ex.A7 is not proved. Ex.A8- inquest report stated that the deceased
was working as a Manager in Nettel Gardens at Hyderabad. The claimant failed
to prove the income of the deceased as Rs.11,000/- per month.
9(iv). Although, the policy was in force, the Insurance Company is not liable in
view of the findings of the issue No.1.
8
Arguments in the appeal:
For the appellants:
10(i). The learned MACT failed to note that the deceased was travelling from
West to East. The accident occurred when the crime vehicle was reversing
without following the required caution. Crime is registered against the driver of
the offending vehicle. The driver of the vehicle was not examined to disbelievethe negligence. The findings of the learned MACT as to absence of negligence
on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle are not tenable.
10(ii). The learned MACT erred in taking note of age and income of the deceased
etc. The deceased is a young man. The parents of the deceased are claimants
and the claimants lost dependency.
For the Respondent-Insurance Company:
11.
Evidence of P.W.2, the eye witness to the accident, is not supporting
claimants and the findings of the learned MACT as to the absence of negligence
are proper. They are no grounds to interfere. In any event, the contribution and
negligence on the part of the deceased shall be taken as a substantial cause for
the accident. In the light of the same, the aspect of liability of the respondents
particularly the Insurance Company requires to be assessed.
\
9
The points that arise for determination in this appeal are;
1) Whether the pleaded accident dated 13.06.2009 has occurred on
account of negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle or due to the
negligent driving of the offending vehicle by the deceased himself?
2) Whether the claimants are entitled for compensation? If so, to what
quantum and what is the liability of the respondents?
3) What is the result of the appeal?
Point No.1:
Statutory and Precedential Guidance:
13(i). It is relevant to note that the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 are
applicable in deciding the cases by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and they
are made in exercise of powers conferred under Section 176 of the Motor
Vehicles Act which reads as follows;
176. Power of State Government to make rules.–A State
Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect
the provisions of sections 165 to 174, and in particular, such rules
may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:–
(a) the form of application for claims for compensation and the
particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect
of such applications;
(b) the procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal In holding an
inquiry under this Chapter;
*11
10
(c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a
Claims Tribunal;
(d) the form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on
payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a
Claims Tribunal; and
(e) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed.
13(ii). Chapter ’11’ of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 commencing from
Rule 455 to Rule 476A deals with the powers of the Tribunal and all other allied
aspects like form of application, registration, notice to parties, appearance and
examination of parties, local inspection, summary examination of parties, method
of recording evidence, adjournments, framing and determination of issues,
judgments and enforcements of awards. Court fee relating to claim petitions
applicability of Civil Procedure Code and the application for claim basis to award
the claim by the claims tribunal. Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989
reads as follows:
Rule 476: Application for claim
(7) Basis to award the claim The Claims Tribunal shall proceed
to award the claim on the basis of;-
(i) Registration Certificate of the Motor Vehicle involved in
the accident;
(ii) Insurance Certificate or Policy relating to the insurance
of the Motor Vehicle against the Third party risk;
(Hi) Copy of First Information Report;
11
(iv) Post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from
the Medical Officer; and
(v) The nature of the treatment given by the Medical Officer
who has examined the victim.
(7A) Specification of amount of compensation awarded by the
Tribunal to each victim:- Where compensation is awarded to two
or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall also specify theamount payable to each of them.
13(iii). It is relevant to note that in view of the summary nature and mode of
enquiry contemplated under Motor Vehicles Act and social welfare nature of
legislation the Tribunal shall have holistic view with reference to facts and
circumstances of each case. It is sufficient if there is probability. The principle of
standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering
a claim seeking compensation for the death or the injury on account of road
accident. The touch stone of the case, the claimants shall have to establish is
preponderance of probability only. The legal position to this extent is settled and
consistent.
13(iv). The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bimla Devi and others Vs. Himachal Road
Transport Corporation\ in para 15 observed as follows:
15.In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic
view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an
accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be
possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish
their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard‘ 2009 (13) see 530
12Of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said
purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective
stories set forth by both the parties..”13(v). In a case between Bhagwan Ram and Ors. Vs. Deen Dayal and Ors.^,
while considering the nature of proof is required for believing the negligent driving
in Motor Accident Claims, the Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan found that
Certificate and the copies of documents prepared by the Police on the spot,
including the Challan, First Information Report etc. are admissible, even in the
absence of statement of eye witnesses and the same can be the basis to believe
the negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, vide para-11 which
reads as follows:
“11. The fact that any of the eye witness or the police personnel and
authorities, who had prepared the documents – certified copies of challan
Exhibit-1, First Information Report as Exhibit-2, Naksha Mauka as Exhibit-4,
Halat Mauka as Exhibit-5, Postmortem Report as Exhibit-10 were notexamined is of no consequence. The said documents being certified copies of
public documents even In absence of such statements are admissible inevidence as held by this Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road
Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Devilal & Ors., reported at 1991 ACJ
230 and Shrwan Kumar v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation &
Ors., reported at 1995 ACJ 337. It was held by this Court In the case of
Shrwan Kumar as under-
“18. Public documents like the first information report and the report of
the mechanical inspection of the bus can be taken into consideration and
this point is no longer res Integra so far as this court is concerned. In‘ 2013 (0) sc (Raj) 812
13Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Devilal, 1991 ACJ 230
(Rajasthan) , it was observed that strictly speaking, provisions of Evidence
Act are not applicable before the Tribunal; if a document is a certified copy
of a public document it need not be proved by calling a witness or the
person who prepared it. “
13(vi). In Anitha Sarma and Others Vs. New Indian Assurance Company
Ltd.^, the Honble Apex Court observed that in Motor Accident Claims, standard
of proof is one of the preponderance of possibilities render beyond reasonable
doubt; approach and role of the Courts, while examining the evidence in accident
cases, ought not to be to find fault with non-examination of the best eye
witnesses, as may happen in criminal Trial, but instead should be only to analyse
the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant’s
version is more likely than not true. The observations in para-17 are as follows:-
“fZ. Unfortunately, the approach of the High Court was not sensitive enough
to appreciate the turn of events at the spot, or the appellant-claimants’
hardship in tracing witnesses and collecting information for an accident which
took place many hundreds of kilometers away In an altogether different State.
Close to the facts of the case in hand, this Court in Parmeshwari v. Amir
Chand [Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 (2011) 4 SCC
(Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 605], viewed that: (SCC p. 638, para 12)“12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed [Amir Chand v.
Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 9302] the case was by way of
disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High
Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as
a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her
to reach the doctor’s chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets
medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just
because he did not file a complaint himself We are constrained to repeat our
^ 2021(1) see 171
14
obsen/ation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not
sensitized enough to appreciate the plight of the victim.
’15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view
of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an
accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be
possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish
their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.
>99
13(vii). In a case between New India Assurance Company Ltd., Vs.
Kethavarapu Sathyavathi and Ors/, the Hon’ble Division Bench of High Court
of Andhra Pradesh has referred to Section 168, 169 of M.V. Act and Rule 476(7)
of A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules and also catena of decisions. The point for
consideration before the Hon’ble Division Bench was that in holding an inquiry in
terms of Motor Vehicles Act, what is the procedure to be followed and whether
the F.I.R. can be basis for considering the claim. Observations in para 5 to 7 are
as follows:
‘5. Point:
Under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “the
Act”), the Claims Tribunal shall give the parties an opportunity of being heard,
hold an inquiry into the claim and make an award determining just
compensation, etc. In holding any such inquiry. Section 169 of the Act
mandates the Tribunal to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit
subject to rules. The Tribunal was conferred with the powers of a civil Court for
the specified purposes and under Rule 476 of the Rules, the Claims Tribunal
was directed to follow the procedure of summary trial as contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Tribunal was cautioned not to reject any
application on the ground of any technical flaw and was also obligated to
obtain whatever information necessary from the police, medical and other
authorities. It is true that sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules states that the
Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim on the basis of registration
certificate of the motor vehicle. Insurance certificate or Policy, copy of first2009 Supreme (AP) 136=2010(2) ALD 403=2009(3) ALT 260
15information report, post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the
medical officer and the nature of treatment given by the medical Officer.
6. The said sub-rule obviously refers to the relevant dependable criteria for
assessment of the compensation, which Is patently illustrative and can never
be considered to be exhaustive. This Sub-rule stating the basis to award the
claim, is obviously subject to the prohibition against depending on any
technical flaw and the procedure for summary trial to be followed by the
Tribunal. The said sub-rule cannot travel beyond the statutory obligation
imposed on the Tribunal to determine the just compensation after an inquiry,
in which an opportunity of being heard is given to the parties. The judicial
determination of the questions In controversy before the Tribunal in terms of
Sections 168 and 169 of the Act cannot be confined to consideration of the
five documents referred to in sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules alone and
exclude any other oral or documentary evidence. The procedure of summary
trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure which the Tribunal shall follow
under Rule 476 of the Rules itself mandates taking all such evidence as may
be produced by both sides In support of their respective versions, apart from
the evidence which the Court, of its own motion, causes to be produced as per
Section 262 read with Sections 254 and 255 of the said Code. Sub-rule (7) to
be understood in the light of the object and scheme of the Act, is a directory
provision referring to some of the documents which can offer guidance to the
Tribunal in discharge of its statutory duty and the word “shall” used In the said:
subrule has to be necessarily understood as “may”.
7. That apart, to say that the, first information report alone should be the
conclusive basis for determining the manner of the accident, even in spite of
the availability of other dependable evidence on record on that aspect, will be
offending the plain language of the statute and if that were the purport of sub
rule (7), it cannot be considered valid, as any such delegated legislation
cannot travel beyond the legislation itself.”
13(viii). In Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz^, the Hon’ble Apex
Court observed in Para 7 to 9, as follows:-
” 7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of negligence on the part of the
first respondent who was driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was
required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of
preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. (Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC [(2009) 13 SCO 530]^ (2013) 10 see 646
16
8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta [(2011) 10 SCC 509 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] while considering the nature
of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-Judge Bench of
this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions (ii), (v) and
(vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be
extracted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 518, para 10)“10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant
is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact,
there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu Initiated by the
Tribunal.
(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the
compensation. It does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. …
(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it
thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge
of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry. ”
9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would
require specific note : (Shila Datta case [(2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC
(Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328], SCC p. 519)“10. …We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an
award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication
between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory
determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident,
after due enquiry. In accordance with the statute.
”
Analysis of Evidence as to Negligence:
14(i). The evidence of P.W.2 failed to gain positive nod from the learned MACT.
During chief examination, P.W.2 categorically stated that he witnessed the
accident and that the deceased sustained injuries and was shifted to hospital.
There was negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. It is relevant to note
that P.W.2 is a rustic villager and he affixed thumb impression during his
evidence, both chief and cross examination. Major importance to the evidence of
17P.W.2 in cross examination is given by the learned MACT. Therefore, the same
requires scrutiny.
14(ii) P.W.2 evidence and analysis:
(i) P.W.2 do not know the deceased prior to the accident- this suggests his
neutrality.
(ii). P.W.2 has came to Court at the request of relatives of deceased- this
suggests about the knowledge of proceedings through the relatives of the
deceased.
(iii). P.W.2 stated that, there are shops by the side of the road where the
accident took place- this suggests his knowledge and acguaintance about
the accident spot.
(iv). P.W.2 stated that, when Van was being reversed, a motorcycle came
from behind it and dashed to the Van. It is relevant to note that in what
direction the offending vehicle was coming and which direction the
deceased was travelling on motorcycle is not elicited.
(v). P.W.2 stated that, the driver of the van was not at fault.
This depends on what was the Question that was put to the
witness. This further suggest that driver of the offending vehicle was taking
reverse and the motor cycle came from behind.
18
(vi). Whether the accident took place due to the negligent riding of the
motorcycle depends on the question, if the motorcycle was moving on the
road in usual speed and if the offending vehicle was taking reverse who
must be careful? It is pertinent to note that P.W.2 is an eye witness but,
other record FIR and charge sheet are indicating that the driver of the
offending vehicle was charge sheeted. No doubt the evidence of eye
witness produced by the claimant plays important role but at the same
time, the other material cannot be completely ignored.
(vii). Even according to the evidence of P.W.2, Reddy Abbulu, it is not the
case that the offending vehicle did not involve in the accident. During
chief examination, P.W.2 has stated that, without blowing horn, the driver
of the offending vehicle was taking reverse from the Ceramic shop into the
main road. This suggests that the offending vehicle was coming into the
main road by taking reverse and the motor cycle was going on main road.
If there was sudden taking of reverse without any horn it will make the
person going on main road to hit the vehicle coming into the road that does
not mean that there was total negligence on the part of the person going
on straight road and that there was no negligence of person enter into
main road particularly taking reverse that without blowing horn.
i .
19
(viii). Further, it is relevant to note that the accident taken place on
13.06.2009. Examination of witness taken place on 13.08.2012. There
was more than three years gap. The witness is a rustic villager and
illiterate. Photographic memory of the incident and narration of
incident with mathematical accuracy cannot be expected that too during
cross examination before a district Court.
(ix). It if further relevant to note that no steps are taken to examine the
driver of the offending vehicle. It is also relevant to note that he remained
parte.
(X). The evidence of P.W.2, appears to be true as to the offending
vehicle taking reverse and the motorcycle on which the deceased was
travelling on straight road hitting the offending vehicle. Therefore, the
deceased should have been more careful in riding the motorcycle. But this
does not make the motorcycle rider completely responsible for accident.
(xi). A person taking reverse and facing the criminal trial being a
tortfeasor in respect of civil liability cannot totally stay away from the
proceedings, and play hide and seek through total blame on the victim
party and take advantage of the evidence of the innocent witness.
15. In any view of the matter, upon consideration entire material throwing total
fault on the part of the deceased and giving a clean chit to the driver of the
offending vehicle a tortfeasor who faced criminal trial found not convincing and in
20
the facts and circumstances of the case, negligence found attributable to the both
driver of the offending vehicle and the deceased and accordingly contribution IS
apportioned at 50% each taking aid of evidence and precedential guidance
referred above vide:
(i) Bimla Devi and Others vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation (1
supra),
(ii) Bhagwan Ram and Ors. vs. Deen Dayal and Ors.{2 supra),
(iii) Anitha Sarma and Others vs. New Indian Assurance Company
Lfc/.(3supra),
(iv) New India Assurance Company Ltd., vs. Kethavarapu Sathyavathi
and Ors (4 supra) and
(v) Dulcina Fernandes vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz (5 supra).
16.
In view of the discussion made above, the point No.1 is answered
concluding that the accident is the result of contribution of negligence by both the
deceased and the driver of the offending vehicle at the rate of 50% each.
Point No.2:
Quantum of Compensation:
Precedential auidance:-
a) Adoption of Multiplier. Multiplicand and Calculation:
17(i). Hon’ble Apex Court to have uniformity of practice and consistency in
awarding just compensation provided certain guidelines in Sarla Verma (Smt.)
wrr^
W[S’
21
f and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.^ vide paragraph Nos. 18
and 19, while prescribing a table directed adoption of suitable multiplier
mentioned in column No.4 of the table. As per the observations in the judgment
the claimants have to establish the following;
1. Age of the deceased.
2. Income of the deceased.
3. Number of dependents,
(ii). Hon’ble Apex Court directed certain steps while determining the
compensation, they are;
Step No.1:
Ascertain the multiplicand, which shall be the income of the deceased he /
she should have contributed to the dependents and the same can be arrived
after deducting certain part of personal living expenses of the deceased.
Step No.2:
Ascertaining Multiplier. This shall be with reference to the table provided
and table is provided in judgment itself.
Step No.3:
Calculation of the compensation.
Final Step:
After calculation adding of certain amount towards conventional heads
towards loss of estate, loss of consortium, funeral expenditure, cost of transport.
® 2009 (6) see 121
22cost Of medical expenses for treatment of the deceased before the death etc. are
advised.
b) Adding of future prospects:
18(i). Enhancing the scope for awarding just compensation, the Hon’ble Apex
Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Others^ case
guided for adding of future prospect. In respect of permanent employment, 50%
where the deceased is below 40 years, 30% where the deceased is 40-50 yearsand 15% where the deceased is 50-60 years.
(ii). The actual salary to be taken shall be after deducting taxes, Further, in
respect of self employed on fixed salary addition is recommended, at 40% for the
deceased below 40 years, at 25% where the deceased is between 40-50 years,at 10% where the deceased is between 50-60 years, Further, adding of
compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses atRs. 15,000/- and Rs.40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively is recommended by
Hon’ble Apex court with an addition of 10% for every three years in Pranay
Sethi‘s case.
c) Loss of Consortium under the heads of parental and filial consortium:
19. Further enlarging the scope for awarding just and reasonable compensation
in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and Others^,‘ 2017(16) see 680
*(2018) 18 sec 130
F23
Hon’ble Apex Court observed that compensation can be awarded under the
heads of loss of consortium not only to the spouse but also to the children and
parents under the heads of parental and filial consortium.
d) Just Compensation:
20. In Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others^, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in para Nos. 10 and 11 made relevant observations, they are as follows:
10. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation In
excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in
this case. At para 10 of Nagappa case [Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh,
(2003) 2 see 274 : 2003 SCC (eh) 523 : AIR 2003 SC 674] , it was
held as follows: (See p. 280)
“10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the eiaims Tribunal to ‘make
an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it
to be just’. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the
compensation is that it must be ‘just’. There is no other limitation or
restriction on Its power for awarding just compensation.
”
The principle was followed In the later decisions in Oriental Insurance
Co. Ltd. V. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 877 :
(2009) 2 SCC (CrI) 987] and in NIngamma v. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 241 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
1213]
11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions Is with regard
to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and it has now
become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or
technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the court should be to equate,
as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the
compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the
vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned
by the victim.
® (2013) 9 see 54
24
21.
As per the evidence of P.W.1, the deceased was working as Marketing
Manager and getting a salary of Rs.11,000/- per month. He was aged about 25
years by the date of accident. Ex.A7 is the salary certificate.
22.
Learned MACT observed that Ex.A7 is not proved. The contents of Ex.A7
are showing that M.V.S. Ravi Kumar worked
as team leader and earning salary
of Rs.11,000/- per month and certificate was issued to the parents of M.V.S.Ravi
Kumar, Empathetic concern of the learned MACT is found missinr, in thk
ugpn examination of the wav in which the case is dealt Parents of a young man
and his sister lost their sole bread
winner who was reportedly working as
Marketing Manager. They were before the learned MACT for legal redressal.
23. The difficulties of the victims i
– in procuring evidence and their deoendenry
on the counsels, doctors and
so many are reguired to be keot in view, in handling
cases relating to social welfare legislatives. Ex A7 was properly produced If thP
auantum of salary mentioned in Ex.A7 is doubtful it need not hr.
reasons
^If the employment itself is not believahls at least nn nntinn^i
some income can be considered. Even in respect of a vega bond, snmp inpnma
is, contemplated under the Motor Vehicles Act IntereetinnI’, MACT
did not accept any income in this case and declined to naimiato any
compensation
25
24. Interestingly, the objections of the learned MACT are:
(i). P.W.1 did not say the name of the Company in which the deceased
was working.
Ans:- Ex.A7 is reflecting the name of the company in which the deceased
was working.
(ii). Ex.A7 is reflecting the capacity in which the deceased was working
that he was a team manager, but it is not reflecting when he was
appointed? and when he joined the service? and how much service the
deceased was putting? and details of salary, pay, allowances and
deductions etc.?
Ans:- This way of unjustly invalidating a document is painful that too in a
claim for compensation in MACT case without there being any cross
examination on those aspects. This reflecting oddness instead of fairness
on the part of the learned MACT.
(iii). Learned MACT refers the inquest report states that deceased was
working as Manager in Nettle Garden at Hyderabad and observes that
Ex.A7 is indicating that he is working at Kakinada. Therefore, there is
contradiction.
Ans;- Either at Kakinada or at Hyderabad, some working is reflected. The
age could have been accepted and at least notional income should have
26
‘t
been taken by the learned MACT, but the learned MACT did not accept
any income and recused from quantifying the compensation,
(iv). Learned MACT interestingly observed that petitioners are
parents and they cannot be said as dependents.
Ans:- When the law recognizes the right of maintenance of parents against
children by way of maintenance proceedings in terms of Section 125 of the
Cr.P.C or in terms of personal laws, it is not known how, without there
being any material, the learned MACT concluded that parents are not
dependents.
25. It is relevant to note that the Insurance Company suggested during the
cross examination of P.W.2 that the claim of the claimants is excessive. During
cross examination of PW.1, Ex.A7 was disputed but during re-examination, the
inquest report was got marked as Ex.A8. During further cross examination, the
working status of the deceased as reflected in Ex.A8 was not denied and it was
simply suggested that he was not getting the salary of Rs.11,000/- per month.
26. Since the claimant Nos.1 and 2 are the parents this Court finds that, they
are entitled to compensation. Claimant No.3, the married sister of the deceased
entitled for a nominal amount as she is not shown as the dependent.
27. From the material on record and in view of the discussion made above.
upon considering the age of the deceased, it is found reasonable to adopt the
V
27
income Of the deceased at Rs.6.000/- per month, upon taking note of socio-
economic status of the year 2009. Adding of 1/3’^’^ towards future prospects is
also found reasonable in the context of the case, whereby the income can be
taken at Rs.8,000/- per month which comes to Rs.96,000/- per annum. The
deceased was unmarried; hence, 50% is liable to be deducted towards personal
expenses. 50% of the same comes to Rs.48,000/-. The same can be considered
as the multiplicand. The deceased was aged about ’25’ years by the date of
accident. Multiplier applicable is ’18’. Then, the loss of dependency of claimants
comes to Rs.8,64,000/-. Claimant Nos.1 and 2 are entitled for Rs.40,000/- each
towards loss of consortium. The claimants are also entitled for Rs. 15,000/-
towards loss of estate and Rs.15,000/- towards funeral expenditure.
of the reasons and
28. In the light of the precedential guidance and in view
evidence referred above, the entitlement of the claimants for reasonable
compensation is as follows:
SI. Head Fixed by this
No. Appellate Court
1. Loss of dependency Rs.8,64,000/-
2. Loss of consortium Rs.80,000/-
3. Loss of estate Rs.15,000/-
4. Funeral expenses Rs.15,000/-
Total; Rs.9,74,000/-
28
29.
Since the negligence is apportioned at 50%, the entitlement of claimants
for compensation against Respondents concerned with the offended vehicle can
be fixed at Rs.4,87,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the
date of petition till deposit or realization. Point No.2 is answered accordingly.
Point No.3:
30.
For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings of point Nos.1 and 2,
point No.3 is answered as follows:
In the result,
(i) The appeal is allowed-in-part.
(ii) The decree and judgment dated 21.11.2012 passed by the learned
MACT dismissing the M.V.O.P.No.149 of 2011 is hereby set-aside,
(iii) M.V.O.P.No.149 of 2011 is allowed as follows:
a) Claimants are entitled for a compensation of Rs.4,87,000/- with
interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till
deposit or realization,
b) Rs.2,50,000/- is apportioned to the share of claimant No.1/ the
mother of the deceased with proportionate interest and total
costs,
c) Rs.1,50,000/- is apportioned to the share of claimant No.2/ the
father of the deceased with proportionate interest.
29
d) Rs.87,000/- is apportioned to the share of claimant No.3/ the
sister of the deceased with proportionate interest.
e) All the claimants are entitled to withdraw the amount at once on
deposit.
f) Respondent Nos.2 and 3 are jointly and severally liable. But
Respondent No.3 is liable in view of the Insurance Policy.
g) Time for deposit is two months.
(iv) There shall be no order as to costs, in this appeal.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall
stand closed.
Sd/- G HELA NAIDU
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
//TRUE COPY//
SECTION OFFICER
One Fair Copy to the Hon’ble Sri Justice A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA
(For His Lordship’s Kind Perusal)
To,
1. The Chairman, Motor Accidents-Cum-Tribunal VIII Additional District
Court, East Godavari District.
2. One CC to Sri. T G S Srivatsava, Advocate [OPUC]
3. One CC to Sri. N Siva Reddy, Advocate [OPUC]
4. One CC to Sri. Naresh Byrapaneni, Advocate [OPUC]
5. Nine(09) L.R Copies.
6. The Union Secretary, Union of India, Ministry of Law Justice and Company
Affairs, New Delhi.
7. The Secretary, A.P., Advocates Association Library, High Court
Buildings, Nelapadu, Amaravati, Guntu District, A.P.,
8. Two C.D Copies.
Ssl
VNA
HIGH COURT
DATED:01/08/2025
* 1 § AUG 2025 m
JUDGMENT + DECREE . Current Section
eo.
MA.CMA. NO. 301 OF 2013
PARTLY ALLOWING THE MA.CMA.
WITHOUT COSTS
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