Delhi High Court
Smt. Ritu Aggarwal @ Aditi & Ors. vs State & Anr. on 16 December, 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on:16.12.2024
+ CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 & CRL.M.A. 32873/2019
SMT. RITU AGGARWAL @ ADITI & ORS. .....Petitioners
versus
STATE & ANR. .....Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioners : Mr. Rajesh Aggarwal, Adv.
For the Respondents : Mr. Naresh Kumar Chahar, APP for the
State with Mr. Amrendra Choudhary, Mr.
Achint Kumar & Mr. Amit Kumar, Advs.
SI Shivendra Singh, PS- Subhash Place
Counsel for R-2 (Appearance not given)
CORAM
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition has been filed, inter alia, challenging
orders dated 30.03.2019 and 25.05.2019 (hereafter ‘impugned
orders’), passed by the learned Special Judge, North West District,
Rohini Courts, Delhi, in CR No. 50/2018.
2. The learned Revisional Court by impugned order dated
30.03.2019, dismissed the challenge of the petitioners to the order
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 1 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
dated 24.01.2018, passed by the learned Trial Court, and held that the
contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that they deserve to be
discharged as the charge sheet was filed after period of limitation was
meritless.
3. By the impugned order dated 25.05.2019, the learned
Revisional Court noted that the learned Trial Court had rightly framed
charges against the accused persons for the offences under Sections
451/341/323/506(II)/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC‘).
4. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
4.1. Respondent No.2 filed an application under Section 156(3) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘CrPC‘) along with a criminal
complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC against the petitioners. It is
alleged that Petitioner No.1 and the complainant were married,
however, she had left the matrimonial home on the pretext of
attending a family function. It is alleged that on 05.06.2006, at around
8 PM, the accused petitioners forcefully gained entry into the house of
the complainant in the absence of the complainant. It is alleged that
the accused persons abused and humiliated the parents of the
complainant and threatened the complainant’s mother that he would
be kidnapped if they didn’t obey the accused persons. Petitioner No.2
(mother of Petitioner No.1) further threatened the parents of the
complainant that they would have been killed if they had been in
Batala, PB. When the complainant rushed to his home on finding out
about the incident, he was manhandled along with his parents by the
accused persons. The accused persons ransacked the complainant’s
house and also took the jewellery and cash of the complainant’sSignature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 2 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
mother. When the complainant objected to this, he was dragged by the
accused persons on road and beaten, due to which he sustained severe
injuries. The complainant lost consciousness. The mother of the
complainant tried to intervene and she was pushed away due to which
she also sustained minor injuries. The same culminated into FIR No.
980/2006 dated 10.09.2006, registered at Police Station Saraswati
Vihar, for offences under Sections 323/325/34/341/452/506 of the
IPC.
4.2. The charge sheet was filed against the accused persons in the
year 2009. The learned Trial Court took cognizance for offences under
Sections 323/506/34 on 07.05.2011.
4.3. The petitioners raised the issue of limitation under Section 468
of the CrPC in filing of charge sheet, however, the learned Trial Court
dismissed the application for discharge on the ground of limitation by
order dated 10.10.2017. The petitioners challenged the said order
before this Court in CRL.M.C. 5371/2017.
4.4. The learned Trial Court by order dated 24.01.2018 framed
charges against the accused persons for offences under Sections
451/341/323/506(II)/34 of the IPC. The said order was challenged
before the Revisional Court in CR No. 50/2018. This Court, by order
dated 14.03.2019, in CRL.M.C. 5371/2017, dismissed the petition
after observing that the issue of limitation had already been raised by
the petitioners before the Revisional Court. The Court directed the
Revisional Court to pass a speaking order on the plea of limitation as
well.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 3 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
4.5. By impugned order dated 30.03.2019, the learned Revisional
Court rejected the plea of limitation. It was noted that the complaint
was registered by Respondent No.2 soon after the incident and the
complainant could not be blamed for delay on part of the investigating
officer. It was noted that grave injustice would be caused to
Respondent No.2 if the order taking cognizance is held to be bad in
law on account of limitation.
4.6. By impugned order dated 25.05.2019, the learned Revisional
Court upheld the order dated 24.01.2018 on merits. It was noted that
each case is to be decided on its own merits and it cannot be held that
that the petitioners had only given empty threats of causing dire harm.
It was held that at that stage, the manner in which the accused persons
had acted by breaking into the complainant’s house, beating him and
threatening his parents, was sufficient to frame charges under Sections
451/341/323/506(II)/34 of the IPC against them.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that a bare
perusal of the record indicates that the charge sheet has been filed
against the petitioners after the limitation period of three years. He
submitted that despite the delay in filing of chargesheet, the learned
Courts below erroneously did not grant benefit of the same to the
petitioners.
6. He submitted that the Courts below erroneously observed that
there is no period of limitation to file the charge sheet. He further
submitted that the plea of limitation was dismissed on the observation
that the learned Trial Court had framed charges for graver offence of
Section 506(II) of the IPC which has no period of limitation without
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 4 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
appreciating that the same is not attracted in the present case as there
is no allegation that the threats caused any alarm to the complainant.
7. He submitted that mere outburst by the accused that he will kill
the complainant is not sufficient to constitute the offence under
Section 506(II) of the IPC.
8. He submitted that the question of limitation and framing of the
graver charge of Section 506(II) of the IPC is interconnected and
ought to have been adjudicated simultaneously. He submitted that the
petitioners never conceded to disposal of matter in such a manner.
9. He submitted that no case under Section 451 of the IPC is made
out as Petitioner No.1 had gone to her own matrimonial house with
her mother and brother. He submitted that the other accused persons
were not present at the spot and did not visit the matrimonial house of
Petitioner No.1.
10. He submitted that no victim was wrongly restrained and Section
341 of the IPC has been attracted without due application of mind.
11. Per contra¸ the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the
State submits that the learned Revisional Court and the learned Trial
Court have framed the charges after due application of mind to the
facts of the case. He submitted that the FIR was filed within the period
of limitation, and thus, the plea of limitation is not applicable to the
present case.
ANALYSIS
12. At the outset, it is relevant to note that while it is settled law that
a second revision cannot be filed in terms of the bar under Section 397
of the CrPC, the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 5 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
CrPC has a wide ambit and can be exercised in the interest of justice.
It is settled law that the power under Section 482 of the CrPC is to be
exercised cautiously and sparingly, especially when Sessions Judge
has already exercised revisional power under Section 397 of the CrPC.
13. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Krishnan v.
Krishnaveni : (1997) 4 SCC 241, had observed as under:
“8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring
the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401,
upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory
jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct
irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the
inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482.
The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However,
the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and
cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised
revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High
Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of
judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not
correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the
abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct
irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court
in its juridical process or illegality of sentence or order.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. In the present petition, the petitioners have assailed the charges
framed against them on the ground of limitation and also on merits.
15. Insofar as the issue of limitation is concerned, it is relevant to
refer to Section 468 of the CrPC. The same reads as under:
“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of
limitation.–(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this
Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category
specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of
limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be–
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 6 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a
term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in
relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be
determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with
the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe
punishment.”
16. The issue of relevant date for the purpose of calculating period
of limitation under Section 468 of the CrPC was considered by the
Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sarah
Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases : (2014) 2 SCC 62
has observed as under:
“3. No specific questions have been referred to us. But, in our
opinion, the following questions arise for our consideration:
3.1. (i) Whether for the purposes of computing the period of
limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of
filing of the complaint or the date of institution of the prosecution
or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate
takes cognizance of the offence?
xxx
5.2. Section 468 CrPC has to be read keeping in view other
provisions particularly Section 473 CrPC. A person filing a
complaint within time cannot be penalised because the
Magistrate did not take cognizance. A person filing a complaint
after the period of limitation can file an application for
condonation of delay and the Magistrate could condone delay if the
explanation is reasonable. If Section 468 is interpreted to mean
that a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence after the
period of limitation without any reference to the date of filing of
the complaint or the institution of the prosecution it would be
rendered unconstitutional. A court of law would interpret a
provision which would help sustaining the validity of the law by
applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than
accepting an interpretation which may make such provision
unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. (U.P. PowerSignature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 7 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
Corpn. Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra [(2008) 10 SCC 139 :
(2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 1000] .)
xxx
35. In this connection, our attention is drawn to the judgment of
this Court in Sharadchandra Dongre [State of
Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre, (1995) 1 SCC 42
: 1995 SCC (Cri) 16] . It is urged on the basis of this judgment that
by condoning the delay, the court takes away a valuable right
which accrues to the accused. Hence, the accused has a right to be
heard when an application for condonation of delay under Section
473 CrPC is presented before the court. Keeping this argument in
mind, let us examine both the viewpoints i.e. whether the date of
taking cognizance or the date of filing complaint is material for
computing limitation. If the date on which complaint is filed is
taken to be material, then if the complaint is filed within the period
of limitation, there is no question of it being time-barred. If it is
filed after the period of limitation, the complainant can make an
application for condonation of delay under Section 473 CrPC. The
court will have to issue notice to the accused and after hearing the
accused and the complainant decide whether to condone the delay
or not. If the date of taking cognizance is considered to be relevant
then, if the court takes cognizance within the period of limitation,
there is no question of the complaint being time-barred. If the court
takes cognizance after the period of limitation then, the question is
how will Section 473 CrPC work. The complainant will be
interested in having the delay condoned. If the delay is caused by
the Magistrate by not taking cognizance in time, it is absurd to
expect the complainant to make an application for condonation of
delay. The complainant surely cannot explain that delay. Then in
such a situation, the question is whether the Magistrate has to issue
notice to the accused, explain to the accused the reason why delay
was caused and then hear the accused and decide whether to
condone the delay or not. This would also mean that the Magistrate
can decide whether to condone delay or not, caused by him. Such a
situation will be anomalous and such a procedure is not known to
law. Mr Luthra, learned ASG submitted that use of disjunctive
“or” in Section 473 CrPC suggests that for the first part i.e. to find
out whether the delay has been explained or not, notice will have to
be issued to the accused and for the latter part i.e. to decide
whether it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice, no notice
will have to be issued. This question has not directly arisen before
us. Therefore, we do not want to express any opinion whether for
the purpose of notice, Section 473 CrPC has to be bifurcated or
not. But, we do find this situation absurd. It is absurd to hold that
the court should issue notice to the accused for condonation ofSignature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 8 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
delay, explain the delay caused at its end and then pass an order
condoning or not condoning the delay. The law cannot be reduced
to such absurdity. Therefore, the only harmonious construction
which can be placed on Sections 468, 469 and 470 CrPC is that
the Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the
complaint in respect of it is filed within the prescribed limitation
period. He would, however, be entitled to exclude such time as is
legally excludable.
xxx
37. We are inclined to take this view also because there has to be
some amount of certainty or definiteness in matters of limitation
relating to criminal offences. If, as stated by this Court, taking
cognizance is application of mind by the Magistrate to the
suspected offence, the subjective element comes in. Whether a
Magistrate has taken cognizance or not will depend on facts and
circumstances of each case. A diligent complainant or the
prosecuting agency which promptly files the complaint or
initiates prosecution would be severely prejudiced if it is held that
the relevant point for computing limitation would be the date on
which the Magistrate takes cognizance. The complainant or the
prosecuting agency would be entirely left at the mercy of the
Magistrate, who may take cognizance after the limitation period
because of several reasons; systemic or otherwise. It cannot be
the intention of the legislature to throw a diligent complainant
out of the court in this manner. Besides, it must be noted that the
complainant approaches the court for redressal of his grievance.
He wants action to be taken against the perpetrators of crime.
The courts functioning under the criminal justice system are
created for this purpose. It would be unreasonable to take a view
that delay caused by the court in taking cognizance of a case
would deny justice to a diligent complainant. Such an
interpretation of Section 468 CrPC would be unsustainable and
would render it unconstitutional. It is well settled that a court of
law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the
validity of the law by applying the doctrine of reasonable
construction rather than applying a doctrine which would make the
provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. (U.P.
Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra [(2008) 10 SCC 139
: (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 1000] .)
xxx
39. As we have already noted in reaching this conclusion, light can
be drawn from legal maxims. Legal maxims are referred to
in Bharat Kale [Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., (2003) 8
SCC 559 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 39] , Japani Sahoo [Japani
Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394 : (2007) 3
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 9 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
SCC (Cri) 388] and Vanka Radhamanohari [Vanka
Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, (1993) 3 SCC 4 : 1993
SCC (Cri) 571] . The object of the criminal law is to punish
perpetrators of crime. This is in tune with the well-known legal
maxim nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi, which means that a
crime never dies. At the same time, it is also the policy of law to
assist the vigilant and not the sleepy. This is expressed in the Latin
maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Chapter
XXXVI CrPC which provides limitation period for certain types of
offences for which lesser sentence is provided draws support from
this maxim. But, even certain offences such as Section 384 or 465
IPC, which have lesser punishment may have serious social
consequences. The provision is, therefore, made for condonation of
delay. Treating date of filing of complaint or date of initiation of
proceedings as the relevant date for computing limitation under
Section 468 of the Code is supported by the legal maxim actus
curiae neminem gravabit which means that the act of court shall
prejudice no man. It bears repetition to state that the court’s
inaction in taking cognizance i.e. court’s inaction in applying mind
to the suspected offence should not be allowed to cause prejudice
to a diligent complainant. Chapter XXXVI thus presents the
interplay of these three legal maxims. The provisions of this
Chapter, however, are not interpreted solely on the basis of these
maxims. They only serve as guiding principles.
xxx
Conclusion
50. Having considered the questions which arise in this reference
in the light of legislative intent, authoritative pronouncements of
this Court and established legal principles, we are of the opinion
that Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp
SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646] will have to be restricted to its
own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to
what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of
limitation under Section 468 CrPC, primarily because in that case,
this Court was dealing with Section 9 of the Child Marriage
Restraint Act, 1929 which is a special Act. It specifically stated that
no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the said Act
after the expiry of one year from the date on which offence is
alleged to have been committed. There is no reference either to
Section 468 or Section 473 CrPC in that judgment. It does not refer
to Sections 4 and 5 CrPC which carve out exceptions for the
special Acts. This Court has not adverted to diverse aspects
including the aspect that inaction on the part of the court in taking
cognizance within limitation, though the complaint is filed within
time may work great injustice on the complainant. Moreover,
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 10 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
reliance placed on Antulay ‘1984’ case [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas
Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] , in our
opinion, was not apt. In Antulay ‘1984’ case [A.R.
Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC
(Cri) 277] this Court was dealing inter alia with the contention
that a private complaint is not maintainable in the Court of the
Special Judge set up under Section 6 of the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 1952 (“the 1952 Act”). It was urged that the
object underlying the 1952 Act was to provide for a more speedy
trial of offences of corruption by a public servant. It was argued
that if it is assumed that a private complaint is maintainable then
before taking cognizance, a Special Judge will have to examine the
complainant and all the witnesses as per Section 200 CrPC. He
will have to postpone issue of process against the accused and
either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be
made by a police officer and in cases under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 by police officers of designated rank for the
purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding. It was submitted that this would thwart the object of
the 1952 Act which is to provide for a speedy trial. This contention
was rejected by this Court holding that it is not a condition
precedent to the issue of process that the court of necessity must
hold the inquiry as envisaged by Section 202 CrPC or direct
investigation as therein contemplated. That is matter of discretion
of the court. Thus, the questions which arise in this reference were
not involved in Antulay ‘1984’ case [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas
Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] : since
there, this Court was not dealing with the question of bar of
limitation reflected in Section 468 CrPC at all, in our opinion, the
said judgment could not have been usefully referred to in Krishna
Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121 :
1990 SCC (Cri) 646] while construing provisions of Chapter
XXXVI CrPC. For all these reasons, we are unable to endorse the
view taken in Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran,
1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646] .
51. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the
relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of
institution of prosecution and not the date on which the
Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat
Kale [Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559 :
2004 SCC (Cri) 39] which is followed in Japani Sahoo [Japani
Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394 : (2007) 3
SCC (Cri) 388] lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai [Krishna
Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri)Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 11 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
646] will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the
authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date
for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section
468 CrPC.
52. The reference is answered accordingly. The Registry may list
the matters before the appropriate courts for disposal.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. The learned Special Judge noted in the impugned order dated
30.03.2019 that the petitioners had failed to assail the order dated
07.05.2011 whereby the learned Trial Court had taken cognizance for
offences under Sections 323/506/34 of the IPC. It was noted that
although it is open to the accused to plead for his discharge at the
stage of framing of charges, however, the accused then runs the risk
that the Court will frame charges for more serious offences as has
happened in this case. It was noted that the argument that the
cognizance was bad in law is insignificant as the accused have now
been charged with the offence under Section 506(II) of the IPC for
which there is no period of limitation. It was also noted that in terms
of Section 473 of the CrPC, the Court is justified in taking cognizance
after the period of limitation even where delay has not been properly
explained. It was rightly opined that delay in filing of charge sheet has
been caused by the investigating officer and Respondent No.2 cannot
be held responsible for the same.
18. In the present case, it is undisputed that the complaint was made
by Respondent No.2 regarding the incident in the month of June, 2006
itself, that is, in the same month when the offence took place. Pursuant
to the same, the FIR was registered in September, 2006. Thus,
admittedly, there was no delay on part of Respondent No.2 in filing
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 12 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
the complaint and initiating the proceedings. Thereafter, the
chargesheet was filed in the year 2009 and the cognizance was taken
by the learned Magistrate on 07.05.2011.
19. As noted in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular
Disease (supra), Respondent No.2 cannot be prejudiced on account of
any delay caused by the prosecuting agency in filing the chargesheet
or the learned Court in taking cognizance. It is not the case of the
petitioners that the chargesheet was delayed due to Respondent No.2
in any manner. In such circumstances, stifling the proceedings at this
stage would cause gross miscarriage of justice and defeat the purpose
of the remedy available to Respondent No.2, who had been diligent in
filing the complaint in time. In view of the same, this Court finds no
merit in the argument of the petitioners in this regard.
20. Insofar as the charges are concerned, it is relevant to note that
charges have been framed against the accused persons for the offences
under Sections 451/341/323/506(II)/34 of the IPC. It is argued that no
case for the offences under Sections 451, 341 and 506(II) of the IPC is
made out against the petitioners. It is apposite to succinctly discuss the
statutory law with respect to framing of charge and discharge as
provided under Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC. The same is set out
below:
“227. Discharge
If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents
submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the
accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that
there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused,
he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.
228. Framing of Charge
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 13 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge
is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused
has committed an offence which-
(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame
a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for
trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or any other Judicial
Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial
Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and
thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with
the procedure for the trial of warrant cases instituted on a police
report;
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a
charge against the accused.
(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of
subsection (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the
accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of
the offence charged or claims to be tried.”
21. It is trite law that the learned Trial Court while framing charges
is not required to conduct a mini-trial and has to merely weigh the
material on record to ascertain whether the ingredients constituting the
alleged offence are prima facie made out against the accused persons.
The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI : (2010)
9 SCC 368, has culled out the following principles in regards to the
scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC:
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the
charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift
and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been
made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend
upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge
and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 14 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of
the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents
produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at
this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and
cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form
an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can
frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the
material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a
charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material
placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of
offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to
evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to
find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value
disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the
alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it
cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the
prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common
sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial
Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this
stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or
acquittal.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. In a recent decision in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh
Rao : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
discussed the parameters that would be appropriate to keep in mind at
the stage of framing of charge/discharge, as under:
“7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary
to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution
for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell
into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of
the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that
stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by
the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the groundsSignature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 15 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
are sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge
sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected
by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which
prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances
against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and
such material would be taken into account for the purposes of
framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be
discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such
consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming
that accused has committed the offence which is triable, then
necessarily charge has to be framed.
xxx
12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge
is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the
probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This
Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of
Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State
of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of
evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the
charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at
the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive
opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the
offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative
value of the material on record and to check whether the material
on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of
trial.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. In view of the above, it is clear that this Court, at this stage, is
not required to revaluate the evidence or hold a mini trial as the same
would tantamount to this Court assuming appellate jurisdiction. Thus,
all that has to be seen is whether the learned Trial Court has
adequately appreciated the material on record and whether, given the
material placed before it, there is grave suspicion against the accused
which is not properly explained.
24. However, it cannot be ignored that the scope of interference in
exercise of inherent jurisdiction is more expansive.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 16 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
25. It is an admitted case that Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.2
are embroiled in matrimonial disputes with each other. In such
circumstances, where there is possibility of the proceedings being
manifestly frivolous or vexatious or are instituted with the ulterior
motive of wreaking vengeance, the Court is permitted to look into the
facts and circumstances of the case a little more closely in exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. The Court can look into the attending
circumstances emerging from the record of the case and can read
between the lines. If the allegations are farfetched and it appears that
the criminal machinery is being misused for personal gains, since it
has become an increased tendency to implicate the relatives in the
matrimonial disputes, this Court can interfere while exercising its
inherent jurisdiction [Ref. Mahmood Ali & Ors. v. State of U.P &
Ors. : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950].
26. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that no offence is made
out against them and the learned Trial Court has erroneously framed
charges without application of mind. It has also been argued that apart
from Petitioner No.1, Petitioner No. 2 (mother of Petitioner No.1) and
Petitioner No. 3 (brother of Petitioner No.1) her and brother, none of
the other accused persons were even present at the spot.
27. A bare perusal of the record shows that the present case is
essentially based on the statement of the complainant. While the
allegations can be taken on a demurer at the stage of taking
cognizance, however, at the stage of charge, the Court is required to
sift through the material on record and give a prima facie finding.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 17 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
28. The learned Trial Court has noted in the order on charge dated
24.01.2018 that the Investigating agency was not right to arrive at the
conclusion that Section 451 of the IPC is not made out against the
accused persons as they had no intention to commit offence when they
entered the complainant’s house. No finding on merits qua any of the
other offences was given by the learned Trial Court.
29. On the other hand, the learned Revisional Court endorsed the
aforesaid finding of the learned Trial Court. It was noted that at this
stage, it could not be said that the threats levelled by the accused
persons were merely empty threats and therefore Section 506(II) of the
IPC was attracted. The learned Revisional Court noted that the alleged
manner in which the accused persons had acted after they entered the
house of the complainant, beaten him and further allegedly threatened
his parents was sufficient to frame charges for offences under Sections
451/341/323/506(II)/34 of the IPC.
30. Insofar as the offence under Section 506 (II) of the IPC is
concerned, it is trite law that mere exaggerated and empty threats are
insufficient to constitute the aforesaid offence. In the present case, a
vague allegation is made that the accused persons threatened to kill the
parents of the complainant. It is also alleged that Petitioner No.2
threatened that the complainant would be kidnapped if the
complainant and his parents don’t obey the accused persons. The
threats seem to be made in the heat of the moment. There is no
allegation that the same caused any alarm either. Exaggerated threats
of this nature cannot be said to constitute the aforesaid offence.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 18 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
31. Similarly, the offences under Sections 451/341/323 of the IPC
do not seem to be made out in the present case. There are no material
findings in relation to the aforesaid offences so as to raise grave
suspicion. In the opinion of this Court, the allegations fail to disclose
the necessary ingredients to constitute the aforesaid offences.
32. While it is alleged that the complainant suffered multiple
injuries and he was beaten with sticks and given fists and leg blows,
however, as per the chargesheet, the injury was opined to be very
minor in nature. The same was also not caused to any vital body part
of the complainant. It is trite law that the law does not concern itself
with trifles or actions that cause slight harm.
33. From the above, prima facie, it appears that the complainant
had exaggerated the true version of events and his statement cannot be
entirely deemed to be reliable.
34. As noted above, at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is
not required to accept the prosecution’s version as gospel truth. While
the Court is not required to conduct a roving enquiry into the probative
value of evidence, however, the Court is to sift the material on record
to ascertain whether there is strong suspicion that the accused has
committed the concerned offences.
35. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid order, it is clear that the
Courts below have taken the allegations levelled by the complainant
on a demurer. While the same may be sufficient to cast suspicion
against the accused persons, however, in view of the aforesaid
discussion, it does not inspire such a grave suspicion so as to warrant
subjecting the accused persons to a trial.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 19 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26
36. This Court finds no infirmity with the impugned order dated
30.03.2019, however, considering that the prosecution has failed to
establish a strong prima facie case against the petitioners, the
impugned order dated 25.05.2019 is set aside. Consequently, the
petitioners stand discharged in the present case.
37. The present petition is therefore allowed in the aforesaid terms.
38. Pending application also stands disposed of.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
DECEMBER 16, 2024
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:KAMALDEEP
CRL.M.C. 3857/2019 Page 20 of 20
KAUR
Signing Date:21.12.2024
12:48:26