Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Smt. Sarojini Mondal And Others vs Sukumar Naskar And Others on 21 August, 2025
Author: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
Bench: Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
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In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
The Hon'ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon'ble Justice Uday Kumar
F.A. No.55 of 2023
+
CAN 2 of 2024
+
CAN 3 of 2025
+
CAN 4 of 2025
Smt. Sarojini Mondal and others
Vs.
Sukumar Naskar and others
For the appellants : Mr. Sourav Sen, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Partha Chakraborty,
Mr. Muhammad Obaid,
Ms. Debdatta Manna
For the respondent nos.1 & 2 : Mr. Ayan Banerjee,
Mr. Abhishek Verma,
Mr. Atulya Sinha Verma,
Ms. Brihanwita Debnath,
Ms. Aparna Sarkar,
Mr. Swaraj Naskar
For the respondent no. 3 : Mr. Kushal Chatterjee,
Mr. Debrup Choudhury
Heard on : 26.06.2025, 10.07.2025
& 04.08.2025
Reserved on : 04.08.2025
Judgment on : 21.08.2025
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Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. The objectors in a probate proceeding under Section 276 of the Indian
Succession Act have preferred the present appeal against the grant of
probate in respect of the last Will and testament dated January 7, 2004
of one Badal Chandra Naskar. By the said Will, the testator
bequeathed his properties to the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 – Sukumar
Naskar and proforma respondent no. 3 – Arabinda Naskar, his two
sons, without granting anything to his five daughters, being the present
appellants and the proforma respondent nos. 2 and 4. Learned senior
counsel for the appellant assails the Will on the ground that the same
was not read over and explained to the testator, who put his Left
Thumb Impression (LTI) on the Will. There is no evidence on record to
indicate that it was ever read over and explained, despite the testator
having affixed his LTI, which itself vitiates the execution of the Will.
2. It is further argued that despite being literate, the testator put his LTI
on the Will, which itself is a suspicious circumstance shrouding the
execution of the Will.
3. Learned senior counsel argues that the due execution of the Will was
never proved in terms of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, read
with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. There was patent
contradiction between the depositions of the plaintiffs’ witnesses. It is
argued that PW 2, one of the grandsons of the testator (son of one of
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the beneficiaries), an attesting witness, did not state in his evidence
whether the other attesting witness signed in presence of the testator.
Thus, the ingredients of Section 63(c) of the Succession Act have not
been proved.
4. Learned senior counsel next contends that the testator, being the father
of the contesting parties, was forcibly taken away from Namita Naskar,
his youngest daughter, with whom he was residing, by the two
sons/beneficiaries of the testator on July 4, 2004, whereas the Will was
allegedly executed on June 7, 2004. Learned senior counsel also
submits that an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, bearing CAN 3 of 2025, has been filed in the present
appeal to bring on record the police complaint by the daughters of the
testator in that regard dated January 28, 2004 and also a Will executed
by the mother of the parties previously and the judgment dismissing
the probate application in connection with the same. The mother of the
parties, by the said Will, had granted her property purportedly to her
grandsons as well.
5. Learned senior counsel for the appellants further submits that the
testator admittedly executed and had registered two Wills on the self-
same date, that is, on June 7, 2004, one of which being the present
disputed one, being registered at Barasat, and the other at Salt Lake.
The evidence of PW 1 indicates that the disputed Will was presented for
such registration at the Registration Office at Barasat from 11:00 AM to
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4:00 PM and, thus, the Salt Lake Will must have been the second and
last Will of the testator. However, no probate was obtained in respect of
the Will registered at Salt Lake where the grandsons, that is the sons of
the testator’s sons, were bequeathed his property. There is no
explanation forthcoming as to how and why two Wills were registered,
bequeathing the self-same property to different persons, on the self-
same date. This itself, it is argued, shows that the testator was of a
feeble mind, being 86 years old at the relevant juncture and the
propounder and other beneficiaries, who were his two sons, were in a
position to dictate terms to the testator. Hence, the Will was not
executed by the testator of his own volition.
6. It is further argued that there was a reversal of beneficiaries and
executor in the Wills executed by the mother and the father of the
parties. In the mother’s Will, the grandsons were the beneficiaries
whereas one of her sons was the executor, while in the father’s Will it
was just the reverse. Also, the typist and scribe of both the Wills were
the same. Thus, a prominent role was played by the beneficiaries of the
present Will in the reverse manner in the execution of the two Wills,
which, according to the appellants, also casts a doubt on the due
execution of the impugned Will.
7. Learned senior counsel for the appellants contends that whereas the
mother’s Will says that the daughters were happily married and did not
look after their parents, the father’s Will states that two of the
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daughters were married not according to his choice and hence he is not
satisfied with the daughters. Thus, there is a discrepancy in the
explanations for depriving the daughters between the mother’s and the
father’s Will.
8. The extensive schedule given in the impugned Will, it is argued, was
unusual for a man of 86 years, that is, the testator to give. This,
combined with the fact that the testator was taken away forcibly
immediately prior to the execution of the disputed Will and his LTI was
put on the Will despite him being literate, go on to show that the Will
was executed under compulsion and duress, the testator having been
coerced to do so by the beneficiaries/sons.
9. Learned senior counsel cites Kavita Kanwar v. Pamela Mehta and
others, reported at (2021) 11 SCC 209, for the proposition that the
propounder has to satisfy the conscience of the Testamentary Court
irrespective of whether any plea has been taken by the objectors. By
relying on Rani Pnrnima Debi and another v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan
Deb and another, reported at AIR 1962 SC 567, it is argued that mere
registration does not dispel all doubt and, by relying on Bhagwan Kaur
w/o Bachan Singh v. Kartar Kaur w/o Bachan Singh and others,
reported at (1994) 5 SCC 135, it is argued that even if there is
endorsement by the Registrar it is not enough to prove the due
execution of the Will.
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10. The learned trial Judge, it is argued by the appellants, relied on
Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and another v. Panchanan Banerjee (dead) By
LRs and others, reported at (1995) 4 SCC 459 but the facts of the said
case were different from the present, as there is no endorsement by the
Registrar in the present case to the effect that the disputed Will was
read over and explained to the testator, as opposed to the cited
judgment.
11. The court is to take a rational approach as per Anil Kak v. Kumari
Sharada Raje and others, reported at (2008) 7 SCC 695 and it is
germane as to whether the other witness signed at the time of
attestation, which is to be duly proved by evidence, as held in M.B.
Ramesh (D) By LRS. v. K.M. Veeraje Urs (D) BY LRS. and others, reported
at (2013) 7 SCC 490. Apart from the above two judgments, learned
senior counsel cites Leela Rajgopal and others v. Kamala Menon
Cocharan and others, reported at (2014) 15 SCC 570, in support of the
proposition that there has to be an overall assessment of the evidence
and the cumulative effect of all the factors and circumstances must
weigh with the court.
12. Meena Pradhan and others v. Kamla Pradhan and another, reported at
(2023) 9 SCC 734 is cited to show how a Will is to be executed.
13. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants cites Gurdial Kaur
and others v. Kartar Kaur and others, reported at (1998) 4 SCC 384 for
the proposition that the propounder should demonstrate that the Will
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was executed of the own free volition of the testator and he must have
been mentally fit to exercise his mind. Abdul Jabbar Sahib v. Venkata
Sastri & Sons and others, reported at AIR 1969 SC 1147, is cited for the
proposition that it is essential that the witness shall put his signature
animo attestandi.
14. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, one of the beneficiaries of the
Will, contends that there was no suspicious circumstance surrounding
the execution of the Will. It is argued that the due execution of the Will
was proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Succession Act, read
with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. PW 1, the propounder,
proved the Will and PW 2, one of the attesting witnesses, as required by
Section 68 of the Evidence Act, duly adduced evidence. Their
examinations-in-chief were unshaken in cross examination.
15. The mere fact that the PW 2 did not specifically state that the other
attesting witness was seen by the testator to sign the Will is immaterial,
in view substantial proof of the execution of the Will having been
adduced and no counter-suggestion having been put to that effect
during the cross-examination of PW 2.
16. Learned counsel cites Naresh Charan Das Gupta v. Paresh Charan Das
Gupta, reported at (1954) 2 SCC 800, for the proposition that where the
execution of the Will by the testator has been proved beyond doubt and
there is no cross-examination on the question of attestation to the
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extent that the testator, having seen the attesting witness, signed the
Will, it can be safely inferred that there was due attestation.
17. Learned counsel argues that the story about the father/testator being
taken forcibly from the custody of the youngest daughter Namita was
never established. Namita Naskar herself, who would have been the
best person to prove such allegation, never faced the witness box, thus,
subjecting herself to adverse inference being drawn.
18. The good health and sound mind of the testator was proved by the
plaintiff’s witnesses in evidence, along with the due execution of the
Will. The LTI, as explained by the witnesses, was put by the testator
since his fingers were trembling due to old age. The testator,
admittedly, was literate and there was no question of reading over and
explaining the Will separately to him. The testator was a reputed law
clerk/Moharar of the Sealdah Court and as such, was fully aware of the
implication of the execution of a Will. The DW 1, the only defendants’
witness, clearly admitted that the testator did not take any food or
financial assistance from his sons or from Namita, his youngest
daughter, with whom he was allegedly living. Thus, the strength of
mind and will-power of the testator at the relevant juncture was proved
sufficiently.
19. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 argues that the propounder
having discharged the onus of proving the Will and due execution of the
same, the burden of proving fraud, coercion and other similar
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allegations shifts on the person making such allegation, which duty
was never discharged by the defendants/appellants. In support of
such proposition, learned counsel cites Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi v.
Mridula Jyoti Rao and others, reported at (2006) 13 SCC 433. Where on
looking at the depositions and facts of the case, it is established that
the attesting witnesses signed the Will in presence of the testator, proof
with mathematical certainty is not required and the test is always the
satisfaction of a prudent man. For such proposition, learned counsel
cites Gopal Swaroop v. Krishna Murari Mangal and others, reported at
(2010) 14 SCC 266, and Pranati Ghosh and others v. Anil Kumar Ghosh,
reported at 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 2736.
20. Regarding the allegation of the testator being forcibly taken away from
Namita’s custody on January 4, 2004, it was Namita who had to come
to the witness box to adduce such evidence. None else can be given a
Power of Attorney or the authority to prove such fact, unless the said
witness had personal knowledge of the fact. DW 1 Sumita did not have
any such personal knowledge since, as per the defendants’ allegation,
the testator was taken away from Namita’s custody. Thus, the evidence
of DW 1 in that regard ought to be discarded altogether. Learned
counsel cites Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar and others, reported at
2024 SCC OnLine SC 981, in support of the said argument.
21. CAN 4 of 2025 has been filed by the appellant for bringing on record as
additional evidence the other Will executed on July 7, 2004 at Salt
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Lake. However, the same was produced by the propounder in the trial
court and was all along on record, but never sought to be exhibited by
either side. Thus, Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure
does not permit production of the document at this stage. For this
proposition, learned counsel cites Sunderlal and Son v. Bharat
Handicrafts (P) Ltd., reported at AIR 1968 SC 406.
22. It is lastly submitted by the respondent no. 3 that affixation of the
thumb impression of the testator is permissible under Section 63 of the
Indian Succession Act, as held in Sushila Bala Saha v. Saraswati
Monday, reported at AIR 1991 Cal 166.
23. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the court comes to the
following CONCLUSIONS:
(i) Testator’s LTI on disputed Will
24. Two limbs of arguments have been advanced by the appellants on this
issue.
25. Taking first things first, it is argued that the Will was never proved to
be read over and explained to the testator, despite his LTI appearing on
the Will.
26. However, PW 2 (Koushik Naskar), a grandson of the testator and one of
the attesting witnesses, in his examination-in-chief, categorically stated
that the LTI was put by his grandfather on the Will in his presence and
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that he could sign but due to old age, executed the Will by putting his
thumb impression.
27. The Will, as per PW 2, was prepared as per the instruction of the
testator.
28. It was further elicited in evidence that the testator was a registered
Moharar at the Barasat Court. It has been also contended by the
parties that he was a law clerk of some repute.
29. PW 2, in his evidence, also explained that that the testator put his LTI
instead of his signature as, due to his advanced years (he was 86 years
old at the time of executing the Will), his hands/fingers were trembling
and shaking at the time of signing. Section 63(c) of the Succession Act
categorically permits either his signature to be put or his mark to be
affixed by the testator on the Will. In view of sufficient explanation
having been furnished by the plaintiff’s witnesses for LTI being affixed
by the testator instead of his signature, such fact itself does not create
any suspicious circumstance. Also, there does not arise any question
as to why the Will should be separately read over and explained to an
admittedly literate testator and as to why the concerned Register, of the
registration office where the Will was registered, should adduce
evidence in that regard.
30. The second limb of argument is that an admittedly literate testator
affixing his LTI is a suspicious circumstance, which, as discussed
above, has been dispelled by the unshaken evidence of PW 2, an
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attesting witness, that due to his advanced years, LTI was put by the
testator on the Will. There is no rebuttal evidence to destroy the said
explanation. Section 63 (c) of the Indian Succession Act permits either
a signature to be put or the mark of the testator to be affixed to the
Will. Thus, either of the two modes of execution of a Will are valid in
law.
31. That apart, the two pleas are self-contradictory and mutually
destructive. In the same breath, the appellants contend that the Will
was not read over and explained while on the other hand, that there is
no explanation as to why LTI was put by the testator, who was literate.
The admitted literacy of the testator renders irrelevant any necessity to
have the Will read over and explained to him. On the other hand, there
being sufficient explanation for the LTI being affixed instead of the
signature b the testator, such arguments of the appellants cannot be
accepted by the Court.
(ii) Non-compliance of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act
32. The appellants have vociferously argued that PW 2, the only attesting
witness who gave evidence, did not specifically state that the other
attesting witness signed the Will in the presence of the testator.
33. However, no counter-suggestion to the effect that the other attesting
witness did not sign in the presence of the testator was put to the said
witness by the appellants in his cross-examination. In his
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examination-in-chief, PW 2 stated that he was a witness to the disputed
Will, that his grandfather (the testator) executed the Will by putting his
thumb impression in the presence of PW 2 and that the testator was
quite hale and hearty at the time of execution of the Will. He further
stated that the testator could sign but due to old age he put thumb
impression, as his right hand started trembling about two years before
his death, which facts are generally corroborated by PW 1. PW 2 states
further that he put his signature as an attesting witness as per
instruction of the testator and thereafter the Will was taken to the
Barasat Registration Office and that the testator put his LTI in the TI
Book written in the Registration Office. PW 2 identified the signatures
of his grandfather, the testator, in the Will in his examination-in-chief
and stated that he had himself signed as an attesting witness. He also
identified his own signature.
34. PW 2, in his cross-examination, states that at the time of execution of
the Will, there were no outsiders except himself, the other attesting
witness, the two sons of the testator, the learned Advocate and
Moharar.
35. On a composite reading of the said evidence, it is clearly seen that all
the necessary ingredients of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act
have been satisfied. From the cross-examination of PW 1, we find that
the testator had put his LTI in the Will first and his name was written
through the pen by his nephew Kaushik Naskar. Both the attesting
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witnesses, as per PW 2, signed on the Will after the name of the testator
was written by one of them.
36. Thus, from a cumulative assessment of the evidence, it is crystal clear
that both the witnesses were present when the testator signed the Will
and they signed almost simultaneously with the testator putting his LTI
on the Will. Hence, the necessary elements of Section 63 are satisfied
and have been proved by PW 2, one of the attesting witnesses, in terms
of Section 68 of the Evidence Act.
37. The Supreme Court categorically held in Gopal Swaroop (supra)1 that
where the execution of the Will has been substantially proved, proof
with mathematical precision is not required. The test is the satisfaction
of a prudent mind, which has sufficiently been complied with in the
present case. The same principle was reiterated by our Court in
Pranati Ghosh (supra)2. The element of suspicion, as per the said
decision, takes a backseat when the execution of the Will in terms of
Section 63 of the Succession Act has been substantially proved, as in
the present case. The same proposition also stems from Naresh Charan
Das Gupta (supra)3.
38. Despite the testamentary court being a court of conscience, the
satisfaction of conscience has to be on the test of a prudent man on
1. Gopal Swaroop v. Krishna Murari Mangal and others, reported at (2010) 14 SCC 266
2. Pranati Ghosh and others v. Anil Kumar Ghosh, reported at 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 2736
3. Naresh Charan Das Gupta v. Paresh Charan Das Gupta, reported at (1954) 2 SCC 800
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preponderance of probabilities. The vigilance of a testamentary court
cannot be converted to Paranoia to such a extent that every minor gap
in the evidence has to be taken as a suspicious circumstance.
39. A cumulative reading of the evidence in the present case fully justifies
the conclusion of the probate court that the execution of the Will was
duly proved. The Appellate Court, as per the well-settled principle of
law, shall not adopt a fault-finding approach but shall only interfere
where there is a palpable error of law or fact in the impugned judgment
granting probate. We, frankly, do not find any such lacuna in the
impugned judgment.
40. Importantly, DW 1 herself admitted the execution of the disputed Will
in favour of the sons of the testator on January 7, 2004 and the factum
that the same was registered. She alleged that the execution and
registration were done by force and coercion, which the appellants have
miserably failed to prove by cogent evidence. Once the due execution of
the Will is proved, the onus shifts on the persons alleging fraud or
coercion to prove such circumstance, which is completely absent in the
present case. The Supreme Court, in Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi
(supra)4, clearly laid down that once the onus of due execution is
discharged by the propounder, the burden to prove fraud, coercion and
the like shifts on the objectors.
4. Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi v. Mridula Jyoti Rao and others, reported at (2006) 13 SCC 433
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41. Certain flimsy grounds have also been taken by the objectors to dispute
the Will. It has been argued that the extensive schedule of the Will was
unusual for an 86 years old person. We are completely at a loss as to
why it should be so. The testator in the present case was not only
literate but a Moharar of a court of law and has been proved to be in
sound and mental condition by the deposition of PWs 1 and 2, which
has not been rebutted by any cogent evidence whatsoever by the
defendants. A person having knowledge of law, who instructed his
advocate to draft the Will and put his LTI thereon, would obviously
insist upon an extensive schedule. It is beyond understanding as to
why it should be otherwise just because of the advanced years of the
testator.
42. The testator was strong-willed, as per the admission of DW 1 to the
effect that he did not take any financial assistance either from his
youngest daughter Namita, with whom he was allegedly living, or his
sons, and did not taken any meal from his sons. The testator, till his
demise, maintained his own family. A person of such nature would
not, obviously, be amenable to coercion by his sons.
43. The story of abduction of the testator by his sons on July 4, 2004 is
absolutely without any basis and unsupported by any evidence. DW 1,
Sumita Naskar, has stated in her evidence regarding such alleged
abduction. However, admittedly, the testator was residing with Namita,
his youngest daughter, and vivid description has been given as to how
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the sons of the testator, being the beneficiaries of the Will, allegedly
called out the name of Namita at her house on July 4, 2004 and
thereafter broke open, threw out household articles, allegedly assaulted
Namita and forcibly took away their father.
44. Surprisingly, Namita did not come to the witness box at all.
Withholding of Namita, the best witness, casts suspicion not on the
execution of the Will but on the allegation of abduction itself. By way of
Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CAN 3 of 2025), a
purported police complaint by the daughters dated January 28, 2004
has been sought to be brought in. However, the said application is hit
by Order XLI Rule 27(1)(aa), in the absence of any explanation as to
why the 2004 complaint was never produced in the testamentary court.
45. That apart, the timings are also crucial. The Will was executed and
registered on January 7, 2004 and the alleged abduction took place on
July 4, 2004, three days prior to the Will. However, a complaint was
purportedly lodged by the daughters, who were deprived in the Will, as
late as on January 28, 2004. The gap of 24 days between the alleged
incident and the complaint, even if the complaint was to be taken on
record, and the fact that the complaint was lodged only after the
execution and registration of the Will, throws sufficient doubt on the
veracity of the complaint. Rather, the complaint reeks of being an
afterthought. Hence, introduction of the said complaint at this stage as
additional evidence would not only be impermissible but also irrelevant.
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46. By way of CAN 4 of 2025, the appellants seek to disclose the other Will,
purportedly executed on the self-same day as the disputed Will, that is,
January 7, 2004. Although the said document was produced by the
propounder himself in the testamentary court and was on record all
along, no effort was made by either party to have the same marked as
an exhibit. Hence, there is no explanation whatsoever for the slumber
of the appellants throughout the testamentary proceeding in not having
the same marked as an exhibit and suddenly waking up at the
appellate stage to seek such marking.
47. In any event, since the document came from the custody of the
appellants themselves and they themselves disclosed it, per se the said
document does not create any suspicious circumstance and/or vitiate
the execution of the disputed Will.
48. In any event, by the other Will of even date, the property was
bequeathed to the grandsons of the testator, that is, the sons of the
beneficiaries of the disputed Will. Hence, nothing would hinge on the
execution of the second Will, since in any event even if the said Will was
executed as the last Will of the testator, the property would come to the
sons of the present beneficiaries and there could be no conceivable
impetus at all for the beneficiaries of the disputed Will to manufacture
such a Will. Moreover, one of the grandsons of the testator, who would
be a beneficiary of the other Will, himself acted as an attesting witness
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to the disputed Will and adduced evidence to prove its execution as
PW2.
49. That apart, the execution and registration of both the Wills is admitted
by the defendants/appellants. Also, it is not impossible for two Wills
executed by the testator to be registered in the Barasat and Salt Lake
Registration Offices on the same day, since both the said places are on
the northern fringe of the city of Kolkata and are not so far apart from
each other that the respective registrations could not be completed
within the same day.
50. Thus, nothing turns on the execution of the said other Will and CAN 4
of 2025 is accordingly also to be disallowed.
51. The Will of the mother of the parties, it has been argued, indicates a
quid pro quo between the parties. It has been alleged that the scribe
and the typist of both the mother’s and the father’s Will are the same
and the beneficiaries and executants in the said Wills are just the
reverse of each other, apparently suggesting a reciprocity. We are
unable to understand how the aforesaid fact creates any suspicion. It
would only be natural that the parents of the parties would choose the
same persons to act as scribe and typist in their respective Wills. In
view of the very nature of the Will executed by the mother of the
parties, by which she bequeathed the property to the grandsons, that is
the sons of her sons (present beneficiaries), it was possible that the
father might be in two minds as to whom to bequeath the property,
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whether to his grandsons or his sons, for which he might very well have
executed two Wills on the relevant date.
52. Reciprocity between Wills of two spouses is not unknown and, rather
than being a suspicious circumstance, is but natural.
53. In any event, one important aspect is that the mother’s Will clearly
states that her husband, the testator of the present disputed Will, had
an intention to bequeath his property to his sons, which does not
vitiate, but validates the present Will, the bequest made in the latter
being thus borne out by the statements made in the earlier Will of the
mother. Hence, the reliance on the mother’s Will by the appellants not
only is not in their favour but demolishes the suspicion sought to be
cast by the appellants on the Will in dispute.
54. Hence, in spite of applying our mind as a ‘Court of Conscience’, we do
not find any suspicious circumstance surrounding the Will. Rather, the
due execution of the Will having been substantially proved on the
yardstick of a prudent person, we are of the opinion that the learned
Testamentary Court was perfectly within law and jurisdiction on the
facts of the case to grant a probate in respect of the said Will.
55. Furthermore, in view of the above observations, the two applications
under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the
appellants are also to be dismissed.
56. Accordingly, CAN 3 of 2025 and CAN 4 of 2025 are dismissed on
contest.
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57. F.A. No. 55 of 2023 is also dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the
judgment and deemed decree dated January 19, 2023 passed by the
learned Additional District Judge, Seventh Court at Barasat, District:
North 24 Parganas in O.S. Case No. 20 of 2006, thereby granting
probate of the last Will and testament of Late Badal Chandra Naskar
dated January 7, 2004 in favour of the plaintiffs/respondent no. 1.
58. CAN 2 of 2024 stands consequentially disposed of.
59. There will be no orders as costs.
60. Urgent certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon
compliance of due formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Uday Kumar, J.)