Meghalaya High Court
Smti. Tiret Mawlong vs State Of Meghalaya on 30 August, 2025
Author: W. Diengdoh
Bench: W. Diengdoh
2025:MLHC:776-DB
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.A. No. 2 of 2024
Date of Decision: 30.08.2025
1. Smti. Tiret Mawlong
Wife of (Late) Kornik Kharthangmaw
Resident of Village Sohdadek,
P.S: Mairang
West Khasi Hills District, Meghalaya
.....Appellant
-Versus-
1. State of Meghalaya
Through Public Prosecutor
......Respondent
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. S.D. Upadhaya, Legal Aid Counsel
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. R. Gurung, GA
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press: Yes/No
JUDGMENT
Per W. Diengdoh, J.
1. Judgment and Order dated 29.07.2022 and Sentence dated
02.08.2022 passed in Session Case No. 107 of 2015 under Section
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302/34 IPC by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial),
West Khasi Hills District, Nongstoin by which the appellant herein stood
convicted for an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) and was made to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with
respective fine of ₹ 10,000/-, in default thereof, to further undergo
simple imprisonment of six months is under challenge herein in this
appeal filed by the convict in the case.
2. On perusal of the memo of appeal, the materials on record and
from the contents of the paper-book, what is understood is that an FIR
was lodged on 04.06.2015 by one Shri Aiji Mawlong with the Incharge
Dongki-ingding Police Outpost under Mairang Police Station, informing
the police about the commission of murder of Riket Mawlong on
03.06.2015 at about 11:30 p.m. at the house of Smti Tiret Mawlong.
3. On receipt of the said FIR, police case being Mairang P.S. Case
No. 33(6) of 2015 under Section 302/34 IPC was registered and S.I.
M.K. Marak has taken up the preliminary investigation. S.I. L.M.
Lyngdoh and one Bn constable were deputed to enquire into the matter,
however, from the records, it appears that PW-9 S.I. Malcolm K. Marak
has completed the investigation.
4. It is also evident that the police went to the place of occurrence
and found the dead body of Riket Mawlong outside the house of Tiret
Mawlong, whereupon, the inquest was conducted by S.I. Malcolm K.
Marak (PW-9) in presence of witnesses. The body was then taken to
Dongki-ingding PHC where the post mortem examination was also
conducted therein.
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5. Two suspects were arrested in connection with the incident, that
is, Shri Kornik Kharthangmaw and Smti Tiret Mawlong, both husband
and wife. On completion of the Investigating Officer (IO) in conducting
the investigation, the chargesheet was filed on 31.07.2015, with a
finding that the deceased was murdered by his sister, Tiret Mawlong and
her husband Kornik Kharthangmaw with lethal weapons at their
residence on 03.06.2015 at about 11:30 p.m. in course of hot altercation
regarding dispute of inheritance of property. Therefore, the two accused
persons were made to stand trial before the court of law, a prima facie
case under Section 302/34 IPC having been made out against them.
6. It is on record that even before the trial commenced, the accused
Kornik Kharthangmaw had expired as a result of a motor vehicle
accident and as such, the charge was framed only against the accused
Tiret Mawlong on 06.05.2016, whereas on being explained the charges
to her, that is, one under Section 302 and another under Section 34 IPC,
she pleaded guilty.
7. Thereafter, the prosecution, in order to prove its case has
examined 9(nine) prosecution witnesses and has exhibited 4(four)
documents and two material exhibits being Mat. Exhibit 1 and 2
respectively.
8. On completion of the recording of the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, the learned Trial Court then recorded the
statement of the accused/appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and
thereafter after hearing the learned counsels for the parties, had delivered
the impugned judgment on 29.07.2022 and the sentence was pronounced
on 02.08.2022 on a finding that the evidence of the prosecution
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witnesses are found to be consistence and reliable to complete the chain
of circumstances with reasonable conclusion that the heinous act was
committed by none other than the accused/appellant herself and for such
an act, she is found to have committed an offence described under the
third clause of Section 300 IPC and is therefore liable to be punished
under Section 302 IPC.
9. It may also be mentioned that this is the second round of
litigation between the parties before this court. When the first appeal was
preferred by the appellant herein against the judgment dated 21.03.2018
wherein she was convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC and
sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with fine of ₹ 10,000/-, in
default thereof, to suffer simple imprisonment of six months, this Court
upon hearing the parties has disposed of the same with a direction that
the same be remanded to the Trial Court for proceeding afresh from the
stage of recording the statement of the appellant accused under Section
313 Cr.P.C. and also for an opportunity to the appellant to cross-examine
the PW-5 and PW-6 on their recall for the same.
10. In compliance with the said order, the learned Trial Court has
recalled the PW-5 and 6 respectively and after they were cross-examined
and discharged, the statement of the appellant/accused under Section
313 Cr.P.C. was recorded and again, after hearing the argument of the
parties, the impugned judgment and sentence was passed.
11. Heard learned Legal Aid Counsel (LAC), Mr. S.D. Upadhaya
who has, at the outset, led this Court to the facts and circumstances of
the case of the appellant, which is not required to be repeated as the same
has been brought out hereinabove.
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12. The learned LAC has then read out the evidence of PW-1, Shri
Aiji Mawlong who has filed the FIR by reporting to the police about the
death of the deceased victim Riket Mawlong. This witness has stated
before the Court that on the day when the incident took place, that is, on
03.06.2015 at about 10:00 p.m., at Sohdadek village, he was in his
village at Mawlum Khri. It was only on the following day when he
received a telephonic call from the Sordar of Sohdadek village
informing him that his brother Riket Mawlong has died an unnatural
death that he proceeded to the house of the accused persons.
13. This witness has also stated that he has filed the FIR on the day
of the incident itself, however, the FIR was dated 04.06.2015, which was
on the next date. Further, he has also stated that the post mortem was
conducted at the place of occurrence, whereas, it was actually conducted
at Dongki-ingding PHC. Again, this witness has also stated that the
accused persons confessed that they have murdered his deceased
brother, but such extra-judicial confession has not been proved. Not
being an eye-witness, the version of this witness cannot help the
prosecution, submits the learned LAC.
14. As for the evidence of PW-2, the learned LAC has submitted that
this witness has stated that the incident took place on 03.06.2015 and
about 12:00 midnight of the same day, the two accused persons appeared
at his residence and informed him that they have murdered Riket
Mawlong, the younger brother of the appellant herein. The accused
persons have also requested him to escort them to the police thanad at
Dongki-ingding. This witness has further stated that he accompanied the
two accused persons who went to the thanad along with Smti Hir
Mawlong, the mother of the appellant and the two minor sons of the
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appellant. As to the post mortem, this witness has stated that the Doctor
came on 05.06.2015 to conduct the same.
15. However, this evidence of this witness was questioned by the
learned LAC as to its authenticity since there is ambiguity and
inconsistency in the same, particularly as regard the place where the post
mortem was conducted, which was at Dongki-ingding PHC and not at
the PO.
16. On the evidence of PW-3, Smti Helut Mawlong, the learned
LAC has submitted that she is the mother of the appellant herein and she
was the first person to know of the incident as in her statement, she has
said that she was awoken by her son-in-law, accused Kornik
Kharthangmaw who asked her to wake up as he has murdered Riket
Mawlong. On being so awoken, she saw her son lying in a pool of blood
and she became unconscious. Therefore, from this evidence, it can be
concluded that it was accused Kornik Kharthangmaw who has murdered
the victim and not the appellant. As such, no liability can be fastened
upon the appellant.
17. The learned LAC has again submitted that the evidence of PW-
4 cannot be relied upon since he is a hearsay witness as he has stated that
he heard about the incident only from others.
18. PW-5 and PW-6 are the seizure witnesses who have signed in
the seizure list. PW-5 has identified the Material Exhibit I, a khasi dao
and Material Exhibit -2, a small iron rod. However, he has admitted that
he does not know if the police have seized anything from the possession
of the accused Tiret Mawlong(appellant).
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19. PW-6 has also identified Material Exhibit-1 and 2 in court,
however, he has stated that he has not seen from which part of the house
the police has seized the said materials and that he does not know if the
police have seized anything from the physical possession of the accused
person.
20. The learned LAC has submitted that this seizure cannot be
accepted for the reason that there is no signature of the officer who has
drawn up the said seizure list exhibited as Exhibit-3. The same is not
admissible in law.
21. As to the evidence of the Doctor who has conducted the post
mortem, in his evidence as PW-7, he has admitted that he has conducted
the post-mortem examination of the deceased late Riket Mawlong, the
body being brought to the PHC by the police on 04.06.2015 at 7:15 pm.
The post mortem examination was conducted on 05.06.2015 and the
findings are that the cause of death is hemodynamic shock due to
haemorrhage (severe bleeding) from multiple injuries on the body.
These injuries may be caused by heavy-sharp object and fairly heavy
slender object. However, there is nothing to state as to which injuries are
ante mortem and which are post-mortem and also which injuries were
caused by heavy sharp object and which were caused by slender object,
submits the learned LAC.
22. The learned LAC has then referred to the evidence of the
Investigating Officer who was examined as PW-9. It is submitted that
this witness in his deposition has stated that “…After reaching the place
of occurrence which is the residence of the accused Smti. Tiret Mawlong
I found the dead body of (L) Riket Mawlong lying outside the house at
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veranda of the accused persons…”. This, according to the learned LAC
would mean that the alleged incident happened outside the house while
the appellant was inside the house taking care of her three children.
Therefore, the appellant has no connection with the alleged offence.
23. As to the motive and intention, the learned LAC has submitted
that PW-9 (IO) has stated that on enquiry from the villagers and the
headman they have informed him that on the night of the incident, they
heard a commotion and quarrelling between the accused persons and the
deceased about land dispute. But none of the prosecution witnesses,
more particularly the family members like PW-1 and PW-3 have stated
anything before the court about either the quarrelling over land dispute,
as such, motive could not be imputed as against the appellant herein.
24. On the seizure of the alleged murder weapons, PW-9 has stated
that he has found a Khasi dao and one iron rod from inside the house of
accused Smti. Tiret Mawlong which she claimed belongs to her and the
same were seized in front of witnesses. However, the seizure list
exhibited in court has no signature of the IO who has prepared the same
and accordingly, the same is not admissible in law.
25. The prosecution has also failed to prove that the above seized
materials were used in the commission of offence as they were not sent
for forensic examination to detect presence of finger prints of the
appellant or of anyone who had handled the said materials.
26. The learned LAC has reiterated that the case of the prosecution
is based on circumstantial evidence which is doubtful considering the
discrepancies found in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses
wherein the chain of events is not complete to link the appellant with the
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crime, the fact being that there are no eye-witnesses of the alleged crime,
and the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 being hearsay evidence,
conviction cannot be based on such type of evidence. Furthermore, since
the weapon said to have been used in the commission of the crime could
not be connected to have been used by the appellant in the commission
of the crime, especially in absence of any forensic examination report, it
cannot be said that the appellant had caused the death of her deceased
brother.
27. The learned LAC has also advanced his argument to further
consolidate the stand of the appellant by submitting that the appellant in
her statement made under Section 313 Cr.P.C while answering the query
made by the court, she had given a full explanation to all the
incriminating evidence and materials alleged against her. Her answer to
question Nos. 3, 4 and 5 in particular, has clearly brought out the fact
that it was her deceased husband Kornik Kharthangmaw who had killed
the victim when he was drunk and could not control himself. The
appellant has also clarified that perhaps after the incident her husband
woke her up from her sleep to accompany him to report the matter to the
police which she had refused as she did not do anything but since the
members of the village had already hired one Bolero vehicle to go to the
police outpost, she was requested to go there, which she did so,
accompanied by her two minor children, her mother, members of the
Seng Longkmie and others. To another question put to her as regard the
evidence of PW-3, the appellant has answered that “…It is not a fact that
my deceased brother Riket Mawlong used to assault me.”. In support of
the appellant’s case the learned LAC has referred to the following
authorities:
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i. State of Punjab v. Kewal Krishan, AIR 2023 SC 3226,
para 19 and 21;
ii. Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289,
para 19, 20 and 22;
iii. Abdulwahab Abdulmajid Baloch v. State of Gujarat,
(2009) 11 SCC 625, para 37, 40 and 41;
iv. Sangili alias Sanganathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2014)
10 SCC 264, para 16, 17 and 18;
v. Sobaran Singh & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2015)
13 SCC 537, para 20 and 21;
vi. Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 11
SCC 724, para 28, 29, 30 and 31;
vii. Varun Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 12 SCC
545, para 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29;
viii. Mehboob Ansari v. State of Meghalaya, (2018) 2 MJ 469,
para 48;
ix. Rajesh Rabha v. State of Meghalaya, (2016) 2 MJ 498,
para 53.
28. Per contra Mr. R. Gurung, learned GA while responding to the
argument of the learned LAC has submitted that the prosecution has
been able to prove the case against the accused/appellant and therefore
the impugned judgment and sentence cannot be faulted. This appeal is
liable to be dismissed.
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29. The learned GA has also led this Court to the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses and has submitted that PW-1 Shri. Aiji Mawlong,
is the informant who has lodged the FIR before the In-charge, Police
Outpost Dongki-ingding with the information that it has come to the
knowledge of the relatives of the deceased Riket Mawlong that he was
murdered inside the house of the accused/appellant, Tiret Mawlong on
03.06.2015 at about 11:30 p.m. It is prayed that necessary steps be taken
to punish these people in accordance with law. In his deposition before
the court as PW-1, this informant has narrated that he came to know of
the incident having received a telephone call from the Sordar of
Sohdadek Village who has informed him of the same and on reaching
the place of occurrence he found the body of his deceased brother lying
outside the house of the accused persons in a pool of blood. This witness
has further stated that after the accused persons were released from
custody, he met both of them and they confessed that they have
murdered his deceased brother Riket Mawlong.
30. The learned GA has further submitted that PW-2 Shri. Gisteroy
Stepwar who was the Secretary of the village at that point of time, in his
evidence has also corroborated the evidence of PW-1 when he said that
“…on 03-06-2015 and at about 12:00 midnight accused Shri. Kornik
Kharthangmaw and accused Tiret Mawlong appeared at my resident
and call out to me to open the door and when I answer the door both of
them told me that they have murdered Shri Riket Mawlong younger
brother of accused Tiret Mawlong and also told me to go and escort
them to Thanad at Donki Ingding…”
31. Again, PW-3 Smti. Helut Mawlong, the mother of the deceased
as well as that of the appellant herein has also deposed before the court
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by stating that on the day of the incident, the date and year of which she
could not remember but it was in the month of June, her son-in-law Shri.
Kornik Kharthangmaw woke her up from her sleep and informed her
that he has murdered the deceased Riket Mawlong. When she woke up,
she saw her deceased son lying dead in a pool of blood, submits the
learned GA.
32. In view of the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, the learned
GA has submitted that the prosecution has been able to prove that the
accused persons, that is, the appellant herein and her deceased husband
have murdered the deceased since they have admitted to the same on
their own accord, such confession being confirmed by the said witnesses
mentioned hereinabove.
33. The learned GA has also referred to the evidence of PW-4 Shri.
Elingson Mawlong who, on being informed of the incident went to the
place of occurrence and reached there at about 12:00 a.m., there he saw
the head of the deceased was crushed, the right eye was crushed, and the
intestine was bulging out. This piece of evidence was found matching
with the post-mortem report filed by PW-7 Dr. H.L. Kharchandy who
has conducted the post-mortem and, in his evidence, has referred to his
findings as follows:
“Wounds- Penetrating wound, 2.5 centimeters over the right part
of forehead, penetrating deep into the brain matter. Penetrating
wound over left eye, penetrating into the eyeball deep into the
socket. Penetrating wound 3 centimeters over back of the head
(occipital region) penetrating deep into the brain matte. Chop
wound, 6 inches over anterior and lateral parts of the neck,
revealing the neck soft tissues, the cut vessels, bronchi, partly
chopped oesophagus and extend posteriorly. Stab wound
(penetrating) with dragged margins 7. inches over left12
2025:MLHC:776-DBhypochondrium and left lumber parts of abdomen revealing the
intestines (including the perforated intestines) and torn
peritoneal lining with faecal matter leakage from perforated
intestines. There was brain membranes torn at the penetrating
wound over the (occipital region) and brain matters come out
from the wound.”
34. As to the manner in which the deceased was murdered, the
learned GA has submitted that the evidence of PW-4 and PW-7 have
only confirmed the findings of PW-9, the Investigating Officer who, in
his evidence has stated that when he visited the PO on 04.06.2015, he
has conducted the inquest then and there. His report in this regard
reflected that he found the body lying outside the veranda of the accused.
He also stated that “…During inquest I saw that the left eye ball was
crushed, from the head white fluid and blood were coming out, his throat
was cut and cut mark on the lower abdomen of which intestine bulging
out…”
35. As to the weapon used for the murder of the deceased Riket
Mawlong, the learned GA has submitted that PW-5 Shri Shngainlut L.
Nonglait in his evidence has stated that he was present at the place of
occurrence on the next day of the incident at about 2:00 p.m. when the
police arrived at the PO, one khasi dao with handle and one iron rod
from the possession of the accused/appellant herein was seized. This
witness has appended his signature on the body of the seizure list as a
seizure witness and he has also proved Mat. Exhibit-1 and Mat. Exhibit-
2 as well as the seizure list when the same was produced in his presence
before the court.
36. Similarly, PW-6 Shri Ping Kharkongor is also another seizure
witness who has seen the police seized the khasi dao and the iron rod
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from the place of occurrence and that he has also signed as one of the
seizure witnesses on the body of the seizure list, Exhibit-3.
37. The learned GA went on to submit that from the evidence on
record, there is no doubt that the weapons used by the appellant and her
husband have been proven to be the one seized from her possession in
presence of reliable witnesses and such evidence have not been able to
be contradicted by the defence.
38. As to the repeated defence sought to be set up by the appellant
that it was a case of self-defence, wherein the Investigating Officer, as
PW-9 in his deposition has stated that the appellant on being interrogated
has confessed that her deceased brother came to her house on the day of
occurrence in a drunken state and started quarrelling with her, taking up
the issue of land dispute, when she refused to comply with his demand,
he started to beat her and in order to protect herself she hit back and her
deceased husband on seeing them fighting, he too started to beat the
deceased victim, the learned GA has submitted that this witness in his
cross-examination has stated that he did not see any injuries on the
person of the A-2/appellant. However, the nature of injuries is such that
every part of the body of the deceased victim was inflicted with lethal
weapons with such injuries sufficient to cause his death, therefore,
premeditation and intention to kill having been established, even as the
accused persons have confessed their guilt, the plea of self-defence has
no ground to stand. The case of N. Ramkumar v. State Rep. by Inspector
of Police, 2023 SCC Online SC 1129 at para 15 and 16 was cited to
support this contention.
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39. We have duly taken note of the contention and submission of the
learned counsels for the parties in support of their respective stand vis-
à-vis the said impugned judgment and sentence.
40. Before reverting to the submission of the learned counsels, what
can be seen is that the prosecution story as was depicted by the IO in his
report under Section 173 Cr.P.C, is that on 03.06.2015 at about 11:30
p.m., the deceased victim Riket Mawlong was murdered by the
accused/appellant and her husband Kornik Kharthangmaw (since
deceased) with lethal weapons at their residence at Sohdadek village
after a hot altercation regarding inheritance of family properties.
41. In order to prove this story, the prosecution has examined about
9(nine) witnesses and has brought before the court two material exhibits,
being a khasi dao and one iron rod said to have been used as the murder
weapons. The seizure list indicating the seizure of such weapons by the
IO wherein is found two appending signatures of the witnesses to the
said seizure was also produced as Exhibit-3. On inquest being
conducted, the report of such inquest was also produced as Exhibit-2.
The post mortem report was also exhibited as Exhibit-4.
42. Evidently, nobody has actually seen the accused persons killing
the deceased. In order to establish its case, the prosecution has relied
mostly only on the fact that the body of the deceased was found at the
house of the appellant obviously covered with injuries which has
probably caused his death and also on the alleged confession of the
accused persons that they have killed the deceased.
43. PW-1 who has filed the FIR is the brother of the appellant and
the deceased victim. His knowledge of the incident was only by way of
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a telephonic information received from the Sordar of Sohdadek village
and that too on the day after the incident. However, he came to the PO
and saw the dead body of his brother lying outside the house of the
appellant. He also said that the accused persons, that is, his sister and
brother-in-law have already been arrested when he arrived at the PO and
it was only later that he met them after their release from custody. On
his enquiry, he said that they have confessed to him that they have
committed the murder.
44. PW-2 is the Secretary of Sohdadek village. This witness has
stated in court that on the night of the incident, both the accused persons
appeared at his house at 12:00 midnight and told him that they have
murdered Shri Riket Mawlong.
45. Even PW-3, the mother of the appellant has also stated in her
evidence that she was informed of the incident only when the accused
Kornik Kharthangmaw, her son-in-law came to her residence and woke
her up from her sleep whereupon he told her that he has murdered Riket
Mawlong. Later, when she asked her daughter, the appellant herein, as
to the cause of the incident, she was told by the appellant that the
deceased used to beat her up and on the day of the incident, he came to
her house and started assaulting her. Her husband on seeing this, became
angry and started assaulting the deceased resulting in his death. This
witness in her cross-examination has reiterated that she thinks that the
deceased was murdered by the accused because he (deceased) had
seriously assaulted the appellant and that in self-defence, the accused
murdered the deceased.
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46. This theory of self-defence was also restated by PW-4, one of
the brothers of the appellant who has admitted in his cross-examination
that he is aware that the deceased used to be a habitual drinker and when
he is drunk, he used to create trouble to his sisters and even prior to the
incident, he had a quarrel with the appellant. This witness has further
opined that it was in self-defence that the accused persons caused the
death of the deceased.
47. The version of the incident and the cause thereof as was depicted
by PW-3 and PW-4 was also corroborated by PW-9, the Investigating
Officer, who in his deposition before the court has stated that during
interrogation, the accused persons confessed to their guilt and has told
him that on the day of the incident, the deceased came to their house in
a drunken state and started assaulting the appellant to which she
defended herself by fighting back. Her husband on seeing them fighting,
in order to help his wife, he too started to beat the deceased till he died.
This witness, in his cross-examination has however stated that there was
no intention or preparation on the part of the accused to commit the
offence, but the incident happened in the heat of passion and was purely
in self-defence as the victim himself went to the house of the accused
persons and started assaulting the appellant.
48. From the above, what can be understood is that the defence has
sought to put up a case of self-defence in the commission of the said
offence while the prosecution has maintained that it is not a case of self-
defence but of intentional murder, the manner in which the deceased
victim was killed and the weapons used, indicating this state of mind of
the accused persons, including the appellant herein.
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49. Admittedly, death has occurred inasmuch as there is no
contradiction made to the fact that the deceased victim was found lying
dead outside the house of the appellant and her husband. There are
visible injuries mark on his body. His body was later taken to Dongki-
ingding PHC where his post mortem was conducted there by the doctor
(PW-7). His death can therefore be said to be homicidal.
50. The appellant has been found by the Trial Court to have
committed the offence of culpable homicide, such culpable homicide
amounting to murder and thereby fits the description of the offence of
murder as found in Section 300 IPC.
51. The findings of the learned Trial Court are that the plea of self-
defence, that is, the appellant on being assaulted by her deceased brother,
she had defended herself cannot be believed in the light of the manner
in which the deceased was killed. Therefore, the accused/appellant had
participated in the murder of her brother for which she was eventually
convicted and made to suffer punishment as per Section 302 IPC.
52. It can also be said that this is a case which can only be proved by
circumstantial evidence since there are no eye-witness(es) who have
actually seen the appellant and her husband or only her husband or only
the appellant committing the murder. In such a situation, in the case of
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down certain principles of how
evidence is to be appreciated in a case based on circumstantial evidence,
at para 153 it was held as follows:
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“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an
accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is
to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’
established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal
distinction between ‘may be proved’ and “must be or should be
proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793] where the following
observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p.
1047]
Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be
and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the
mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and
divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all
human probability the act must have been done by the
accused.”
53. An analysis of the circumstances surrounding the death of the
deceased brother of the appellant, at the initial stage cannot be explained,
that is, how he allegedly came to the house of the appellant and whether
he was actually drunk and has assaulted the appellant. The picture that
was presented by the witnesses is that it was the appellant who has told
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them that she along with her husband had killed her brother because he
had assaulted her in a drunken condition for which she has to defend
herself. However, this piece of evidence was allegedly forthcoming only
on the confession of the appellant to PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3. But this
would only be in the realm of ‘extra-judicial confession’, which
expression will be discussed further herein. Therefore, such
circumstances cannot be determined, more so, cannot form the basis to
establish the guilt of the appellant.
54. Even if the evidence on record is perused, the evidence of PW-3
who is the mother of the accused/appellant would connect the death of
the deceased to the action of the deceased husband of the appellant as
this witness has stated that it was the deceased husband of the appellant
who had woken her up from her sleep and had told her that he had killed
the deceased. He has never said anything about the participation of the
appellant in the commission of such act. The appellant has also stated in
her statement under Section 313 while replying to one of the questions
put by the court that after the incident her husband woke her up from her
sleep and told her to accompany him to the police station. To another
question she has answered that she does not know the condition of her
deceased brother at the time when he died as she did not go to see him
even though he was lying dead in her compound.
55. In view of such circumstances, it is the opinion of this Court that
there is no evidence which proved circumstances to be of a conclusive
nature pinpointing to the guilt of the appellant in the alleged commission
of the murder. There are no credible or possible hypothesis to connect
the appellant to the said murder.
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56. The contents of the post mortem report cannot be doubted as
PW-7 who is the doctor who had conducted the post mortem and who
has filed the related report has clearly opined that the manner of death is
homicidal, the cause of death is haemodynamic shock due to
haemorrhage (severe bleeding), from multiple injuries on his body and
these multiple injuries may be caused by heavy-sharp object and fairly-
heavy slender object.
57. The discovery of the alleged murder weapons was said to have
been made from the house of the appellant and the IO had accordingly
seized the two objects that is, one khasi dao and one iron rod. However,
the seizure list said to have been prepared by the IO has not been actually
signed by him to certify its genuineness. Even though the two seizure
witnesses who have proved the said seizure list, in different versions,
they have stated that they did not see from where the two materials were
actually seized. Moreover, these materials have not been sent for
forensic examination to determine as to whether there is any blood found
in them, either of the deceased victim or the appellant. Under such
circumstances, legally, the said weapons or materials cannot be linked
or connected to the appellant or even to her deceased husband. This is
where the case of the prosecution fails in this regard.
58. Coming to the issue of extra-judicial confession, this Court
would rely on some authorities and case laws which has brought some
clarity in this area, particularly as regard the culpability of the person
who has made such confession to whom and under what circumstances.
59. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramu Appa
Mahapatar v. State of Maharashtra, (2025) 3 SCC 565, at para 20, 21
21
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and 26 has expounded the proposition of extra judicial confession by
observing as follows:
“20. In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram [(2003) 8 SCC 180], this
Court explained the concept of extra-judicial confession.
Confession may be divided into two classes i.e. judicial and
extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made
before a Magistrate or a court in the course of judicial
proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are
made by the party elsewhere than before a Magistrate or a court.
Extra-judicial confessions are generally those that are made by a
party before a private individual who may be a judicial officer
also in his private capacity. As to extra-judicial confessions, two
questions arise: firstly, whether they are made voluntarily and
secondly, are they true? If the court is of the opinion that the
confession was not made voluntarily but was a result of an
inducement, threat or promise, it would not be acted upon. It
follows that a confession would be voluntary if it is made by the
accused in a fit state of mind and if it is not caused by any
inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge
against him proceeding from a person in authority. Whether or
not the confession was voluntary would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case judged in the light of Section 24
of the Evidence Act, 1872 (briefly
“the Evidence Act” hereinafter). The law is clear that a
confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the
court is satisfied that it was voluntary. At that stage, the question
whether it is true or false does not arise. If the facts and
circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to
cast a doubt on the veracity and voluntariness of the confession,
the court may refuse to act upon the confession even if it is
admissible in evidence. The question whether a confession is
voluntary or not is always a question of fact. A free and
voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit because it
is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt.
21. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made
in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The
confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value
of the evidence as to confession like any other evidence depends
upon the reliability of the witness to whom it is made and who22
2025:MLHC:776-DBgives the evidence. Extra-judicial confession can be relied upon
and conviction can be based thereon if the evidence about the
confession comes from a witness who appears to be unbiased,
not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of
whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he
may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the
accused. The words spoken by the witness should be clear,
unambiguous and unmistakenly convey that the accused is the
perpetrator of the crime and that nothing is omitted by the
witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the
evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of
credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can
be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.
26. Upon an indepth analysis of judicial precedents, this Court
in Sahadevan [(2012) 6 SCC 403] summed up the principles
which would make an extra-judicial confession an admissible
piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of
an accused: (SCC pp. 412-13, para 16)
“16…(i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence
by itself.
It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution.
(ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be
truthful.
(iii) It should inspire confidence.
(iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater
credibility
and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of
cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by
other prosecution evidence.
(v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of
conviction, it should not suffer from any material
discrepancies and inherent improbabilities.
(vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like
any other fact and in accordance with law.”
60. In the said case of Ramu Appa Mahapatar (supra) at para 19, it
has been observed that extra-judicial confession is one of several
23
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instances of circumstantial evidence and has to be proved as such, that
is, that the chain must be complete and found to be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. This para reads as follows:
“19. Extra-judicial confession of an offence made by the accused
before a witness is one of the several instances of circumstantial
evidence; there are other circumstances, such as, the theory of
last seen together; conduct of the accused before or immediately
after the incident; human blood being found on the clothes or
person of the accused which matches with that of the accused;
leading to discovery, recovery of weapon, etc. As we know,
circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but
consists of evidence of various other facts which are so closely
associated with the fact in issue that taken together, they form a
chain of circumstances from which the existence of the principal
fact can be legally inferred or presumed. The chain must be
complete and each fact forming part of the chain must be proved.
It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case
rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, inference of guilt can
be justified only when all the incriminating facts and
circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence
of the accused or the guilt of any other person. The
circumstances would not only have to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, those would also have to be shown to be
closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred
from those circumstances. All these circumstances should be
complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence.
The proved circumstances must be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent
with his innocence. The circumstances taken cumulatively must
be so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that
within all human probability the crime was committed by the
accused and none else. While there is no doubt that conviction
can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but great care
must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence. If the
evidence relied upon is reasonably capable of two inferences, the
one in favour of the accused must be accepted.”
61. Again, as to the evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Harjinder Singh @ Kala v.
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State of Punjab, vide order dated 22.01.2025 in SLP(Crl.) No(s). 8944
of 2022, a case where facts and circumstances are almost similar to the
case herein, has acquitted the appellant/accused who has approached the
court on his being convicted by the trial court and on appeal before the
High Court, his appeal was rejected.
62. However, it would be worthwhile to briefly mention the story of
the said case in the context of the case in hand. On 14.08.2014, one
Narain Dass was found lying lifeless in his cot with injury marks made
by sharp weapons on the right side of the face and abdomen. An FIR
was filed and a case registered. On 19.08.2014, Harjinder Singh
approached the village Sarpanch and tendered an extra-judicial
confession to the effect that he has murdered Narian Dass. The Sarpanch
convinced him to surrender to which he does and was arrested and again,
during investigation, he made a disclosure to the Investigating Officer
whereby the knife which was used to commit the crime was recovered.
Charges were framed against the appellant therein under Section 302
IPC and on conclusion of the trial, he was found guilty of the said
offence and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment with fine of ₹
5000/- with default clause.
63. At para 16 & 17 of the said case of Harjinder Singh(supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the issue of extra-judicial
confession has observed as follows:
“16. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence, that an
extra-judicial confession must be accepted with great care and
caution. If found reliable and convincing, an extra-judicial
confession may be used as corroboration for other evidence to
record conviction of the accused. This Court had the occasion to
deal with the evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession in25
2025:MLHC:776-DBSahadevan v. State of T.N. [(2012) 6 SCC 403], wherein it was
held that:-
“14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that
extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence.
Wherever the court, upon due appreciation of the entire
prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an
extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that the same
inspires confidence and is corroborated by other
prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra-judicial
confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent
improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent as per the
prosecution version, it may be difficult for the court to base
a conviction on such a confession. In such circumstances,
the court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence
out of consideration.
16. Upon a proper analysis of the above referred judgments
of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles
which would make an extra-judicial confession and
admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis
of conviction of an accused. These precepts would guide
the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases
where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-
judicial confession alleged to have been made by the
accused:
(i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence
by itself. It has to be examined by the court with
greater care and caution.
(ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be
truthful.
(iii) It should inspire confidence.
(iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater
credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by
a chain of cogent circumstances and is further
corroborated by other prosecution evidence.
(v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of
conviction, it should not suffer from any material
discrepancies and inherent improbabilities.
26
2025:MLHC:776-DB
(vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like
any other fact and in accordance with law.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. In Kalinga v. State of Karnataka [(2024) 4 SCC 735], this
Court further deliberated upon the evidentiary value of an extra-
judicial confession, and held therein:-
“15. The conviction of the appellant is largely based on the
extra-judicial confession allegedly made by him before PW
1. So far as an extra-judicial confession is concerned, it is
considered as a weak type of evidence and is generally
used as a corroborative link to lend credibility to the
other evidence on record. In Chadrapal v. State of
Chhattisgarh, this Court reiterated the evidentiary value of
an extra-judicial confession in the following words:
“11. …This court has consistently held that an extra-
judicial confession is a weak kind of evidence and
unless it inspires confidence or is fully corroborated
by some other evidence of clinching nature,
ordinarily conviction for the offence of murder
should not be made only on the evidence of extra-
judicial confession. As held in State of M.P. v. Paltan
Mallah, the extra-judicial confession made by the co-
accused could be admitted in evidence only as a
corroborative piece of evidence. In absence of any
substantive evidence against the accused, the extra-
judicial confession allegedly made by the co-
accused loses its significance and there cannot be
any conviction based on such extra-judicial
confession of the co-accused.”
16. It is no more res integra that an extra-judicial
confession must be accepted with great care and
caution. If it is not supported by other evidence on record,
it fails to inspire confidence and in such a case, it shall not
be treated as a strong piece of evidence for the purpose of
arriving at the conclusion of guilt. Furthermore, the extent
of acceptability of an extra-judicial confession depends on
the trustworthiness of the witness before whom it is given
and the circumstances in which it was given. The
prosecution must establish that a confession was indeed
made by the accused, that it was voluntary in nature and
27
2025:MLHC:776-DB
that the contents of the confession were true. The standard
required for proving an extra-judicial confession to the
satisfaction of the Court is on the higher side and these
essential ingredients must be established beyond any
reasonable doubt. The standard becomes even higher
when the entire case of the prosecution necessarily rests on
the extra-judicial confession.”
64. In circumstances similar to this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
at para 34, 35 & 36 of the Harjinder Singh case has said the following:
“34. It is further noteworthy that the Investigating Officer,
S.H.O. Bhagwant Singh(PW-7) did not state that the knife,
which was allegedly recovered at the instance of the appellant,
was sealed and thereafter forwarded to the FSL for forensic
examination, which makes the recovery of the alleged murder
weapon inconsequential. Thus, the recovery of the knife
purportedly used in commission of murder, is of no avail to the
prosecution.
35. In addition, thereto, it is the case of the prosecution that the
blood-stained pyjama allegedly worn by the appellant at the time
of the incident was also recovered in furtherance of his
disclosure statement. However, the FSL report produced on
record does not indicate any positive conclusion of blood
grouping which could connect the weapon i.e., the knife and the
clothing (stained pyjama) with the blood group of the deceased.
This is again a material rift in the case of the prosecution and
makes their entire case doubtful.
36. No other evidence was led by the prosecution to bring home
the guilt of the appellant. Therefore, we find that the prosecution
has failed to prove even one of the so-called incriminating
circumstances attributed to the appellant so as to affirm his
guilt.”
65. In view of the above findings and observations, we are of the
view as was held in the case of Manthuri Laxmi Narsaiah v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 14 SCC 117 at para 6 that:
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“6. It is by now well settled that in a case relating to
circumstantial evidence the chain of circumstances has to be
spelt out by the prosecution and if even one link in the chain is
broken the accused must get the benefit thereof. We are of the
opinion that the present is in fact a case of no evidence”
66. To reiterate the factual situation of the case herein, what is
apparent is that the accusation of the deceased victim being murdered
was directed at the appellant and her deceased husband. Though the
husband has since died even before charges could be framed against him,
nevertheless, the narrative of the prosecution as to his culpability or
complicity in the case cannot be ignored on account of his death which
is a subsequent development in the case.
67. From the stage of framing of charge to the recording of evidence
of the prosecution witnesses, the prosecution has sought to make out a
case only against the appellant herein. In spite of evidence pointing to
the presence of the deceased husband of the appellant and his so called
confession before PW-3 of having killed the deceased and also the fact
that PW-1 and PW-2 have also stated that it was the two of them, that is,
the appellant and her husband who had killed the deceased, if such
evidence is even valid or considered by this Court, the question of who
has actually dealt the fatal blow has not been determined. Motive and
intention not being proved, therefore the appellant cannot even be said
to be having a common intention with her husband to kill the deceased.
This is apparent when the learned Trial Judge has thought it fit not to
implicate the appellant under Section 34, but only under Section 302
IPC. Under such circumstances, the link in the chain is broken and as
such, the accused must get the benefit of doubt, which we are hereby
inclined to do so.
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68. It may be reminded that the authorities cited and relied upon by
the appellant and the prosecution has been acknowledged herein,
however, only what is relevant to the issues involved and taken up in
this hearing have been taken due note of.
69. On a final analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case of
the appellant, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has not
been able to make out a case for conviction of the appellant and the
impugned judgment of conviction, including the sentence thereof is
liable to be set aside and quashed which is done so herein.
70. The convict/appellant is hereby acquitted and is directed to be
henceforth set at liberty without any liability as far as this case is
concerned, if not wanted in any other case.
71. Let copy of this order be issued upon the Superintendent, District
Prisons and Correctional Home, Shillong for necessary compliance.
72. Trial Court’s record to be sent back after the mandatory period
of appeal is over.
73. Appeal disposed of.
(B. Bhattacharjee) (W. Diengdoh)
Judge Judge
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by 30
TIPRILYNTI KHARKONGOR
Date: 2025.08.30 13:28:21 IST
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