Bombay High Court
Sony Mony Electronics Limited vs State Of Maharashtra Through Collector … on 7 August, 2025
2025:BHC-OS:12862
9.WP-2757.12(J).DOCX
ppn
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Digitally signed ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
by PRACHI
PRACHI PRANESH
PRANESH NANDIWADEKAR
NANDIWADEKAR
Date: 2025.08.07 WRIT PETITION NO.2757 OF 2012
16:58:37 +0530
Sony Mony Electronics Limited a
limited company registered under the
Companies Act, 1956 having its address
at Acme Regency, Vile Parle (West) ... Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Maharashtra through
Collector of Stamp Andheri Taluka,
MMRDA Building, 1st floor, Opp. Family
Court, Bandra Kurla Complex Bandra
East, Mumbai 400 051.
2. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
Maharashtra State Pune, New
Administrative Building Ground Floor,
Opp. Council Hall Sadhu Waswani
Chowk, Pune 411 001. ... Respondents
______________________________________________________
Mr. M. M. Vashi, Senior Advocate a/w. Ms. Panthi Desai and
Ms.Manisha Desai i/b M/s. M. P. Vashi & Associates for
the Petitioner.
Mr. Himanshu Takke, AGP for Respondent Nos.1 & 2.
______________________________________________________
CORAM : Jitendra Jain, J.
RESERVED ON : 4 August 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 7 August 2025
JUDGMENT :
–
1. This petition challenges an order dated 14 August 2012
passed by respondent no.2 under Section 53A of the
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Bombay/Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘Stamp Act‘) whereby a sum of Rs.8,21,000/- is
demanded on account of deficit stamp duty on the instrument
dated 15 December 2003. The petition also challenges order
dated 21 August 2015 passed by respondent no.2 pursuant to
the directions given by this Court.
2. In the impugned order dated 14 August 2012, reference
was made to an audit report and the valuation report sought
by respondent no.2 from the Joint Director, Town Planning,
Valuation without the copy of the same being given to the
petitioner. Therefore, vide order of this Court dated 15 April
2015, the respondents were directed to give a copy of the
valuation report and after hearing, the petitioner were
directed to pass appropriate orders. Pursuant thereto,
respondent no.2 vide his order dated 21 August 2015 passed
the order confirming his earlier order dated 14 August 2012
and the said order is also a subject matter of challenge in the
present petition.
Brief Facts :-
3. On 2 December 2003, pursuant to the petitioner
lodging agreement for sale for adjudication, a certificate
under Section 32(1)(b) of the Stamp Act was issued
accepting the valuation specified in the agreement and
determining stamp duty of Rs.16,59,950/- under Article
25(b) of the Schedule to the Stamp Act.
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4. On 12 December 2003, the petitioner executed the
aforesaid agreement for sale with a Developer to purchase
ground floor, basement and first floor of an immovable
property which was described as ‘office premises’ in the
agreement for a consideration of Rs.1,65,97,620/-.
5. The aforesaid certificate under Section 32(1)(b) further
states that same is subject to the provisions of Section 53A of
the Stamp Act. The petitioner paid an amount of
Rs.16,59,950/- as stamp duty.
6. On 2 March 2007 and 29 December 2007, a notice was
issued by respondent no.2 under Section 53A of the Stamp
Act with respect to the valuation and the payment of stamp
duty on the above instrument. The said notice was made
returnable on 12 March 2007 and 7 January 2008,
respectively.
7. On 14 November 2011, a notice to show cause was
issued by respondent no.2 to the petitioner for payment of
differential stamp duty. The said notice was issued under
Section 53A of the Stamp Act. Similar notice was also issued
on 29 November 2011 and made returnable on 12 December
2011.
8. On 29 February 2012, respondent no.2 issued a notice
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to the petitioner requesting to attend the office of respondent
no.2. The said notice was issued under Section 53A of the
Stamp Act. On 30 March 2012, the respondents issued a
differential demand notice of Rs.12,06,050/- to the petitioner
and the petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing on 9
April 2012.
9. On 9 July 2012, a letter was addressed by Assistant
Director Town Planning Valuation, Government of
Maharashtra to the legal advisor of the Inspector General of
Registration and Controller of Stamps regarding valuation of
the above document. As per the said letter and according to
the valuation authority, the valuation should be
Rs.2,48,09,500/- and not Rs.1,65,97,620/- and therefore the
said authority requested respondent no.2 to take further
action in the matter.
10. Pursuant to the above, impugned order by respondent
no.2 came to be passed on 14 August 2012 demanding deficit
stamp duty of Rs.8,21,000/-.
Submissions of the Petitioner:-
11. Mr.Vashi, learned senior counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the impugned orders dated 14 August 2012
and 21 August 2015 passed under Section 53A of the Stamp
Act are barred by limitation since same are passed after the
expiry of period of 6 years from the date of adjudication
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which was on 2 December 2003. He submitted that on a
reading of Section 53A(1) of the Stamp Act, the proceeding
should not only be initiated within 6 years but same should
also be concluded within a period of 6 years. In any case even
otherwise the impugned order is not passed within
reasonable period. He therefore, submitted that the impugned
orders are beyond limitation period and thus bad-in-law.
12. Mr. Vashi further, submitted that the classification made
by the respondents for valuing the property as “shop
premises” and not “commercial property” is not borne out
from the provisions of the Stamp Act but same is based
merely on ready reckoner and therefore, even on this count,
the valuation made by the respondents is in excess of the
jurisdiction conferred under the Act.
Submissions of the Respondent:-
13. Mr. Takke, learned counsel for the respondents strongly
defended the impugned orders. He submitted that on a
reading of Section 53A (1) of the Act, the proceedings should
be initiated within a period of 6 years from the date of
adjudication but the final order can be passed at any time
after period of 6 years. Mr. Takke relied upon the decision of
this Court in the case of Hillside Construction Company
Private Limited & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 1 in
support of his submission.
1
Writ Petition no.9397 of 2011 decided on 31 January 2012
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14. He further, submitted that Article 25 of Schedule I to
the Stamp Act only states immovable property and the
valuation has to be done as per the valuation rules, which in
turn, is based on annual rates and at that point of time, the
classification of the property is required to be done and if the
property is a shop, then different valuation will entail. He,
therefore, defended the impugned orders and prayed for
dismissal of the petition.
15. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the
respondents and with their assistance have perused the
documents brought to my notice. I may state that other than
what is recorded above no other submissions have been
canvassed by both the counsel.
Analysis & Submissions:-
16. Sections 32C and 53A(1) of the Stamp Act reads as
under :-
“32C. Revision
Subject to the provisions of section 32B and any rules which may be
made in this behalf by the State Government, the Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority may, suo motu, call for and examine the record of
any order passed (including an order passed in appeal) under this
Act or the rules made thereunder, by any officer and pass such order
thereon as he thinks just and proper; and the order so passed shall
be final and shall not be called in question in any Court or before
any authority:
Provided that, no notice calling for the record under this section
shall be served by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority after the
expiry of three years from the date of communication of the order
sought to be revised and no order of revision, shall be made by the
said Authority hereunder after the expiry of five years from suchPage 6 of 20
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date:
Provided further that, no order shall be passed under this section
which adversely affects any person, unless such person has been
given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.]”
“53A. Revision of Collector’s decision under Sections 32, 39 and 41
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section
32, sub-section (2) of section 39 and sub-section (2) of section 41,
when through mistake or otherwise any instruments is charged with
less duty than leviable thereon, or is held not chargeable with duty,
as the case may be, by the Collector, the Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority may, within a period of six years from the date of
certificate of the Collector under sections 32, 39 or 41, as the case
may be, require the concerned party to produce before him the
instrument and, after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard
to the party, examine such instrument whether any duty is
chargeable or any duty is less levied, thereon and order the recovery
of the deficit duty, if any, from the concerned party. An endorsement
shall be made on the instrument after payment of such deficit duty.”
[emphasis supplied]
17. Before I advert to decide the issues, following dates
are relevant:
1. 2 December Date of adjudication under
2003 Section 32.
2. 2 March 2007- First Notice under Section 53A.
3. 2 December Six years ended from date of
2009 adjudication.
4. 14 August Order under Section 53A
2012 passed demanding deficit
stamp duty.
Issue 1 :- The first issue which needs to be addressed is
whether on a reading of Section 53A (1) of the Stamp Act
only initiation of proceedings should be within 6 years or
whether the order also should be passed within 6 years from
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the date of certificate under Section 32 of the Stamp Act ?
18. Section 53A(1) of the Stamp Act provides that when
through mistake or otherwise an instrument is charged with
less duty than leviable then, within a period of 6 years from
the date of certificate of the Collector under Section 32, 39
or 41, the Authority may require the concerned party to
produce before him such instrument and after giving a
reasonable opportunity of being heard to the party, examine
such instrument and order recovery of the deficit duty from
the concerned party.
19. Section 53A(1) of the Stamp Act can be dissected in
three parts :-
(i) The Collector/Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
may, within a period of six years from the date of
certificate of the Collector under Sections 32, 39 or
41, as the case may be
(ii) require the concerned party to produce before him
the instrument and, after giving reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the party, examine such
instrument whether any duty is chargeable or any
duty is less levied, thereon
(iii) and order the recovery of the deficit duty, if any, from
the concerned party.
20. In my view, on a reading of Section 53A(1) the order of
recovery should be passed within 6 years preceded by
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compliance of natural justice and application of mind. The
first part is to be read with the third part and between the
said two parts, there has to be a compliance of natural justice
and application of mind. This is fortified by the conjunctive
phrase “and” used before the phrase “order the recovery of
the deficit duty.” The second part also contains the phrase
“and” but that conjunctive is used to comply with the
principles of natural justice by requiring the production of the
instrument and giving reasonable opportunity and after
complying with the same to apply one’s mind on chargeability
of the instrument. Therefore, the first part and third part are
connected with the conjunctive word “and” and consequently,
the period of 6 years provided in Section 53A(1) should be
read to mean that the order of recovery should be passed
within the said time frame.
21. It is also important to note proviso to Section 32C of
the Act which states that no notice calling for the record
under Section 32C shall be served by the Chief Controlling
Revenue Authority after the expiry of three years from the
date of communication of the order sought to be revised and
no order of revision shall be made by the said Authority after
expiry of 5 years from such date. Similar proviso does not
exist in Section 53A(1) of the Stamp Act. Section 53A does
not provide for any period for passing the final order after the
issuance of the notice. Therefore, in the absence of similar
provisions as that contained in proviso to Section 32C in
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Section 53A, the contention raised by Mr. Takke that only the
proceedings should be initiated within 6 years and the final
order can be passed at any time thereafter cannot be
accepted. Wherever legislature wanted to specify different
time period for initiation and completion they have specified
so but in the absence of different periods it should be
presumed that legislature intended to complete the
proceedings within one time limit specified therein which in
the case of before me is 6 years.
22. The interpretation given by me of Section 53A(1) of the
Stamp Act to the effect that the order should be passed within
a period of 6 years also finds support from the scheme of the
Stamp Act. Section 32C of the Stamp Act which deals with
similar powers of revision provides for a maximum of 5 years
from the date of order sought to be revised within which, the
authority has to pass the order of revision. It is settled
position in revenue laws that the proceedings have to be
concluded within certain time frame and same cannot be kept
pending for long which would lead to uncertainty which is
contrary to the canons of any fiscal legislation.
23. In the instant case, Section 53A(1) of the Stamp Act, in
my view, provides for maximum of 6 years from the date of
certificate for not only exercising the power under the said
Section but also to conclude by passing an order for the
recovery of the deficit duty, if any, from the concerned party.
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Therefore, the contention raised by the respondents that the
time limit is provided only for initiation and not for passing
the order cannot be accepted on a reading of the Scheme of
the Stamp Act and the context in which the period of 6 years
is specified.
24. In Hariom Agrawal vs. Prakash Chand Malviya2, the
Supreme Court had an occasion to interpret provisions of
Section 48-B of the Madhya Pradesh Stamp Act which reads
as under :-
“48-B. Original instrument to be produced before the
Collector in case of deficiency.–Where the deficiency of
stamp duty is noticed from a copy of any instrument, the
Collector may, by order, require the production of original
instrument from a person in possession or in custody of the
original instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to
the adequacy of amount of duty paid thereon. If the original
instrument is not produced before him within the period
specified in the order, it shall be presumed that the original
document is not duly stamped and the Collector may
proceed in the manner provided in this Chapter:
Provided that no action under this section shall be taken
after a period of five years from the date of execution of such
instrument.”
25. The Supreme Court in paragraph 19 observed as
under :-
“By virtue of proviso to Section 48-B, the Collector’s power to
adjudicate upon the adequacy of stamp duty on the original
instrument on the basis of copy of the instrument is restricted
to the period of five years from the date of execution of the
original instrument.”
(emphasis supplied)
2
(2007) 8 SCC 514
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26. The substance of the provision before the Supreme
Court and the substance of Section 53A(1) before me is
similar and therefore, the interpretation given by the
Supreme Court on proviso to Section 48-B of the Madhya
Pradesh Stamp Act supports the view that the order
adjudicating deficit duty under Section 53A(1) should also be
passed within a period of 6 years from the date of the
certificate of the Collector thereby resulting into adjudication
within time limit provided under the Act.
27. This issue came for consideration before this Court in
Uma Niwas Co-operative Housing Society Vs. The Collector of
Stamps & Ors.3. Paragraph 13 of the said decision reads as
under:
“13. Section 53A empowers revision of Collector’s decision
under Section 41 within a period of 6 years from the date of
certificate of the Collector under Section 41 for raising the
demand on account of deficit stamp. In the instant case, the
certificate issued under Section 41 is dated 2 nd March 1995
and the period of 6 years had expired on 1 st March 2001.
The impugned order raising the demand (interim) is dated
2nd July 2015 and (final) is dated 2nd May 2016. Both these
communications of 2015 and 2016 would be beyond the
year 2001 and, therefore, on this count itself the orders
passed on 28th September 2015 and 2 nd May 2016 raising
demand of deficit stamp duty payable with respect to Flat
no.320 is required to be quashed and set aside.”
28. In this case, the certificate under Section 32 of the
Stamp Act was given on 2 December 2003 and the order of
3
Writ Petition no.10602 of 2016 decided on 3 October 2024
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recovery of the deficit duty is passed on 14 August 2012
which is beyond the period of 6 years and therefore, the
impugned orders are beyond the limitation period provided
under Section 53A(1) of the Act.
Issue 2 :- If Section 53A(1) provides only for initiation of the
proceedings within six years then within what time from the
date of initiation should an order be passed under Section
53A(1) of the Stamp Act ?
29. It is settled position that once any proceedings are
initiated then, same has to be concluded within a “reasonable
time” frame. In such cases, the reasonable period would not
start from the last day of the expiry of time specified in the
provision but from the date of initiation.
30. In my view, the “reasonable period” to conclude the
proceedings under Section 53A(1) after initiation of the
proceedings would be maximum 2 years. This is so because
Sections 32C of the Stamp Act provides for issuing notice for
revision within 3 years from the date of communication of
the order sought to be revised and to pass the order of
revision before the expiry of 5 years from the date of order
sought to be revised. Thereby the Scheme of the Act dealing
with similar provision gives a period of 2 years (5 years
minus 3 years) for completion of the proceedings. Therefore,
taking clue from the provisions of Section 32C, period of 2
years is considered to be reasonable to conclude the
proceedings from the date of initiation.
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31. In this case, the period of 2 years from the date of
initiation would expire on 2 March 2009 because first notice
under Section 53A was issued on 2 March 2007 and the
impugned order is passed on 14 August 2012 and, therefore,
on this count also, the impugned orders are passed beyond
the limitation period.
32. In revenue matters, the proceedings cannot be kept
in abeyance for a long period. The reasonable period has to
be construed based on the Scheme of the Act. First proviso to
Section 32C of the Stamp Act gives a clue that the
proceedings can be initiated within 3 years from the date of
communication of orders sought to be revised and the
revision order can be made after expiry of 5 years from the
date of communication of the order. Therefore, what it
conveys is that the maximum period within which revision
order can be passed is 5 years from the date of
communication of the order. The said 5 years consists of 3
years for initiation and 2 years for completion. Even if the
parameters laid down in first proviso to Section 32C are
considered then also in the instant case, the impugned orders
are beyond reasonable period.
33. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha 4,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:-
“11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can
revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true
4
AIR 1969 SC 1297Page 14 of 20
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that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section
211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be
exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable
time must be determined by the facts of the case and the
nature of the order which is being revised.”
34. In the case of the State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District
Co-op. Milk Producers’ Union Ltd.5, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court followed the above principle and applied it to even tax
law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the context of revisional
powers conferred by the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948
enabling reopening of the assessment, followed the above
principle quoted and held as under:-
“17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that
although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefor,
the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be
exercised at any time.
18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been
prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction
within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the
reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the
statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant
factors.”
35. Then, again in the case of Santoshkumar Shivgonda
Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale6, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court followed the ratio in the judgments of Patil Raghav
Natha (supra) and the Bhatinda District Co-op. Milk
Producers Union Ltd. (supra) and reiterated the principle as
referred above.
5
[2007] 11 SCC 363
6
[2009] 9 SCC 352
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36. The same view appears to have been taken earlier also
in the case of the Government of India v. Citadel Fine
Pharmaceuticals 7.
37. In Bhatinda District Co-op. Milk Producers Union Ltd.
(supra), the question that arose before the Supreme Court
was regarding initiation of proceedings by exercise of
jurisdiction by the statutory authority. The Supreme Court
held that exercise of jurisdiction must be within a reasonable
period of time and considering the provisions of the Punjab
General Sales-Tax Act, 1948, it was held that a reasonable
period of time for initiating proceedings would be five years.
38. Therefore, in my view, impugned order is passed
beyond reasonable period from the date of initiation.
Issue 3 :- Whether the impugned order can be said to have
been passed within reasonable period from the expiry of six
years, if we accept the submissions of the respondents ?
39. Assuming, for the sake of argument the contention of
Mr. Takke is to be accepted, that six years period applies for
initiation and conclusion of the proceedings, then also the
impugned orders cannot be sustained. The certificate under
Section 32 was issued on 2 December 2003. The period of 6
years from the date of certificate under Section 32 would
expire on 2 December 2009. After the expiry of 6 years period
7
[1990] 184 ITR 467 (SC)
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i.e. from 2 December 2009, no order was passed till 14
August 2012 i. e. order was passed after almost 2 years and 8
months.
40. In my view, even if the contention of Mr. Takke is to be
accepted then the respondent no.2 ought to have passed the
final order within a “reasonable period”. The impugned order
is passed on 14 August 2012 which after 2 years 8 months
from 2 December 2009 being expiry of six years period which
is beyond reasonable period of 2 years as observed by me
above and therefore even on this count, the order is beyond
limitation.
41. I have not been shown any judgment by the
respondents in support of their submissions except the
decision of this Court in the case of Hillside Construction
Company Private Limited (supra). The said decision only
records that notice under Section 53A was issued within 6
years and the proceedings were therefore initiated within 6
years. The issue whether the order under Section 53A(1)
ought to be passed within a period of 6 years or not does not
appear to be an issue before the Court or atleast same cannot
be ascertained from the order and therefore, this decision is
not applicable.
42. After the hearing in the morning session to give an
opportunity, to the counsel for respondents the matter was
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kept in the afternoon session for bringing to the notice of the
Court any decision on this issue. In the afternoon session,
the respondents informed the Court that there are no
judgments on the issue under consideration of this Court or
any other Court.
43. I also note that respondents have issued notices
under Section 53A of the Stamp Act on 14 November 2011
and 29 February 2012. These notices are admittedly after a
period of 6 years and therefore, cannot revive a dead cause
which on the basis of respondents submissions itself expired
on 2 December 2009. Therefore, for the purpose of present
adjudication, I have taken first notice issued on 2 March 2007
under Section 53A(1) of the Act.
44. To conclude, looked from any angle, either by
accepting the submissions on limitation made by the
petitioner or by the respondents, the impugned order dated
14 August 2012 cannot be said to have been passed within
the limitation period of 6 years provided under Section
53A(1) of the Stamp Act nor within reasonable period from
the issue of notice under Section 53A(1) or within reasonable
time from the expiry of the 6 years period. Therefore, on this
short ground of limitation, the impugned orders dated 14
August 2012 and 21 August 2015 are quashed and set aside.
45. Since the impugned orders are quashed on the
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ground of limitation the submission made on valuation aspect
does not survive and is left open to be considered in an
appropriate case.
46. Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and
(a1). Rule is made absolute in the above terms.
47. By our order dated 18 March 2018, interim reliefs
were granted on the condition that the petitioner would
deposit 50% of the demanded amount with the Prothonotary
and Senior Master and same shall be invested in Fixed
Deposit. Since I have quashed the impugned orders,
consequently the petitioner is entitled to the refund of the
amount, if any, deposited alongwith the interest accrued, if
any, thereon. The Prothonotary and Senior Master is directed
to refund the said amount, if deposited, alongwith accrued
interest, if any, after a period of 4 weeks from the date of
uploading of the present order.
48. In the course of the hearing, the Court pointed to
the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that various
notices issued under Section 53A by the respondent has
neither been referred nor enclosed in the petition although
the petitioner has raised ground of limitation. These notices
were annexed by the respondent in their reply. Learned
counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the ground of
limitation was based on the date of final order and the date
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of adjudication and since both the documents in connection
therewith were referred to and annexed with the petition, the
petitioners may have inadvertently not referred to various
notices. I have considered the said submissions. Although, the
submission of limitation was based on the said two
documents, but for the sake of complete disclosure, the
petitioners ought to have referred to and annexed various
notices. Therefore, in my view there may not be intentional
suppression but the fact of suppression cannot be ruled out.
In the light of this fact, the petitioner is directed to donate a
sum of Rs.50,000/- to Tata Memorial Hospital, Parel within a
period of 2 weeks from the date of uploading of the present
order.
49. Petition is allowed. No order as to cost.
(Jitendra Jain, J)
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