Telangana High Court
Spunklane Media Private Limited And 8 … vs Megha Engineering And Infrastructure … on 28 May, 2025
Author: T. Vinod Kumar
Bench: T.Vinod Kumar, P.Sree Sudha
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. VINOD KUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE P. SREE SUDHA
C.M.A. Nos. 22, 45 and 51 of 2023
COMMON JUDGMENT:
(Per Hon’ble Sri Justice T. Vinod
Kumar)
These Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are directed against
the order dated 02.12.2022 passed in I.A.No.1623 of 2022 and in
O.S. No. 510 of 2022 on the file of the III Additional District
Judge-Cum- II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge-Cum-
Principal Family Judge, Medchal Malkajgiri District, At
Kukatpally.
2. Heard Sri A. Chandra Sekhar, Sri T. Rajani Kanth Reddy
and Sri Sai Sanjay Suraneni, learned counsels for the appellants
and Senior Counsel Sri K.V. Bhanu Prasad appearing on behalf
of Sri V. Seetha Rama Avadhani learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondents, and perused the record.
3. Since, all the three Appeals arise out of the same order in
the underlying Interlocutory application and the suit, these
Appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment.
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4. The appellants herein are defendants in the suit filed by the
respondent No.1 herein as plaintiff vide O.S. No. 510 of 2022 for
recovery of damages for defamation and mandatory injunction.
5. The respondent No.1 herein, had filed an Interlocutory
Application vide I.A.No.1623 of 2022 under Order 39 Rule 1 and
2 CPC r/w Section 151 of CPC in the above said suit to restrain
the appellants or their representatives, employees, agents, or any
one acting on their behalf from publishing, circulating,
spreading, advertising, exhibiting, screening, uploading,
transmitting, broadcasting, relaying, or otherwise communicating
to public, either by electronic, visual, verbal, media, reports,
publications, films, Compact Discs, Pen Drives, or other
electronic gadgets, devices, web magazines, journals, motion
pictures, caricatures, etc., containing libelous, slanderous and
defamatory contents. against the respondent No.1 and its
management.
6. The trial Court vide order dated. 02.12.2022, while ordering
notice to the appellants, had granted ad-interim ex parte
injunction in favour of the respondent No.1.
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7. Being aggrieved by the said order of the trial Court, the
appellants have filed the present Appeals.
8. The appellants contend that the impugned order dated.
02.12.2022 passed by the trial court is a ‘gag’ order inasmuch as
the said order is in violation of article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution of India. The Constitutional courts had time and
again emphasized that a ‘gag’ order amounts to throttling the
neck of the media and imposes an unconstitutional prior
restraint. Furthermore, the press is justified in telecasting,
publishing, printing the truth in the interest of public which are
carried in good faith and with bonafide intention and the same
can’t be curtailed.
9. Appellants further contend that the impugned order is in
violation of principles of natural justice, particularly the principle
of “audi alterm Partem” as the said order was passed without
giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellants. The appellants
further contend that the respondent No.1 had suppressed the fact
that O.S. No. 8 of 2022 which was filed for similar reliefs,
against the similar publications is pending adjudication before
the I Additional District Judge at Khammam.The trial Court had
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failed to appreciate the aforesaid fact while granting ad-interim
ex parte injunction in favour of the respondent No.1.
10. The appellants further contend that the freedom of press, as
enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India can be
restricted by an individual or the State including the courts solely
for the purposes mentioned in Article 19(2) and the restriction
must be justified. The impugned order is a pre-publication or
Pre-telecast injunction which in turn do not come within the
purposes mentioned in Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
11. Per contra, respondent No.1 contend that the respondent
No.1 herein is an Engineering and Infrastructure company,
having project profile all over the country and also executed few
projects abroad.
12. The respondent No.1 contend that they have been subjected
to a series of defamatory publications by the appellants, alleging
their involvement in financial misconduct and political dealings.
These publications have significantly tarnished the reputation
and business standing of respondent No.1. The respondent No.1
further contend that the appellants published an item on
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27.01.2022, stating that the respondent No.1 company has
funded the marriage of a senior IAS officer’s daughter and
respondent No.1 was falsely linked to Big Wave Infra Pvt. Ltd.
In addition, on 01.02.2022, e-magazine of DISHA published that
the respondent No.1 expanded its business nationally by
providing election funds amounting to Rupees 27 crores to BJP,
alleging a ‘quid pro quo’ arrangement.
13. The respondent No.1 further contend that on 02.02.2022 e-
magazine of Toli Velugu, published the defamatory statements
accompanied by the photographs of managing director of
respondent No.1 alongside a senior IAS officer. These
publications continued over several months, reiterating the
allegations of bribery and political favouritism against the
respondent No.1.
14. The Respondent No.1 contend that on 26.04.2022 and
27.04.2022, the appellants published articles in the Toli Velugu
e-magazine and e-paper, respectively, under the caption “Badipy
Avineethi Meghalu,” pertaining to the “Mana Ooru-Mana Badi”
project. These publications alleged that Respondent No.1 and its
6management was involved in a significant scam related to the
above said project.
15. The respondent No.1 herein filed a suit vide O.S. No. 8 of
2022 for permanent injunction against the defamatory
statements, published and circulated by appellants, on the file of
District Judge, Khammam and the same is pending adjudication.
16. The respondent No.1 contend that the trial court had rightly
granted an ad-interim ex parte injunction order inasmuch as the
respondent No.1 had established all the three essentials needed
for granting an injunction i.e. the prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable injury in his favour.
17. We have taken note of the respective contentions urged.
18. At the Outset, it is to be noted that as per Order XXXIX
Rule 3, any court while granting ad-interim ex parte injunction
order without issuing notice to the opposite party shall record
reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction
would be defeated by delay. Any person being aggrieved by such
order, cannot approach the appellate or revisional Court straight
away and is required to avail the remedies provided under the
7Order 39, of the Code of Civil Procedure, itself. In the instant
case the appellants preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous
Appeal without availing the alternative remedy provided under
19. Though, the appellants had not taken any steps before the
court below to get the said order vacated, vary, set aside or
discharge, this Court is of the view that the present Civil
Miscellaneous Appeals are liable to be allowed inasmuch as the
impugned order is contrary to the Order XXXIX Rule 3 proviso
and Rule 3A of C.P.C. It would be apt and appropriate to refer
Provisio to Order XXXIX Rule 3, which reads as follows:
Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without
giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the court shall
record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the
injunction would be defeated by delay….
It is also pertinent to note that the impugned order was passed
without specifying any time within which time the
appellants/respondents are required to take steps to get the same
vacated. Therefore, the said order also takes away the right of the
appellants to file counter, which the court is required to consider
8within 30 days from the date of granting initial injunction under
Order XXXIX Rule 3A.
20. The Apex Court in the case of A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v.
S. Chellappan1 dealing with appeals filed under Order 43 rule 1
(r) of C.P.C directly before the High Court observed as under:
From a reading of the said judgment, it appears to our mind that it
is only an extraordinary circumstance under which the aggrieved
person can prefer an appeal against an ad interim injunction order.
But, as a matter of course, the aggrieved person cannot approach
the appellate or revisional Court during the pendency of the
application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. It was a
case where an application to vacate an ad interim injunction was
filed and as the said application to vacate the same, was not
disposed of within the stipulated time under the provisions of Order
39, Rule 3A C.P.C., the parties therein approached the Appellate
Court and, in that context, the Supreme Court has held that an
appeal is maintainable. But, however, it impliedly cautioned that in
the normal course, the aggrieved party cannot approach the
appellate or revisional Court during the pendency of the application
for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. It is only when there
is an inaction on the part of the Courts in following the mandate
provisions, then only the aggrieved party can approach the
Appellate Court.
So, it is clear that though an appeal is maintainable, such an appeal
should be filed only in an extraordinary circumstance under which
the party is able to explain as to why he prefers an appeal in the
High Court instead of choosing to file a petition to vacate the ad
1
(2000) 7 SCC 695
9interim injunction. Even in case of appeal against an ad interim
injunction, the appellate Court will not be bound to apply its mind to
all the contentions, which the Original Court is bound to consider
on the case shown by the party affected by ad interim order.
The immediate remedy that is available to the opposite party in case
of issuing temporary injunction without issuing notice, is under the
provisions of Order 39, Rule 4 C.P.C which enables the Original
Court to vary or set aside or discharge the ex parte order. In the
light of the above provisions and also the legal propositions, no
appeal lies, as a matter of course, against an ex parte order, except
in extraordinary circumstances or the rarest of the rare cases where
the order is perverse or bias or suffers from lack of jurisdiction, but
it is not the case of the petitioner.
21. Considering the ad-interim ex-parte injunction passed in the
present case, it is not only unreasoned but also does not specify
the time period during which it would be in force, before the
respondent causing their appearance in the matter, passing of the
said order is contrary to the mandate under C.P.C and is thus
impermissible.
22. The Supreme Court in Morgans Stanley Mutual Fund v.
Kartick Das 2, had laid down the salient principles which every
court in India must follow, before granting ex parte ad interim
injunction:
2
(1994) 4 SCC 225
10“As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted only under
exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh with the
court in the grant of ex parte injunction are:
(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the
plaintiff;
(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater
injustice than the grant of it would involve;
(c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first
had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper
order against a party in his absence is prevented;
(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for
some time and in such circumstances, it will not grant ex parte
injunction;
(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte injunction to
show utmost good faith in making the application.
(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a limited
period of time.
(g) General principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience
and irreparable loss would also be considered by the court.”
23. In the instant case the trial Court has granted an ad-interim
ex parte injunction in favour of respondent No.1 restraining the
appellants from publishing, circulating, advertising, uploading,
transmitting or broadcasting any derogatory statements, libelous
or defamatory statements by any means against the respondent
No.1. It is to be noted that the nature of the impugned order
passed
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by the trial Court amounts to a ‘GAG’ order. A gag order refers
to judicial or executive action that prohibits individuals from
expressing or making any public statements. While gag orders
are recognized as a tool to maintain the integrity of legal
proceedings, their application should be scrutinized. The Courts
must ensure that ‘gag’ orders are necessary, proportionate, and
do not infringe upon constitutional rights, particularly the
fundamental right to free speech. Furthermore, the fundamental
rights can only be curtailed in accordance with Article 19(2) of
the Constitution of India.
24. The Apex Court in the case of Romesh Thappar V. State of
Madras 3 has held as follows:
“12. We are therefore of the opinion that unless a law restricting
freedom of speech and expression is directed solely against the
undermining of the security of the State or the overthrow of it, such
law cannot fall within the reservation under clause (2) of Article 19,
although the restrictions which it seeks to impose may have been
conceived generally in the interests of public order. It follows that
Section 9(1-A) which authorises imposition of restrictions for the
wider purpose of securing public safety or the maintenance of public
order falls outside the scope of authorised restrictions under clause
(2), and is therefore void and unconstitutional.”
3
AIR 1950 SC 124
12
25. The gag orders or order of restraint or injunction should be
passed only when it is necessary to prevent substantial risk, to
fairness of a trial. In the absence of any such substantial risk the
Court cannot pass any restraint or gag order. (See: S. Basavaraj
vs. Bar Council of India and Ors)4
26. The Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Zubair v. State (NCT
of Delhi)5 has held as follows:
34. Merely because the complaints filed against the petitioner arise
from posts that were made by him on a social media platform, a
blanket anticipatory order preventing him from tweeting cannot be
made. A blanket order directing the petitioner to not express his
opinion–an opinion that he is rightfully entitled to hold as an active
participating citizen — would be disproportionate to the purpose of
imposing conditions on bail. The imposition of such a condition
would tantamount to a gag order against the petitioner. Gag orders
have a chilling effect on the freedom of speech. According to the
petitioner, he is a journalist who is the co-founder of a fact checking
website and he uses Twitter as a medium of communication to dispel
false news and misinformation in this age of morphed images,
clickbait, and tailored videos. Passing an order restricting him from
posting on social media would amount to an unjustified violation of
the freedom of speech and expression, and the freedom to practice
his profession.
4
2024 SCC OnLine Kar 104
5
2023 16 SCC 764
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27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Imran Pratapgadhi Vs.
State of Gujarat 6 highlighted the importance of freedom of
expression and the duty of the courts to uphold such freedom and
observed as follows:
38. Free expression of thoughts and views by individuals or groups
of individuals is an integral part of a healthy, civilised society.
Without freedom of expression of thoughts and views, it is
impossible to lead a dignified life guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution. In a healthy democracy, the views, opinions or
thoughts expressed by an individual or group of individuals must be
countered by expressing another point of view. Even if a large
number of persons dislike the views expressed by another, the right
of the person to express the views must be respected and protected.
Literature including poetry, dramas, films, stage shows, satire and
art, make the life of human beings more meaningful. The Courts are
duty-bound to uphold and enforce fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution of India. Sometimes, we, the Judges, may not
like spoken or written words. But, still, it is our duty to uphold the
fundamental right under Article 19 (1)(a). We Judges are also under
an obligation to uphold the Constitution and respect its ideals. If the
police or executive fail to honour and protect the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, it is the duty
of the Courts to step in and protect the fundamental rights. There is
no other institution which can uphold the fundamental rights of the
citizens.
6
2025 SCC OnLine SC 678
14
28. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court in Wikimedia
Foundation Inc v. Ani Media Private Limited & Ors7, observed
that:
30. …. However, those who offer criticism should remember that
Judges cannot respond to such criticism but if a publication
scandalizes the court or a Judge or Judges and if a case of contempt
is made out, as highlighted by Justice Iyer in the sixth principle,
certainly, courts should take action. But it is not the duty of the
court to tell the media: delete this, take that down.
29. It is to be noted that the words “freedom of speech and
expression” must, therefore, be broadly construed to include the
freedom to circulate one’s views by words of mouth or in writing
or through audio-visual instrumentalities. Therefore, it includes
the right to propagate one’s views through the print media or any
other communication channel, e.g. the radio and the television. It
is obvious that subject to reasonable restrictions placed under
Article 19(2), a citizen has a right to publish, circulate and
disseminate his views and any attempt to thwart or deny the
same would offend Article 19(1)(a). (See: LIC v. Manubhai D.
Shah (Prof.)8
7
2025 INSC 656
8
(1992) 3 SCC 637
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30. Further, the respondent No.1 being aggrieved by the
defamatory publications made by the appellants dated.
27.01.2022, 28.01.2022, 29.01.2022, 01.02.2022, 02.02.2022,
26.04.2022, 27.04.2022, 03.05.2022, 18.5.2022, 27.5.2022,
28.05.2022, 12.09.2022, and 14.09.2022, filed a suit for recovery
of damages for defamation and mandatory injunction vide O.S.
No. 510 of 2022 on 02.12.2022. Upon examination of the
aforementioned series of publications, it becomes evident that
Respondent No.1 filed the suit for damages pertaining to the
alleged defamatory content nearly a year after to the initial
publication. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that Respondent
No.1 opted to file a suit for recovery of damages for defamation,
rather than a Suit for defamation, which specifically addresses
the defamation.
31. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above, the order
dated. 02.12.2022 passed by the trial Court in the underlying
interlocutory Application is a ‘gag’ Order inasmuch as the
impugned order scuttles the throat of the press i.e. the appellants.
The Supreme Court in various instances had underscored the
protection of media freedom by opposing passing of gag orders.
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A gag order can only be passed when there is a substantial risk to
national security and to fairness of trial. Any restriction on the
right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a)
must strictly conform to the grounds enumerated in Article 19(2)
of the Constitution.
32. Further, the Respondent No. 1 while filing the present Suit
vide O.S. No. 510 of 2022 had deliberately suppressed it having
filed another suit earlier vide O.S. No. 8 of 2022, on the file of I
Additional District Judge, Khammam, in which the respondent
No.1 had sought similar reliefs against similar publications and
the said suit is pending adjudication. The above action of
suppression by respondent no. 1 amounts to a clear abuse of the
process of law and since, in the present instance, the ad-interim
injunction was granted without adhering to the established legal
principles that courts are mandated to follow before issuing such
ex parte orders, this Court is of the view that the order dated.
02.12.2022 in I.A. No. 1623 of 2022 in O.S. No. 510 of 2022
cannot be sustained.
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33. Resultantly, these Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are allowed
in terms of the above observations. The impugned order of the
trial Court dated. 02.12.2022 is set-aside. No order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any shall
stand closed.
____________________
T. VINOD KUMAR, J
___________________
P. SREE SUDHA, J
Date: 28.05.2025
Mrkr/Vsv