Sri B K Kishore Kumar vs The State Of Karnataka on 10 March, 2025

Date:

Karnataka High Court

Sri B K Kishore Kumar vs The State Of Karnataka on 10 March, 2025

Author: K.Somashekar

Bench: K.Somashekar

                                                 -1-                              R
                                                           WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
                                                       C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024



                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                             DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025

                                             PRESENT
                              THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.SOMASHEKAR
                                                 AND
                            THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
                            WRIT PETITION NO.25080 OF 2023 (S-KSAT)
                                                 C/W
                            WRIT PETITION NO.18983 OF 2024 (S-KSAT)


                   IN WP NO.25080 OF 2023

                   BETWEEN:

                        SRI KISHORE KUMAR B.K.
                        S/O. B.M. KRISHNAPPA
                        AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
                        RESIDING AT #49
                        'BHUVANESWARI NILAYA'
                        BASAVANAPURA
Digitally signed        BENGALURU-560 083.
by SUMATHY
KANNAN                                                              ...PETITIONER
Location: HIGH
COURT OF                (BY SRI PRITHVEESH M.K., ADVOCATE)
KARNATAKA
                   AND:

                   1.   STATE OF KARNATAKA
                        REPRESENTED BY
                        ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY
                        HOME DEPARTMENT
                        ALSO KNOWN AS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
                        MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
                        ROOM NO.222
                        VIDHANA SOUDHA
                        BENGALURU-560 001.

                   2.   DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
                        STATE OF KARNATAKA
                        OFFICE OF DG AND IGP
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                                  C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024



     NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
     BENGALURU-560 001.

3.   INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
     CENTRAL RANGE
     OFFICE OF IGP
     NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
     BENGALURU-560 001.

4.   ADDITIONAL DGP CUM
     DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY
     INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION
     OFFICE OF ADGP-ISD
     NO.60, RICHMOND CIRCLE
     BENGALURU-560 025.

5.   SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
     INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION
     OFFICE OF ADGP-ISD
     NO.60, RICHMOND CIRCLE
     BENGALURU-560 025.

6.   SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
     BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT
     OFFICE OF SP, BENGALURU RURAL
     CHANDRIKA HOTEL CIRCLE
     VASANTH NAGAR
     BENGALURU-560 052.

                                             ...RESPONDENTS

     (BY SRI VIKAS ROJIPURA, AGA FOR RESPONDENTS)

                                  ***

     THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OR SUCH OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION QUASHING
ORDER OF SUSPENSION BEARING NO.PERSONNEL-4/34/ISD/2022-
23 DATED 15.10.2022 ISSUED BY ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF POLICE, INTERNAL SECURITY WING, NO.60 RICHMOND ROAD,
BENGALURU, RESPONDENT NO.4 VIDE ANNEXURE A AND THE
ORDER DATED 11.09.2023 PASSED BY KSAT IN APPLICATION
NO.3106 OF 2023 VIDE ANNEXURE B AND SUCH OTHER RELIEF AS A
CONSEQUENCE THEREOF, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.
                              -3-
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                                   C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024



IN WP NO.18983 OF 2024
BETWEEN:

     SRI B.K. KISHORE KUMAR
     S/O. B.M. KRISHNAPPA
     AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
     WORKING AS INSPECTOR OF POLICE
     INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION (ISD)
     BENGALURU
     RESIDING AT NO.99
     'BHUVANESHWARI NILAYA'
     BASAVANAPURA
     BANNERGHATTA ROAD
     GOTTIGERE POST
     BENGALURU-560 083.
                                                ...PETITIONER
     (BY SRI PRITHVEESH M.K., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.   THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
     REPRESENTED BY ITS
     ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY
     HOME DEPARTMENT
     VIDHANA SOUDHA
     BENGALURU-560 001.

2.   THE DIRECTOR GENERAL AND
     INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
     NO.2, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
     BENGALURU-560 001.

3.   THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
     AND ENQUIRY OFFICER
     OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
     GENERAL OF POLICE
     HEAD OFFICE
     BENGALURU-560 009.
                                              ...RESPONDENTS

     (BY SRI VIKAS ROJIPURA, AGA FOR RESPONDENTS)

                                   ***
                              -4-
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                                   C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024



      THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 20.06.2024 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE
KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU IN
APPLICATION    NO.5226     OF    2023   (ANNEXURE-A)    AND
CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE SAID APPLICATION NO.5226 OF 2023
AS PRAYED FOR BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE HON'BLE
TRIBUNAL (ANNEXURE-B) TO MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE.



     THESE WRIT PETITIONS, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 25.02.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, K. SOMASHEKAR J., PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:




CORAM:     HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.SOMASHEKAR
           and
           HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T


                      CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE K. SOMASHEKAR)

Since common questions of fact and that of law arise

for consideration in both these writ petitions, and the

petitions having been filed by the common petitioner, they

are taken up for hearing together and are disposed of by

this common order.

2. The present writ petitions are filed under Articles

226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with specific

prayers. W.P.No.25080/2023 is filed seeking to quash
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the order of suspension bearing No. Personnel-

4/34/ISD/2022-23 dated 15.10.2022 issued by the

Additional Director General of Police, Internal Security

Wing, and the order dated 11.09.2023 passed by the

Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (KSAT) in

Application No. 3106/2023 vide Annexure-“B”. The

petition in W.P.No.18983/2024 is filed seeking to set aside

the impugned order dated 20.06.2024 passed by KSAT in

Application No. 5226/2023, upholding the disciplinary

proceedings against the petitioner.

3. Heard the learned counsel Shri Prithveesh M.K for

the petitioner in both the petitions and the learned AGA

Shri Vikas Rojipura for the respondents and perused the

material available on record.

4. The Facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows:

The petitioner was initially appointed as a Sub-

Inspector of Police in the year 2003 and was subsequently

promoted to the rank of Inspector of Police in the year

2010. While discharging his duties at Attibele Police
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Station, he was arraigned as Accused No. 12 in Crime No.

356/2022, which was initially registered against other

individuals. The said FIR invoked various penal provisions

under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, including Sections

109, 409, 420, 421, 418, 423, 424, 465, 467, 468, 471,

and 120B read with Section 34 IPC, along with Sections 8

and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

5. Consequent to the registration of the FIR, the

Additional Director General of Police / Respondent No. 4 in

W.P.No.25080/2023, issued an order dated 15.10.2022,

placing the petitioner under suspension. The said order,

however, did not attribute any specific act of misconduct

under the provisions of the Karnataka State Police

(Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter

referred to as ‘the DP Rules, 1965’, for short). Aggrieved

by his suspension, the petitioner is said to have preferred

Application No. 3106/2023 before the Karnataka State

Administrative Tribunal (KSAT). The KSAT, vide order

dated 11.09.2023, dismissed the said application and

upheld the suspension without rendering any findings as to
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whether the petitioner’s alleged actions constituted

misconduct under the DP Rules, 1965 or not.

6. Parallely, it is stated that the petitioner assailed

the criminal proceedings before the Hon’ble High Court of

Karnataka in W.P. No. 2071/2023, invoking its jurisdiction

under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India

read with Section 482 Cr.PC. By an order dated

05.10.2023, a learned Single Judge of this Court quashed

the FIR, charge sheet, and cognizance order, inter alia, on

the ground that there were procedural infirmities,

including the failure to conduct a proper investigation

regarding the Lodha Committee’s approval for the

alienation of properties and the absence of requisite

sanction for prosecution.

7. The Lodha Committee had been constituted by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court to oversee matters pertaining to

Pearls Agrotech Corporation Ltd. (PACL), a company

alleged to have defrauded approximately 5.5 crore

investors of a sum of 49,000 crores. The Supreme Court
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had explicitly restrained the sale or disposal of PACL-linked

properties without the Committee’s prior approval. It was

the allegation of the respondents that the petitioner, along

with other accused persons in Crime No. 352/2022, had

facilitated unauthorized sale transactions of these

properties, thereby deriving wrongful personal gain, which

was in violation of Rule 97-A of the Karnataka Civil

Services Rules. Additionally, it is the case of the

respondents that the petitioner had threatened the

complainant Sri Shridhar, who had filed the initial

complaint, and that the petitioner remained unauthorizedly

absent from duty for the period between 01.10.2022 to

31.10.2022, despite repeated attempts by his superiors to

contact him.

8. It is stated that pursuant to the aforementioned

allegations, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against

the petitioner under the DP Rules, 1965. The respondents

maintained that the petitioner’s suspension was warranted

under Rule 5 of the DP Rules, 1965, which permits

suspension when disciplinary proceedings are
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contemplated or when a criminal case is under

investigation or trial. Further, the respondents have taken

the position that departmental proceedings are

independent of criminal proceedings and that such

proceedings can proceed irrespective of the quashing of

the criminal case.

9. In the meanwhile, it is significant to note that the

Disciplinary Committee (2nd Respondent) appointed

Inquiry Officer (3rd Respondent) through the order dated

17.03.2023 to issue Articles of Charge and to conduct

inquiry against the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner was

issued Articles of Charge by the Inquiry Officer himself,

and not by the Disciplinary Authority, as required under

the DP Rules, 1965. The petitioner, in response, submitted

a detailed reply dated 17.04.2023, categorically refuting

all allegations. However, despite his representation, the 3rd

Respondent / Inquiry officer, proceeded with the

disciplinary inquiry and recorded the petitioner’s First Oral

Statement without considering his response.

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10. Challenging the order appointing the Inquiry

Officer and the issuance of the Articles of Charge, the

petitioner approached the Hon’ble Tribunal in Application

No. 5226/2023. The matter was taken up for consideration

on 14.12.2023, and the Tribunal was pleased to grant an

interim order staying both the order dated 17.03.2023,

whereby the Inquiry Officer was appointed, as well as the

Articles of Charge dated 05.04.2023. Subsequently, on

03.04.2024, the State filed its reply, wherein it was

reiterated that liberty be granted to issue a fresh charge

memo under Rule 6(2) of the DP Rules, 1965, by the

Disciplinary Authority (2nd Respondent). Upon hearing the

arguments advanced by both sides on 28.05.2024,

Tribunal reserved the matter for orders and, subsequently,

vide order dated 20.06.2024, dismissed the petitioner’s

application, upholding the disciplinary proceedings.

11. Aggrieved by the order dated 20.06.2024, the

petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court by filing the

present Writ Petitions, namely:

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● W.P. No. 25080/2023, challenging the order dated

11.09.2023 in Application No. 3106/2023, whereby

the Hon’ble Tribunal upheld the suspension order;

and

● W.P. No. 18983/2024, challenging the order dated

20.06.2024 in Application No. 5226/2023, which

upheld the validity of the disciplinary proceedings

against the petitioner.

The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of

this Hon’ble Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India, seeking appropriate relief against the

arbitrary and procedurally flawed actions of the

respondents.

12. The learned counsel Sri Prithveesh M.K for the

petitioner, submits that the Karnataka State

Administrative Tribunal (KSAT) has erroneously

interpreted the jurisdictional provisions and delegation of

authority, leading to an illegal and unsustainable order.

That the impugned order (Annexure-“A”) is devoid of any

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reasoning regarding the petitioner’s conduct under the

Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules,

1965. Instead, the order solely relies on the fact that an

FIR was registered, where the petitioner was later added

as Accused No. 12. It is contended that this mere filing of

an FIR, which was subsequently quashed, does not

constitute legal evidence to justify the petitioner’s

suspension. Due to this lack of legal basis, he contends

that the impugned order is liable to be quashed.

13. The learned counsel for the petitioner asserts

that the inclusion of the petitioner’s name as an accused in

the said proceedings was unwarranted and legally

unsustainable, as the mandatory sanction under Section

197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for

prosecuting a public servant, was not obtained.

14. The learned counsel further contends that Rule 5

of the DP Rules, 1965, permits the Government or the

appointing authority to place a police officer under

suspension in two situations:

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1 a) When disciplinary proceedings are contemplated

or pending

1(b) When a criminal case against the officer is

under investigation or trial.

In the present cases, Clause (a) is not satisfied, as no

valid disciplinary proceedings were contemplated at the

time of suspension. As for Clause (b), the FIR and the

entire criminal case, which formed the basis for the

petitioner’s suspension, has been quashed by the order of

a learned Single Judge of this Court. Consequently, the

order of suspension cannot stand on a legally invalidated

foundation and is liable to be quashed.

15. In support of his case, the learned counsel for the

petitioner relies on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the case of Union of India & Others v. Ashok

Kumar Agarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147, which holds that:

“An order of suspension must be based on valid
considerations, and mere reliance on a criminal
case, without due application of mind, cannot
justify suspension.”

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16. It is contended that this principle squarely applies

to the case on hand, as the Department had issued the

suspension order solely based on the filing of a criminal

case, which has now been quashed. Since the very basis

of issuing the suspension order is no longer in existence,

the said order is legally unsustainable.

17. Insofar as the petitioner in WP No. 18983/2024,

the learned counsel Shri Prithveesh M.K. contends that the

primary challenge is against the order dated 17.03.2023,

appointing the Inquiry Officer, and the subsequent Articles

of Charge dated 05.04.2023, which were issued by the

Inquiry Officer himself, rather than the Disciplinary

Authority, as required under Rule 6(2) of the Karnataka

State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1965. He

contends that the Rules, 1965, specifically mandates that

only the Disciplinary Authority or a specially empowered

authority can issue Articles of Charge. However, in the

present case, the Inquiry Officer, who is expected to be

fair, impartial, and ought to act as a quasi-judicial

authority, has assumed the role of the prosecutor by

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framing the Articles of Charge, thereby vitiating the entire

disciplinary process.

18. It is further contended that the Tribunal has

erroneously presumed that the order dated 17.03.2023

delegated the power to the Inquiry Officer to issue Articles

of Charge. However, a plain reading of the said order does

not indicate any such delegation under Rule 6(2) of the

Rules, 1965. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

Rashmi Metalicks Ltd. v. Kolkata Metropolitan

Development Authority, (2013) 10 SCC 95, relying

upon the principle laid down in the case of Mohinder

Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, ((1978) 1

SCC 405)), has categorically held thus:

“16. The following observations found in the
celebrated decision in Mohinder Singh Gill v.
Chief Election Commr.
[(1978) 1 SCC 405 AIR
1978 SC 851] are relevant to this question:

“8. The second equally relevant matter is that
when a statutory functionary makes an order
based on certain grounds, its validity must be
judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot

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be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of
affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in
the beginning may, by the time it comes to court
on account of a challenge, get validated by
additional grounds later brought out. We may
here draw attention to the observations of Bose,
J. in Gordhandas Bhanji [Commr. of Police v.
Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16]:

‘9…. public orders, publicly made, in exercise of
a statutory authority cannot be construed in the
light of explanations subsequently given by the
officer making the order of what he meant, or of
what was in his mind, or what he intended to do.
Public orders made by public authorities are
meant to have public effect and are intended to
affect the actings and conduct of those to whom
they are addressed and must be construed
objectively with reference to the language used in
the order itself.’

19. It is contended that the Respondents themselves,

in their Reply Statement at Para Nos.5, 8, 9, and 12, have

admitted that the Articles of Charge were issued without

jurisdiction and sought liberty to issue fresh Articles of

Charge through the Disciplinary Authority. Despite this,

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the Tribunal unilaterally assigned its own reasoning to

justify the legality of the Articles of Charge, which is

wholly impermissible in law.

20. The learned counsel further places reliance on the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

B.V. Gopinath v. Union of India, (2014) 1 SCC 351,

wherein it was held thus:

“52. In our opinion, the submission of the learned
Additional Solicitor General is not factually
correct. The primary submission of the
respondent was that the charge-sheet not having
been issued by the disciplinary authority is
without authority of law and, therefore, non est
in the eye of the law. This plea of the respondent
has been accepted by CAT as also by the High
Court. The action has been taken against the
respondent in Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules
which enjoins the disciplinary authority to draw
up or cause to be drawn up the substance of
imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into
definite and distinct articles of charges. The term
“cause to be drawn up” does not mean that the
definite and distinct articles of charges once

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drawn up do not have to be approved by the
disciplinary authority. The term “cause to be
drawn up” merely refers to a delegation by the
disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority
to perform the task of drawing up substance of
proposed “definite and distinct articles of charge-
sheet”. These proposed articles of charge would
only be finalised upon approval by the disciplinary
authority. Undoubtedly, this Court in P.V.
Srinivasa Sastry v. CAG
[(1993) 1 SCC 419:

1993 SCC (L&S) 206: (1993) 23 ATC 645] has
held that Article 311(1) does not say that even
the departmental proceeding must be initiated
only by the appointing authority. However, at the
same time it is pointed out that: (SCC p. 422,
para 4) “4…. However, it is open to the Union of
India or a State Government to make any rule
prescribing that even the proceeding against any
delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer
not subordinate to the appointing authority.”

21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court elaborated on the

requirement under Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules,

which enjoins the Disciplinary Authority to either draw up

or cause to be drawn up the Articles of Charge. The Court

held that even when delegation occurs, the final approval

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must still come from the Disciplinary Authority, which is

absent in the present case.

22. It is the further contention of the learned counsel

that the Tribunal has misplaced its reliance in the case of

R.S. Mahadevappa v. State of Karnataka & Ors., W.P.

No. 23204/2024 (Judgment dated 01.02.2024) to reject

the petitioner’s contention regarding jurisdiction. In fact,

the said judgment supports the petitioner’s case as it

holds that:

“4….

a) The object of a Departmental Inquiry is to find
out whether the delinquent is guilty of
misconduct under the conduct rules for the
purpose of determining whether he should be
penalized. This has to happen in accordance with
the rules that obtain in the department
concerned. No employee can be proceeded
against contrary to the extant rules. The
competent authority should constitute the
enquiry; it is the competent authority who should
frame the Charge Memo; unless authorized, he
cannot delegate his powers to others. The

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proceedings should be held in accordance with
the principles of natural justice, although strict
rules of evidence are not applicable. These are
the basic tenets of disciplinary proceedings.
Mr.Nargund, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for
the Petitioner is right in arguing that the
provisions of Rule 6 of the 1965 Rules empower
only the Disciplinary Authority to frame the
Charge Memo, on the basis of which the
departmental proceedings could have been
conducted by the Enquiry Officer.

b) Rule 6 of the 1965 Rules has the following
text:

“6. Procedure for imposing major penalties.-

(1) No order imposing on a Police Officer any
penalty specified in sub-clauses (i), (ii), (iii) or

(iv) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 23
shall be passed except after an inquiry held, as
far as may be, in the manner hereinafter
provided.

(2) The Disciplinary Authority or any authority
empowered by it in this behalf (hereinafter in this
rule referred to as ‘specially empowered
authority’) shall frame definite charges on the
basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is

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proposed to be held. Such charges, together,
with a statement of the allegations on which they
are based, shall be communicated in writing to
the Police Officer and he shall be required to
submit, within such time as may be specified by
the Disciplinary Authority or the specially
empowered authority, a written statement of his
defence and also to state whether he desires to
be heard in person.”

23. It is not in dispute that the disciplinary

proceedings had the thrust of major penalties and

therefore, apparently Rule 6 would come into play. The

language of Rule 6(2) leaves no manner of doubt that it is

the Disciplinary Authority who has to frame the Charge

Memo. However, if he wants to delegate the same, he

ought to do it by a specific order, whereupon the other

authority can do it. However, such a delegation by the

Disciplinary Authority, is not forthcoming from the record

of proceedings. Merely directing the holding of disciplinary

inquiry, would not satisfy this requirement.

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24. The contention of learned AGA that the above

ground was not taken up before the Tribunal or the

authorities concerned, would not come to the rescue of

respondents inasmuch as it is a pure question of law which

is attracted to the facts borne out by record. It is a point

that goes to root of the matter and therefore, it is not

possible to assume the waiver. It hardly needs to be stated

that when law prescribes a particular procedure for doing a

particular thing, it has to be done only as prescribed and

not otherwise. That apart, competence cannot be

conferred by consent or waiver. Thus, the Tribunal’s

reliance on R.S. Mahadevappa (supra) is misconceived, as

the judgment reaffirms that the Disciplinary Authority

alone is competent to issue Articles of Charge, and

delegation of such power must be made through a specific

order, which is absent in the present case.

25. The learned counsel further places reliance on the

judgment dated 07.06.2021 of this Court in the case of

Smt. SHASHIKALA M. -V/s- STATE OF KARNATAKA in

Writ Petition No. 1360/2018, wherein it was held that

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under the very Rules of 1965 itself, it has been

categorically held that an Inquiry officer has no jurisdiction

to issue the Articles of Charge. The Tribunal has failed to

appreciate these contentions in its proper perspective and

therefore, even on this ground, the impugned Order is

liable to be set aside.

26. It is the further contention of the learned counsel

for the petitioner that the Tribunal had erred in holding

that the Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings)

Rules, 1965 do not require the issuance of Articles of

Charge before appointing an Inquiry Officer. Under Rule

6(2) and Rule 6(4) of the Rules, 1965, it is mandatory that

Articles of Charge be issued first, followed by the

appointment of the Inquiry Officer. However, in the

present case, the Inquiry Officer was appointed even

before the Articles of Charge were issued, indicating a

prejudged decision to conduct an inquiry without affording

an opportunity of fair hearing to the petitioner.

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27. The learned counsel has further relied on a

decision of this Court in the case of N.K. Nagaraja v.

State of Karnataka, (ILR 1979 (1) KAR 564), wherein

it was held that such an appointment before issuing a

charge memo, violates procedural fairness and natural

justice. Furthermore, the appointment of the Inquiry

Officer by designation instead of by name is contrary to

the Rules, making the proceedings legally unsustainable.

The petitioner, therefore, submits that the impugned

order, being in violation of procedural safeguards and

natural justice, is liable to be set aside.

28. The Learned counsel has further relied on a

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar, Delhi High Court,

(2015) 16 SCC 415, wherein it was held thus:

“Enquiry should be completed in the shortest
possible time and, at any rate, within 6 months.”

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29. Despite the Government of Karnataka’s Official

Memorandum dated 28.06.2001, which mandates that

disciplinary inquiries be completed within four months, the

present inquiry has been prolonged without justification,

thus adversely affecting the petitioner’s promotional

prospects.

30. The Learned counsel further relies on a judgement

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal v.

State of Rajasthan, (2024) 1 SCC 175, wherein it was

held thus:

“Disciplinary proceedings can be quashed if the
employee is fully acquitted after concluding that
the prosecution has failed to prove the charge.”

The learned counsel contends that since this Court has

quashed the criminal proceedings against the petitioner,

the disciplinary proceedings cannot be sustained in the

absence of independent material proving the misconduct.

31. It is the further contention of the learned counsel

for the petitioner that the Tribunal failed to recognize that

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

the charges do not constitute misconduct, as no finding on

this aspect was recorded. It is argued that without a

decision on the petitioner’s leave application, unauthorized

absence cannot be alleged against the petitioner, making

the charge baseless. In this regard, reliance is placed on a

judgment of this Court in the case of State of Karnataka

v. Dr. Sayeed A. S. (W.P. No. 211/2003, Order dated

07/09/2010), where this Court has held that absence

cannot be treated as unauthorized if the leave application

remains undecided. The learned counsel for the petitioner,

therefore, contends that the impugned order is legally

unsustainable. The relevant portion of said order reads

thus:

“8. It is clear on scrutiny of the material on record
that it is no doubt true that charges 2 and 3 pertain to
unauthorized absence of the applicant before the K.A.T.
the respondent herein for the period from 12.04.1991 to
24.04.1991, on 05.12.1991 and from 25.12.1991 to
31.01.1992. However, the fact that after joining the duty
after the period of absence, an application for grant of
leave was given along with medical certificate and the
said application has not been considered, is clearly

– 27 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

proved by the respondent herein as the petitioners have
not produced any material to show that his application for
grant of leave had been considered and rejected…XXX…..
In view of the above said facts, it cannot be disputed that
the application for sanction of leave for the period from
12.04.1991 to 24.04.1991, on 05.12.1991 and from
25.12.1991 to 31.01.1992 was pending consideration
before the leave sanctioning authority and unless the said
application is considered, no cause of action would arise
for the petitioners to frame charge of unauthorised
absence against the respondent herein…XXX… Since no
decision was taken on the application for sanction of
leave for the above said period of absence, in view of the
decision of this Court in the case of Dr. H. Jayamma’s
case (supra), wherein on similar facts, this Court has held
that in the absence of any decision on the leave
application filed for the period of absence, there is no
question of any unauthorized absence and charge framed
in that regard would be without any basis. …..”

32. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends

that the Tribunal failed to consider the aspect that

unauthorized absence must be proved to be ‘willful’, in

order to constitute misconduct. Even if the petitioner’s

absence is assumed to be unauthorized, it does not

amount to misconduct, unless willfulness is established, as

– 28 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Coal

India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC

620, the relevant portion of which runs as under:

“21. In the present case, the disciplinary
authority failed to prove that the absence from duty
was willful, no such finding has been given by the
inquiry officer or the appellate authority.”

33. The learned counsel has further relied on a

judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3

SCC 178, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that:

“17. If the absence is the result of compelling
circumstances under which it was not possible to
report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held
to be wilful. Absence from duty without any
application or prior permission may amount to
unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean
wilful. There may be different eventualities due to
which an employee may abstain from duty, including
compelling circumstances beyond his control like
illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such
case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of

– 29 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a
government servant.

18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of
unauthorised absence from duty is made, the
disciplinary authority is required to prove that the
absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the
absence will not amount to misconduct.

19. In the present case the inquiry officer on
appreciation of evidence though held that the
petitioner was unauthorisedly absent from duty but
failed to hold that the absence was wilful; the
disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority,
failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the
petitioner guilty.”

The Learned counsel contends that since the petitioner’s

leave application was pending consideration, the charge of

unauthorized absence, is without any legal basis.

34. Lastly, the learned counsel places reliance on a

judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Prabash Chandra

Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565, which carves out

exceptions for maintaining a challenge to the Articles of

Charge. The present case would fall within the said

– 30 –

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exceptions. The delay in concluding the inquiry is a

specific exception laid out, subject to it being prejudicial to

the employee. It is contended that an exception has been

carved out in the said judgment thereby holding that the

challenge to initiation of inquiry/issuance of Articles of

Charge is maintainable, when the same is without

jurisdiction or where no misconduct is made out against

the delinquent. The said position is also affirmed by a

Co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court in the case of

VIJAY KUMAR G SULAKHE -V/s- STATE OF

KARNATAKA in Writ Petition No. 104460/2018 vide

Order dated 10/09/2018. The Co-ordinate Bench of

this Court has also carved out an exception on the ground

of delay in initiation of inquiry in the cases as aforestated.

In the present case, the charge memo is without

jurisdiction, the allegations therein do not constitute any

misconduct and there has been a delay in initiating and

concluding the inquiry. As previously stated, the delay is

fatal to the Petitioner as the pendency of inquiry is

– 31 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

affecting his promotions. Therefore, even on this ground,

the impugned Order is liable to be set aside.

35. Additionally, the learned counsel contends that

the impugned order violates the petitioner’s fundamental

rights under Articles 14, 16, 19, and 21, as well as the

amalgam of Articles 309 to 311 of the Constitution of

India. The order of suspension is arbitrary, and is tainted

by malice, as it was influenced by a whistleblower with

ulterior motives, who was himself named in the rowdy

sheet while the petitioner was in charge of the police

station and hence deserves to be quashed. On all these

grounds, the learned counsel for the petitioner prays that

this Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any

such order or direction quashing the order of suspension

bearing no Personnel-4/34/ISD/2022-23 dated 15.10.2022

issued by the Additional Director General of Police,

Internal Security Wing and the order dated 11.09.2023

passed by the KSAT in Application No.3106/2023, and

further to set aside the impugned Order dated

20.06.2024, passed by the Karnataka State Administrative

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Tribunal in Application No. 5226/ 2023, and grant such

other reliefs as deemed fit in the interests of justice and

equity.

36. Per contra, the learned Additional Government

Advocate Sri V. Shivareddy, representing Respondents 1

to 6, entered the arguments and countered the

contentions of the Petitioner Counsel. The learned AGA

contends that the impugned suspension order is a well-

reasoned and justified decision. The argument of the

petitioner is that the suspension order lacks sufficient

reasoning and is based solely on the criminal proceedings

against him. However, learned AGA contends that a plain

reading of the suspension order reveals that it explicitly

details the misconduct of the petitioner, including

unauthorized absence from duty for 31 days, threats made

to the complainant in Crime No. 352/2022, and the

petitioner’s engagement in private business activities, in

violation of Rule 97-A of the Karnataka Civil Services

Rules. In support of the said contention, the learned AGA

relies on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

– 33 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

case of State of Punjab v. Dr. P. L. Singla (2008) 8

SCC 469, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that,

unauthorized absence constitutes indiscipline and warrants

disciplinary action. Hence, the learned AGA contends that

the Petitioner’s actions, therefore, justifies his suspension

under Rule 5 of the Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary

Proceedings) Rules, 1965.

37. The Learned AGA further countered the

Petitioner’s contention that the quashing of criminal

proceedings in WP No. 2071/2023 necessitates the

revocation of his suspension, is legally unsound. In this

regard, he has relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, in the case of State of Karnataka v. Umesh

((2022) 6 SCC 563)), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court

has made it clear that the quashing of criminal

proceedings do not automatically absolve an employee

from Departmental inquiries. The quashing of the FIR and

charge sheet in WP No. 2071/2023, was due to procedural

lapses and did not constitute an ‘honourable acquittal’ of

the Petitioner. As held in the case of G. M. Tank v. State

– 34 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

of Gujarat ((2006) 5 SCC 446)), only an honourable

acquittal, based on merits, can impact Departmental

proceedings. In the said case, the quashing was

procedural and did not establish the innocence of the

Petitioner.

38. The Learned AGA further countered the

Petitioner’s argument that the suspension order was

passed by an incompetent authority, as being without any

merit. The order was initially issued by the 4th Respondent,

the Additional Director General of Police (ADGP), Internal

Security Wing, in charge of the disciplinary authority.

However, it was subsequently ratified by the Director

General & Inspector General of Police (DG&IGP) on

20.10.2022, in accordance with the Departmental Circular

dated 18.04.2020. Hence, he contends that the

suspension order was validly issued by a competent

authority and is not vitiated on the grounds alleged by the

learned counsel for the petitioner.

– 35 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

39. The Learned AGA further contended that the

Petitioner’s claim that his 31-day leave was duly

sanctioned, is factually incorrect. He contends that the

records show that he had initially applied for four days of

casual leave on 26.09.2022, which was sanctioned.

Subsequently, on 29.09.2022, he had applied for an

additional 31 days of leave, which was only recommended

by the Superintendent of Police, but was never approved

by the competent authority, which in this case is the

Inspector General of Police (IGP). As per the Official

Memorandum dated 09.06.2022, only the IGP has the

authority to approve such leave for a Police Inspector.

Since there is no order of sanction from the IGP, the

Petitioner’s absence from duty was unauthorized, thereby

justifying the suspension order.

40. It is the further contention of the Learned AGA

that the Departmental inquiry against the Petitioner is

currently ongoing. A report from the Deputy

Superintendent of Police, Departmental Inquiries, Central

Range, Bangalore, dated 24.01.2024, confirms the

– 36 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

necessity of the Petitioner’s presence in the inquiry

proceedings. His continued suspension is necessary to

ensure that he does not interfere with the inquiry process.

41. The Learned AGA further emphasised that the

Petitioner’s reliance on WP No. 2071/2023 is misplaced, as

the said matter has not attained finality. The 3rd

Respondent, Inspector General of Police, Central Range,

has sought permission from the 2nd Respondent, DG &

IGP, to file a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme

Court challenging the quashing of proceedings in WP No.

2071/2023. The recommendation for filing the SLP was

forwarded to the 1st Respondent / Additional Chief

Secretary, Home Department, on 05.12.2023. Since the

legal process regarding this matter is still ongoing, he

contends that the petitioner cannot claim any finality in his

favour and use it as a ground to revoke his suspension

order.

42. The Learned AGA further contended that the

petitioner has a well-documented history of criminal

– 37 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

misconduct. He has been involved in multiple cases,

including Crime No. 234/2022 at Varthur Police Station for

fraud and forgery, which led to the Deputy Commissioner

of Police, Crime-1, Bangalore, seeking sanction for

prosecution. He has also been implicated in illegal land

transactions in Chemmanahalli, misuse of official position

to obtain Call Detail Records (CDRs) of journalists in

violation of their privacy rights, and other acts of

misconduct that are currently under investigation. Given

the severity of the alleged offences committed by him, his

continued suspension is warranted to ensure the integrity

of the investigations.

43. The Learned AGA further contended that the

continued suspension of the petitioner has been reviewed

and reaffirmed by the authorities. The ADGP,

Administration, sought an opinion from the IGP, Central

Range, on whether the suspension should be extended.

The IGP, Central Range, after evaluating the ongoing

proceedings and the severity of the allegations,

recommended that the suspension should continue.

– 38 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

Furthermore, as per the Official Memorandum dated

25.11.2020 issued by the Department of Personnel and

Administrative Reforms, Government of Karnataka,

suspension can be extended beyond six months if criminal

or departmental inquiries are pending. Since multiple

inquiries and criminal proceedings are ongoing against the

Petitioner, the decision to extend his suspension is legally

sound.

44. The Learned AGA further contended that the

petitioner has violated multiple provisions of the Karnataka

Police Act, 1963, and Departmental rules. Section 28 of

the Karnataka Police Act strictly prohibits police officers

from engaging in business dealings, land transactions, and

commercial activities. The record shows that the Petitioner

has engaged in land dealings and has facilitated illegal

land transactions, thereby violating the statutory

restrictions placed on police officers. Additionally, the

DG&IGP Circular dated 14.11.2018 specifically prohibits

police officers from misusing their position in land

– 39 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

disputes. The Petitioner’s actions are in direct violation of

these provisions, further justifying his suspension.

45. In the light of the foregoing facts and legal

principles, the learned AGA contends that the Petitioner

has failed to make out any case for relief. The impugned

suspension order is based on a clear record of misconduct,

unauthorized leave, ongoing inquiries, and pending

criminal matters. The judicial review of suspension orders

is limited, as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

the case of Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal

(2013) 16 SCC 147, where it was held that suspension is

a precautionary measure to ensure that the delinquent

official does not interfere with the proceedings. Given the

nature of the allegations and the ongoing investigations,

lifting the suspension order at this stage would be against

the interests of justice. Hence, the learned AGA prays to

dismiss the writ petitions as being without any merit.

46. In the context of contentions advanced by the

learned counsel for both the petitioner and the learned

– 40 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

AGA, it is relevant to examine whether the suspension

order dated 15.10.2022, issued by the Additional Director

General of Police (Respondent No. 4), is sustainable in law

or not. In this regard, it is to be noticed that the primary

basis for the suspension was the registration of Crime No.

352/2022, wherein the petitioner was belatedly arraigned

as Accused No.12. However, this Court, in W.P. No.

2071/2023, has already quashed the said FIR, charge

sheet, and cognizance order vide order dated 05.10.2023

on the ground of procedural infirmities, including the

absence of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. In view of

the fact that the criminal proceedings, which formed the

basis of the suspension order has been set aside, the

suspension order having lost its legal foundation, is liable

to be quashed.

47. Further, it is relevant to note that Rule 5 of the

Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules,

1965, permits suspension only in two circumstances

namely,

– 41 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

(a) when disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or

pending, or

(b) when a criminal case is under investigation or

trial.

48. In the present case on hand, the respondents

have failed to establish that a valid disciplinary proceeding

was pending at the time of issuing the order of

suspension. Further, with the quashing of the FIR and

charge sheet, Clause (b) is not satisfied. In the absence of

any independent justification beyond the now-quashed

criminal case, the continuation of suspension order is

arbitrary and violative of the petitioner’s fundamental

rights.

49. The Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal

(KSAT), while upholding the suspension in Application No.

3106/2023, has failed to render any specific finding as to

whether the petitioner’s alleged acts constitute misconduct

under the DP Rules, 1965 or not. It has merely relied on

the existence of an FIR, which, as established, has already

– 42 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

been set aside. In the absence of a clear attribution of

misconduct under the applicable service rules, the order

upholding the suspension is legally unsustainable.

50. The appointment of the Inquiry Officer on

17.03.2023 and the issuance of the Articles of Charge on

05.04.2023, are in direct contravention of Rule 6(2) of the

DP Rules, 1965. The said rule explicitly mandates that

Articles of Charge must be framed by the Disciplinary

Authority or an authority specially empowered by it. In

the present case, the Inquiry Officer (3rd Respondent)

himself issued the Articles of Charge without any

delegation of authority, thereby vitiating the entire

disciplinary process. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of B.V. Gopinath v. Union of India ((2014) 1 SCC

351)), has categorically held that charge memos issued

without the approval of the competent Disciplinary

Authority are without jurisdiction and non est in the eye of

law. Thus, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against

the petitioner are liable to be quashed.

– 43 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

51. The Tribunal, while dismissing Application No.

5226/2023, has incorrectly presumed that the Inquiry

Officer was vested with the authority to issue Articles of

Charge. The respondents themselves, in their reply

statement, have admitted that the charge memo was

issued without jurisdiction and sought liberty to issue fresh

Articles of Charge. Despite such an admission, the Tribunal

erroneously justified the issuance of Articles of Charge by

assigning reasons that were neither stated in the

impugned order nor supported by record. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v.

Chief Election Commissioner ((1978) 1 SCC 405))

has held that administrative orders must be judged based

on the reasons contained in the order itself and cannot be

supplemented by fresh explanations at a later stage. The

Tribunal’s reasoning, therefore, is wholly impermissible in

law.

52. The disciplinary proceedings initiated against

the petitioner have been unreasonably prolonged, causing

undue hardship and prejudicing his career prospects. The

– 44 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prem Nath Bali v.

Registrar, Delhi High Court ((2015) 16 SCC 415)),

has categorically held that disciplinary inquiries must be

concluded within six months. Furthermore, the

Government of Karnataka’s Official Memorandum dated

28.06.2001 mandates that Departmental inquiries be

completed within four months. The respondents have

failed to justify the prolonged pendency of the inquiry, and

the resultant prejudice to the petitioner necessitates

intervention by this Court.

53. The respondents have alleged that the petitioner

was unauthorizedly absent from duty between 01.10.2022

and 31.10.2022. However, the record establishes that the

petitioner had applied for leave, and there is no material

to indicate that his leave application was rejected. This

Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Dr. Sayeed

A. S., (W.P. No. 211/2003), has held that unauthorized

absence cannot be alleged if the leave application remains

undecided. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case

of Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India ((2012)

– 45 –

WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

3 SCC 178)) has held that unauthorized absence must be

wilful to constitute misconduct. In the present case, in the

absence of a finding of wilful absence, the charge of

unauthorized absence is untenable.

54. The petitioner’s continued suspension, despite

the quashing of the criminal case and the procedural

infirmities in the disciplinary proceedings, constitutes an

arbitrary and disproportionate action, violative of Articles

14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Ashok

Kumar Aggarwal ((2013) 16 SCC 147)) has held that

suspension must be based on valid considerations, and

mere reliance on a criminal case, without due application

of mind, cannot justify suspension. The respondents’

continued insistence on the petitioner’s suspension,

despite the lack of legal foundation, is thus arbitrary and

legally unsustainable.

– 46 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

55. The High Court of Karnataka, in W.P. No.

2071/2023, has quashed the criminal case against the

petitioner, thereby eliminating the very basis on which

disciplinary action was initiated. The Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan ((2024) 1 SCC

175)) has held that disciplinary proceedings must be

quashed if the employee is fully acquitted and there is no

independent evidence of misconduct. The respondents

have failed to produce any material independent of the

quashed criminal case to justify continuing the

departmental inquiry. Consequently, the disciplinary

proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be set

aside.

56. The continued suspension of the petitioner

beyond six months, in the absence of periodic review as

mandated by the Government of Karnataka’s Official

Memorandum dated 25.11.2020, is illegal. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary v.

Union of India ((2015) 7 SCC 291), has held that

suspension should not be extended beyond three months

– 47 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

without a charge sheet, and if the charge sheet is issued,

a reasoned decision must justify the extension beyond six

months. In the present case, there is no material to

indicate any such review or justification, rendering the

continued suspension arbitrary and contrary to established

legal principles.

57. Be that as it may, it is appropriate to state that

contention of the respondent was that the petitioner’s

suspension was warranted under Rule 5 of the DP Rules,

1965, which permits suspension when disciplinary

proceedings are contemplated or when a criminal case is

under investigation. The criminal case which was initiated

against the petitioner came to be quashed by this Court.

However, the respondents have taken the position that

Departmental proceedings are independent of the criminal

proceedings and that such proceedings can proceed

irrespective of the quashing of the criminal cases. But the

learned counsel for the petitioner in both the petitions has

emphatically submitted that the Karnataka State

– 48 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

Administrative Tribunal has erroneously interpreted the

jurisdictional provisions and delegation of authority leading

to illegal and unsustainable orders. We find justification in

the said contention. Therefore, it is said that the

impugned order dated 15.10.2022 vide Annexure-“A” is

devoid of any reasoning regarding the petitioner’s conduct

under the Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary

Proceedings) Rules, 1965, Further, as contended by the

learned counsel for the petitioner, mere filing of FIR which

was subsequently quashed, does not constitute legal

evidence to justify the petitioner’s suspension. Due to this

lack of legal basis, impugned order is liable to be quashed.

Therefore, keeping in view the contentious contentions

taken in both these writ petitions are concerned, it is said

that there is substance to interfere with the impugned

orders passed by the Karnataka State Administrative

Tribunal, as there are infirmities in the orders which

warrants interference.

58. For the aforementioned reasons, we proceed to

pass the following:

– 49 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

ORDER

i) Both the writ petitions are allowed;

ii) The impugned order of suspension bearing No.

Personnel-4/34/ISD/2022-23 dated 15.10.2022 vide

Annexure-“A” in W.P.No.25080/2023 being unsustainable

in law, is hereby quashed. As a consequence, the

petitioner is entitled to all statutory benefits, in accordance

with the rules.

iii) The impugned order dated 11.09.2023 in

Application No. 3106/2023 vide Annexure-“B” in

W.P.No.25080/2023 passed by the KSAT dismissing the

application and upholding the suspension, is hereby set

aside.

iv) The impugned order dated 20.06.2024 in

Application No. 5226/2023 vide Annexure-“A” in

W.P.No.18983/2024, dismissing the said application and

upholding the disciplinary proceedings, is set aside.

– 50 –

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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024

v) The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the

petitioner, including the Articles of Charge issued on

05.04.2023, are quashed as being without any jurisdiction.

SD/-

(K.SOMASHEKAR)
JUDGE

SD/-

(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE

KS



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