Karnataka High Court
Sri B K Kishore Kumar vs The State Of Karnataka on 10 March, 2025
Author: K.Somashekar
Bench: K.Somashekar
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WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.SOMASHEKAR
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
WRIT PETITION NO.25080 OF 2023 (S-KSAT)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.18983 OF 2024 (S-KSAT)
IN WP NO.25080 OF 2023
BETWEEN:
SRI KISHORE KUMAR B.K.
S/O. B.M. KRISHNAPPA
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
RESIDING AT #49
'BHUVANESWARI NILAYA'
BASAVANAPURA
Digitally signed BENGALURU-560 083.
by SUMATHY
KANNAN ...PETITIONER
Location: HIGH
COURT OF (BY SRI PRITHVEESH M.K., ADVOCATE)
KARNATAKA
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY
ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY
HOME DEPARTMENT
ALSO KNOWN AS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
ROOM NO.222
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU-560 001.
2. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
STATE OF KARNATAKA
OFFICE OF DG AND IGP
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NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001.
3. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
CENTRAL RANGE
OFFICE OF IGP
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001.
4. ADDITIONAL DGP CUM
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY
INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION
OFFICE OF ADGP-ISD
NO.60, RICHMOND CIRCLE
BENGALURU-560 025.
5. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION
OFFICE OF ADGP-ISD
NO.60, RICHMOND CIRCLE
BENGALURU-560 025.
6. SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT
OFFICE OF SP, BENGALURU RURAL
CHANDRIKA HOTEL CIRCLE
VASANTH NAGAR
BENGALURU-560 052.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VIKAS ROJIPURA, AGA FOR RESPONDENTS)
***
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OR SUCH OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION QUASHING
ORDER OF SUSPENSION BEARING NO.PERSONNEL-4/34/ISD/2022-
23 DATED 15.10.2022 ISSUED BY ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF POLICE, INTERNAL SECURITY WING, NO.60 RICHMOND ROAD,
BENGALURU, RESPONDENT NO.4 VIDE ANNEXURE A AND THE
ORDER DATED 11.09.2023 PASSED BY KSAT IN APPLICATION
NO.3106 OF 2023 VIDE ANNEXURE B AND SUCH OTHER RELIEF AS A
CONSEQUENCE THEREOF, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.
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WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
IN WP NO.18983 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
SRI B.K. KISHORE KUMAR
S/O. B.M. KRISHNAPPA
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
WORKING AS INSPECTOR OF POLICE
INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION (ISD)
BENGALURU
RESIDING AT NO.99
'BHUVANESHWARI NILAYA'
BASAVANAPURA
BANNERGHATTA ROAD
GOTTIGERE POST
BENGALURU-560 083.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI PRITHVEESH M.K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS
ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY
HOME DEPARTMENT
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU-560 001.
2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL AND
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
NO.2, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001.
3. THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
AND ENQUIRY OFFICER
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF POLICE
HEAD OFFICE
BENGALURU-560 009.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VIKAS ROJIPURA, AGA FOR RESPONDENTS)
***
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WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 20.06.2024 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE
KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT BENGALURU IN
APPLICATION NO.5226 OF 2023 (ANNEXURE-A) AND
CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE SAID APPLICATION NO.5226 OF 2023
AS PRAYED FOR BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE HON'BLE
TRIBUNAL (ANNEXURE-B) TO MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 25.02.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, K. SOMASHEKAR J., PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.SOMASHEKAR
and
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE K. SOMASHEKAR)
Since common questions of fact and that of law arise
for consideration in both these writ petitions, and the
petitions having been filed by the common petitioner, they
are taken up for hearing together and are disposed of by
this common order.
2. The present writ petitions are filed under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with specific
prayers. W.P.No.25080/2023 is filed seeking to quash
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the order of suspension bearing No. Personnel-
4/34/ISD/2022-23 dated 15.10.2022 issued by the
Additional Director General of Police, Internal Security
Wing, and the order dated 11.09.2023 passed by the
Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal (KSAT) in
Application No. 3106/2023 vide Annexure-“B”. The
petition in W.P.No.18983/2024 is filed seeking to set aside
the impugned order dated 20.06.2024 passed by KSAT in
Application No. 5226/2023, upholding the disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner.
3. Heard the learned counsel Shri Prithveesh M.K for
the petitioner in both the petitions and the learned AGA
Shri Vikas Rojipura for the respondents and perused the
material available on record.
4. The Facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows:
The petitioner was initially appointed as a Sub-
Inspector of Police in the year 2003 and was subsequently
promoted to the rank of Inspector of Police in the year
2010. While discharging his duties at Attibele Police
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356/2022, which was initially registered against other
individuals. The said FIR invoked various penal provisions
under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, including Sections
109, 409, 420, 421, 418, 423, 424, 465, 467, 468, 471,
and 120B read with Section 34 IPC, along with Sections 8
and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
5. Consequent to the registration of the FIR, the
Additional Director General of Police / Respondent No. 4 in
W.P.No.25080/2023, issued an order dated 15.10.2022,
placing the petitioner under suspension. The said order,
however, did not attribute any specific act of misconduct
under the provisions of the Karnataka State Police
(Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the DP Rules, 1965’, for short). Aggrieved
by his suspension, the petitioner is said to have preferred
Application No. 3106/2023 before the Karnataka State
Administrative Tribunal (KSAT). The KSAT, vide order
dated 11.09.2023, dismissed the said application and
upheld the suspension without rendering any findings as to
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whether the petitioner’s alleged actions constituted
misconduct under the DP Rules, 1965 or not.
6. Parallely, it is stated that the petitioner assailed
the criminal proceedings before the Hon’ble High Court of
Karnataka in W.P. No. 2071/2023, invoking its jurisdiction
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India
read with Section 482 Cr.PC. By an order dated
05.10.2023, a learned Single Judge of this Court quashed
the FIR, charge sheet, and cognizance order, inter alia, on
the ground that there were procedural infirmities,
including the failure to conduct a proper investigation
regarding the Lodha Committee’s approval for the
alienation of properties and the absence of requisite
sanction for prosecution.
7. The Lodha Committee had been constituted by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court to oversee matters pertaining to
Pearls Agrotech Corporation Ltd. (PACL), a company
alleged to have defrauded approximately 5.5 crore
investors of a sum of 49,000 crores. The Supreme Court
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had explicitly restrained the sale or disposal of PACL-linked
properties without the Committee’s prior approval. It was
the allegation of the respondents that the petitioner, along
with other accused persons in Crime No. 352/2022, had
facilitated unauthorized sale transactions of these
properties, thereby deriving wrongful personal gain, which
was in violation of Rule 97-A of the Karnataka Civil
Services Rules. Additionally, it is the case of the
respondents that the petitioner had threatened the
complainant Sri Shridhar, who had filed the initial
complaint, and that the petitioner remained unauthorizedly
absent from duty for the period between 01.10.2022 to
31.10.2022, despite repeated attempts by his superiors to
contact him.
8. It is stated that pursuant to the aforementioned
allegations, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against
the petitioner under the DP Rules, 1965. The respondents
maintained that the petitioner’s suspension was warranted
under Rule 5 of the DP Rules, 1965, which permits
suspension when disciplinary proceedings are
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contemplated or when a criminal case is under
investigation or trial. Further, the respondents have taken
the position that departmental proceedings are
independent of criminal proceedings and that such
proceedings can proceed irrespective of the quashing of
the criminal case.
9. In the meanwhile, it is significant to note that the
Disciplinary Committee (2nd Respondent) appointed
Inquiry Officer (3rd Respondent) through the order dated
17.03.2023 to issue Articles of Charge and to conduct
inquiry against the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner was
issued Articles of Charge by the Inquiry Officer himself,
and not by the Disciplinary Authority, as required under
the DP Rules, 1965. The petitioner, in response, submitted
a detailed reply dated 17.04.2023, categorically refuting
all allegations. However, despite his representation, the 3rd
Respondent / Inquiry officer, proceeded with the
disciplinary inquiry and recorded the petitioner’s First Oral
Statement without considering his response.
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10. Challenging the order appointing the Inquiry
Officer and the issuance of the Articles of Charge, the
petitioner approached the Hon’ble Tribunal in Application
No. 5226/2023. The matter was taken up for consideration
on 14.12.2023, and the Tribunal was pleased to grant an
interim order staying both the order dated 17.03.2023,
whereby the Inquiry Officer was appointed, as well as the
Articles of Charge dated 05.04.2023. Subsequently, on
03.04.2024, the State filed its reply, wherein it was
reiterated that liberty be granted to issue a fresh charge
memo under Rule 6(2) of the DP Rules, 1965, by the
Disciplinary Authority (2nd Respondent). Upon hearing the
arguments advanced by both sides on 28.05.2024,
Tribunal reserved the matter for orders and, subsequently,
vide order dated 20.06.2024, dismissed the petitioner’s
application, upholding the disciplinary proceedings.
11. Aggrieved by the order dated 20.06.2024, the
petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court by filing the
present Writ Petitions, namely:
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WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024● W.P. No. 25080/2023, challenging the order dated
11.09.2023 in Application No. 3106/2023, whereby
the Hon’ble Tribunal upheld the suspension order;
and
● W.P. No. 18983/2024, challenging the order dated
20.06.2024 in Application No. 5226/2023, which
upheld the validity of the disciplinary proceedings
against the petitioner.
The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of
this Hon’ble Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, seeking appropriate relief against the
arbitrary and procedurally flawed actions of the
respondents.
12. The learned counsel Sri Prithveesh M.K for the
petitioner, submits that the Karnataka State
Administrative Tribunal (KSAT) has erroneously
interpreted the jurisdictional provisions and delegation of
authority, leading to an illegal and unsustainable order.
That the impugned order (Annexure-“A”) is devoid of any
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reasoning regarding the petitioner’s conduct under the
Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules,
1965. Instead, the order solely relies on the fact that an
FIR was registered, where the petitioner was later added
as Accused No. 12. It is contended that this mere filing of
an FIR, which was subsequently quashed, does not
constitute legal evidence to justify the petitioner’s
suspension. Due to this lack of legal basis, he contends
that the impugned order is liable to be quashed.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner asserts
that the inclusion of the petitioner’s name as an accused in
the said proceedings was unwarranted and legally
unsustainable, as the mandatory sanction under Section
197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for
prosecuting a public servant, was not obtained.
14. The learned counsel further contends that Rule 5
of the DP Rules, 1965, permits the Government or the
appointing authority to place a police officer under
suspension in two situations:
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WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
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or pending
1(b) When a criminal case against the officer is
under investigation or trial.
In the present cases, Clause (a) is not satisfied, as no
valid disciplinary proceedings were contemplated at the
time of suspension. As for Clause (b), the FIR and the
entire criminal case, which formed the basis for the
petitioner’s suspension, has been quashed by the order of
a learned Single Judge of this Court. Consequently, the
order of suspension cannot stand on a legally invalidated
foundation and is liable to be quashed.
15. In support of his case, the learned counsel for the
petitioner relies on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Union of India & Others v. Ashok
Kumar Agarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147, which holds that:
“An order of suspension must be based on valid
considerations, and mere reliance on a criminal
case, without due application of mind, cannot
justify suspension.”
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16. It is contended that this principle squarely applies
to the case on hand, as the Department had issued the
suspension order solely based on the filing of a criminal
case, which has now been quashed. Since the very basis
of issuing the suspension order is no longer in existence,
the said order is legally unsustainable.
17. Insofar as the petitioner in WP No. 18983/2024,
the learned counsel Shri Prithveesh M.K. contends that the
primary challenge is against the order dated 17.03.2023,
appointing the Inquiry Officer, and the subsequent Articles
of Charge dated 05.04.2023, which were issued by the
Inquiry Officer himself, rather than the Disciplinary
Authority, as required under Rule 6(2) of the Karnataka
State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules, 1965. He
contends that the Rules, 1965, specifically mandates that
only the Disciplinary Authority or a specially empowered
authority can issue Articles of Charge. However, in the
present case, the Inquiry Officer, who is expected to be
fair, impartial, and ought to act as a quasi-judicial
authority, has assumed the role of the prosecutor by
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framing the Articles of Charge, thereby vitiating the entire
disciplinary process.
18. It is further contended that the Tribunal has
erroneously presumed that the order dated 17.03.2023
delegated the power to the Inquiry Officer to issue Articles
of Charge. However, a plain reading of the said order does
not indicate any such delegation under Rule 6(2) of the
Rules, 1965. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Rashmi Metalicks Ltd. v. Kolkata Metropolitan
Development Authority, (2013) 10 SCC 95, relying
upon the principle laid down in the case of Mohinder
Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, ((1978) 1
SCC 405)), has categorically held thus:
“16. The following observations found in the
celebrated decision in Mohinder Singh Gill v.
Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC 405 AIR
1978 SC 851] are relevant to this question:
“8. The second equally relevant matter is that
when a statutory functionary makes an order
based on certain grounds, its validity must be
judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of
affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in
the beginning may, by the time it comes to court
on account of a challenge, get validated by
additional grounds later brought out. We may
here draw attention to the observations of Bose,
J. in Gordhandas Bhanji [Commr. of Police v.
Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16]:
‘9…. public orders, publicly made, in exercise of
a statutory authority cannot be construed in the
light of explanations subsequently given by the
officer making the order of what he meant, or of
what was in his mind, or what he intended to do.
Public orders made by public authorities are
meant to have public effect and are intended to
affect the actings and conduct of those to whom
they are addressed and must be construed
objectively with reference to the language used in
the order itself.’
19. It is contended that the Respondents themselves,
in their Reply Statement at Para Nos.5, 8, 9, and 12, have
admitted that the Articles of Charge were issued without
jurisdiction and sought liberty to issue fresh Articles of
Charge through the Disciplinary Authority. Despite this,
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the Tribunal unilaterally assigned its own reasoning to
justify the legality of the Articles of Charge, which is
wholly impermissible in law.
20. The learned counsel further places reliance on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
B.V. Gopinath v. Union of India, (2014) 1 SCC 351,
wherein it was held thus:
“52. In our opinion, the submission of the learned
Additional Solicitor General is not factually
correct. The primary submission of the
respondent was that the charge-sheet not having
been issued by the disciplinary authority is
without authority of law and, therefore, non est
in the eye of the law. This plea of the respondent
has been accepted by CAT as also by the High
Court. The action has been taken against the
respondent in Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules
which enjoins the disciplinary authority to draw
up or cause to be drawn up the substance of
imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour into
definite and distinct articles of charges. The term
“cause to be drawn up” does not mean that the
definite and distinct articles of charges once
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disciplinary authority. The term “cause to be
drawn up” merely refers to a delegation by the
disciplinary authority to a subordinate authority
to perform the task of drawing up substance of
proposed “definite and distinct articles of charge-
sheet”. These proposed articles of charge would
only be finalised upon approval by the disciplinary
authority. Undoubtedly, this Court in P.V.
Srinivasa Sastry v. CAG [(1993) 1 SCC 419:
1993 SCC (L&S) 206: (1993) 23 ATC 645] has
held that Article 311(1) does not say that even
the departmental proceeding must be initiated
only by the appointing authority. However, at the
same time it is pointed out that: (SCC p. 422,
para 4) “4…. However, it is open to the Union of
India or a State Government to make any rule
prescribing that even the proceeding against any
delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer
not subordinate to the appointing authority.”
21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court elaborated on the
requirement under Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules,
which enjoins the Disciplinary Authority to either draw up
or cause to be drawn up the Articles of Charge. The Court
held that even when delegation occurs, the final approval
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must still come from the Disciplinary Authority, which is
absent in the present case.
22. It is the further contention of the learned counsel
that the Tribunal has misplaced its reliance in the case of
R.S. Mahadevappa v. State of Karnataka & Ors., W.P.
No. 23204/2024 (Judgment dated 01.02.2024) to reject
the petitioner’s contention regarding jurisdiction. In fact,
the said judgment supports the petitioner’s case as it
holds that:
“4….
a) The object of a Departmental Inquiry is to find
out whether the delinquent is guilty of
misconduct under the conduct rules for the
purpose of determining whether he should be
penalized. This has to happen in accordance with
the rules that obtain in the department
concerned. No employee can be proceeded
against contrary to the extant rules. The
competent authority should constitute the
enquiry; it is the competent authority who should
frame the Charge Memo; unless authorized, he
cannot delegate his powers to others. The
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proceedings should be held in accordance with
the principles of natural justice, although strict
rules of evidence are not applicable. These are
the basic tenets of disciplinary proceedings.
Mr.Nargund, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for
the Petitioner is right in arguing that the
provisions of Rule 6 of the 1965 Rules empower
only the Disciplinary Authority to frame the
Charge Memo, on the basis of which the
departmental proceedings could have been
conducted by the Enquiry Officer.
b) Rule 6 of the 1965 Rules has the following
text:
“6. Procedure for imposing major penalties.-
(1) No order imposing on a Police Officer any
penalty specified in sub-clauses (i), (ii), (iii) or
(iv) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 23
shall be passed except after an inquiry held, as
far as may be, in the manner hereinafter
provided.
(2) The Disciplinary Authority or any authority
empowered by it in this behalf (hereinafter in this
rule referred to as ‘specially empowered
authority’) shall frame definite charges on the
basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is
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proposed to be held. Such charges, together,
with a statement of the allegations on which they
are based, shall be communicated in writing to
the Police Officer and he shall be required to
submit, within such time as may be specified by
the Disciplinary Authority or the specially
empowered authority, a written statement of his
defence and also to state whether he desires to
be heard in person.”
23. It is not in dispute that the disciplinary
proceedings had the thrust of major penalties and
therefore, apparently Rule 6 would come into play. The
language of Rule 6(2) leaves no manner of doubt that it is
the Disciplinary Authority who has to frame the Charge
Memo. However, if he wants to delegate the same, he
ought to do it by a specific order, whereupon the other
authority can do it. However, such a delegation by the
Disciplinary Authority, is not forthcoming from the record
of proceedings. Merely directing the holding of disciplinary
inquiry, would not satisfy this requirement.
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24. The contention of learned AGA that the above
ground was not taken up before the Tribunal or the
authorities concerned, would not come to the rescue of
respondents inasmuch as it is a pure question of law which
is attracted to the facts borne out by record. It is a point
that goes to root of the matter and therefore, it is not
possible to assume the waiver. It hardly needs to be stated
that when law prescribes a particular procedure for doing a
particular thing, it has to be done only as prescribed and
not otherwise. That apart, competence cannot be
conferred by consent or waiver. Thus, the Tribunal’s
reliance on R.S. Mahadevappa (supra) is misconceived, as
the judgment reaffirms that the Disciplinary Authority
alone is competent to issue Articles of Charge, and
delegation of such power must be made through a specific
order, which is absent in the present case.
25. The learned counsel further places reliance on the
judgment dated 07.06.2021 of this Court in the case of
Smt. SHASHIKALA M. -V/s- STATE OF KARNATAKA in
Writ Petition No. 1360/2018, wherein it was held that
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under the very Rules of 1965 itself, it has been
categorically held that an Inquiry officer has no jurisdiction
to issue the Articles of Charge. The Tribunal has failed to
appreciate these contentions in its proper perspective and
therefore, even on this ground, the impugned Order is
liable to be set aside.
26. It is the further contention of the learned counsel
for the petitioner that the Tribunal had erred in holding
that the Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings)
Rules, 1965 do not require the issuance of Articles of
Charge before appointing an Inquiry Officer. Under Rule
6(2) and Rule 6(4) of the Rules, 1965, it is mandatory that
Articles of Charge be issued first, followed by the
appointment of the Inquiry Officer. However, in the
present case, the Inquiry Officer was appointed even
before the Articles of Charge were issued, indicating a
prejudged decision to conduct an inquiry without affording
an opportunity of fair hearing to the petitioner.
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27. The learned counsel has further relied on a
decision of this Court in the case of N.K. Nagaraja v.
State of Karnataka, (ILR 1979 (1) KAR 564), wherein
it was held that such an appointment before issuing a
charge memo, violates procedural fairness and natural
justice. Furthermore, the appointment of the Inquiry
Officer by designation instead of by name is contrary to
the Rules, making the proceedings legally unsustainable.
The petitioner, therefore, submits that the impugned
order, being in violation of procedural safeguards and
natural justice, is liable to be set aside.
28. The Learned counsel has further relied on a
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar, Delhi High Court,
(2015) 16 SCC 415, wherein it was held thus:
“Enquiry should be completed in the shortest
possible time and, at any rate, within 6 months.”
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29. Despite the Government of Karnataka’s Official
Memorandum dated 28.06.2001, which mandates that
disciplinary inquiries be completed within four months, the
present inquiry has been prolonged without justification,
thus adversely affecting the petitioner’s promotional
prospects.
30. The Learned counsel further relies on a judgement
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal v.
State of Rajasthan, (2024) 1 SCC 175, wherein it was
held thus:
“Disciplinary proceedings can be quashed if the
employee is fully acquitted after concluding that
the prosecution has failed to prove the charge.”
The learned counsel contends that since this Court has
quashed the criminal proceedings against the petitioner,
the disciplinary proceedings cannot be sustained in the
absence of independent material proving the misconduct.
31. It is the further contention of the learned counsel
for the petitioner that the Tribunal failed to recognize that
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the charges do not constitute misconduct, as no finding on
this aspect was recorded. It is argued that without a
decision on the petitioner’s leave application, unauthorized
absence cannot be alleged against the petitioner, making
the charge baseless. In this regard, reliance is placed on a
judgment of this Court in the case of State of Karnataka
v. Dr. Sayeed A. S. (W.P. No. 211/2003, Order dated
07/09/2010), where this Court has held that absence
cannot be treated as unauthorized if the leave application
remains undecided. The learned counsel for the petitioner,
therefore, contends that the impugned order is legally
unsustainable. The relevant portion of said order reads
thus:
“8. It is clear on scrutiny of the material on record
that it is no doubt true that charges 2 and 3 pertain to
unauthorized absence of the applicant before the K.A.T.
the respondent herein for the period from 12.04.1991 to
24.04.1991, on 05.12.1991 and from 25.12.1991 to
31.01.1992. However, the fact that after joining the duty
after the period of absence, an application for grant of
leave was given along with medical certificate and the
said application has not been considered, is clearly
– 27 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024proved by the respondent herein as the petitioners have
not produced any material to show that his application for
grant of leave had been considered and rejected…XXX…..
In view of the above said facts, it cannot be disputed that
the application for sanction of leave for the period from
12.04.1991 to 24.04.1991, on 05.12.1991 and from
25.12.1991 to 31.01.1992 was pending consideration
before the leave sanctioning authority and unless the said
application is considered, no cause of action would arise
for the petitioners to frame charge of unauthorised
absence against the respondent herein…XXX… Since no
decision was taken on the application for sanction of
leave for the above said period of absence, in view of the
decision of this Court in the case of Dr. H. Jayamma’s
case (supra), wherein on similar facts, this Court has held
that in the absence of any decision on the leave
application filed for the period of absence, there is no
question of any unauthorized absence and charge framed
in that regard would be without any basis. …..”
32. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends
that the Tribunal failed to consider the aspect that
unauthorized absence must be proved to be ‘willful’, in
order to constitute misconduct. Even if the petitioner’s
absence is assumed to be unauthorized, it does not
amount to misconduct, unless willfulness is established, as
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Coal
India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC
620, the relevant portion of which runs as under:
“21. In the present case, the disciplinary
authority failed to prove that the absence from duty
was willful, no such finding has been given by the
inquiry officer or the appellate authority.”
33. The learned counsel has further relied on a
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3
SCC 178, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that:
“17. If the absence is the result of compelling
circumstances under which it was not possible to
report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held
to be wilful. Absence from duty without any
application or prior permission may amount to
unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean
wilful. There may be different eventualities due to
which an employee may abstain from duty, including
compelling circumstances beyond his control like
illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such
case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of
– 29 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a
government servant.
18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of
unauthorised absence from duty is made, the
disciplinary authority is required to prove that the
absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the
absence will not amount to misconduct.
19. In the present case the inquiry officer on
appreciation of evidence though held that the
petitioner was unauthorisedly absent from duty but
failed to hold that the absence was wilful; the
disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority,
failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the
petitioner guilty.”
The Learned counsel contends that since the petitioner’s
leave application was pending consideration, the charge of
unauthorized absence, is without any legal basis.
34. Lastly, the learned counsel places reliance on a
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Prabash Chandra
Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565, which carves out
exceptions for maintaining a challenge to the Articles of
Charge. The present case would fall within the said
– 30 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
exceptions. The delay in concluding the inquiry is a
specific exception laid out, subject to it being prejudicial to
the employee. It is contended that an exception has been
carved out in the said judgment thereby holding that the
challenge to initiation of inquiry/issuance of Articles of
Charge is maintainable, when the same is without
jurisdiction or where no misconduct is made out against
the delinquent. The said position is also affirmed by a
Co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court in the case of
VIJAY KUMAR G SULAKHE -V/s- STATE OF
KARNATAKA in Writ Petition No. 104460/2018 vide
Order dated 10/09/2018. The Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court has also carved out an exception on the ground
of delay in initiation of inquiry in the cases as aforestated.
In the present case, the charge memo is without
jurisdiction, the allegations therein do not constitute any
misconduct and there has been a delay in initiating and
concluding the inquiry. As previously stated, the delay is
fatal to the Petitioner as the pendency of inquiry is
– 31 –
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
affecting his promotions. Therefore, even on this ground,
the impugned Order is liable to be set aside.
35. Additionally, the learned counsel contends that
the impugned order violates the petitioner’s fundamental
rights under Articles 14, 16, 19, and 21, as well as the
amalgam of Articles 309 to 311 of the Constitution of
India. The order of suspension is arbitrary, and is tainted
by malice, as it was influenced by a whistleblower with
ulterior motives, who was himself named in the rowdy
sheet while the petitioner was in charge of the police
station and hence deserves to be quashed. On all these
grounds, the learned counsel for the petitioner prays that
this Court be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any
such order or direction quashing the order of suspension
bearing no Personnel-4/34/ISD/2022-23 dated 15.10.2022
issued by the Additional Director General of Police,
Internal Security Wing and the order dated 11.09.2023
passed by the KSAT in Application No.3106/2023, and
further to set aside the impugned Order dated
20.06.2024, passed by the Karnataka State Administrative
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
Tribunal in Application No. 5226/ 2023, and grant such
other reliefs as deemed fit in the interests of justice and
equity.
36. Per contra, the learned Additional Government
Advocate Sri V. Shivareddy, representing Respondents 1
to 6, entered the arguments and countered the
contentions of the Petitioner Counsel. The learned AGA
contends that the impugned suspension order is a well-
reasoned and justified decision. The argument of the
petitioner is that the suspension order lacks sufficient
reasoning and is based solely on the criminal proceedings
against him. However, learned AGA contends that a plain
reading of the suspension order reveals that it explicitly
details the misconduct of the petitioner, including
unauthorized absence from duty for 31 days, threats made
to the complainant in Crime No. 352/2022, and the
petitioner’s engagement in private business activities, in
violation of Rule 97-A of the Karnataka Civil Services
Rules. In support of the said contention, the learned AGA
relies on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
case of State of Punjab v. Dr. P. L. Singla (2008) 8
SCC 469, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that,
unauthorized absence constitutes indiscipline and warrants
disciplinary action. Hence, the learned AGA contends that
the Petitioner’s actions, therefore, justifies his suspension
under Rule 5 of the Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary
Proceedings) Rules, 1965.
37. The Learned AGA further countered the
Petitioner’s contention that the quashing of criminal
proceedings in WP No. 2071/2023 necessitates the
revocation of his suspension, is legally unsound. In this
regard, he has relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in the case of State of Karnataka v. Umesh
((2022) 6 SCC 563)), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court
has made it clear that the quashing of criminal
proceedings do not automatically absolve an employee
from Departmental inquiries. The quashing of the FIR and
charge sheet in WP No. 2071/2023, was due to procedural
lapses and did not constitute an ‘honourable acquittal’ of
the Petitioner. As held in the case of G. M. Tank v. State
– 34 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
of Gujarat ((2006) 5 SCC 446)), only an honourable
acquittal, based on merits, can impact Departmental
proceedings. In the said case, the quashing was
procedural and did not establish the innocence of the
Petitioner.
38. The Learned AGA further countered the
Petitioner’s argument that the suspension order was
passed by an incompetent authority, as being without any
merit. The order was initially issued by the 4th Respondent,
the Additional Director General of Police (ADGP), Internal
Security Wing, in charge of the disciplinary authority.
However, it was subsequently ratified by the Director
General & Inspector General of Police (DG&IGP) on
20.10.2022, in accordance with the Departmental Circular
dated 18.04.2020. Hence, he contends that the
suspension order was validly issued by a competent
authority and is not vitiated on the grounds alleged by the
learned counsel for the petitioner.
– 35 –
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
39. The Learned AGA further contended that the
Petitioner’s claim that his 31-day leave was duly
sanctioned, is factually incorrect. He contends that the
records show that he had initially applied for four days of
casual leave on 26.09.2022, which was sanctioned.
Subsequently, on 29.09.2022, he had applied for an
additional 31 days of leave, which was only recommended
by the Superintendent of Police, but was never approved
by the competent authority, which in this case is the
Inspector General of Police (IGP). As per the Official
Memorandum dated 09.06.2022, only the IGP has the
authority to approve such leave for a Police Inspector.
Since there is no order of sanction from the IGP, the
Petitioner’s absence from duty was unauthorized, thereby
justifying the suspension order.
40. It is the further contention of the Learned AGA
that the Departmental inquiry against the Petitioner is
currently ongoing. A report from the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Departmental Inquiries, Central
Range, Bangalore, dated 24.01.2024, confirms the
– 36 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
necessity of the Petitioner’s presence in the inquiry
proceedings. His continued suspension is necessary to
ensure that he does not interfere with the inquiry process.
41. The Learned AGA further emphasised that the
Petitioner’s reliance on WP No. 2071/2023 is misplaced, as
the said matter has not attained finality. The 3rd
Respondent, Inspector General of Police, Central Range,
has sought permission from the 2nd Respondent, DG &
IGP, to file a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme
Court challenging the quashing of proceedings in WP No.
2071/2023. The recommendation for filing the SLP was
forwarded to the 1st Respondent / Additional Chief
Secretary, Home Department, on 05.12.2023. Since the
legal process regarding this matter is still ongoing, he
contends that the petitioner cannot claim any finality in his
favour and use it as a ground to revoke his suspension
order.
42. The Learned AGA further contended that the
petitioner has a well-documented history of criminal
– 37 –
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
misconduct. He has been involved in multiple cases,
including Crime No. 234/2022 at Varthur Police Station for
fraud and forgery, which led to the Deputy Commissioner
of Police, Crime-1, Bangalore, seeking sanction for
prosecution. He has also been implicated in illegal land
transactions in Chemmanahalli, misuse of official position
to obtain Call Detail Records (CDRs) of journalists in
violation of their privacy rights, and other acts of
misconduct that are currently under investigation. Given
the severity of the alleged offences committed by him, his
continued suspension is warranted to ensure the integrity
of the investigations.
43. The Learned AGA further contended that the
continued suspension of the petitioner has been reviewed
and reaffirmed by the authorities. The ADGP,
Administration, sought an opinion from the IGP, Central
Range, on whether the suspension should be extended.
The IGP, Central Range, after evaluating the ongoing
proceedings and the severity of the allegations,
recommended that the suspension should continue.
– 38 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
Furthermore, as per the Official Memorandum dated
25.11.2020 issued by the Department of Personnel and
Administrative Reforms, Government of Karnataka,
suspension can be extended beyond six months if criminal
or departmental inquiries are pending. Since multiple
inquiries and criminal proceedings are ongoing against the
Petitioner, the decision to extend his suspension is legally
sound.
44. The Learned AGA further contended that the
petitioner has violated multiple provisions of the Karnataka
Police Act, 1963, and Departmental rules. Section 28 of
the Karnataka Police Act strictly prohibits police officers
from engaging in business dealings, land transactions, and
commercial activities. The record shows that the Petitioner
has engaged in land dealings and has facilitated illegal
land transactions, thereby violating the statutory
restrictions placed on police officers. Additionally, the
DG&IGP Circular dated 14.11.2018 specifically prohibits
police officers from misusing their position in land
– 39 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
disputes. The Petitioner’s actions are in direct violation of
these provisions, further justifying his suspension.
45. In the light of the foregoing facts and legal
principles, the learned AGA contends that the Petitioner
has failed to make out any case for relief. The impugned
suspension order is based on a clear record of misconduct,
unauthorized leave, ongoing inquiries, and pending
criminal matters. The judicial review of suspension orders
is limited, as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal
(2013) 16 SCC 147, where it was held that suspension is
a precautionary measure to ensure that the delinquent
official does not interfere with the proceedings. Given the
nature of the allegations and the ongoing investigations,
lifting the suspension order at this stage would be against
the interests of justice. Hence, the learned AGA prays to
dismiss the writ petitions as being without any merit.
46. In the context of contentions advanced by the
learned counsel for both the petitioner and the learned
– 40 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
AGA, it is relevant to examine whether the suspension
order dated 15.10.2022, issued by the Additional Director
General of Police (Respondent No. 4), is sustainable in law
or not. In this regard, it is to be noticed that the primary
basis for the suspension was the registration of Crime No.
352/2022, wherein the petitioner was belatedly arraigned
as Accused No.12. However, this Court, in W.P. No.
2071/2023, has already quashed the said FIR, charge
sheet, and cognizance order vide order dated 05.10.2023
on the ground of procedural infirmities, including the
absence of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. In view of
the fact that the criminal proceedings, which formed the
basis of the suspension order has been set aside, the
suspension order having lost its legal foundation, is liable
to be quashed.
47. Further, it is relevant to note that Rule 5 of the
Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules,
1965, permits suspension only in two circumstances
namely,
– 41 –
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
(a) when disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or
pending, or
(b) when a criminal case is under investigation or
trial.
48. In the present case on hand, the respondents
have failed to establish that a valid disciplinary proceeding
was pending at the time of issuing the order of
suspension. Further, with the quashing of the FIR and
charge sheet, Clause (b) is not satisfied. In the absence of
any independent justification beyond the now-quashed
criminal case, the continuation of suspension order is
arbitrary and violative of the petitioner’s fundamental
rights.
49. The Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal
(KSAT), while upholding the suspension in Application No.
3106/2023, has failed to render any specific finding as to
whether the petitioner’s alleged acts constitute misconduct
under the DP Rules, 1965 or not. It has merely relied on
the existence of an FIR, which, as established, has already
– 42 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
been set aside. In the absence of a clear attribution of
misconduct under the applicable service rules, the order
upholding the suspension is legally unsustainable.
50. The appointment of the Inquiry Officer on
17.03.2023 and the issuance of the Articles of Charge on
05.04.2023, are in direct contravention of Rule 6(2) of the
DP Rules, 1965. The said rule explicitly mandates that
Articles of Charge must be framed by the Disciplinary
Authority or an authority specially empowered by it. In
the present case, the Inquiry Officer (3rd Respondent)
himself issued the Articles of Charge without any
delegation of authority, thereby vitiating the entire
disciplinary process. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of B.V. Gopinath v. Union of India ((2014) 1 SCC
351)), has categorically held that charge memos issued
without the approval of the competent Disciplinary
Authority are without jurisdiction and non est in the eye of
law. Thus, the disciplinary proceedings initiated against
the petitioner are liable to be quashed.
– 43 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
51. The Tribunal, while dismissing Application No.
5226/2023, has incorrectly presumed that the Inquiry
Officer was vested with the authority to issue Articles of
Charge. The respondents themselves, in their reply
statement, have admitted that the charge memo was
issued without jurisdiction and sought liberty to issue fresh
Articles of Charge. Despite such an admission, the Tribunal
erroneously justified the issuance of Articles of Charge by
assigning reasons that were neither stated in the
impugned order nor supported by record. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v.
Chief Election Commissioner ((1978) 1 SCC 405))
has held that administrative orders must be judged based
on the reasons contained in the order itself and cannot be
supplemented by fresh explanations at a later stage. The
Tribunal’s reasoning, therefore, is wholly impermissible in
law.
52. The disciplinary proceedings initiated against
the petitioner have been unreasonably prolonged, causing
undue hardship and prejudicing his career prospects. The
– 44 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prem Nath Bali v.
Registrar, Delhi High Court ((2015) 16 SCC 415)),
has categorically held that disciplinary inquiries must be
concluded within six months. Furthermore, the
Government of Karnataka’s Official Memorandum dated
28.06.2001 mandates that Departmental inquiries be
completed within four months. The respondents have
failed to justify the prolonged pendency of the inquiry, and
the resultant prejudice to the petitioner necessitates
intervention by this Court.
53. The respondents have alleged that the petitioner
was unauthorizedly absent from duty between 01.10.2022
and 31.10.2022. However, the record establishes that the
petitioner had applied for leave, and there is no material
to indicate that his leave application was rejected. This
Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Dr. Sayeed
A. S., (W.P. No. 211/2003), has held that unauthorized
absence cannot be alleged if the leave application remains
undecided. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India ((2012)
– 45 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
3 SCC 178)) has held that unauthorized absence must be
wilful to constitute misconduct. In the present case, in the
absence of a finding of wilful absence, the charge of
unauthorized absence is untenable.
54. The petitioner’s continued suspension, despite
the quashing of the criminal case and the procedural
infirmities in the disciplinary proceedings, constitutes an
arbitrary and disproportionate action, violative of Articles
14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Ashok
Kumar Aggarwal ((2013) 16 SCC 147)) has held that
suspension must be based on valid considerations, and
mere reliance on a criminal case, without due application
of mind, cannot justify suspension. The respondents’
continued insistence on the petitioner’s suspension,
despite the lack of legal foundation, is thus arbitrary and
legally unsustainable.
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
55. The High Court of Karnataka, in W.P. No.
2071/2023, has quashed the criminal case against the
petitioner, thereby eliminating the very basis on which
disciplinary action was initiated. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan ((2024) 1 SCC
175)) has held that disciplinary proceedings must be
quashed if the employee is fully acquitted and there is no
independent evidence of misconduct. The respondents
have failed to produce any material independent of the
quashed criminal case to justify continuing the
departmental inquiry. Consequently, the disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be set
aside.
56. The continued suspension of the petitioner
beyond six months, in the absence of periodic review as
mandated by the Government of Karnataka’s Official
Memorandum dated 25.11.2020, is illegal. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary v.
Union of India ((2015) 7 SCC 291), has held that
suspension should not be extended beyond three months
– 47 –
WP NO. 25080 OF 2023
C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
without a charge sheet, and if the charge sheet is issued,
a reasoned decision must justify the extension beyond six
months. In the present case, there is no material to
indicate any such review or justification, rendering the
continued suspension arbitrary and contrary to established
legal principles.
57. Be that as it may, it is appropriate to state that
contention of the respondent was that the petitioner’s
suspension was warranted under Rule 5 of the DP Rules,
1965, which permits suspension when disciplinary
proceedings are contemplated or when a criminal case is
under investigation. The criminal case which was initiated
against the petitioner came to be quashed by this Court.
However, the respondents have taken the position that
Departmental proceedings are independent of the criminal
proceedings and that such proceedings can proceed
irrespective of the quashing of the criminal cases. But the
learned counsel for the petitioner in both the petitions has
emphatically submitted that the Karnataka State
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
Administrative Tribunal has erroneously interpreted the
jurisdictional provisions and delegation of authority leading
to illegal and unsustainable orders. We find justification in
the said contention. Therefore, it is said that the
impugned order dated 15.10.2022 vide Annexure-“A” is
devoid of any reasoning regarding the petitioner’s conduct
under the Karnataka State Police (Disciplinary
Proceedings) Rules, 1965, Further, as contended by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, mere filing of FIR which
was subsequently quashed, does not constitute legal
evidence to justify the petitioner’s suspension. Due to this
lack of legal basis, impugned order is liable to be quashed.
Therefore, keeping in view the contentious contentions
taken in both these writ petitions are concerned, it is said
that there is substance to interfere with the impugned
orders passed by the Karnataka State Administrative
Tribunal, as there are infirmities in the orders which
warrants interference.
58. For the aforementioned reasons, we proceed to
pass the following:
– 49 –
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024ORDER
i) Both the writ petitions are allowed;
ii) The impugned order of suspension bearing No.
Personnel-4/34/ISD/2022-23 dated 15.10.2022 vide
Annexure-“A” in W.P.No.25080/2023 being unsustainable
in law, is hereby quashed. As a consequence, the
petitioner is entitled to all statutory benefits, in accordance
with the rules.
iii) The impugned order dated 11.09.2023 in
Application No. 3106/2023 vide Annexure-“B” in
W.P.No.25080/2023 passed by the KSAT dismissing the
application and upholding the suspension, is hereby set
aside.
iv) The impugned order dated 20.06.2024 in
Application No. 5226/2023 vide Annexure-“A” in
W.P.No.18983/2024, dismissing the said application and
upholding the disciplinary proceedings, is set aside.
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C/W WP NO. 18983 OF 2024
v) The disciplinary proceedings initiated against the
petitioner, including the Articles of Charge issued on
05.04.2023, are quashed as being without any jurisdiction.
SD/-
(K.SOMASHEKAR)
JUDGE
SD/-
(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
KS
