Telangana High Court
Sri Boyenepally Srijayavardhan vs Smt. V. Nirupama Reddy on 10 January, 2025
HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
HON'BLE JUSTICE M.G. PRIYADARSINI
A.S.No.19 of 2024
Mr. P.Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. Nizampur Chandra
Sekhar, learned counsel for the appellant.
Mr. D.PrakashReddy, learned Senior Counsel representing
Mr. K.K.Mahender Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 5.
JUDGMENT:
(Per Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)
The Appeal arises out of an order dated 30.10.2023
passed by the IX Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy
District, at L.B. Nagar in I.A.No.162 of 2024 in O.S.No.414 of
2023.
2. By the impugned order, the Trial Court allowed the
interlocutory application filed by the respondent Nos.1-
5/defendant Nos.2-6 (I.A.No.162 of 2024) for rejection of plaint
in the Suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff (O.S.No.414 of 2023).
3. The Trial Court was of the view that the plaint was liable
to be rejected on the ground that the plaint lacked pleadings as
to the maintainability of the relief for directing the defendant
Nos.2-6 (the respondent Nos.1-5 in the first Appeal) to execute a
registered Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff. The Trial Court
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was also of the view that there was no pleadingfor justifying
specific performance of Agreement of Sale.
4. The relevant facts pleaded by the parties and the views of
the Trial Court will be discussed in the later part of this
judgment.
5. The appellant filed the Suit against the
respondents/defendants for a direction on the defendant Nos.1-
7 to execute and register a sale deed in favour of the
appellant/plaintiff or his nominees in respect of the Schedule ‘A’
and ‘B’ properties and in the alternative,for the Court to execute
the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.
6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant/plaintiff submits that the defendant No.1 entered into
an Agreement of Sale with the appellant/plaintiff on 23.08.2018
for alienating the suit schedule properties on the premise that
the properties were acquired by the defendant No.1’s parents
through registered Sale Deeds and the defendant No.1 was the
absolute owner of the said properties. Counsel submits that
since the Agreement of Sale dated 23.08.2018 did not stipulate
a date for performance of the contract, the appellant issued a
legal notice on 18.05.2023 to show that the appellant was ready
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and willing to perform the contract. Counsel submits that the
appellant also called upon the defendant No.1 on 05.06.2023 to
execute a registered sale deed, whereupon the appellant was
informed of two Suits, namely, O.S.Nos.42 and 43 of 2014, in
which the defendant No.1 and the other defendants are parties.
The appellant was informed that the said Suits were filed
seeking for permanent injunction and the defendant No.1
compromised with the other defendants in the said Suits.
7. Counsel submits that the appellant was therefore
constrained to file the present Suit for specific performance of
the Agreement of Sale dated 23.08.2018 and for cancellation of
the compromise decrees passed in O.S.Nos.42 and 43 of 2014.
8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent
Nos.1-5/defendant Nos.2-6 in the Suit (O.S.No.414 of
2023)submits that the Suit filed by the appellant is bereft of a
cause of action and is also barred by law since a suit for specific
performance is not maintainable against third parties who are
not parties to the Agreement of Sale which forms the subject
matter of the Suit. Counsel submits that these third parties are
not claiming any property from the defendant No.1 in the
Agreement of Sale.Counsel relies on Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the
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C.P.C. and on Section 19 of The Specific Relief Act,1963, which
bars setting aside of a compromise decree by way of a Suit.
9. Counsel submits that the present Appeal seeking
injunction restraining alienation cannot be entertained in view
of the fact of the appellant/plaintiff having failed to make out a
prima facie case with regard tothe other defendants having
derived title to the property from the defendant No.1.
10. I have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant/plaintiff and the respondent Nos.1 to 5/defendant
Nos.2 to 6.
11. It is relevant to clarify that the respondent Nos.1 to 5 are
the defendant Nos.2 to 6 and respondent No.6 is the defendant
No.1 in O.S.No.414 of 2023 respectively. The application for
rejection of the plaint (I.A.No.162 of 2023), which was allowed
by the impugned order, was filed by the defendant Nos.2 to 6
(respondent Nos.1 to 5 in the present Appeal).
12. The events which are relevant for the present Appeal are
as follows:
13. The father of the defendant No.1 purchased Ac.15.03
guntas of land in Survey No.49 situated at RaikuntaMaktha,
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GolkondaKalan Village, ShamshabadMandal, Ranga Reddy
District, under a registered Sale Deed No.552/1969 (Schedule
‘A’ property) dated 01.08.1969. On the same date i.e., on
01.08.1969, the mother of the defendant No.1 purchased
Ac.71.07 guntas of land in Survey Nos.43, 44, 45, 33, 35 and 36
situated at RaikuntaMaktha, GolkondaKalan Village,
ShamshabadMandal, Ranga Reddy District, under a registered
Sale Deed No.550/1969 (Schedule ‘B’ property). An Agreement
of Sale was executed on 23.08.2018 between the defendant No.1
and the plaintiff in respect of Schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ properties for
a total consideration of Rs.4.00 Crores, Rs.12,00,000/- of which
was paid as advance consideration.
14. The plaintiff issued a Legal Notice to the defendant No.1
on 18.05.2023 calling upon the defendant No.1 to receive the
balance sale consideration and execute a registered Sale Deed.
The plaintiff thereafter again called upon the defendant No.1 on
05.06.2023 to execute a registered Sale Deed when the plaintiff
was informed by the defendant No.1 that the defendant No.1
had entered into an understanding with the defendant Nos.2-6
herein. O.S.No.42 of 2014 filed by the defendant Nos.2-6
against the defendant No.1 for declaration and injunction was
decreed in terms of a compromise dated 02.01.2023 by
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thelearned X Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga
Reddy District at L.B. Nagar. The appellant/plaintiff obtained
copies of the Suits and the compromise decrees passed therein
in June 2023 and filed the present Suit (O.S.No.414 of 2023) on
14.06.2023.
15. In the present Suit, the appellant/plaintiff prayed for a
direction on the defendant Nos.1-7 to execute a registered Sale
Deed in the plaintiff’s favour in respect of the Schedule ‘A’ and
‘B’ properties and for the Court to execute the same in favour of
the plaintiff or his nominees and for delivery of possession in
the alternative. The plaintiff also prayed for cancellation of the
compromise decrees in O.S.Nos.42 and 43 of 2014.
16. The plaintiff filed I.A.No.124 of 2023 on 14.06.2023
seeking injunction against the defendant Nos.2-6 from
alienating the suit schedule properties. The defendant Nos.2-6
filed I.A.No.162 of 2023 on 01.08.2023 for rejection of the plaint
filed in O.S.No.414 of 2023 under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of The
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C). The Trial Court passed
the impugned order on 30.10.2023 allowing I.A.No.162 of 2023
for rejecting the plaint in the Suit (O.S.No.414 of 2023).
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17. The adjudication in the instant Appeal centres on whether
the compromise decrees in O.S.Nos.42 and 43 of 2014 i.e.,
between the respondent Nos.1-5 (plaintiffs in the two Suits) and
the respondent No.6 (defendant No.1 in the said two
Suits),should be set aside.
18. To simplify the facts, O.S.No.42 of 2014 was filed by the
predecessors of the respondent Nos.1-5 for restraining the
respondent No.6 from interfering with their possession and
enjoyment of the properties. O.S.No.43 of 2014 was filed by the
respondent No.7/defendant No.7 seeking perpetual injunction.
Respondent No.7/defendant No.7 is not material to the present
Appeal as the said defendant did not file any application for
rejection of the plaint.
19. As stated before, the respondent Nos.1-5 in the present
Appeal are the defendant Nos.2-6 in O.S.No.414 of 2023filed by
the appellant/plaintiff. The respondent No.6 is the defendant
No.1 in the said Suit. The compromise decrees dated
02.01.2023 record the respondent No.6 (defendant No.1 in
O.S.No.414 of 2023) confirming the pre-existing title of the
respondent Nos.1-5. In essence, the respondent No.6 (defendant
No.1 in O.S.No.414 of 2023) settled the dispute with the
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respondent Nos.1-5 and the Suits were decreed in terms of the
compromise.
20. It is clear from the aforesaid that the respondent Nos.1-5
did not acquire any title under the said compromise decrees
since the said respondents sued the respondent No.6 on a pre-
existing and independent title. It is also clear that the title of
the respondent Nos.2-6 existed from a date prior to the
Agreement of Sale executed between the plaintiff/appellant in
the present Appeal and the defendant No.1/respondent No.6 on
23.08.2018. This finding would be evident from the fact that
the respondent Nos.1-5 and 7 filed the Suits in 2014 not for title
to the properties in question but for restraining the respondent
No.6 from interfering with the suit schedule property and for
perpetual injunction, respectively.
21. The second logical finding from the above facts is that
even if the compromise decrees are set aside, the
appellant/plaintiff would not derive any right to the properties
which was the subject matter of the 2014 Suits and least of all,
title to the said properties.
22. The legal premise of the Court’s decision is based on the
following considerations.
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Is the appellant’s prayer for cancellation of the Compromise
Decreeshit by Order XXIII Rule 3-A of The Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 ?
23. Order XXIII of the C.P.C provides for “Withdrawal and
Adjustment of Suits”. Rule 3-A of Order XXIII of the C.P.C. sets
down the following:
“Bar to Suit – No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on
the ground that the compromise on which the decree is
based was not willful”.
24. The bar to a Suit for setting aside a compromise decree,
as stipulated under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the C.P.C,is self-
explanatory. It is clear that the provision prohibits filing of a
separate Suit for setting aside a compromise or consent decree.
The bar is peremptory and draws in a third party to the
compromise decree. Therefore, the bar to filing of a second Suit
would necessarily cover a stranger to the earlier compromise
decree who assails the same either on the ground of failure of
consideration, unlawful consideration or fraud: TrilokiNath
Singh v. Anirudh Singh 1 .The Supreme Court in that decision
considered the scheme of Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the C.P.C. and
relied on Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) Through LR
1
[(2020)6 SCC 629]
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SadhnaRai(Smt) Vs. Rajinder Singh2to hold that no independent
suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the
ground that the compromise was not lawful. The Supreme Court
proceeded to hold that the only remedy available to a party to a
consent decree for avoiding the decree is to approach the Court
which recorded the compromise.The party must establish that
there was indeed no compromise.
25. Amro Devi Vs. Julfi Ram3, relied on by the appellant, laid
emphasis on Order XXIII Rule 3 of the C.P.C requiring a lawful
agreement/compromise in writing, signed by the parties. The
Supreme Court in that case came to a specific finding that the
relevant order was not an order of compromise of suit under
Order XXIII Rule 3 of the C.P.C. In the facts of the present case,
there is no dispute that O.S.Nos.42 and 43 of 2014 were
decreed on consent of the parties thereto i.e., between the
respondent Nos.1-5 and the respondent No.6. The terms of the
Memorandum of Understanding between the parties contained
in the affidavit filed by the plaintiffs clearly record the terms to
the effect of the defendant confirming the title in respect of the
suit property in favour of the plaintiffs. The Terms further
record that the defendant (the respondent No.6 in the present
2
2005(5) SCC 566
3 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1715
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Appeal) confers title in favour of the plaintiff and covenants that
the defendant does not have any right, title or interest in the
said property.
26. The defendant is the respondent No.6/defendant No.1 in
the Suit (O.S.No.414 of 2023) which forms the subject matter of
the present Appeal. The existence of a compromise decree
would also be evident from prayer (e) of the plaint where the
plaintiff/appellant has sought for cancellation thereof.
27. The appellant/plaintiff, who seeks setting aside of the
compromise decrees passed in the Suits of 2014, is admittedly a
stranger to the said Suits. The case of the appellant is that the
compromise decrees ought to be set aside on the ground that
there was no lawful consideration for the said compromise. A
challenge to a compromise decree on the ground that there was
no lawful consideration for the compromise was considered by
the Supreme Court in Sree Surya Developers & Promoters Vs. N.
Sailesh Prasad 4 . The Supreme Court categorically held that
there cannot be any challenge to a consent decree as stipulated
under Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the C.P.C. The Supreme Court
accordingly held that the Trial Court was absolutely justified in
rejecting the plaint on the ground that the Suit was filed
4
(2022) 5 SCC 736
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challenging the compromise decree and that clever drafting
would not permit the plaintiff to maintain the Suit when it was
otherwise barred by law.
28. Rule 3-A was added in Order XXIII of the C.P.C w.e.f.
01.02.1977 for a bar to Suits for setting aside a decree on the
ground that the compromise on which the decree was passed
was not lawful. The purpose of the amendment reinforces the
finality of decisions as the salutary principle of certainty of
litigation. The certainty would also call for an end of litigation.
The object is to prevent multiplicity of litigation and disallow
parties to file a new Suit to unsettle a purely voluntary act of
giving consent to end litigation: TrilokiNath Singh (supra).
29. A compromise decree or compromise of a Suit is provided
under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the C.P.C where the Court is
empowered to order the compromise arrived at between the
parties in relation to the whole or part of the subject matter of
the Suit and pass a decree recording the same. The only
window available to a party to the compromise to deny the
adjustment or satisfaction is under the proviso to Order XXIII
Rule 3 of the C.P.C., in which case the Court shall decide the
question without delay or granting of adjournment.
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A.S.No.19 f 2024
Does Section 19 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963, come in the
way of the relief of specific performance against the answering
respondents?
30. The relevant part of Section 19 of The Specific Relief Act,
1963 is set out below:
“19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under
them by subsequent title.–
Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter, specific
performance of a contract may be enforced against–
(a) either party thereto;
(b) any other person claiming under him by a title
arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee
for value who has paid his money in good faith and
without notice of the original contract;
(c) any person claiming under a title which, though
prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might
have been displaced by the defendant;
…
…
…”
31. Section 19, as extracted above, makes it clear that the
relief claimed in a suit for specific performance can, in the usual
course, be made against parties who claim title to the subject
property subsequent to filing of the Suit. Specific performance
of the contract may be enforced in such cases against either of
the parties to the contract. The relief for specific performance
can also be enforced against a person who is not a party to the
contract but who claims title through a person who is a party to
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the contract. The claim must however be made subsequent to
the contract against which the relief is sought by the plaintiff
under Section 19 of the 1963 Act. The only exception for
enforcing a contract for specific performance in such cases
would apply where a transferee claims title to the property, of
which specific performance is sought, and has paid money for
the property in good faith and without knowledge of the original
contract (Section 19(a) and (b)) of the 1963 Act.
32. Sub-section (c) of Section 19 covers cases where title is
claimed by a person prior to the contract and who is known to
the plaintiff but who has been dispossessed by the defendant in
the Suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance. Section
19 and sub-section (b) thereunder uses three pronouns which
adds a measure of ambiguity. The ambiguity can however be
clarified with an analogy of concentric circles of contractual
relationships.
i. The contract involving title to the property
forms the core. Either of the contracting parties
can enforce specific performance of the contract
against each other.
ii. The next circle consists of a party who is not
one of the contracting parties but who claims title
subsequent to the contract and through one of
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A.S.No.19 f 2024
the parties to the contract. Specific performance
can be enforced against such non-party;except
where the non-party is a transferee for value and
who has paid money for the transfer of the
property in good faith and without notice of the
original contract. (Section 19(b)).
iii. The outer-circle involves a person who claims
title before the contract was entered into in
respect of the property and whose identity is
known to the plaintiff but who was subsequently
dispossessed by the defendant in the suit for
specific performance.
33. The other sub-sections of section 19 are not relevant to
the present adjudication.
34. In the context of paragraph 29 of this judgment, the three
pronouns used in Section 19 and sub-section (b) thereunder
may thus be clarified in the following manner:
“them” in Section 19 refers to the parties to a
contract involving the property, the title whereof
forms the subject matter of a subsequent suit for
specific performance relating to the same
property.
“him” in Section 19(b) refers to one of the
contracting parties under section 19.
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A.S.No.19 f 2024“his”in Section 19(b) refers to a transferee for
value who has parted with money for purchase of
the property in good faith and without notice.
35. A breakdown of the intent and purposes of Section 19
would show that Section 19 is not relevant to the present facts.
36. Although section 19 contemplates enforcing specific
performance of a contract against non-parties or persons
claiming under a title, both prior and subsequent to the
contract, the circles of enforcement close against third parties
who cannot be brought within the ambit of section 19. A Court
cannot grant specific performance against a person by
compelling him/her to enter into an agreement with a third
party and seek specific relief against the third party:Raman
(dead) Vs. R.Natarajan5.
Section 19 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963 does not apply to the
present case.
37. In the present case, the respondents Nos.1-5 are neither
purchasers of the property from the respondent No.6 nor do
they claim title through the respondent No.6. Therefore, the
respondent Nos.1-5 cannot be compelled to execute a sale deed
5 (2022) 10 Supreme Court Cases 143
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A.S.No.19 f 2024
in favour of the appellant/plaintiff or join the respondent No.6
in executing a sale deed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff.
38. The factual narration given in the preceding section of
this judgment makes it clear that the respondent Nos.1-
5/defendant Nos.2-6 did not claim title to the suit schedule
properties through the respondent No.6/defendant No.1 in the
2014 Suits. The plaint filed in O.S.No.414 of 2023 does not
contain any statement that the respondent Nos.1-5 acquired the
suit schedule properties through the respondent No.6 or the
respondent Nos.1-5 are subsequent purchasers of the suit
schedule properties through the respondent No.6. Therefore,
there is admittedly no privity of contract between the
respondent Nos.1-5 and the respondent No.6 which is essential
to Section 19 of the Act.
39. The appellant/plaintiff could only have relied on Section
19 of the Act if the respondent Nos.1-5 had made a claim to the
suit schedule properties through the respondent No.6. The
above analysis of Section 19 makes it evident that the claim of
title to property of which specific performance is sought must be
a continuing claim and one that runs through the concentric
circles of relationships. In other words, specific performance
can be enforced by a party against a party to the contract and
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thereafter against a non-party who claims title to the property
through one of the parties to the contract.The chain of claim to
the property in question must hence remain unbroken so as to
bind subsequent title-holders to the property save and except
bona fidetransferees for value and without notice.
40. In the present case, there is no underlying contract
between the respondent Nos.2-5 and the respondent No.6.
Therefore, there is also no case of any party staking a claim to
the property under any other party which would entitle the
plaintiff/appellant to enforce specific performance of the
Agreement of Sale dated 23.08.2018 (between the plaintiff and
the respondent No.6/defendant No.1) against the answering
respondent Nos.1-5. There is in fact no chain of claim to title
subsequent to the Agreement of Sale dated 23.08.2018 between
the plaintiff and the respondent No.6/defendant No.1 since the
respondent Nos.1-5 claimed to be the owners of the properties
in question prior to 2014.
41. The facts and the law read together lead to the
inescapable conclusion that Section 19 of The Specific Relief
Act, 1963 has no application to the present Appeal and the
appellant/plaintiff cannot rely on the same.
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A.S.No.19 f 2024
Is Order VII Rule 11 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a
complete bar to meritless Suits?
42. The relevant part of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is set
out below:
“11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected in
the following cases:–
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
…
…
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint
to be barred by any law;
…
…
…”
43. The language of Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C is
peremptory.The plaint without a cause of action or contrary to
law “shall” be rejected. The law is that the plaint is the only
document for deciding whether the plaint should cross the
threshold of the six conditions contemplated in Order VII Rule
11 of the C.P.C unscathed. Or simply put, whether the plaint
should be rejected on any one of the conditions under Order VII
Rule 11. The adjudication would involve a meaningful reading
of the plaint including whether the cause of action pleaded
supports the relief prayed for: DahibenVs.
ArvindbhaiKalyanjiBhanusali (Gajra)6.
6 (2020) 7 Supreme Court Cases 366
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44. A Division Bench of this High Court and a Single Bench of
the Allahabad High Court in S.P.R. Publications Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Ganpati Industries 7 and Rajeev Gupta Vs.
SwatantrataSangramSenaniAshritSangathan 8 reiterated the
position in law that the Court should read a plaint in its totality
for considering an application for rejection of plaint and that the
power can be exercised at any stage of the Suit. These decisions
do not assist the case of the appellant.
45. The discussion in the forgoing paragraphs would show
that the appellant/plaintiff seeks to prop its case up on the
unstable frame of section 19 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963 and
Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the CPC and also the fact that the
respondent No.6/defendant No.1 did not file any application for
rejection of the plaint. The appellant relies on the law under
section 19 and Order XXIII Rule 3-A is misplaced. This has
already been discussed above and is not being repeated.
46. On the factual score, nothing turns on the respondent
No.6/defendant No.1 not filing an application for rejecting the
plaint in O.S.No.414 of 2023 since the respondent
7 2024 6 ALD 288
8 AIR ONLINE 2024 ALL 657
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A.S.No.19 f 2024
No.6/defendant No.1 did not contend that it had transferred
any title to the respondent Nos.1-5/defendant Nos.2-6.
47. The plaintiff has failed to establish a cause of action
which would bind the answering respondents to the relief of
specific performance insofar as the answering respondents
deriving title to the property from the respondent No.6. The
plaint must naturally fail on the appellant’s failure to plead a
cause of action against the respondent Nos.1-5/defendant
Nos.2-6. The reliefclaimed in the Suit is hit by Order VII Rule
11(a) of the CPC. The fact that the Suit is barred by law would
be clear from Section 19 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963 and
Order XXIII Rule 3-A of the CPC. Therefore, the plaint is also
hit by Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.
48. This Court is hence of the view that the first to fifth
respondents have made out a good case for rejecting the
appellant’s plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The said
respondents’ case is supported by the law and the attending
facts.
49. The decisions cited on behalf of the appellant do not take
the appellant’s case forward.
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50. Vijay A. Mittal Vs. KulwantRai (dead) through Legal
Representatives 9 , P.V. Guru Raj Reddy, Rep. by GPA
LaxmiNarayana Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy 10 andAhmed
NawabAlladin v. Hyderabad Industries Limited,
Hyderabad11deal with thegeneral proposition of Order VII Rule
11 of the C.P.C. and on the specific finding arrived at by the
Courts as to the plaint disclosing a cause of action in the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. The
proposition that rejection of plaint is a rarity and the Courts
would generally prefer to adjudicate the Suit on merits than to
discard it at the threshold cannot be applied omnibus to each
and every fact situation and certainly not in contradiction to the
express language of Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C, which uses
the words “….shall be rejected…..”.
51. KhalilHajiBholumiyaSalar v. Parveen 12 and Vipin Kumar
Manaktala v. Vinod Kumar13have been cited for the proposition
that fraudulently obtained compromise decrees can be set aside.
This proposition is not applicable to the present case since there
is no evidence of fraud in the compromise decree nor has the
appellant given any particulars of fraud which would warrant
9
(2019) 3 SCC 520
10
2015 (4) ALD 66 (SC)
11
2015 (3) ALD 584
12
2013 (3) MhLJ 182
13
2023 SCC OnLine Del 3876
23
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A.S.No.19 f 2024
setting aside of the compromise decree. The appellant has
failed to clear the benchmark of the compromise decree being
vitiated by fraud.
52. Urvashiben v. KrishnakantManuprasadTrivedi 14 has been
relied on for the issue of limitation being a mixed question of
fact and law. We do not find this decision to be useful since we
have given other reasons for sustaining the impugned order.
The Impugned Order
53. The subject matter of the present Appeal is the impugned
order dated 30.10.2023 allowing the application filed by the
respondent Nos.1-5 (the defendant Nos.2-6) in a Suit filed by
the appellant (plaintiff) for rejection of plaint.
54. The Trial Court discussed the mandate of Order VII Rule
11 of the CPC – Rejection of Plaint – and came to the conclusion
that the plaint does not contain any pleading as to how the
petitioners (the respondent Nos.1-5) acquired interest in the suit
schedule property or in what manner the relief claimed by the
plaintiff/appellant for a direction on the defendants for
executing a registered sale deed is maintainable.
14
(2019) 13 SCC 372
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A.S.No.19 f 2024
55. The Trial Court found that there are no documents to
prove that the respondent No.6/defendant No.1 is the owner
and possessor of the suit schedule property or that he is the
only owner of the suit schedule property or is in possession
thereof. The Trial Court also held that the plaintiff could not
establish that the Suit was filed within limitation. The Trial
Court also found that the plaint did not contain any pleading
with regard to supporting the relief of specific performance of
the Agreement of Sale between the plaintiff and the defendants.
The Trial Court accordingly allowed the application filed by the
respondent Nos.1-5 for rejection of plaint.
56. We must confess that the reasons given by the Trial Court
in the impugned order are insufficient for the purpose of
adjudication under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. Rejection of a
plaint entails drastic consequences since a plaintiff is non-
suited at the very threshold. Rejection of a plaint also amounts
to a decree under Section 2 (2) of the CPC which means that a
defendant who successfully applies under Order VII Rule 11 of
the CPC would obtain a decree in his/her favour.
57. Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.Chas tight contours since a
plaint can only be rejected on any one of the six grounds
contemplated therein. The Court must hence be circumspect
25
MB,J & MGP,J
A.S.No.19 f 2024
before rejecting a plaint and must thoroughly enquire into the
facts and the law in this regard. Although the Trial Court gave
certain findings with regard to the plaint not disclosing essential
pleadings, the reasons fall short of the exacting standards
which are to be expected of a Court while rejecting a plaint. We
have indicated our reasons for the view that the respondent
Nos.1-5 correctly applied under Order VII Rule 11 since the
plaint lacked a cause of action and was barred by law. Our
reasons deal with both aspects in detail.
58. Therefore, even though we cannot fully endorse the
reasons given by the Trial Court in allowing the application filed
by the answering respondents for rejection of the plaint, we are
of the view that the impugned order should be sustained on the
grounds urged by the answering respondents and accepted by
us. As a matter of general principle a party in an appeal who
has the order in his/her favour, is entitled to show that the
order can still be sustained by reversing the material finding on
some other ground:JamshedHormusjiWadiaVs. Board of
Trustees, Port of Mumbai15.
59. Although an argument has been made on behalf of the
appellant that the Suit was filed within the period of limitation
15
(2004) 3 SCC 214
26
MB,J & MGP,J
A.S.No.19 f 2024
as provided under the Schedule to The Limitation Act, 1963, we
are of the view that the plaint should be rejected for absence of
a cause of action, and being barred by law under Order VII Rule
11 (d) of the C.P.C. on the other legal premise as discussed
above.
Conclusion:
60. We do not find any scope for interference with the
impugned order dated 30.10.2023 allowing the application filed
by the respondent Nos.1-5/defendant Nos.2-6 for rejection of
the plaint. We have already opined that the reasons given by
the Trial Court in allowing the application under Order VII Rule
11 (d) of the C.P.C ought to have been better articulated. A
judgement can be upheld albeit for different or supplemental
reasons: M.T. Khan Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh16. This
however would not operate as a basis to set aside the impugned
order since we have given our independent reasons as to why
the appellant’s plaint should anyway have been rejected on
failing to disclose a cause of action against the respondents and
being barred by law. The defence taken by the appellant under
section 31 of The Specific Relief Act, 1963, authorising a person
to sue for cancellation of a written instrument as void or
16
(2004) 2 SCC 267
27
MB,J & MGP,J
A.S.No.19 f 2024voidable, loses relevance in the face of the bar under section 19
of the very same Act. Thus, we find no merit in the Appeal.
61. A.S.No.19 of 2024 is accordingly dismissed. Interim
orders, if any, shall stand dismissed. All connected applications
are disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
__________________________________________
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
________________________________
M.G. PRIYADARSINI, J
Date: 10.01. 2025
Note: L.R. Copy to be marked
VA/BMS