Sri H K Krishnegowda vs The State Of Karnataka on 11 June, 2025

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Karnataka High Court

Sri H K Krishnegowda vs The State Of Karnataka on 11 June, 2025

Author: S.G.Pandit

Bench: S.G.Pandit

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

       DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF JUNE 2025

                     PRESENT

        THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. G. PANDIT
                        AND
        THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF


       WRIT PETITION NO.28694/2024 (S-KSAT)

BETWEEN:

SRI H.K. KRISHNEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
S/O H.B. KOTEGOWDA
RETIRED CHIEF ENGINEER
NOW R/AT NO.16, 2ND MAIN
5TH BLOCK, KUMARA PARK WEST
BENGALURU-560020.
                                       ... PETITIONER
(BY SRI.RANGANATH S JOIS, ADV.)


AND:

  1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
     REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
     DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL &
     ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS
     VIDHANA SOUDHA
     BENGALURU-560001.

  2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
     REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
     PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT
                                  2




     VIKASA SOUDHA
     BENGALURU- 560001.
                                              ...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI VIKAS ROJIPURA, AGA FOR R1 & R2)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
CALL FOR THE RECORDS RELATING THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DATED 25.09.2024 MADE IN A.NO.3279/2024
PASSED BY THE KSAT BENGALURU VIDE ANNEXURE-A
PERUSE AND QUASH THE SAID THE ORDER AS BEING
ARBITRARY ILLEGAL AND ERRONEOUS AND VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE 14 AND 16 (1) AND ALSO THE ORDERS
CHALLENGED IN A.NO.3279/2024 AND ALLOW THE SAID
APPLICATION BY GRANTING THE RELIEF SOUGHT FOR
THEREIN AND ETC.

THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDER ON 02.06.2025 COMING ON THIS
DAY, S.G.PANDIT J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
and
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE T.M.NADAF
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CAV ORDER
(PER: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT)

This writ petition filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India is directed against order dated

25.09.2024 in Application No.3279/2024 passed by

the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at

Bengaluru (for short “the Tribunal”), rejecting

petitioner’s prayer to quash the charge memo dated

20.02.2021.

2. The brief facts of the case are that:

The petitioner is a retired Chief Engineer of the

Public Works Department. He retired on 31.05.2021

on attaining the age of superannuation. It is the case

of the petitioner that subsequent to his retirement,

charge memo dated 20.02.2021 was served upon him

on 06.07.2024. Further, the petitioner would state

that the charge memo dated 20.02.2021

(Annexure-A1) relates to the period between
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03.07.2000 to 24.04.2003. Hence, the petitioner

contends that the charge memo is liable to be set

aside on the ground that the same is barred by Rule

214 of Karnataka Civil Service Rules (for short

“KCSRs”) and also that the department could not have

initiated enquiry belatedly i.e., after 18 years.

3. On the above stated ground, the petitioner was

before the Tribunal in Application No.3279/2024 and

the Tribunal under impugned order rejected the

prayer of the petitioner holding that Rule 214 of

KCSRs would not assist the petitioner and also holding

that it is not a case for quashing the Articles of

Charge. Questioning the said order of the Tribunal,

the petitioner is before this Court in this writ petition.

4. Heard learned counsel Sri.Ranganath Jois for

petitioner through video conference and learned AGA
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Sri.Vikas Rojipura for respondents. Perused the entire

writ petition papers.

5. Learned counsel Sri.Ranganath Jois would

contend that the charge memo dated 20.02.2021 was

served upon the petitioner only on 06.07.2024 much

subsequent to petitioner’s retirement on 31.05.2021.

Learned counsel placing reliance on Rule 214 of

KCSRs would contend that since the incident on which

the charge memo issued relates to the years 2000 to

2003, the charge memo is barred by Rule 214 of

KCSRs, since no enquiry could be initiated against a

retired Government servant in respect of an incident

that had taken place more than 4 years prior to his

retirement.

6. Nextly, learned counsel Sri.Ranganath Jois

contends that initiation of enquiry in respect of an

incident which alleged to have taken place between
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the years 2000 to 2003 is impermissible. As there is

unexplained inordinate delay in initiating enquiry, the

charge memo requires to be quashed. Learned

counsel would submit that there is no explanation for

delay of more than 18 years in initiating enquiry either

in the charge memo or in the statement of objections

filed before the Tribunal. It is contended that delay in

initiating enquiry has prejudiced the defense of the

petitioner. As the delay is not explained, the

petitioner would be entitled for the relief as prayed.

7. Per contra, learned AGA Sri.Rojipura would

submit that the contention that the charge memo is

barred by Rule 214 of KCSRs is untenable in the facts

and circumstances of the case. He submits that the

charge memo is dated 20.02.2021 and the charge

memo was despatched for service on the petitioner

while he was in service. He submits that the date of

issuance of charge memo would be relevant and not
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the date of service. Thus, learned AGA would pray for

rejection of the said contention. Further, learned AGA

would submit that no charge memo could be quashed

as the charge memo itself would not give cause of

action to come before this Court. The petitioner would

not become an aggrieved person only on issuance of

charge memo unless consequential order is passed

imposing any punishment. Further, he submits that

the petitioner would get an opportunity in the enquiry

to defend his case, as such he prays for dismissal of

the writ petition.

8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

and on perusal of the writ petition papers, the

following points would arise for consideration:

(a) Whether the charge memo dated

20.02.2021 is barred by Rule 214 of KCSRs?

(b) Whether the charge memo dated

20.02.2021 suffers from inordinate delay and latches?
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(c) Whether the impugned order of the

Tribunal requires interference?

9. It is not in dispute that the petitioner retired

from service on attaining the age of superannuation

on 31.05.2021. Prior to his retirement, charge memo

dated 20.02.2021 (Annexure-A1) was issued to the

petitioner, but the same was alleged to be served on

the petitioner only on 06.07.2024, subsequent to his

retirement. The relevant date for determining

whether the charge memo is barred by Rule 214 of

KCSRs is the date of issuance and not the date of

service of charge memo. The Tribunal, in the

impugned order has observed that Articles of Charge

was issued on 20.02.2021 and it was sent through

Registered Post to the address furnished by the

applicant to his residence and the same was returned

back with postal endorsement “incomplete

address”, though it was addressed to the address
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furnished by the petitioner. If the charge memo dated

20.02.2021 was sent through registered post while th

e petitioner was in service, it would mean that charge

memo/charge sheet was issued to the petitioner while

in service itself. Rule 214 of KCSRs would not permit

initiation of enquiry against a retired person for an

incident which had taken place more than 4 years

prior to the date of issuance of charge memo. Rule-

214 of KCSRs would not come to the aid of petitioner

since charge memo is issued while the petitioner was

in service.

10. A co-ordinate bench of this Court in

W.P.NO.12920/2022 (SRI.ANIL GANAPATI

SANKOLLI VS. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND

OTHERS), placing reliance on the decision of the

Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (1993) 3 SCC 196 in

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Vs. H.C.

KHURANA, wherein the word ‘issue’ is interpreted
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held that date of despatch would be the relevant date

has held as follows:

“The Hon’ble Apex Court in H.C.
KHURANA
case cite supra was considering and
interpreted the word ‘issue’ in the matter of
issuance of charge memo in a departmental
proceedings. The relevant portion as held by
the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 13, 14
and 15 reads as follows :-

“13. It will be seen that in Jankiraman
also, emphasis is on the stage when ‘a
decision has been taken to initiate the
disciplinary proceedings’ and it was
further said that ‘to deny the said benefit
(of promotion), they must be at the
relevant time pending at the stage when
charge-memo/charge-sheet has already
been issued to the employee’. The word
‘issued’ used in this context in
Jankiraman it is urged by learned
counsel for the respondent, means
service on the employee. We are unable
to read Jankiraman in this manner. The
context in which the word ‘issued’ has
been used, merely means that the
decision to initiate disciplinary
proceedings is taken and translated into
action by despatch of the charge-sheet
leaving no doubt that the decision had
been taken. The contrary view would
defeat the object by enabling the
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government servant, if so inclined, to
evade service and thereby frustrate the
decision and get promotion in spite of
that decision. Obviously, the contrary
view cannot be taken.

14. ‘Issue’ of the charge-sheet in
the context of a decision taken to initiate
the disciplinary proceedings must mean,
as it does, the framing of the charge-
sheet and taking of the necessary action
to despatch the charge-sheet to the
employee to inform him of the charges
framed against him requiring his
explanation; and not also the further fact
of service of the charge-sheet on the
employee. It is so, because knowledge to
the employee of the charges framed
against him, on the basis of the decision
taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings,
does not form a part of the decision
making process of the authorities to
initiate the disciplinary proceedings, even
if framing the charges forms a part of
that process in certain situations. The
conclusions of the Tribunal quoted at the
end of para 16 of the decision in
Jankiraman which have been accepted
thereafter in para 17 in the manner
indicated above, do use the word ‘served’
in conclusion No.(4), but the fact of
‘issue’ of the charge-sheet to the
employee is emphasised in para 17 of
the decision. Conclusion No.(4) of the
Tribunal has to be deemed to be
accepted in Jankiraman only in this
manner.

15. The meaning of the word
‘issued’, on which considerable stress
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was laid by learned counsel for the
respondent, has to be gathered from the
context in which it is used. Meanings of
the ‘word issue’ given in the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary include ‘to give
exit to; to send forth, or allow to pass
out; to let out; …. to give or send out
authoritatively or officially; to send forth
or deal out formally or publicly-, to emit,
put into circulation’. The issue of a
charge-sheet, therefore, means its
despatch to the government servant, and
this act is complete the moment steps
are taken for the purpose, by framing
the charge-sheet and despatching it to
the government servant, the further fact
of its actual service on the government
servant not being a necessary part of its
requirement. This is the sense in which
the word ‘issue’ was used in the
expression ‘charge-sheet has already
been issued to the employee’, in para 17
of the decision in Jankiraman.”

The above decision makes it abundantly clear
that when a charge memo/charge sheet is
issued, the date of issue would be the date of
despatch of such charge memo/charge sheet.
The issuance of charge memo would be
complete, the moment steps are taken for the
purpose of despatch, despatching it to the
Government Servant.”

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In view of the above, there is no merit in the

contention of the petitioner that the charge memo

dated 20.02.2021 is barred by Rule 214 of KCSRs.

Accordingly, point No.1 is answered in the negative.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further

contended that the charge memo/charge sheet suffers

from inordinate delay. A perusal of the charge memo

dated 20.02.2021 (Annexure-A1) indicates that the

charge memo is issued in respect of an incident

alleged to have taken place between 03.07.2000 to

24.04.2003 when the petitioner was working as

Executive Engineer, Panchayat Raj Engineering

Division, Chikkamagaluru. The charge memo itself

indicates that the Audit Team from Accountant

General Office had pointed out the lapses in its

Inspection Report for the period between 2005-2008

in respect of the irregularities in awarding work

contract. But the enquiry is initiated only in the year
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2021 by issuing show-cause notice/charge memo

dated 20.02.2021. There is 18 years delay in

initiating enquiry from the date of the incident and

more than 13 years delay from the date of audit

report.

12. The delay prejudices the petitioner. There is no

explanation for delay in initiating the enquiry either in

the charge memo or in the statement of objections

filed before the Tribunal. The delay in initiating the

enquiry definitely affects the defense of the petitioner

or the petitioner would not be in a position to defend

his case by placing on record the cogent materials.

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decisions

has held that the delinquent employee has a right that

disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded

expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental

agony and also monetary loss when enquiry is

unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part
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in delaying the proceedings. Further the Hon’ble Apex

Court has observed that the delay in initiating enquiry

vitiates the disciplinary proceedings. The delay

always prejudices the case of either side. Further,

interfering with the charge memo/charge sheet at the

initial stage depends on the facts and circumstances of

each case. However, in the instant case, there is no

explanation for the delay in initiating enquiry.

Moreover, the petitioner has retired from service on

attaining the age of superannuation.

14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent decision

reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 693 in the case of

AMRESH SHRIVASTAVA v/s STATE OF MADHYA

PRADESH AND OTHERS was considering the

question as to whether inordinate unexplained delay in

issuance of charge sheet (14 years) would in itself be

a ground for quashing the charge sheet issued. The
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Hon’ble Apex Court, at paragraphs 17 and 18 has held

as under:

“17. As to the second question, regarding
whether delay is a ground for stopping the
departmental proceedings at the stage of the
chargesheet itself, suffice it to say that this
varies from case to case. However, in the
instant case where there is unexplained
inordinate delay in initiating departmental
proceedings despite the alleged misconduct
being within the knowledge of the department,
but still no departmental proceedings are
initiated, the answer must go in favour of the
employee. However, there may be cases
where the department was not even aware of
such irregularities or the misconduct, which is
of such a nature that it is indicative, based on
material considerations of factors other than
merit, such as extraneous influences and
gratifications. In such cases, such a delay, by
itself would not be a valid ground to scuttle the
initiation of the process of departmental
proceedings.

18. Reference in this regard can be
made to the decision of this Court in State of
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Madhya Pradesh V. Bani Singh, wherein the
court noted that there was no reason to
interfere with the quashing as the disciplinary
proceedings were initiated after 12 years of
delay. A reference should also be made to the
decision of this Court in P.V.Mahadevan v.
MD, T.N.Housing Board
, where it has been
reiterated that continuing the departmental
proceedings after an undue delay would be
unjust, causing unnecessary mental distress
and damaging the reputation of the employee
for the mistakes committed by the department
in initiating departmental proceedings.”

15. The Tribunal under the impugned order failed to

consider the prejudice that would be caused to the

petitioner that too when he retired from service on

attaining the age of superannuation in enquiring the

subject matter relating to the years 2000 to 2003.

16. For the reasons recorded above, the petitioner

has succeeded on the second ground of delay in

initiating the enquiry canvassed by the learned
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counsel for the petitioner. Accordingly point No.2

and 3 are answered in affirmative, in favour of

petitioner. Hence, the following order:

The writ petition is allowed. The order dated

25.09.2024 in Application No.3279/2024 passed by

the Tribunal is quashed. Application No.3279/2024 is

allowed and consequently, charge memo bearing No.

¹D¸ÀÄE 08 EªÀÄÄ« dated 20.02.2021 (Annexure-A1)

issued by the State Government is quashed.

Sd/-

(S.G.PANDIT)
JUDGE

Sd/-

(T.M.NADAF)
JUDGE

MPK
CT: bms



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